

THE NAVY

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THE JOURNAL OF THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA



**LIGHT FLEET CARRIERS FOR
AUSTRALIA – A NO BRAINER**

**ANZACS IN
CRETE**

**CRITICAL MASS: PLANNING
FOR A CAPABLE AND
RESILIENT WARTIME RAN**

**AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC
APPROACH TO PROTECTION
OF TRADE SHIPPING**

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Front cover:

HMAS TOOWOOMBA during ASWEX 25. ASWEX is the annual, Navy led, joint enabled Field Training Exercise (FTX) primarily focused on Under Sea Warfare (USW) and enabled by the RAAF and Five Eye partner nations. ASWEX25 was conducted on the West Coast of Australia. HMA Ships HOBART, WARRAMUNGA, TOOWOOMBA, ARUNTA, STUART and CHOULES formed a Task Group and conducted high-end anti-submarine warfighting training. Royal New Zealand Air Force P-8s (5 Squadron), RAN Fleet Air Arm 808 and 816 Squadron and RAAF platforms supported the exercise. (LSIS Iggy Roberts)

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New Kids on the Block

The previous issue (Apr-Jun) was due to come out before the Federal election and to set out the Defence manifestoes of the major parties. In the event, publishing was delayed and *THE NAVY* did not reach newsagents, subscribers, and members until after the election.

The election was a missed opportunity, as far as an adequate debate on Defence and energy was concerned. The only Defence manifesto – if one can call it that – was by the Greens, who were also soundly defeated in the election.

Many commentators describe the election as “the worst they have seen,” with most criticism reserved for the (on-off-on) LNP – who failed to raise their game or land any substantive blows. A Parliamentary democracy relies on an effective and competent opposition. As John Howard apparently observed: “the voter is always right.” The ALP has a thumping parliamentary majority belying the fact it achieved about 1/3 of the primary vote. A reversal – to some extent – of the Voice result. We are living in precarious, dangerous, and uncertain times – when national security should have ranked at least as high as social security in the election debate. It did not.

Maintaining a bi-partisan approach, *Directed Telescope* this issue, addresses what a second-term Defence budget and policies (including energy) could look like. It examines the recent PLAN Surface Action Group as an exemplar, and the brief, spurious debate (labelled as *gender wars*) on the role of women on the front line – between the LNP and ALP, Andrew Hastie, and Jennifer Parker. As with the energy (reliables & renewables) debate, at some stage there may need to be an examination of male and female roles in Defence and the limits/impositions of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion – by outcomes rather than opportunities.

Paper 1 this issue is by Chief Petty Officer (RAN) Peter Cannon, entitled *Critical Mass: Planning for a Capable and Resilient Wartime RAN*. This paper is an essential lead into papers two and three, dealing with the roles of “a wartime Royal Australian Navy... contesting [an] adversary attempts at power projection through Australia’s northern approaches by sea denial, protecting economic sea lines of communication, and contributing to allied formations fighting for control of the Indo-Pacific”. With his years of experience and technical knowledge of Navy, Peter makes some excellent points about what a war *en masse* might look like, and how the ADF / RAN might cope. He concludes, perhaps optimistically:

The RAN’s role... is to safeguard Australia’s enormous and widely under-appreciated maritime interests. In war, this equates to fighting and winning at sea – but assuming this can be achieved in the event of a major, prolonged war in the Indo-Pacific without



Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) flies over INS VIKRANT (R 11) 2023. Image Indian Navy.

suffering losses is naïve. Only increased numbers can alleviate force hollowness with peacetime crewing concerns mitigated through adoption of a rotating pool of reserve platforms, such a scheme being strengthened by the inclusion of rapidly maturing USV technology. Such a mobilisation reserve... would provide the RAN with scalable mobilisation options... [and] a resilient wartime navy able to positively shape the future maritime, and thus economic, security the nation depends on.

Paper 2 is an updated version of longstanding contributor Kelvin Curnow, entitled *Light Fleet Carriers for Australia - a no brainer* (see *THE NAVY*, Vol 78, No. 2, Apr-Jun 2016). Noting changes to design limiting the operations of F-35B *Lightning II*, Kelvin observes that: “Australia has either overspent on an unnecessarily large design, or underspent so that the ships cannot offer the full range of capabilities in any future high order conflict”. This appears to be the case today, with the LHD relegated to ferry duties and not featuring, or only marginally so, in the current Navy Order of Battle. Something it is sensed, that may align with ALP Defence thinking. Such as it is. Curnow concludes:

Plans already exist within Defence HQ and with Navantia, the ships’ design authority and builder, to enable F-35B operations from Australia’s LHDs. Japanese, Singaporean, Italian, USMC, or Royal Navy F-35Bs could utilize Australia’s LHDs for coalition operations, reinforcing the principle that we are stronger together than apart.

The third paper, *Australian Strategic Approach to Protection of Trade Shipping* by Captain Christopher Skinner RAN (Ret) – Essay competition, third prize, professional entry – provides a natural segue to papers 1 and 2. Noting an integral component of Australia’s maritime and integrated joint force for operations in our immediate region to ensure the safety and security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade... [Chris asks] “what is the scope of safety and security of sea lines of communication and maritime trade?” Quoting the 2024 enhanced lethality surface combat fleet report and the national defence strategy [1-4], Skinner ends by asking the unresolved question:

...how will Australia’s Defence Force exercise the defence of Sea Lines of Communication over the broad extent of trade shipping routes between Australia and the northern hemisphere and how will the vast number of shipping movements be protected?



JS IZUMO Strikes F-35B Below during 2024 Trials off San Diego (Image JMSDF).



USS ESSEX (LHD-2) Exercises Strike Capabilities employing F-35B During Transit of Gulf of Aden (Image USN).

Concluding pessimistically, Skinner notes that “protection... from coercion has not been assured.” In this case, the assurances necessary to fight and win against any peer or near peer aggressor in our region. If necessary, alone – or at distance from close Allies, be they Japan, India, or the U.S.

The final paper is by Commander Walter Burroughs RAN (Ret) – essay competition, third prize, non-professional entry – entitled *Anzacs in Crete*, which traces the Island’s history from classical times, to the 20th Century, WWI, between world wars, WW2 to the modern age. The author writes with affection for the island, and Greek / Australian connections – noting from “early times Crete flourished owing to its position between the European mainland, the Near East and North Africa – [later controlling] entry to Suez and its important link to the Far East.” It could be argued, Crete, globalisation and good order at sea are all synonymous – when one falters, all falter. As the author notes “Souda Bay remains naturally protected from storms [providing] the bastion of NATO forces in the region; [occupying a] unique strategic position – just as important today as it was in centuries past.”

WE HAVE A VOICE

When writing defence strategy or operational plans, it is often forgotten that “the enemy gets a vote” as to what happens or what unravels. Meaning, as some Army observers would have it, that “no plan survives first contact” – thereafter everything changes. Attributed to Eisenhower, is the observation “that the value is in the planning; not the plan.” Indicating three things:

- An effective Defence Force needs to value and have in place the authorities, standards, processes, capacity, stockpiles, reserves, and mechanisms for effective planning, designing, preparing, building, and decision making;
- Plans need to adapt quickly as circumstances change – providing also for resilience and the contingent capacity (like a shock absorber) to bounce back;
- Decision Takers – the *10 percenters* – need to be able to take timely, informed decisions, if an organisation is to adapt, survive, and change, agilely.

Planning essentially provides the structure (including doctrine) necessary for adaptation, and agile decision taking. In his book *Ukraine: lessons of battle and lessons of war* (see book review), Chris Donnelly concludes, *inter alia*:

1. The global rules-based order (GRBO) established in 1945 is under existential threat.
2. Many widespread models, practices and procedures of national governance are no longer appropriate or adequate.

3. Very few western democracies have governments, societies, or armed [defence] forces, which are in any way prepared.
4. The principles governing the use of armed [defence] forces do not seem to have changed much – at most, new technologies may give greater significance to some principles than in previous wars.
5. Most democracies have forgotten the importance of mass as a prerequisite of their ability to fight a war against a peer enemy.
6. The Global West across Government needs to learn to adapt quickly if it is to restore productivity to its economies and preparedness to its armed [defence] forces.
7. Western democracies are already at war – not merely the war which Putin insists he is engaged in against the west – “but a situation tantamount to war brought about by the extent, depth, and speed of global change.”

Unlike Communist, illiberal, no limits regimes – western democracies have a voice. They need not be helpless and can change, and adapt – remarkably quickly. That, though, is down to the quality of its younger generations – the *Millennials* and *Gen Z* (b 1990-2004; 2005-2019), now coming into the ADF and beginning to take on senior positions. They are different, they think differently – nor have they been as blessed with opportunities as previous generations. They have also lived through 911 and its after effects: the Global Financial Crisis; the Global Recession, the long wars of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, in addition to COVID and the breakdown of the GRBO – as exemplified by China’s actions in the South China Sea and against Taiwan, Russia-Ukraine, Hamas-Israel, and the Trump imposition of tariffs.

A global rules-based order relies on Globalisation, which in turn relies on freedom of navigation (as expressed in UNCLOS). Remove or threaten freedom of navigation, and you have neither globalisation nor a GRBO...

We have a fabulous new *great generation* emerging – who, the editor senses, are capable of great things. They are finding their voice and will – given time and support – assist in the rebuild of a better world. One *hopefully* assisted not dominated by AI – although “hope is not a plan!” In this regard, *THE NAVY* alongside the NLA (see *statement of policy*) is fully aligned with Navy’s theme for the *Sea Power Conference* (INDOPAC) 2025 – which the NLA will be attending in force – that:

Strength at Sea = Security and Prosperity at Home

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For the maintenance of the Maritime wellbeing of the nation. The Navy League is intent upon keeping before the Australian people the fact that we are a maritime nation and that a strong Navy and capable maritime industry are elements of our national wellbeing and vital to the freedom of Australia. The League seeks to promote Defence self-reliance by actively supporting defence manufacturing, research, cyberspace, shipping, transport, and other relevant industries.

Through geographical necessity Australia's prosperity, strength, and safety depend to a great extent upon the security of the surrounding seas and island areas, and on unrestricted seaborne trade.

The strategic background to Australia's security is changing and, in many respects, has become much less certain following increasing tensions, particularly in East Asia involving major powers, and in Europe and the Middle East. The League believes that Australia should rapidly increase the capability to defend itself, paying particular attention to maritime defence.

The Navy League:

- Believes Australia can be defended against attack and that the prime requirement of our defence is an evident ability to control the sea and air space around us and to contribute to defending essential lines of sea, undersea and air communication with our Allies and trading partners.
- Supports a continuing strong alliance with Five Eyes, AUKUS, QUAD, FPDA, and ANZUS partners.
- Supports close relationships with all nations in our general area particularly PNG, Indonesia, the Philippines and the South Pacific Island States.
- Advocates the acquisition of the most capable modern armaments, surveillance systems, sensors, and decision support to ensure decisive advantage over forces in our general area.
- Advocates a strong deterrent element in the ADF.
- Believes the ADF must be capable of protecting commercial shipping both within Australian waters and beyond, in conjunction with allies.
- Endorses the development of the capability for the patrol and surveillance of all of Australia's ocean areas, its island territories and the Southern Ocean.
- Supports Government initiatives for rebuilding an Australian commercial fleet capable of supporting the ADF and the carriage of essential cargoes to and from Australia in times of conflict.
- Supports Government intention to increase maritime preparedness and increase defence expenditure to 3% of GDP.
- Urges the strength and capabilities of the Army (including particularly the Army Reserve) and Air Force be enhanced, and the weaponry, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyberspace and electronic capabilities of the ADF be increased, including an expansion in its UAS, UAV capability.
- The Navy League believes maritime Defence requires a joint integrated endeavour across Navy, Army and Air Force.
- Considers that the level of both the offensive and defensive capabilities of the RAN should be strengthened, in particular with a further increase in the number of proposed replacement surface combatants noting the need to ensure essential fuel and other supplies, and the many other essential maritime tasks.
- Recommends bringing forward the start date of the destroyer replacement program to both strengthen the RAN and mitigate the local industry capability gap.
- Recommends the urgent replacement and increase in numbers of the current mine-countermeasure force.
- Strongly supports the early acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.
- Recommends very early action to provide a strategic submarine base on the Eastern seaboard and further development of Western Australia facilities.
- Notes the potential combat effectiveness and flexibility of the STOVL version of the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35B Lightning II) and supports further examination of its application within the ADF through the LHDs.
- Supports the development of Australia's defence industry, including strong research and design organisations capable of the construction and maintenance of all warships, submarines, and support vessels in the Navy's order of battle, and welcomes the Government decision to provide a stable and continuous shipbuilding program.
- Advocates the retention in maintained reserve of operationally capable ships that are required to be paid off for resource or other economic reasons.
- Supports a strong and identifiable Naval Reserve with consideration as to remobilising the Port Divisions in support of securing the maritime and homeland base.
- Promotes and supports the Australian Navy Cadets organisation.
- Advocates urgent Government research and action to remedy the reported serious naval recruiting and retention problem.

As to the RAN, the League, while noting vital national peacetime tasks conducted by Navy, including border protection, flag showing/diplomacy, disaster relief, maritime rescue, hydrography and aid to the civil power:

- Supports the maintenance of a Navy capable of effective action in hostilities and advocates a build-up of the fleet and its afloat support elements to ensure that, in conjunction with the Army and RAAF, this can be sustained against any force which could be deployed in our area of strategic interest.

The League:

- Calls for a bipartisan political approach to national defence with a commitment to a steady long-term build-up in Australia's defence capability including the required industrial infrastructure.
- Believes that, given leadership by successive governments, Australia can defend itself in the longer term, within acceptable financial, economic and manpower parameters



A Chinese Carrier Battle Group exercising at sea. The next PLA-N circumnavigation of Australia could be by a CBG. Will that wake the Government up from its slumber?

STRENGTH NEVER INVITED AGGRESSION

Minister for Defence, The Hon. Richard Marles (who actually demands to be addressed as Deputy Prime Minister and not Defence Minister), has stated many times that “we live in the most dangerous strategic times since the Second World War”. On that we agree, for the year 2027 is looming as the year of conflict in the Indo-Pacific with China. There are many reasons for this:

1. **PLA Modernisation** – Chinese President Xi Jinping has set a goal for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to become a “modern military” by 2027. This milestone is seen as a key step in China's military readiness. Originally it had been 2030, but Xi brought it forward unexpectedly.
2. **100th Anniversary of the PLA** – 2027 marks the centennial of the PLA's founding, which some analysts believe could be a symbolic moment for China to demonstrate its military strength.
3. **Strategic Assessments** – Many military analysts around the Pacific rim have suggested that China is preparing to be ready for a potential invasion of Taiwan by 2027, citing its buildup of fighter aircraft, warships and long-range missile inventories.
4. **Aggressive Grey Zone tactics** - Aggressive grey zone operations i.e. just short of kinetic or warlike operations, have steadily increased. These are no doubt designed to not only coerce and gain a psychological edge but also act as a covert means of reconnaissance and intelligence gathering.
5. **Taiwan's Defence Planning** – Taiwan itself has identified 2027 as a potential year for a Chinese invasion in its military drills, reflecting growing concerns about Beijing's intentions.
6. **Political Timing** – The year 2027 will coincide with the 21st Party Congress in China, where Xi Jinping is expected to secure his fourth term as leader, which will make him China's longest serving leader, surpassing Mao. Additionally, Taiwan's next presidential election will be approaching, which could influence Beijing's strategy.

With this in mind, the window to rapidly acquire capabilities in the form of new or more existing platforms Australia will need to rely on for its security and survival is almost closed (30 months left). This should not however, be seen as an ‘it's all too late’ moment. There are many ways Australia can still elevate its military capability.

The recent example of our *Hobart-class* destroyers being fitted with new weapons such as NSM, SM-6 and Tomahawk is a good demonstration of how we can boost our existing capability quickly. Other options such as NSM fitted to Seahawks (which its cleared for) or the air launched version of the SM-6, known as AIM-174B, for our Super Hornets could be game changers. RAM missile launchers, and lots of them, in place of Phalanx could also allow for a more survivable and thus capable surface fleet. Other initiatives could include rapid off the shelf purchases of existing capabilities.

Doing this is designed to make our enemy believe that aggression is the least attractive of all alternatives.

To illustrate, cast your mind back to our strategic landscape in 1941. Now imagine if Australia had prepared its maritime defence for the obvious coming conflict several years before with:

- A British *Illustrious-class* aircraft carrier (with 36 aircraft)
- four *Kent-class* heavy cruisers (HMAS AUSTRALIA plus three more)
- six *Leander-class* light cruisers (SYDNEY, PERTH, HOBART plus three more)
- 10 *V-class* destroyers (VAMPIRE and VENDETTA plus eight more) and
- six British *Sealion-class* submarines.

If Australia had possessed a much stronger navy, it would have altered Japan's strategic calculations and possibly affected the start and course of the war in the Pacific. Here are some key ways this could have played out in Tokyo:



A NSM missile fitted to a Seahawk helicopter. The NSM has been certified for use from Seahawk. However, no navy that uses Seahawks and NSM has commenced the necessary integration work to certify its use. NSM from a Seahawk would extend the strike range of the RAN's fleet at sea. (Kongsberg Aust)

1. **Deterrence Against Expansion** – A formidable Australian navy might have forced Japan to reconsider its aggressive expansion in Southeast Asia. If Australia had been perceived as a major regional power with strong defensive capabilities, Japan would have hesitated to launch its campaign.
2. **Stronger Defence of Southeast Asia** – Australia could have played a bigger role in defending British colonies like Malaya and Singapore. A powerful navy could have supported Allied forces in resisting Japanese advances more effectively, possibly delaying or preventing key victories.
3. **Impact on the Attack on Pearl Harbour** – Japan launched the Pearl Harbor attack partly to neutralise the U.S. Pacific Fleet, ensuring it could expand unchallenged. If Australia had been a naval power, Japan might have needed to account for a second major fleet threatening its ambitions on its southern flank.
4. **Alternative War Strategy for Japan** – Instead of focusing on attacking Allied holdings in the Pacific, Japan might have had to allocate more resources to counter Australian forces. This could have changed its priorities or led to a different approach to conquest.
5. **Potential Shift in Alliances** – A stronger Australian military presence might have encouraged the United States or Britain to strengthen regional defences earlier, possibly altering how the Allies prepared for and fought the war.

While these are speculative scenarios, they show that Australia's military strength could have been a significant factor in shaping Japan's decision-making. An investment in peace always pays dividends in war.

Further, history is brimming with examples of how military strength could have averted conflict. One example is the German invasion of Norway during WW II. Germany perceived that Norway was ill-equipped and ill-prepared to defend its neutrality, making it vulnerable to a British invasion and thus presenting a northern flank and threat to its control of Europe.

Another more recent example includes the Falklands conflict of 1982. Had the UK deployed more military assets to the Islands earlier the Argentines would not have invaded.

Another example would be Kuwait's almost non-existent military standing allowing Saddam Hussein to invade, initiating the first Gulf War.

A strong and capable defence force is not a burden. It's the surest guarantee of peace, and at present that peace is looking less likely. As President Ronald Reagan famously said "Strength never invited aggression."

NEW LOOK

Readers will notice recent changes to *THE NAVY* format. This issue we have moved to a full colour production, something we aim to continue for all future issues, including for the 125th Anniversary of the commissioning of the Navy League of Australia, in November 2025.



March 1 1945, HMS ILLUSTRIOUS seen entering Captain Cook Drydock in Sydney. The addition of an aircraft carrier in the RAN order of battle pre 1941 could have altered the Pacific War.

ELECTION AFTERMATH

After the dust has settled from the election, and the promises tallied up, it will be interesting to see if any money is left for the defence of Australia. I suspect not much.

Both sides didn't even see Defence as an issue, despite the worsening strategic environment and the Chinese Navy using the east coast of Australia as a highway and 'yippee shoot' range. We can expect that to continue (heaven only knows what Chinese submarine activity is going on around our coastline).

The Liberal Party's polling had defence at number seven of voter priorities and regrettably adjusted their messaging accordingly. The announcement of more money for defence should not have been seen as a policy but a means to enact a policy. Details matter.

Under the current Government's plan, Australia will not achieve 3% of GDP spending on defence not only recommended and expected by Washington, but also every think tank and defence commentator in Australia. We'll be lucky to reach 2.3%.

However, we look forward to seeing if there is any new thinking or recalibration on spending to match the Minister's strategic warning rhetoric in this second term of government. ■

Mark Schweikert

President, Navy League of Australia

20 May 2025

president@navyleague.org.au



JOHN CHRISTOPHER JEREMY AM

4 JULY 1942 – 18 APRIL 2025

It is my sad duty to advise Readers and (NLA) Members that John Jeremy, much loved son of Joan (d) and Richmond Jeremy (d), brother of David (d) and Richmond (d), adored uncle of Annie, Robert, Mathew and Richmond and their families, and a long-standing member of the NLA, Vice President of the NLA NSW Division, Life Member, and past Federal Vice President died on Good Friday, 18 April after a short battle with cancer.

The NLA Federal President, Vice President, and NSW DIV President attended John's funeral on a bright, Sydney afternoon, in early May. The Service was packed – standing room only for those arriving late (on time was five minutes late in John's book). It was a sombre, sad, and yet also uplifting and joyous occasion. To learn so much about John but also, as the President observed afterwards, to appreciate how much John had given – never holding back his support for all his beloved organisations.

Commander Walter Burroughs RAN (Ret) author of paper 4, *ANZACS in Crete* (this issue) and long standing member of the Naval Historical Society, provided a most moving and eloquent eulogy – giving testimony to John's enduring love of the sea and those connected as sailors, on the oceans we serve. Eternal Father, Strong to Save echoed in the chapel, long after the last words were sung (*Glad hymns of praise from land and sea*).

John and his family was presented on behalf of the Fleet Commander, with a tricorn boxed Australian White Ensign and commemorative medallion. The Service was led by a Naval Chaplain – in the tradition of the naval service, without rank. As John might have thought fitting – “God has no rank.” The President laid a Navy League of Australia commemorative coin – the first to be printed (0001) – alongside John's AM, which was greatly appreciated by his surviving family.

John shared many careers and lives based upon his profession as a naval architect. He will be remembered for his time at Cockatoo Island, beginning in 1960 as an apprentice ship draughtsman and then qualifying as a naval architect at the University of New South Wales. He held several positions in the planning and technical area before being appointed Technical Director of the company in 1976. In 1978 he took responsibility for all production activities and was appointed Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Cockatoo Dockyard, from 1981 until it closed in 1991. He was instrumental in creating the current Cockatoo Island precinct – and argued long for operationally preserving the dock as a strategic asset. An argument that rings even truer today.

A Fellow of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA), John held numerous senior roles within the Institution both in Australia and internationally. He was a naval architect, shipbuilder, sailor, historian, editor, mentor, and leader whose contributions have left a lasting legacy in both the defence and commercial maritime sectors. John was editor par excellence of the RINA Australian Naval Architect, to which he contributed many of over 30,000 catalogued images of ships – John took personally over many years. The Jeremy family hopes to make the catalogue available to organisations such as the NLA in future years.

John was instrumental in the conception, growth, and ongoing success of the International Maritime Conference (IMC), serving as Chairman of the Organising Committee from 2002 to 2025. The IMC, held in conjunction with the Indo Pacific International Maritime Exposition and the Royal Australian Navy's Sea Power Conference (INDOPAC/IMC), has become the preeminent maritime forum in the region (see inside cover for INDOPAC/IMC 2025 details). It owes much of its standing to John's leadership and the strong partnership between the IMC Committee and the AMDA Foundation.

John made an enormous contribution to many organisations, including the Navy League of Australia, the Naval Historical Society of Australia, the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust, the Naval Officers Association, the Australia Day Regatta Committee, and the Sydney Amateur Sailing Club. John's passion for yachting is well documented in a Sydney Amateur Sailing Club podcast available at, <https://sasc.com.au/john-jeremy-am/>.

His relationship and competition with Mr Robert Otto Albert AO, the previous President of the NSW Division of the NLA who predeceased John in January 2024, was profound. Together they would race against each other as members of Royal Sydney Yacht Squadron (RSYS), and conspire new designs and systems for sailing, naval ships, and the Navy in the club house afterwards. John was instrumental in supporting Robert through some challenging times and taking forward the NLA and *THE NAVY* (the journal of the Navy League of Australia), following Robert's death. His advice and consistent support for his beloved Royal Australian Navy, and the NLA will be sorely missed. An expert across the board – his speeches and papers identified both strengths and weaknesses, a core view being that we should build plentiful grey ships (including tankers), in steel, in Australia. In order to survive in our hostile waters and defend our Girt adequately and effectively. If not built here, then fitted out appropriately – using Australian steel. Not the sub-standard steel found all too often in many RAN warships today.

A dear friend to so many in the Royal Australian Navy, the NLA, and the Sydney Amateur Sailing Club. John was a Naval architect, a shipbuilder, sailor, historian, author, editor, photographer, and mentor. A man of many lives, who lived life to the full. He brightened our lives with his quiet humour and enquiring mind. He will be remembered with much love.

One cannot help feel, that as John nears the Pearly Gates, he will already have sketched, photographed, catalogued, and brought the gates into class. To be seen advising St Peter (the fisherman and navigator) and St Barbara (the patron saint of architects, builders, and armourers) as to any substandard modifications, and the need to protect the steel from cathodic erosion. Heaven's gain is our loss – we benefited so much in the years you sailed with us as a servant leader. Thank you, John.

We will remember.

Mark Schweikert

President

The Navy League of Australia



THE NAVY Defence analysts correctly read the 2025 Election in terms of the likely victor – although not the size of the majority. They determined that the Liberal National Party (despite apparent offers to help write their Defence Policy, even late in the campaign):

...lacked substance and imagination – failing to address Defence's systemic lack of investment and failures, over the previous three decades. They would not deliver the DSR (IIP or NDS), although they may give ADF a better fighting chance by 2027.

Despite this apparently being a “khaki election” about national security – the opposition failed the country and Defence. At this time of growing existential threat (as identified by commentators across the political spectrum) it did not formulate a coherent policy on Defence (or anything). The LNP did not deserve to govern – the electorate said the same.

There was much a loyal, competent opposition should have said and done on Defence.

MORE OF THE SAME

Defence Minister Richard Marles and his Defence ministry failed to implement the DSR, NDS or IIP in their first term. Current ALP / Government Defence policies can be summarised as follows:

- Maintaining emphasis upon welfare and social security (the NDIS) largesse and a limited-vision (LV) strategy for Defence, while promoting:
 - (for the time being) AUKUS and marginalising (for factional and ideological reasons) the QUAD;
 - senior positions ideologically determined by DEL;
 - centralisation of control through Canberra, with the further dilution of the single-Services in favour of a “joint-ADF edifice.”
 - further cuts to the ADF public (and contracted) workforce – with an emphasis on cutting contracted support, in favour of the public service.
- Defence Spending in real terms – based on cuts and Defence Cost Inflation (DCI) – continuing to decline until 2027:
 - Noting no commitment to increasing to 2.5% GDP in the near term,
 - Defence spending (without further “one-off increases”) falling to 1.85% GDP in 2026-2027, before recovering above 2% in 2029-30, noting:
 - AUKUS becomes viable at 3% GDP, reached in 2034-2035.
 - underspends accelerating to \$2.0B in 27-28, before reducing when the Forward Estimates kick in, in 2028-2029.

- given the embarrassment of falling below Trumps 2% GDP, further emergency (“one-off”) injections of up to \$2.0B a year prior to the *Forwards Estimates* kicking in.

- pre-election commitments by Mr Marles to increase spending in the *Forward Estimates* (estimated at 10% pa) to 3% GDP in 2031 from 2028 are most unlikely.
 - Such a sustained increase (10% pa) may be unmanageable by Defence and politically unaffordable, in peacetime.
- Maintaining funding for the (increasingly hi-risk) \$4B *Collins-class* LOTE.
- Not prioritising the Tier-2 Frigate program of \$11B – announcement expected before December 2024.

The new factional and ideological-left admixture of the Government is also likely to put increased pressure on the timely delivery of AUKUS, if at all – while promoting renewables and net-zero. As the Government is finding out, the political energy economy is also about social and national security. The country will need a stable, reliable, affordable energy supply if it is to deliver AUKUS. Without coal and nuclear – this can only be delivered by Gas. Gas poses its own carbon, technological, and ideological challenges – and is a finite resource. Renewables, above 25-30% supply, create unsustainable upward pressure on energy prices and the environment – while reducing stability and reliability. Modern industry, like white goods, require a stable energy (frequency and voltage) supply – that renewables cannot deliver. Already, state Governments are pursuing the extension of coal-power generation, as a stop-gap.

The failure of the (occulting) LNP to address cost-of-living – driven significantly by energy prices, as inflated by renewable-energy costs – at the last election, through half-baked policies and nuclear throw-aways, may have done significant damage to Australia's economic, energy, and national security. Without a stable, affordable energy supply (which for all countries means generating a 70-75% admixture of coal and nuclear, supported by gas) there will not be a productive sovereign industrial base. Without a productive industrial base, there will not be the capabilities and funds necessary for national and social security (welfare and warfare). Put simply:

You can have net zero with nuclear (at 25% nuclear, coal and gas at 50%, and reliables at 25%) and a stable, reliable, affordable energy supply – with a productive, sustainable, competitive industrial base. You cannot have both a stable, reliable, affordable, net zero energy supply with a productive industrial base, without nuclear.

CHINESE SURFACE ACTION GROUP (SAG)

There are likely to be more Chinese PLAN SAG and spy vessels operating around Australian coasts in future years. The most recent forays into Australian waters should have been a good-news story for Defence. The vessels were apparently monitored throughout their journeys, and successful handovers achieved between navies. The high seas firings were also identified early as a possibility. All of this was seemingly available to Government in a timely way – but not acted upon. Nor, seemingly, did the Government ask Defence for advice until well after the story broke. The question is why? Three reasons might be suggested:

1. Incompetence of Defence Ministers, Defence Leadership, the Joint Operational Command, the single-Services, the ASD, ASIO, and the PM&C, DFAT, Treasury and the NSC;
2. Exacerbated by 1., a failure of the Ministers, Defence Leadership, the Joint Operational Command, the single-Services, the ASD, ASIO, and the PM&C, DFAT, Treasury and the NSC (potentially for factional reasons) to communicate (reach in / out for advice), or be able to listen to each other;
3. For ideological and factional reasons, the Government being unwilling and / or unable to listen to or reach out to the Minister(s) of Defence or ADF senior leadership for advice.

Setting aside cockup, each factor may have contributed. There are other reasons, including that Mr Richard Marles (perhaps factionally and ideologically excluded) is not seen to have fought for Defence, or been an effective Minister for Defence. From a Sino(CCP)-Australian perspective, the policies of the last Government may be characterised as Chinese-conciliatory – leaning towards appeasement. Previous ALP Governments (2007-2013) were anti-QUAD. The last Government, while not being anti, has not necessarily been pro – for example, some [DFAT] policies may not be seen as promoting Japanese Defence cooperation. Which might explain, in part, the delay of the Tier-2 Frigate proposal – for which the Japanese *Mogami-class* was Navy's clear recommendation. The PM's inner, factional



Mogami-class Warship JS MOGAMI (FFM 1) - Image JMSDF.



RAN Attack Team tackling on board fire.

cohort apparently includes Ms Penny Wong (DFAT), Mr Chris Bowen (Climate Change and Energy), and Senator Katy Gallagher (Finance, Women, and the APS). It does not include the DPM (and Minister for Defence), the Treasurer, or the Minister for "Defence Industry and Capability Delivery, International Development, and the Pacific." If that is the case, then 2. and 3. may apply – although there is always room for cockup.

Whatever way the SAG story broke, or did not break, does not reflect well on the previous Government, or Defence, and the relationship between the two – with ramifications for national security.

GOOD PEOPLE

There are good, competent ALP Ministers and MPs who understand and believe in Defence. The NLA and *THE NAVY* is strictly bi-partisan. Noting the absence of a debate on Defence in the Federal election, the following is offered on a bipartisan basis to the new Government:

1. Approve in 2025, the capital injection of \$10B over 15 years to obtain, build, and sustain F-35B as a carrier-borne element in RAN LHD (CANBERRA and ADELAIDE) – thereby restoring both ships to the combat Fleet.
2. Immediately approve the \$11.0B Tier 2 Frigate purchase of eleven *Mogami-class* frigates, 2026-2031.
3. Discontinue the expensive and hi-risk *Collins-class* Life of Type Extension (LOTE) and negotiate (as part of the *Mogami-class* acquisition) the purchase of six improved *Taigei-class* submarines, for introduction into service 2026-2031 – prior to *Virginia* and *AUKUS-class* acquisitions, 2032-2045.
4. Approve \$500M a year to each front-line commander (Navy for anti-access denial and minehunters), Army (for Littoral Manoeuvre Force), Air (for 6th Gen and

Ballistic Missile Air Defence), plus Joint Capability Group (for Cyber and Space) and Joint Operation Command (for a secondary HQ) to invest locally (on a state-by-state basis) as they see fit.

5. Reduce the Canberra impost of one-third to 20% of the Budget, or \$1.0 spent "in/by CBR" for every \$4.0 spent on Navy, Army, and Air Force.

The above measures, if implemented, would deliver 2.5% GDP by 2028-29, and 3% GDP by 2029-30. This would also provide the Government with:

- the means for negotiating from strategic strength, a back-down from nuclear-powered submarines (if not AUKUS Pillar 2), something ALP factions may support ideologically – while providing;
- A strengthened ADF, capable of fighting, thinking, and winning across any domain.

Note: none of the above – social and national security – will be available without stable, affordable, and reliable energy. Which will mean addressing the ALP "Bowen problem" – possibly by shuffling him off to a UN Job.

CREWING BY DIVERSITY, EQUITY, AND INCLUSION (DEI)

The election campaign provided a brief focus on the role of women on the frontline, picking up on comments made by a dropped Liberal candidate (that "women do not belong in combat") and, a 2018 interview with Andrew Hastie, that "the fighting DNA of close combat units is best preserved when exclusively male".

This brought an immediate response from the ALP "regarding the LNP and its women problem" including from commentators, such as Jennifer Parker (a retired senior RAN Officer and adjunct fellow of naval studies at UNSW Canberra (ADFA)). Writing in *The Australian*, 15 Apr 2025, Parker responded that "as of July 2024 10,000 women were serving in Ukrainian front line combat roles – try telling them (from the safety of an Australian lounge room) they don't belong".

It is possible that both Parker and Hastie are right – but this debate was never had during the election. Largely because any discussion on the matter was immediately labelled part of the "culture wars" and, thereby, misogynous. Even though failure to even consider the issue, may be suggested as misandry.

The term woman in the UK Equality Act refers to individuals with biological female characteristics, at birth

UK Supreme Court, 16 April 2025

The decision by the UK Supreme Court has ramifications for all Common Law countries, such as the U.S., Canada, Australia, and India. No sooner had the ink dried on the

decision, than it was apparent members of the UK Government, senior public servants, and institutions, were seeking to overturn the decision. This is dangerous ground – potentially, in the UK, setting the judiciary and the popular majority (who seemingly agree with the decision), against the executive and enforcement branches.

War is War

Parker may be right – but what is she arguing for?

Facts speak for themselves. Of the reported Ukrainian combat fatalities since 2021, 97.5% are male. Women make up about 20% of the "front line" forces (and ten percent of the Ukraine military). Applying these percentages, women may be twice as likely to serve on the front line, and 150 times less likely to be killed in combat, than male servicemen. The figures are not dissimilar for *The Guardian* and *BBC* reporting of UK combat fatalities (and injuries) during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Except then, 98.5% of fatalities were male – meaning women (despite being twice as likely to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan than men) – were over 250 times less likely to be killed than their male colleagues.

Parker is correct to say that women are indispensable to filling front-line roles in the ADF and elsewhere – and, given the specialist roles often performed by women (in communications, operating bases / HQs, logistics, and medical support) the ADF could not fight without them.

Hastie was referring to combat roles – not front-line roles – a distinction Parker chose not to address. Instead concluding, the argument is "part of faux culture wars" and "the fighting DNA of a warship is strengthened not weakened by diversity of all kinds – including gender." The front line may indeed be strengthened by diversity of all kinds – but this may not apply to "combat DNA," where males and females may not be the same. If it was, then how can a woman serving on the front line be between 150-250 times less likely to die in combat, than her male colleague? Here the argument may descend into the specious. No one in their right mind wants to see people killed in combat, just to make an intellectual point for an Australian lounge room.

Fire at Sea

If one considers a fire (or flood) at sea tackled by a three-person attack crew – the aim is to deal with the fire/flood in the first vital 10 minutes. [1, 2]

In terms of absolute strength, without regard for body size, weight, or composition – the average man tends to be considerably stronger than the average woman. Specifically, the absolute total-body strength of women has been reported as being roughly 67% that of men.

If we assume the combined effort by a three-person male team is 300, then that for two men and a woman may be 267. If 10 minutes requires the full effort of a three-man team – then a two-man, one woman team will require 11 minutes 15 seconds to expend the same effort. Noting the BONHOMME RICHARD – time, tide, fire and flood wait for none. [1, 2]

In terms of respiration, women under physical loading – due largely to lung size – have a 31% higher respiration rate than men. Considering the three-person attack team, if they are all on breathing apparatus, this typically gives up to 15 minutes air-time. When the whistle sounds, all members of the team withdraw and the next three-person team goes in. Noting the higher breathing rate of women under load, potentially they may exhaust their supply in 10 Minutes 20 seconds. Necessitating a withdrawal of the team then, rather than at fifteen minutes.

In tackling a major fire, the intent is to maintain a continuous attack. An all-male fire party may require 4 teams (of 12 persons) per hour. An attack party comprising one or more women, might require 6 attack teams, and 18 people – to sustain a continuous attack.

Fighting DNA

“Fighting DNA” by these measures, do not appear identical. The same may be seen in first division / national female soccer teams consistently defeated by older male teams or boy’s teams, aged fifteen and under. It is not an edifying spectacle and appears misogynous – female hating – to mount such tournaments. Given stamina and strength considerations, an equivalent 15-woman team may defeat an 11-man soccer team – but that would “not be cricket.” Nor does this address the risk to women – between 7-10 times more likely to suffer ACL type injuries than males – and the overall impact on (male, female, or mixed) team morale. [3]

In a major fire on a UK warship, women were brushed aside by the men because they could not sustain the physical rate required. Female team members felt demoralised – because they were excluded from the main effort. While men felt let down – “what’s the point?”

By Preference

An examination of twenty research papers and 36 different data points, concluded 64.3% of males may err more towards the pursuit of “empirical truth and scientific progress,” preferring open contest, mechanical reasoning, interested in things and systems – and 55.9% of females towards “ethical principles and social progress,” preferring egalitarian verbal reasoning, interested in people and relationships. [4] This is not to say that males do not also pursue ethical principles and social progress, or females’ empirical truth and scientific progress, although preferences may be seen in career pursuits. More than 75% of HR practitioners

and para-legals are female, and more than 75% of barristers and pilots are male.

By IQ

Quoting a 1932 report analysing the IQ of 79,376 11-year olds [5], it was concluded that for the highest and lowest IQ scores, boys outnumbered girls. [6]

In percentage terms, about 5.5% of a population have an IQ over 125 and a similar proportion below 75 – where an IQ of 100 is “average”. Further examination indicates that for low IQs, boys outnumber girls by about five boys for every 4 girls – at the lowest IQ levels this may be about three to one. At higher IQs, it might be five boys for every 4 girls – at the highest levels, 10 boys for every 3 girls:

Little appears to have changed in the cognitive profile of men and women since prewar Scotland. Those with IQs above 140 or below 70 are still very much the exception. They can be male or female, but males have a statistically significant edge at both extremes. [6]

These differences are significant. For example, the Australian Radiologist profession has 2350 practicing doctors, who have completed 6 years medical and a further six years specialist training. The profession is under pressure, with an ageing population – increasingly unable to recruit sufficiently, and growing numbers opting to go part time. Thereby also reducing the flow of radiologists in and out of the profession – or to senior positions. Analysis suggest, women are three times as likely to go part time than men – a similar proportion may now be working from home? [7] This is a high, above average IQ population. Fifty years ago, by proportion of IQ, 10.8% of male radiologists may have been at the highly proficient / expert level. For many good reasons, 29.8% of Radiologists are now female.

As an unintended consequence, the proportion of proficient and expert radiologists may have reduced by almost 10% – while competent practitioners increased by 1.3%. At the top end (IQ of 140 or more) the proportion of experts may have reduced by 25%.

Leadership

In leadership terms, the proportion of experts to competent practitioners is important. Applying the rule of six degrees, experts in an all-male population would influence / connect with up to 90% of the profession – whereas at 70.2%, this may reduce to 64%. The centre has been strengthened and the edge weakened. Exacerbating this, might be the reduction of flows – as an increased proportion elect to be part-time practitioners, as opposed to seeking leadership or subject matter expert roles. The same proportions may read across to Navy and ships crews.

As previously reported in *Directed Telescope* (THE NAVY, Vol. 87, No. 1), the ADF proportion of females to males is about 25% for senior officers and Bands 1-2 and increases to 36% for Bands 3 – from a population base of 19.2% ADF females. Due to different retention rates, women in 2024 were 2.5 times more likely to be appointed to Senior / Bands 1-2 positions than males, and 3.8 times more likely to be promoted to Band 3 than their male counterparts [3]. Over a career this makes a considerable difference. It means, for example, females may gain promotion to senior positions between 2-3 years younger than their male counterparts; 4-6 years younger at Bands 1-2, and 5-8 years at Band 3. In career terms, it means that female officers are likely to do one to three jobs less than their male counterparts.

This is not a meritocracy. It also leaves females – no matter how competent – vulnerable to accusations of “promotion by DEI.” In such a situation – where competition in peacetime is fierce – women are more vulnerable to other women, than men.

Noting the previous Governments’ apparent directive to strengthen diversity by mandated equity and inclusion outcomes, this is likely to continue. Given the differences – which we should ordinarily celebrate, *vive la difference* – unproven, non-empirical D by E&I measures may act to the detriment of Defence, with concomitant impacts upon national security and the health and happiness of our men and women. At some point – hopefully when not at war – politicians, public servants, and Defence will need to return to empirical facts, reinforced by the UK Supreme Court ruling, that:


Women are individuals with biological female characteristics, at birth – *ipso facto*, these are different for men born with male characteristics.

This has implications for crewing and supporting the front lines – and in combat.

Jennifer Parker and Andrew Hastie are welcome to respond. ■

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UKRAINE: LESSONS OF BATTLE AND LESSONS OF WAR

Armies fight battles – Countries fight wars

By Chris Donnelly

Earendel Associated Ltd (Stonehage Fleming)

<https://www.earendelassociates.com>, June 2024

Softcover

Chris Donnelly CMG is one of those quintessential Englishmen who appear throughout history. Quiet, persuasive, thoughtful, enquiring, insightful, spiritual, classical – a recusant John le Carré *Smiley* or J.R.R. Tolkien *Gandalf* character to friends, to enemies a persistent, counter-disinformation distiller of truths. This has brought Chris to the attention of the current illiberal no limits alliance, and their fellow travellers.

For many years post 1992 a lone voice regarding Russia, Donnelly kept the analysis and analysts' tradition alive. Serving "behind the wire" as long as he could for the UK Ministry of Defence and NATO. From 1983-1989, Chris was a member of Mrs Thatcher's soviet advisory team during the Thatcher, Reagan, Gorbachev rapprochement years. He was specialist adviser to three UK Defence secretaries and four NATO Secretaries General. He led the UK MOD (Army) *Conflict Studies Research Centre* (CSRC) and *Advanced Research Assessment Group* (ARAG), until retiring as a senior civil servant in 2010. On the closure of both entities (CSRC and ARAG), by the Blair, Brown, and Cameron Governments. When the UK stopped thinking.

Donnelly is a deep Russian specialist and linguist – once known as a Kremlinologist or Sovietologist. He has continued his work (since 2014 in great demand), working now with Earendel Associates, a private company advising on national and security issues. Appropriately, Earendel in Old English, means "morning star" or "rising light." It is also the name of the most distant star ever observed by the Hubble Space Telescope – while Eärendil is a character in J.R.R. Tolkien's *The Silmarillion*, "a half-elven mariner who sailed through the sky with a radiant jewel." We always return to the sea, it is only a matter of time, timing, and tempo (the three relatives).

The A5 (jacket (RAN DPNU uniform), pocket sized) booklet may also be entitled "The Little Grey Book," with its emphasis on dealing with the Grey War we now face. Immensely pragmatic, it provides a suitable, Judaeo-Christian, liberal (as in the democratic traditions of the West) response to the illiberals, and to any tawdry little red books of their making.

The conclusions – stealing the book review editor's thunder – are outlined by the editor, p. 3 (*Crow's Nest*). They make for serious reading, across whole of Government (WOG) – which is where the book needs to be read. Including by Ministers... Specifically, Donnelly maintains:

- Very few western democracies have governments, societies, or armed [defence] forces, which are in any way prepared and ready for hybrid or kinetic warfare. Unless supported WOG resources – they will not be able to implement [recent] learning.
- The principles governing the use of armed [defence] forces do

not seem to have changed much – at most, new technologies may give greater significance to some principles than in previous wars. Rarely has a new technology instantly made older technologies (aircraft, tanks, ships) obsolete. Larger wars are fought with a mix of obsolete, obsolescent, and new weapons – putting a high priority on war maintenance stocks (and reserves). Something few western democracies have done in recent years.

- Most democracies have forgotten the importance of mass as a prerequisite of their ability to fight a war against a peer enemy. Resilience on the battlefield means the ability to absorb casualties and fight on – that requires mass. Noting also the Stalinism: "quantity has a quality all of its own."

The secondary title "*Armies fight battles – Countries fight wars*" is assessed as an important distinction, which potentially gets at the different scales involved between fighting wars and battles. Moving from discretionary fights, toward state on state conflict. There is also the unfortunate corollary of "winning the battles but losing the war" – something potentially the Global West has experience of, since 911. As Donnelly observes:

"War is War" – something we have not been involved with, in an existential sense, since 1945.

The booklet is easily readable and broken down into **Part 1** (*the argument in detail*); **Part 2** (*applying the lessons of war – including on governance and financing* (an essential read)); and **Part 3** (*the crucial importance of mass including organisation, people* (recruiting), *and equipment*). It addresses the need for a competent (productive) public service and an informed loyal opposition (which Australia currently lacks) – noting sovereign debt as a serious problem:

In the 1970s, 1/3 of [UK] Government spending went on health, education, and welfare – today it is 75%, leaving only one-quarter for spending on everything else. The big challenge facing established western democracies is that if there is no change in the level of state-delivered services, they will not be able to sustain those services; the state will be bankrupted and the services will collapse. It is no longer unthinkable that states may go bankrupt.

The booklet is in private circulation. The NLA and *THE NAVY* are encouraging Earendel Associates to do a re-run of the 2024 edition and, possibly, make available electronically. Noting recent geopolitical strategic changes (Trump 247, Taiwan, and in Ukraine) the Author is also currently considering updating *The Little Grey Book*, to a second edition.

If you want a copy, then at this stage you may wish to contact Earendel directly, at <https://www.earendelassociates.com>. A hugely significant winter read, as we watch the northern hemisphere campaign season (May to September) with increasing trepidation. 2027 is eighteen months away...



THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA ANNUAL MARITIME AFFAIRS ESSAY COMPETITION



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
- 21st Century Naval Warfare
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Essays should be 2,500-3,000 words in length and will be judged on accuracy, content and structure.



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Submissions should include the writer's name, address, telephone and email contacts, and the nominated entry category.

THE NAVY reserves the right to reprint all essays in the magazine, together with the right to edit them as considered appropriate for publication.

SUBMISSION DEADLINE:

Saturday 16 August 2025

Prize-winners announced in the January-March 2026 Issue of *THE NAVY*.



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Email: rforcullumjr@gmail.com

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IMPORTANT NATIONAL TASK**

*If you live in Tasmania, please post the form to the Hon. Secretary of the Victoria Division.
If you live in the NT, please post the form to the Hon. Secretary of the SA Division.
If you live in the ACT, please post the form to the Hon. Secretary of the NSW Division.*

SCAN TO JOIN



Subscriptions are due on 1 July of each year, and your membership will be current to 30 June immediately following the date on which you join the league, except that if your first subscription is received during the period 1 April to 30 June in any year, your initial membership will be extended to 30 June in the following year. For more information, visit www.navyleague.org.au



APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

To: The Hon, Secretary, The Navy League of Australia (see address details above)

Division _____

I wish to join the Navy League of Australia, the objectives of which I support, and I enclose a remittance for \$50.00 (including \$4.54 GST) being my first annual subscription to 30 June next.

Name [Mr] [Mrs] [Ms] [Rank] _____

Postal Address _____

State _____ Post Code _____

Phone _____ Mobile _____

Signature _____

Date ____/____/____

DONATION

**Please complete this section
if you wish to donate.**

I wish to donate the following amount to the Navy League of Australia. My details have been included in this form.

On receiving your application, banking details (EFT) will be forwarded to you by your state division with an introductory letter.

DONATION AMOUNT

\$ _____

HATCH



Type 076 Innovative Amphibious
Electromagnetic Catapult UCAV
Carrier, PLAN SICHUAN (L51)
launched December 2024.

Image Sinodefenceforum

MATCH



HMAS CAPE SCHANCK and
CAPE SOLANDER commissioned
into Navy at HMAS CAIRNES
May 2025.

Image Navy

DESPATCH



USS ST LOUIS (LCS 19) Due to
de-commission in 2025 with four
other Littoral Combat Ships and to
be offered for foreign military sale.

Question – is this an opportunity for
RAN to rapidly buy into a USN class
of Tier-2 frigate equivalent ships
(including those built by Austral),
designed for littoral combat support.
A new Scrap Iron Flotilla?

Image Naval Station Mayport