


THE

NAVY

THE MAGAZINE OF THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA



THE ROYAL NAVY'S CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 21



LAND BASED ANTI-SHIP MISSILE USE

COMMANDER AGETA'S INCURSION

TWO MYTHS OF THE SINKING OF HMAS ARMIDALE

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Front cover: Royal Australian Navy ship HMAS ADELAIDE is followed by HMAS CANBERRA and HMAS SUPPLY into Nuku-alofa harbour Operation Tonga Assist 2022 (POIS Christopher Szumlanski). Showing also the naval ensigns for AUKUS and the QUAD as designed by the NLA.

07 LAND BASED ANTI-SHIP MISSILE USE

By Mark Schweikert

12 THE ROYAL NAVY'S CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 21 A SIGN OF REVIVAL OR A SYMBOL OF A NAVY'S DECLINE - RATIONALE BEHIND CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 21

By Kelvin Curnow

22 TWO MYTHS OF THE SINKING OF HMAS ARMIDALE - THE LAST STAND OF TEDDY SHEEAN VC

By Dr Tom Lewis

28 COMMANDER AGETA'S INCURSION

By Murray Dear

REGULAR FEATURES

- 02 From the Crow's Nest
- 04 League Policy Statement
- 05 The President's Page
- 16 Flash Traffic
- 21 Red Duster
- 32 Book Review

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SEAS ETERNAL CALL

In recognition of the series of papers commissioned by *The NAVY* on the IJN and JMSDF, [1-4], the poem *Pacific as One* relating to common service in arms in recognition of our long histories as Allies, including during WW1, was commissioned.

*Seas eternal call
Australia as Japan
May to Blossom's Fall*

海の永遠の呼びかけ
日本もオーストラリアも同じ
花が降るまで [5]

We live in dangerous, uncertain and unstable times at the end of a long period of relative hot peace between global powers, 1945-2022. The papers in this issue reflect in large part change and the need to reaffirm trust, friendships, and alliances in uncertain times. Blood is thicker than water.

Mark Schweikert (NLA Federal Vice President and Strategic Defence Analyst) – having been in much demand during the highly successful Pacific 2022 Maritime conference and exhibition in Darling Harbour (this May) – returns with a powerful paper examining *Land Based Anti-Ship Missile use*, specifically following the sinking of the MOSKVA. Mark observed after PAC 22 that, like a fine beverage, “*The NAVY* and the Navy League of Australia refreshes the parts other publications and researchers cannot reach”. In this vein, the second paper by Kelvin Curnow examines *The RN's Carrier Strike Group 21 – a sign of revival or a symbol of a Navy's decline?* Notwithstanding AUKUS, Kelvin's paper raises fundamental questions of the UK's Indo-Pac outreach, commitment, and meaningful ability to sustain an ongoing presence.

The third paper by Dr Tom Lewis considers the *Two Myths of the Sinking of HMAS Armidale – the last stand of Teddy Sheean VC*. This important and timely paper sets the record straight regarding some of the claims made against Japanese seafarers at the time, and also that HMS ARMIDALE's Commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Richards, was “shunned by the Navy”. The claims against Japanese submariners, in particular, are found wanting, revealing brave and noble actions on their part in the face of their enemy. Readers will recall that, in a timely and prescient piece, William Alston (2020) in *It is Time: RAN VC (The NAVY, Vol 82, Issue No. 4, pp. 22-27)* set out the case for awarding Teddy Sheean his [Australian] VC. He also opposed the dissembling action of the Morrison Government to provide patent for stripping VCs from recipients, against royal decree.

The fourth paper by long standing New Zealand contributor Murray Dear is entitled *Commander Ageta's incursion* and relates to the actions during May 1942 of five Japanese submarines of the 8th Squadron off Australia and New Zealand waters. This piece also sets the record straight and provides a detailed analysis of courageous actions by Imperial Japanese Navy submariners in the Pacific during WW2. Actions, such as the attack against Sydney Harbour leading to the loss of HMAS KUTTABUL, that are recognised in the Navy's excellent Heritage Museum in Garden Island (accessible by ferry from Circular Quay) – where one of the midget submarine's rests. Well worth a visit, along with the best Canteen in Navy!



JNS IZUMO (DDH 183) F-35B Capable Carrier to Deploy to Australia in 2022.

JMSDF crews visiting Sydney harbour pay their respects to their fellow sailors whenever they visit. A memorial and shrine entrusted eternally to the RAN to preserve.

The new Government is off to a firm start with the appointment of Richard Marles as both Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister. Further reaffirming his intent by choosing to reside in the Russell Offices alongside the Chief of the Defence Force and the Secretary. The track record of Labor on Defence this century has not been good – noting the ransacking of the budget, by both Prime Ministers Rudd and Gillard. The record of Defence and the Liberal Government on Defence has proven equally patchy – considering the submarine, guided weapon, and other procurement debacles outlined by both Dr Neil Baird and Hugh Bagehot in recent issues of *The NAVY* (vol 83, no.1, (Jan-Mar 2021), pp 20-26, and vol 84, no. 2, (Apr-Jun 22) pp 8-12).

Peter Dutton was the first big hitter appointed as Minister of Defence since Kim Beazley in 1990. Noting his overturning of the decision to remove SAS unit citations and other gallantry awards by the current Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and Chief of Army on the release of the much-flawed Brereton Report, his relationship with the Chiefs of Defence and the Secretaries were reputedly marginal at best. CDF and Chief of Army should have resigned in 2020 as a matter of principle and honour, as any other CEOs would have done for much less. So, lancing the boil and allowing Defence to move on. Apparently, Mr Dutton prepared his own list of future Chiefs and Secretaries (due to change by the end of the year), so bad had relations become. Something he may now wish to share – out of *noblesse oblige* – with Richard Marles?

The impact on Defence has been significant. Beyond COVID phase 1, and unable to say NO, Defence found itself being used to solve state-federal, media-political issues – often deploying far in excess of numbers or effects required. Resulting, during OP Flood Assist 2022, in over 7000 Navy, Air, and Army personnel cheerfully being deployed in less than two weeks to the flood plains of NSW and South East Queensland. The largest mobilisation of ADF since Vietnam. Where, despite some reporting, they were graciously and warmly greeted by the local populations, as during COVID.

None of this procures, builds, or acquires the submarines, aircraft, ships, and armour urgently required by Australia, today – not in 2040. Yet many Defence commentators continue to read AUKUS and the submarine program incorrectly. There is significant danger that



Nuclear Powered Submarine Task Force showing image of *Astute-class* submarine.

the Nuclear Powered Submarine Task Force (NPSTF) will simply replicate the lack of leadership and incompetence exhibited by the Future Submarine Program.

The NAVY sympathises with Dr Baird’s view [6] that an interim class submarine may be required before the introduction of the nuclear fleet, augmented by at least 24 *Orca-class* Boeing autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV). [6] Some commentators and ex-politicians (who should know better), are advocating the building of *Collins-2* by the same European shipbuilder. Through simple weighted analysis, see Table 1, Dr Neil Baird determined:

The only conventional (non-nuclear powered) SSG submarine that competes across all five sub-categories is the Korean *Jangbogo (III)-class*, built under licence to the German company TKMS – itself derived from the highly successful Type 212 class. The second choice, competing in two of the five sub-categories, is the Japanese-built *Taigei-class*. Only at an extreme, would one go to a European builder, such as for the Navantia SA80 and under no circumstances whatsoever would one touch the “Other European” option. Which, of course, is what Canberra ended up doing for both the *Collins* and (for different reasons) the *Attack-class* submarines.

Table 1: Submarine Replacement Weighted Options

Class	Allied Partner / Relationship	Regional Ally / Proximity	Trade & Defence Liaison	Logistics Chain	Extension Characteristic Modifications	Total Weighting
<i>KSS-III (Jangbogo III) Extension</i>	2	1	2	2	1	8
<i>Navantia SA80 Extension</i>	3	3	3	4	2	15
<i>Type 212 CD Extension</i>	3	3	3	3	2	14
<i>Taigei-class Extension</i>	1	1	1	1	4	8
<i>Other European</i>	3	3	5	5	5	21

Regarding the *Hunter-class*, The NAVY has long advocated that this was the best design. However, like all Frigate and Destroyer options currently available, these represent an optimised design, fit for the 1990s – not the 21st century. The MOSKVA attack (see paper 1), affirms that different designs will be required to survive the modern battlefield. As advocated by ANSON, Blake, and Reay Atkinson et al (7-9). Blake [8] goes further, recommending a 100-ship Versatile Modular Ship design RAN, capitalised to augment and fit with an expanded USN, balanced against the number of submarines.

Table 2: Potential USN and RAN Fleets – Restoring Design Balance and Capacity by VMS design

	USN	280	355	Future VMS Balance?	RAN	2019	Future	Future Balance?	Future VMS?
Aircraft Carriers	13	16	39	LHDs	2	2	2	3	
Amphibious Assault Ship	26	32	76	LSD	1	1	1	4	
Attack Submarine	60	77	77	Submarine SSG	6	12	12	12	
SSBN	19	24	24	AORs	2	2	4	5	
Cruiser	25	32	55	DD	3	3	4	7	
Destroyer	79	100	170	FF	8	9	12	13	
Dock Landing Ship	14	18	43	OPVs	0	11	14	16	
Mobile Base Ship	1	2	4	MCM	6	6	6	14	
Littoral combat ship	13	16	27	Hydrographic	6	6	6	8	
MCM	13	16	39	Patrol Boats	15	0	0	20	
Patrol Boats	15	19	45	Total	49	52	61	100	
Submarine Tenders	2	3	7						
Total	280	355	606						

Underpinning this essential maritime mobilisation (including for Army Littoral Manoeuvre vessels and RAAF (F-35Bs)) are their crews. Navy will need to grow to at least 30,000 by the end of the decade to support such a program. The piece-meal approach to date of adding a few 1000 here and there, simply will not sustain. Similarly, as offered by *The NAVY* (in addition to the flags for QUAD and AUKUS):

- political secretaries of Navy, Army, and Air Force need to be reinstated.
- To support our Allies, proper secretariats also need to be configured from APS and Defence for the National Security Council, QUAD, AUKUS, and NPTF – ideally all co-located in Melbourne.

All of this will require the political, military, industrial, research, educational, and economic leadership necessary to build confidence in uncertain times. This is the challenge of today, if we are to build an Indo-Pacific Charter fit for the 21st century – *Pacific as one*. ■

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- [5] By Associate Professors Captain Simon Reay Atkinson RAN PhD and Commander Hiroyuki Kanazawa PhD JMSDF. The full poem reads: Seas eternal call, A mariner's lonely watch, Pacific as one; Tides essential turn, Australia as Japan, common arms again; Times every season, Waiting fates capricious turn, May to Blossoms Fall.
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STATEMENT OF POLICY

For the maintenance of the Maritime wellbeing of the nation.

The Navy League is intent upon keeping before the Australian people the fact that we are a maritime nation and that a strong Navy and capable maritime industry are elements of our national wellbeing and vital to the freedom of Australia. The League seeks to promote Defence self-reliance by actively supporting defence manufacturing, research, cyberspace, shipping, transport and other relevant industries.

Through geographical necessity Australia's prosperity, strength, and safety depend to a great extent upon the security of the surrounding seas and island areas, and on unrestricted seaborne trade.

The strategic background to Australia's security is changing and in many respects has become much less certain following increasing tensions, particularly in East Asia involving major powers, and in Europe and the Middle East. The League believes that Australia should rapidly increase the capability to defend itself, paying particular attention to maritime defence.

The Navy League:

- Believes Australia can be defended against attack by other than a major maritime power and that the prime requirement of our defence is an evident ability to control the sea and air space around us and to contribute to defending essential lines of sea and air communication with our allies.
- Supports a continuing strong alliance with the US.
- Supports close relationships with all nations in our general area particularly New Zealand, PNG and the South Pacific island States.
- Advocates the acquisition of the most capable modern armaments, surveillance systems and sensors to ensure technological advantage over forces in our general area.
- Advocates a strong deterrent element in the ADF enabling powerful retaliation at significant distances from our shores.
- Believes the ADF must be capable of protecting commercial shipping both within Australian waters and beyond, in conjunction with allies.
- Endorses the development of the capability for the patrol and surveillance of all of Australia's ocean areas, its island territories and the Southern Ocean.
- Advocates Government initiatives for rebuilding an Australian commercial fleet capable of supporting the ADF and the carriage of essential cargoes to and from Australia in times of conflict.
- Notes the Government intention to increase maritime preparedness and gradually increase defence expenditure to 2% of GDP, while recommending that this target should be increased to 3%.
- Urges the strength and capabilities of the Army (including particularly the Army Reserve) and Air Force be enhanced, and the weaponry, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyberspace and electronic capabilities of the ADF be increased, including an expansion in its UAV capability.
- Considers that the level of both the offensive and defensive capabilities of the RAN should be strengthened, in particular with a further increase in the number of new proposed replacement frigates and offshore patrol vessels, noting the need to ensure essential fuel and other supplies, and the many other essential maritime tasks.
- Recommends bringing forward the start date of the replacement frigate program to both strengthen the RAN and mitigate the local industry capability gap.
- Recommends the timely replacement and increase in numbers of the current mine-countermeasure force.
- Strongly supports the early acquisition of large, long range and endurance, fast submarines and notes the deterrent value, reliability and huge operational advantages of nuclear powered submarines and their value in training anti-submarine forces.
- The League is concerned at the very long time before the projected 12 new conventional submarines can enter operational service, noting very serious tensions in the NW Pacific involving major maritime powers.
- Recommends very early action to provide a submarine base on the Eastern seaboard.
- Notes the potential combat effectiveness and flexibility of the STOVL version of the Joint Strike Fighter (F35 *Lightning II*) and supports further examination of its application within the ADF.
- Supports the development of Australia's defence industry, including strong research and design organisations capable of the construction and maintenance of all warships, submarines and support vessels in the Navy's order of battle, and welcomes the Government decision to provide a stable and continuous shipbuilding program.
- Advocates the retention in maintained reserve of operationally capable ships that are required to be paid off for resource or other economic reasons.
- Supports a strong and identifiable Naval Reserve and Australian Navy Cadets organisation.

As to the RAN, the League, while noting vital national peacetime tasks conducted by Navy, including border protection, flag showing/diplomacy, disaster relief, maritime rescue, hydrography and aid to the civil power:

- Supports the maintenance of a Navy capable of effective action in hostilities and advocates a build-up of the fleet and its afloat support elements to ensure that, in conjunction with the RAAF, this can be sustained against any force which could be deployed in our area of strategic interest.

- Advocates urgent Government research and action to remedy the reported serious naval recruiting and retention problem.

The League:

- Calls for a bipartisan political approach to national defence with a commitment to a steady long-term build-up in Australia's defence capability including the required industrial infrastructure.
- Believes that, given leadership by successive governments, Australia can defend itself in the longer term, within acceptable financial, economic and manpower parameters.



A NEW FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Since our last edition there has been a change of government, bringing with it, relevantly for us, a new Defence Minister and new Minister for Veterans Affairs.

On the former, the Navy League of Australia congratulates the new Defence Minister, Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles, on his appointment. Deputy Prime Minister Marles has set a course for Australia's ongoing focus in shaping robust conversation on strategic challenges and regional security dynamics in our region. He has also noted that the region is in the midst of the most consequential strategic alignment of our time, and that Australia remains committed to working with our partners across the region to promote our shared interests of a peaceful, inclusive and resilient Indo-Pacific.

He has signalled his regional focus clearly with early visits to Singapore, Japan and India and we wish him well in the role and welcome his input in what continues to be a challenging time for our region and the wider global order.

Readers will know that the Navy League supports the promotion of Australia's self-reliance, defence manufacturing, research, cyberspace and the shipping and transport industries. We encourage a bipartisan political approach to national defence with a steady long-term build up in Australia's defence capability including the required industrial infrastructure. We were buoyed by the Minister's confirmation that defence spending would remain above 2% of GDP but encourage this target to be increased to 3%.

On the latter removal of the veterans portfolio from cabinet, while veteran support is not one of the Navy League's areas of prime focus, most of us keep a weather-eye on it at least. Those with whom I have spoken are concerned that the removal of the veterans' portfolio

from cabinet will result in worse outcomes for veterans across the board and make it more likely that issues that affect veterans may shift out of key focus when it comes to government decision making. Be sure to keep your eye on this issue and make sure veterans' issues are kept in the fore for government.

SUBMARINES – STEADY AS SHE GOES?

The current government, gladly, is supportive of the future nuclear-powered submarine program to which Australia has committed. This bipartisan position, in support of the purchase of nuclear-powered submarines, is one which the Navy League applauds. Anyone who has read previous editions of this magazine will be under no doubt of the enthusiasm with which the Navy League has pursued this outcome and then supported the decision.

Further, the Defence Minister's commitment to prioritising the purchase of the nuclear submarines and to work toward closing the gap between now and their delivery into service is most welcome and makes sound strategic policy and defence sense.

There has been some suggestion of an 'interim solution', that is, an interim submarine class to be built or purchased to avoid any potential capability gap between now and when the nuclear propelled vessels come into service in twenty years or so. This interim proposal, which has been referred to by some as a 'son of *Collins*' solution, is a fraught one. It is quite likely that those who propose or who even contemplate the 'son of *Collins*' interim solution fail to understand that this would be, virtually, a new submarine. Not only would this bring with it design and build complexity, but there is the real risk that this could be used as a way of scuttling the nuclear-powered future submarine program. That is, a future argument, albeit strategically unsound, could be mounted to suggest that the interim solution could be seen to be adopted as the *Collins* replacement.



Astute-class HMS ASTUTE (S119) Royal Navy submarine alongside in Perth.



Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Richard Marles meets with Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe at the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore .

Further complexities arise. Starting a 'son of *Collins*' program would be no simple task, and would require morphing of a 30+ year-old design into the 21st Century. Neither would it provide a solution to the emerging regional threat and the very reason why the nuclear-powered submarine is the right solution for Australia's emerging situation. A conventional submarine will not mitigate future risks in our region, and the nuclear-powered submarine is the only logical next step for Australia to pursue.

The better alternative to the 'son of *Collins*' suggestion is to speed up the purchase of the nuclear submarines, which Minister Marles has prioritised, while undertaking a *Collins-class* life of type extension. This approach would extend the *Collins-class* to be able to continue to serve until the introduction of Australia's new nuclear submarines. A life of type extension (LOTE) for *Collins* is feasible and essential, but to be fair to the debate that is ongoing some of our own authors have suggested, in these pages too, that we should look at alternatives.

Elements of this debate are included in *Flash Traffic* – intended, as always, to be informed and informative to key decision-makers. Critically, Australia is out of time. It needs these solutions today, if they are to deliver effective deterrence tomorrow. For the submarine force is at the tip of the deterrence spear. A LOTE for *Collins* carries considerable risk, not least to our crews operating in ageing artefacts well beyond their design life's. Procuring an alternative local submarine from either Japan or South Korea, as recommended by Dr Neil Baird, also carries risk. There is an alternative explained in *Flash Traffic*, that may allow Australia to square the circle at least risk, while innovatively maximising regional power projection.

With even our own authors in this magazine not being settled on this issue, and it having been a subject on which there has been much discussion in *The NAVY* magazine, we don't imagine this ending soon. This is an issue of too great an importance for it to not to be debated with vigour, but meanwhile, the government should not waver from its agreed course – only proceed expeditiously in its decision-making process.

Let us know what you think, and be sure to let your federal member of parliament know where you stand also.

THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA ANNUAL MARITIME AFFAIRS ESSAY COMPETITION

The Navy League of Australia Annual Maritime Affairs Essay Competition is underway. Entries are being received. If you are interested in participating, start preparing your paper and ensure it is received by 20 August 2022. Topics can range across 21st Century Naval Warfare, Australian Naval History, Australian Industrial and Merchant Navy Maritime Strategy, and around all of the subjects which you read in editions of *The NAVY*.

The annual competition offers prizes in the professional and non-professional categories and the opportunity to have the papers published in a future edition of the Navy, as well as the lure of the substantial prizes on offer.

Further details are inside the back cover of this edition of *The NAVY*. We look forward to reading your contributions and wish you all the best in the competition. Get writing!

IN THIS EDITION

In this edition we have more great reading for you. We hope you will pass your old copy onto a friend when you finish with it, or use the insert to sign a friend up to receive their own subscription.

Our Federal Vice-President Mark Schweikert returns with a powerful paper examining *Land Based Anti-Ship Missile use*, particularly with regard to MOSKVA. We also have another return, from the winner of the 3rd prize in the Navy League Annual Maritime Essay Competition, Kelvin Curnow. Kelvin's paper examining *The RN's Carrier Strike Group 21 – a sign of revival or a symbol of a Navy's decline* makes for most interesting reading.

We also have a paper from Dr Tom Lewis, which provides a timely re-evaluation and defence, in part, of IJN / Japanese seafarers and their actions in the second world war, including the action in which HMAS ARMIDALE was engaged. Our final paper in this edition is also a 3rd prize winner, this time from the non-professional category, and is from our New Zealand friend and author Murray Dear. Murray writes on *Commander Ageta's incursion* relating to the incursion of the submarine I-22 with five Japanese submarines of the 8th Squadron ordered to undertake maritime operations off Australia and New Zealand.

We hope you will enjoy this edition and look forward to hearing your feedback.

Happy reading. ■



Virginia-class submarine USS DELAWARE (SSN-791) prepares for launch.

LAND BASED ANTI-SHIP MISSILE USE

By Mark Schweikert

With much hype an interest in the current Russian-Ukraine war and its recent episode of the sinking of a major Russian Warship asset, Mark Schweikert takes a look at land base anti-ship missiles and asks if they really are a silver bullet as made out in some parts of the media?



The two trailers set up as makeshift Exocet land-based ASM launchers after being captured by British Forces in the Falkland's Conflict of 1982. The launchers were removed from two A-69 class corvettes and flown to the islands to defend the airstrip at Stanley, with mixed results.

INTRODUCTION

The recent sinking of the 1980's Russian air defence cruiser MOSKVA by Ukrainian land based Anti-Ship Missiles (ASMs) had many a headless chook in the numerous think tanks around the world and Canberra scrambling to cackle the loudest that the surface ship was (again) dead.

But what is the actual historical effectiveness of land based ASMs like? As it stands, of the eight known instances of ASM use from land against warships, only one has been successful in sinking the threat.

The following is a look at each event since the first reported use of land based ASMs in the hope to add some balance to the arguments on the efficacy of this capability. Particularly important given the ADF's desire for a land based ASM capability in a growing budget crisis for the defence portfolio.

EVENT 1 HMS AVENGER 1982

The first examples of land based ASM use occurred during the Falkland's conflict 40 years ago from the date of this publication.

Soon after the start of British attacks on 1 May on the airfield at Stanley from ships offshore using their guns, the Argentine Navy started to investigate how it could defend the precious airfield. The obvious weapon system they had to hand was Exocet in the surface-to-surface mode. But as no land-based variant existed in the Argentine military a simple and urgent engineering solution was sought.

In a magnificent feat of engineering, Argentine engineers took only 10 days to develop a rudimentary system to get a missile off the rail to then hopefully rely on its own internal processes and technology to 'work out' what to do next.

The system they devised consisted of a generator, supporting hardware and two ramps for the Exocet box launchers all mounted on two trailers. The box launchers themselves were cannibalized from two of Argentina's A-69 corvettes.

The engineering team designed a firing sequence from a box with four telephone switchboard switches; these were manual to save time. Each had to be thrown in specific order timed manually by a stopwatch.

By early June the system was at Stanley and ready. Each night at 6pm the system was dragged from beneath camouflage netting and placed behind a 16-foot-high bunker. It had to be ready by 8.30pm when British ships tended to begin their bombardments.

The Argentine Air Force's 2-dimensional AN/TPS-44 air search radar would sweep a 60-degree arc to the south of Stanley Common with the Army providing fire control detail with its AN-TPS 43 3-dimensional radar. All this was reported to the launcher team by voice.

On the night of 27/28 May while on the gun line south of Port Harriet and out of range of conventional artillery the officer of the watch on the Type 21 frigate HMS AVENGER received a call from the flight deck officer to say "a large projectile just hurtled across the flight deck". This was Argentina's first attempt at using a land based Exocet to defend the airfield.

The missile not only failed to acquire the target correctly but its proximity fuze also failed to initiate on the chance close encounter with the frigate. This near-miss was attributed to an incorrect sequence of switches to start the system before firing. Interestingly, an attempt the night before ended in a misfire, again through incorrectly timed switching.

Given the rudimentary nature of the acquisition and fire control system which had never been tested this was still a good attempt. The downside is that the RN now knew that Argentina had placed Exocet at Stanley.



The charred hangar of HMS GLAMORGAN after being hit by a land based Exocet ASM.

To counter the risk, the Task Force Commander Rear-Admiral Woodward, created a 25-mile no go zone from the suspected launch site that no ship was to enter. Part of the problem for the RN in dealing with Exocet was that the weapon was widely used by NATO, and consequently a counter-measure had not been developed. However, with the sinking of HMS SHEFFIELD and the *Atlantic Conveyor* some in the RN started developing counter measures, with some success. In this instance though, Admiral Woodward's counter was to avoid the risk altogether.

EVENT 2 HMS GLAMORGAN 1982

At 2.35am on the night of 12 June 1982, again during the Falklands Conflict, a target presented itself to the Argentine radar operators at Stanley. HMS AVENGER and the *County-class* destroyer HMS GLAMORGAN had both completed the night's fire support mission to 3 Commando Brigade attacking Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Mount Harriet and were departing to return to the Carrier Battle Group to be back as part of the screen by day break.

Unfortunately for GLAMORGAN, the destroyer cut the corner of the no-go area attracting a missile launch by the Argentines, who had been waiting and hoping for such a miscalculation.

On her bridge the ship's navigator detected the incoming Exocet with the ship's navigation radar and ordered a high-speed turn away from the missile, before it struck the port side adjacent to the hangar near the stern. The manoeuvre, which had been designed and developed by the navigator as a defensive/mitigation measure, prevented the missile from striking the ship's side perpendicularly and penetrating; instead, it hit the deck skidding into the hangar and detonating, making a 3.0 m × 4.6 m hole in the hangar deck and a 1.5 m × 1.2 m hole in the galley area below, where a fire started. An officer, six air maintenance crew, four chefs, a steward and a marine engineer, totalling thirteen men, were killed and fourteen injured.

Although HMS GLAMORGAN had an 8-degree list from the weight of water needed to fight the fires, she maintained a steady 18 knots and remained fully operational in spite of the damage. She withdrew to the fleet maintenance area at South Georgia for repairs and returned to the battle in time for the surrender.

EVENT 3 HMS GLOUCESTER 1991

The third use of land based ASMs occurred during the first Gulf War in 1991. Ironically, it involved the RN again. This time with a Type 42 class destroyer, which suffered the most casualties during the conflict with two of the class sunk (SHEFFIELD and COVENTRY) and another badly damaged and sent home early (GLASGOW).

On the night of 25 Feb 1991, a naval gun fire surface action group made up of the RN destroyer GLOUCESTER, the RN Type 22 Batch 2 frigate HMS LONDON and the USN FFG USS JARRETT, and centred



A Royal Marine Commando with a captured Iraqi Silkworm ASM. The large size made it an easy target for HMS GLOUCESTER.

on the Iwo class battleship USS MISSOURI, were fired on by a land-based Silkworm missile battery at al-Finţas at approx. 0452.

The Silkworm is a Chinese version of the old Soviet P-15 Termit anti-ship missile. It is a large, simple, radar-guided missile but despite its age and relatively crude technology, its 1,000lb warhead can inflict serious damage.

The Iraqi battery fired two Silkworms. One of the Silkworms crashed into the sea shortly after launch. However, the other missile continued toward MISSOURI traveling at 605 knots and a height of 375ft.

The U.S. and British ships tracked the incoming missile on their radars with USS JARRETT and MISSOURI firing chaff to confuse the missile's guidance radar. Ironically in a fog of war moment, the Phalanx Close In Weapon System (CIWS) on JARRETT, operating in automatic mode, detected and fixed on MISSOURI's chaff cloud and fired a burst of 20mm rounds through it. From this burst, four rounds hit MISSOURI which was 2–3 miles (3.2–4.8 km) from JARRETT at the time. Fortunately, no one was injured, but it did give the JARRETT's captain the dubious bragging rights of being the only frigate to 'brass up' a battleship and live to tell the tale.

In a reputation saving moment, the Type 42 Batch 3 destroyer HMS GLOUCESTER shot down the remaining Iraqi Silkworm missile with her Sea Dart. The intercept is recorded as the first validated, successful missile-versus-missile strike, in anger, of its kind and took 50 seconds from detection to destruction.



An Iranian Noor/C-802 ASM being launched from a truck. The Noor that hit INS HANIT off Lebanon does not appear to have detonated. Rather, an impact hole was left in the side of the ship and flight deck with unspent fuel causing a fire.

Later, MISSOURI launched a Pioneer drone and located the Iraqi Silkworm battery. The battleship fired 30 16-inch rounds obliterating the battery.

EVENT 4 INS HANIT 2006

On the night of 14 July 2006 during the second Israel – Lebanon war, the Israeli warship INS HANIT, a Sa'ar 5 class corvette, was patrolling in Lebanese waters 10nms off the coast of Beirut when it was fired on by two Chinese designed and Iranian made C-802/Noor land-based ASMs.

While it is understood the missiles were fired by Hezbollah, the Israeli military claim that Iranian military advisors from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had assisted with deploying and readying the missiles for launch, not an unbelievable claim by any stretch of the imagination.

The C-802 is a radar-guided anti-shiping missile manufactured in Iran using Chinese technology and called Noor. Its range is estimated to be about 110km with a 400lb warhead. It is in the Exocet generation of technology and oddly enough looks and acts like Exocet.

HANIT was struck by one of the missiles and damaged on the waterline, under the aft superstructure setting part of the flight deck on fire through unspent missile fuel and temporally crippling the propulsion systems. It does not appear from the images of the damage that the warhead exploded. However, INS HANIT stayed afloat, withdrew and sailed back to the port of Ashdod for repairs under its own power. Four crew members were killed from the attack.

According to the Israeli Navy, the ship's sophisticated automatic missile defence system, based on the Barak missile, was not deployed, even though the early warning system is usually activated during any deployment.

The second Noor missile missed wildly and continued out to sea. It eventually found and hit a Cambodian-flagged freighter, 60kms off shore. A dozen Egyptian sailors from the freighter were picked up by another commercial vessel after the ship sunk following the missile strike.

In the aftermath of the event, reports suggested that no known intelligence existed which would have pointed to the fact that such a sophisticated missile was deployed in Lebanon by Hezbollah. Had it been known, INS HANIT would have had all defensive systems activated and would have positioned herself further from the coastline and out of sight (YouTube video exists showing HANIT patrolling off the coast just before the attack).



The USN Arleigh Burke Flight IIA destroyer USS MASON. MASON and her sister destroyer USS NITZE successfully repelled several ASM attacks over a week. (USN)

An official Israeli Defence Force report on the Lebanon war incident reveals that the crew did not act sufficiently in order to anticipate and thus counter the threat.

The IDF report said, “as far as the intelligence picture is concerned, it was found that despite the lack of pinpoint information about the weapon in the hands of Hezbollah, there was information in the Navy in the past that could have led to some type of an assessment that the enemy holds shore-to-ship missiles.” In addition, failures were uncovered in “the way the forces understood the operative reality and implemented it.” As there were no perceived missile threats, an officer had left the ship's anti-missile suite disabled while patrolling near the coast. Another report suggested that the proximity of other Israeli military assets such as aircraft also prevented the ship's defensive system being placed on automatic mode for fear of a blue-on-blue engagement.



A Nulka electronic decoy round being fired. The Nulka is made in Australia and considered one of the most effective soft kill ASM decoys on the market. It was employment in 2016 by USS MASON and NITZE. (USN)

EVENT 5, 6 & 7 USS MASON AND NITZE 2016

Details of the 9 October 2016 land based ASM attack on two US ships over several days are still a little sketchy but what has been published is that the Arleigh Burke Flight IIA class destroyer, USS MASON (DDG-87), was with amphibious transport dock USS PONCE in the Red Sea about 12nms from the coast of Yeman when they were fired on by Houthi rebels with two ASMs, thought to be Chinese C-802 or Iranian Noor, given Iran's support for the Houthi's anti-US stance.

The MASON's crew fired off two SM-2, one ESSM missiles and two Australian-made Nulka electronic decoys in a complimentary soft



The massive and very impressive Russian Slave class cruiser MOSKVA. Her weaponry and size should have been able to deal with the ASM threat.

and hard kill defence measure. The incoming ASMs were said to have crashed into the sea, whether as a result of defensive measures has still not been confirmed.

Several days later on 12 Oct, five ASMs were fired at the MASON and the Arleigh Burke Flight IIA class destroyer USS NITZE. Again, the ships reacted with missiles and decoys with success.

Another attack occurred on 15 Oct, again a combination of soft and hard kill measures ensured the ships in the group were not hit.

On this third occasion NITZE fired Tomahawk cruise missile at three radar stations that provided the targeting for the attacks. Destroying them and the threat.

Very little detail is still yet to be made public but the US publication *Navy Times* has confirmed that the ships involved received combat action ribbons.

EVENT 8 MOSKVA 2022

On evening of 13 April 2022, the Russian Black Sea Flagship and air defence cruiser MOSKVA was struck by two land-based ASMs fired from Ukraine. MOSKVA was said to be approx. 120 km south of Odessa in the Black Sea at the time of the attack.

The next day the 11,000-tonne warship sank in about 50m of water with one known fatality and 27 listed as missing.

The missiles were Ukrainian modifications to the Russian Kh-35, known in the West as Harpoonski given its many similarities with the US Harpoon ASM, but in Ukrainian service they are known as Neptune.

The all-important targeting appears to have been conducted with an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), although given the lack of video evidence some doubt this.

Based on the photographs of the ship that circulated following the strike, the two Neptunes hit the warship near its most vulnerable point: the ship's main propulsion spaces, dead centre of the ship, just above the waterline.

While the sinking of the 1980's cruiser is dramatic and the largest ship to date (and only ship) sunk by a land based ASM, it needs to be put into context.

The ship was commissioned in 1983 and then decommissioned in 1990. She was re-commissioned and pressed back into service 30 years later in April 2020 until her sinking in April of 2022. She never underwent any extensive weapon or sensor upgrades, just repairs basic updates, and remained quite similar in technology, capability and damage control measures to her 1983 launch.

According to US Naval Institute (USNI) News, the crew of MOSKVA was probably blind to and not ready for the Ukrainian missile attack that sank their ship.

USNI News reported that a review of the images following the strike of the two Neptune ASMs indicated that the guided-missile cruiser did not have its radars activated and thus could not see the threat from the two ASMs.

In the photo of MOSKVA after the strike, the radars were reported to be in their normal stowed position.

While the Russian warship had older point-defence systems, they



MOSKVA on fire and listing to port. This is the result of poor intelligence and lack of preparedness in the ship.

should, on paper, have been capable of countering the Neptune missiles.

In particular, the radar system that would have directed MOSKVA's OSA-M/SA-N-4 Gecko surface to air missiles to counter the Ukrainian missiles appears to not have been active with its emitters stowed, again based on the post-strike imagery.

It is also unknown if her six 30mm gatling gun CIWSs were switched on and/or used.

From this experience the Russian Navy has moved further south out into the Black Sea and out of the range of the Neptune.

PROJECT LAND 4100, PHASE 2

From the 2016 Defence White Paper the Australian Army articulated a requirement for a land based ASM capability, to protect island forward operating bases. That has since gained official status as Project Land 4100 Ph2.

Recently the defence companies Thales Australia and Kongsberg Australia joined forces to illustrate a joint concept of an Australian armoured Bushmaster Ute with two Kongsberg NSM ASM missiles in launch boxes on the back of the vehicle.

The NSM is 'totally passive' using an advanced high resolution imaging infrared seeker to search for, detect and automatically recognise enemy vessels, down to specific ship classes, and with an ability to be programmed to hit a predetermined point on the ship, such as the engine room or operations centre. It also has a very low radar cross section, extremely low sea skimming altitude, terrain following flight, high agility with selectable end-game flight profiles and precise designated time-on-target for swarm attacks or multiple missiles.

The NSM was also recently selected as a replacement for the RAN's Harpoon missile for the Hobarts, Anzacs and Hunters.

A helicopter version is also currently in development for the USN's and thus the RAN's, MH-60R Seahawk helicopters.

An acquisition date on the project is yet to be published.

CONCLUSION

The historical use of land based ASMs has actually been a hit and miss affair with dubious effectiveness in destroying targets. However, its effect on the battlefield is the outcome to focus on, rather than its score, which is to create a maritime version of the World War I no man's land.

As seen in the Falklands and more recently in the Black Sea, knowledge of the capability's deployment can have the desired effect of impacting the effectiveness of the enemy's maritime operations from the sea. The exception being the first Gulf War and the action off Yeman.

So it would seem from the examples over the last 40 years of land based ASM use that the counter to them for navy's operating in the littoral seems to be; avoidance through good intelligence of the threat (type, location numbers) and exploiting the fact the launcher is fairly fixed; hard and soft kill defences to deal with the threat; the early destruction of targeting assets and most importantly, the operation room's preparedness to deal with the threat. All of these things need to happen before the ships arrive in theatre.

A conclusion to draw from the last 40 years of land-based ASM usage could be that if other assets can conduct the anti-ship role in theatre, then they may be more effective and a better expenditure in budgetary resources than a land based ASM solution. ■



Thales Australia and Kongsberg Australia have teamed to compete for the Army's Land 4100 Ph2 contract for land based ASM capability. The concept combines the Bushmaster Ute with the NSM missile package.



THE ROYAL NAVY'S CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 21

A SIGN OF REVIVAL OR A SYMBOL OF A NAVY'S DECLINE - RATIONALE BEHIND CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 21

By Kelvin Curnow

The 2020 British government document titled *Global Britain in a competitive age – The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy* [1] considers Britain's role in the world post-Brexit. As a 'showing the flag' exercise and a demonstration of the UK's desire to establish stronger relations, particularly defence partnerships with the wider global community post-Brexit, Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21) can be considered to have met its objectives. It is only to be hoped that the announced plans for renewal of the RN do proceed, for without them the Royal Navy will remain a minor player in the face of Russian and Chinese developments of their own capabilities.



HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH (R08) alongside aircraft carriers from Japan and the US during CSG21 (Japan Maritime Self-Defense).

we will develop a better understanding of China and its people, improving our ability to respond to the systemic challenge that China poses to our security, prosperity and values – and those of our allies and partners.

To this end, some forty years after the disbandment of the Far East Fleet the Royal Navy (RN) is returning 'East of Suez'. The tangible presence will be in the form of two Singapore based Batch II *River-class* Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), to be replaced in the second half of this decade by *Type 31* frigates, coupled with regular deployments of more substantial units such as the *Queen Elizabeth-class* aircraft carriers.

WORK-UP AND INITIAL DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS

On 1 March 2021 the aircraft carrier HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH sailed from HMNB Portsmouth to begin a period of working-up before deploying as the lead component of Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21). A major component of the work-up was Exercise Strike Warrior which took place off Scotland between 8 May and 19 May 2021. CSG21 comprised: HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH; the Type 45 (T45) destroyers HMS DIAMOND and HMS DEFENDER; the Type 23 (T23) frigates HMS RICHMOND and HMS KENT; the auxiliaries RFA TIDESPRING and RFA FORT VICTORIA; the submarine HMS ARTFUL; the destroyer USS SULLIVANS; and the Dutch frigate HNLMS EVERTSEN. The QUEEN ELIZABETH carried a substantial air component consisting principally of eight Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning IIs from the RAF's 617 Squadron, and ten F-35Bs from the US Marines Corps (USMC) Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 211, all under British command.

Between 22 May 2021 and 24 May 2021 all CSG21 ships departed their respective ports and sailed to the Eastern Atlantic Ocean off Portugal to take part in the NATO Exercise Atlantic Trident. The strike group then passed through the Strait of Gibraltar on 31 May 2021 and met up with the French carrier FS CHARLES de GAULLE to conduct joint carrier operations before exercising with other NATO navies. This was the beginning of a twenty-eight week 26,000nm (48,152km) deployment under the mantle of 'Operation Fortis'.

Sailing into the Eastern Mediterranean F-35s from the strike group bombed Daesh targets in Iraq beginning on 18 June. For the Royal Navy this marked a significant milestone, not since the 1990s had jets flying from the service's carrier decks had taken part in an

INTRODUCTION

The 2020 British government document titled *Global Britain in a competitive age – The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy* [2] considers Britain's role in the world post-Brexit. The paper states that the Indo-Pacific region is critical to the UK's economy, security and global ambition to support open societies. The document specifically addresses the increasing power and international assertiveness of China which it considers to be one of the most significant geopolitical factors in the world today, to which end it makes several important observations, Britain will:


- Require a long-term strategic approach which will continue to adapt to a changing international environment defined by: geopolitical and geo-economic shifts, such as China's increasing international assertiveness and the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific.
- Pursue deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific in support of shared prosperity and regional stability, with stronger diplomatic and trading ties recognising the importance of powers in the region such as China, India and Japan, and extends to others including South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines.
- Do more to adapt to China's growing impact on many aspects of our lives as it becomes more powerful in the world. We will invest in enhanced China-facing capabilities, through which

active bombing campaign, in that instance BAE Sea Harriers flying against targets in the Republika Srpska (Republic of Serbia). For operations against Daesh the F-35Bs from VMFA-211 were armed with GBU-12 Paveway guided bombs, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs), and AIM-9X Sidewinder short range missiles. The UK's aircraft were armed with Paveway IV guided bombs, AMRAAMs and Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (ASRAAMs). There was no attempt to mask the presence of the US or UK aircraft over the battlefield, both nations F-35s carried their short-range missiles externally and were fitted with Luneburg Lenses which are radar reflectors. By not flying in stealth mode there was no prospect of Russian units stationed in Syria of testing their ability to detect and gain a firing position on the F-35s flying in full stealth mode.

INTO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Passing through the Suez Canal on 6 July CSG21 sailed into the Red Sea and then the Indian Ocean exercising with the US and Indian navies respectively. Leaving the Indian Ocean CSG21 passed into the South China Sea (SCS) on 26 July. This marked the beginning of the most significant phase of the deployment featuring a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP), challenging China's claim that it had sovereignty over the entire maritime region within its self-proclaimed nine-dash line, which in basic terms is the whole SCS. Beyond conducting the FONOP QUEEN ELIZABETH's presence in the SCS was a signal to China that the UK was willing to project power in support of like-minded nations which adhere to international conventions. Every country with a coastline on the SCS - China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam - have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This grants them an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up to 200 nautical miles (400 kilometres) from their coastlines. However, China also claims historic rights within the nine-dash line which include areas that go well beyond its own EEZ. These claims have provoked clashes with its neighbours, notably Vietnam and the Philippines, over fisheries and oil and gas exploration. It was not lost on China that CSG21's presence in the SCS signalled that the UK was returning in strength to a region which it had departed after abandoning the East of Suez defence policy.

Not surprisingly the deployment was met with reaction from the Chinese media. However, CSG21 presented a dilemma for Communist Party's outlets such as the *Global Times* and *People's Daily* which at one and the same time argued that the British focus on the Indo-Pacific and the deployment of the ships was both a mortal threat to



PLAN Type 003 Aircraft Carrier approaches readiness to launch (Jun 2022).

regional security, and simultaneously a pointless piece of gesture politics which was militarily insignificant. The rhetoric went unmatched by any significant response from the Chinese military. There were, for example, no overflights by aircraft from the People's Liberation Army Air Force or the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Air Force. Satellite imagery showed that at the same time QUEEN ELIZABETH was in the SCS the PLAN's carrier SHANDONG was also present, albeit the two flat tops were on opposite sides of the disputed waters with the former somewhere between the coast of Vietnam and the island of Borneo and the latter just south of the island of Hainan, leaving the carriers some 580nm (1,074km) apart. Although no official accounts of interactions with Chinese warships have been released the respected online media site Navy Lookout, quoting the *Daily Express*, reported that the strike group had been shadowed by three Type 093 Shang class submarines. Two SSNs were detected by the ASW frigates HMS RICHMOND and HMS KENT, the third by an *Astute-class* submarine sailing ahead of the group. [3] The article noted that both frigates were well equipped for the ASW role with towed-array sonar, while the *Astute-class* is among the most sophisticated submarines extant and far quieter than their Chinese counterparts.

Leaving the SCS some of the intended port visits, including those to Japan and South Korea were largely abandoned because of the COVID pandemic, although HMS ARTFUL did visit the port of Busan in South Korea and other individual units made it into Japanese ports. Marking a significant milestone in her deployment, QUEEN ELIZABETH and her escorts pulled into the US Naval Base on Guam on 6 August having thus far met all strike group's stated goals. (It is beyond the scope of this paper to report CSG21's mission into the Pacific Ocean because of the closing date of the 2021 Essay Competition.)

CSG 21 – STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

The Strengths

For a middle-ranking power like the UK, with a far from robust economy, to have assembled such a sizeable task group led by an aircraft carrier second only in size to the USN's supercarriers, and despatched it on a mission visiting some forty countries is a significant achievement. Further, CSG21 was a well-balanced force containing a good mix of destroyers, frigates and support vessels which in itself marks a change for the RN which will no longer rely on patrols by single vessels but will in future put to sea in larger task groups. The past practice was for the RN to use frigate or destroyer size vessels for patrols in areas where offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) would be both far more suitable, and more than adequate. The RN now has eight OPVs including five of the very capable 2,000-ton



RAF F-35B Operating from HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH (R08) alongside HMS DRAGON (D35).



RN Far East Squadron River Class OPV HMS TAMAR (P233) visits Darwin for Crew Handover (June 22). Impressively armed when compared to original designs for the *Arafura-class*.



HMS DIAMOND (D34) suffered a serious defect during CSG21 docked in Taranto Italy for repairs.

Batch II *River-class*. Possessing helicopter capable OPVs of this size frees up the RN's escort forces to engage in protection of major assets such as aircraft carriers and thus permit the formation of future task groups. Additionally, CSG21 proved again the value of regularly exercising with allies, the Dutch and US ships assigned to the group operated seamlessly under British command, all three nations having a long history of naval cooperation.

The deployment of CSG21 was marked by a number of firsts. Not since 2010 when the UK retired its fleet of Harrier jets had the RN deployed fighters operationally at sea. The jets themselves were of a considerable difference to the second-generation Harrier fighters, these were fifth-generation F-35Bs the most advanced sophisticated fighter produced thus far. With some thirty-three aircraft and helicopters from all three nations distributed across the surface units, CSG21 represented the largest number of aircraft simultaneously at sea in a British-led strike group since the Falklands War. Often repeated in both the technical and popular press is the claim that during the CSG21 deployment QUEEN ELIZABETH carried far more fighter jets than any RN carrier since the days of ARK ROYAL and EAGLE. Of course, such is not the case. HMS HERMES carried sixteen Sea Harriers, ten Harriers and ten Westland Sea King helicopters at the height of the Falklands War. Post the Falklands it was not uncommon for *Invincible-class* carriers to carry a mix sixteen Sea Harrier and Harrier aircraft. What is true, however, is that QUEEN ELIZABETH has put to sea with an air wing containing the largest number of fifth-generation fighters thus far.

Other air assets included three Leonardo Merlin HM2 helicopters modified under the Crownsnest programme to carry Searchwater radar and tasked to provide Airborne Early Warning (AEW) for the fleet. The RN designates these helicopters as fulfilling the Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) task, which is a more accurate description of their role. The helicopters have not yet reached Initial Operating Capability (IOC) because of a long, drawn-out period of development which hit a number of development issues. The other RN helicopters available to the strike group are four Leonardo Wildcat HMA2s drawn from 815NAS, and used in the maritime attack role. Images have appeared of a Wildcat operating as part of CSG21 carrying its maximum load-out of two MBDA Sea Venom and ten Thales Martlet missiles. The former is designed to be employed against corvette size warships; the latter is designed to counter swarm attacks by small boats such as those employed to attack shipping in the Persian Gulf by the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Wildcat's weapon suit is indeed impressive and more than adequate to carry out the tasks assigned to it, however by the time CSG21 sailed neither missile had achieved IOC.

The Weaknesses

On the surface CSG21 could be deemed a success, a show of strength by Britain probably last demonstrated in the Falklands War. Nonetheless, digging deeper reveals serious shortcomings, particularly with the RN's equipment. Primarily, and the most obvious of these, surrounds the number of F-35s on board QUEEN ELIZABETH, there are more American than British aircraft. Without the F-35s from the USMC a meagre RAF eight jets would have been available to the strike group. This reflects the slow buy rate of the aircraft by the UK. Of the intended buy of one hundred and thirty-eight F-35s only forty-eight have been ordered so far and the total number could be as low as sixty to eighty aircraft. This, given that the aircraft would also be required to be RAF's primary land-based fighter aircraft, means that the possibility of operating both *Queen Elizabeth-class* carriers with a full air wing simultaneously would be precluded. With funds for the UK F-35 programme now likely to be transferred to the development and procurement of the UK's own BAE Tempest sixth-generation fighter, the prospect of an adequate number of F-35s is diminishing. The sight of large fleet carriers with empty flight decks is a growing possibility.

Not only F-35 numbers are an issue, the buy rate could be further slowed by the high cost of integration of MBDA Selected Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR) 3 precision ground attack missiles and MBDA Meteor long range air-to-air missiles, both unique to the UK. Together these are weapons which will make the British F-35s more capable than those flown by the forces of other nations, but they will not be available until 2024 at the earliest and until then will leave the RN with serious capability deficiencies. [4] The SPEAR 3 missile will be particularly valuable because it will be capable of attacking land and naval targets at a range of 100km+. Of note there will also be an electronic warfare (EW) variant of the same weapon providing the aircraft with a significant electronic attack capability. The Meteor missile with a range of 100km+ and a speed of Mach 4 will provide a step change in capability in that it can complement the RN's primary long-range surface-to-air missile, the MBDA Aster 30.

The unqualified need for surface attack weapons is highlighted by the reality that between them the four RN escorts assigned to CSG21 carry only four obsolete Boeing Harpoon Block 1C missiles. These are on board the T23 frigate HMS KENT. The plan is to replace these with a limited buy of missiles under the title of the Interim Surface to Surface Guided Weapon (I-SSGW) programme, with the first of these to be delivered by the end of 2023. Also required to perform the land attack role the most likely candidates are the: Lockheed Martin Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) AGM-158C; Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM); and, Saab RBS15 Mk



RN Merlin Crowsnest from 820 Naval Air Squadron commissioned for CSG21 (from Falkland War designs) operating from HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH.

4 'Gungnir' (Odin's Spear). Initially to be fitted to the five Type 23 (towed array) frigates capable of concurrent anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-surface warfare ASuW operations, the missiles will be transferred to the Type 26s as they enter service. Ominously as at August 2021 the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has still to formally invite bids from industry. The T26 frigates will eventually be equipped with the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (FCASW) from 2028. This is an Anglo-French weapon to be designed and built by MBDA, the programme completed the Concept Phase in July 2021. As with the SPEAR 3 and Meteor missiles there will a considerable gap between development, orders being placed, integration of the weapons system and entry into service. Until the latter half of this decade the RN will have comparatively little with which to fight should a shooting war break out.

Other serious deficiencies exist within the RN's escort fleet. The T45 has had a troubled existence with ongoing WR-21 gas turbine powerplant problems. This was highlighted when HMS DIAMOND suffered a breakdown on 7 July and was forced to stay behind at Augusta in Sicily leaving other ships of CSG21 to sail through the Suez Canal. The destroyers are currently being put through a programme of rectification with the first T45, HMS DIAMOND, entering the Power Improvement Package (PIP) programme in 2020. On a brighter note the T45s are to be equipped with twenty-four MBDA Sea Ceptor SAMs which are in addition to the current load out of forty-eight Aster missiles. This represents a considerable improvement in armament. Both programmes will be completed by yet to be determined dates and will undoubtedly, as exhibited with the PIP, face serious delays.

One further glaring deficiency must be mentioned, this being the radar equipment employed by the RN. The T23s are equipped with BAE Systems ARTISAN conventional radar which has an antenna rotating at 30rpm. This is at least two generations behind modern Active Electronically Scanned Array radars. Ominously this radar is also to be fitted to the T26 frigates. Additionally, the Merlin Crowsnest helicopters employ a radar originally equipped the Westland Sea King AEW2 which was born out of a Falklands War requirement for such an aircraft. A system developed in 1982, no matter how much it has been updated, will hardly be adequate to meet future challenges.

CONCLUSION

As a 'showing the flag' exercise and a demonstration of the UK's desire to establish stronger relations, particularly defence partnerships with the wider global community post-Brexit, CSG21 can be considered to have met its objectives. Nevertheless, in doing so it highlighted the reality that the RN has suffered from serious under investment for at least three decades with any money that was available being set aside for the aircraft carriers and the *Successor* SSBN programmes. It is only to be hoped that the announced plans for renewal of the RN do proceed, for without them the navy will remain a minor player in the face of Russian and Chinese developments of their own capabilities. ■



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NLA CRITICAL SUBMARINE DEBATE

Enjoined by the Senior Vice President and Federal Vice Presidents and based upon Peta Credlin's article in *The Australian*, (Jun 16) *Nuclear submarines challenge will define Albanese*, a debate was initiated regarding the non-trivial and contradicting issue of the twin needs to obtain nuclear powered submarines well before 2040 and extend the operational life of the *Collins-class* to cover the gap.

Credlin's article articulated the dangers of a son of Collins/interim solution. It follows many of the fears of what an interim sub might mean for the future nuclear-powered submarine – delaying, postponing, or even cancelling the program.

The NLA position on the submarine gap, potentially suggests an alternative more joint/integrated gap filler rather than an entirely new complex and expensive submarine class?

The gap could be filled by a cold war style SOSUS warning net around Australia and the SW Pacific; crewed/uncrewed surface craft Cooperatively Optimised (COOP) with variable depth sonars; more P-8 *Poseidon* patrols (working with RNZAF); a new Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) facility to cover the SW Pacific area; and a capitalised Versatile Modular System aircraft carrier (configured as to the *Izumo-class*) with F-35Bs.

The maritime, thematic, and temporal gap is much wider deeper and challenging than the GIUK, which is simple by comparison.

The worst option of all may be LOTE. Followed by *Collins-2*. High risk, least gain. Either option would be a new submarine. Dr Neil Baird has argued the same.

There are significant challenges pointed out in previous articles in *The NAVY* facing US shipbuilding in terms of old shipyards, archaic industrial relations, poor designs and an ageing workforce. There may be some wriggle room but to generate two additional *Virginia-class* in the ramp up to 100 USN SSNs is going to be challenging, any time before the 2040s. UK yards are by comparison more modern and modularised and the design may be close to right. But there is no capacity and workforce plus MOD reductionism, lack of ambition and inability to think limits any capacity to, in effect, build one SSN for RN and one for RAN, concurrently. Even if Australia had the shipyards and workforce. Additionally, despite what the PM Boris Johnson and First Sea Lord might say, there is no political vision, or ability, or military industry complex resolve or capability in UK to do so. Back to the US...



Collins-class submarines an exceptional conventional submarine.

The only realistic option if we are to replace *Collins* on an interim basis is to go Japanese or South Korean. As set out by Dr Neil Baird. But, as argued by Peta Credlin, this is likely also to allow the Labor administration off the hook – and push nuclear powered submarines into the long grass. If not cancellation at the end of this Parliament – AUKUS notwithstanding.

In all of this debate, it is necessary to note that this is a political-strategic leadership decision to go SSN. Left to its own resources, Navy has enough on its plate to stay with the same numbers and force structure – without the ambition, capability, capacity, leads, engineers or appetite-in-being to grow the fleet for SSN.

SSN POLICY POSITION

The following NLA policy position was recommended:

BLUF: *The League has been an active supporter of a nuclear powered submarine capability since 1985 and thus welcomes the decision to acquire the capability for Australia's security. We are concerned however, at the potential impact on our undersea warfare capability a protracted acquisition may impose.*

The problem remains that the dates and outcomes don't align. It took 16 years to build six *Collins* from announcement to last sub in the water. If it is decided at the end of 2022 to get an interim sub it will take a year to decide which one and then another two years to customise it to RAN needs (bearing in the mind the lessons learnt from the *Prescott-McIntosh* inquiry). Add that to 16 years for another six brand new subs

(Japanese or South Korean). That means that the last boat would enter service in 2042. Two years later then current planning for our first SSN.

However, if the yard is geared up for SSK production how long is it going to take to re-tool for SSN production? At least another four years?

So Australia wouldn't start building till 2046 (assuming no delays with the above) with first in the water in say 2054? But the first new SSK will still have another 15-20 years left in the hull. How is that value for money, will be the media and political question?

Additionally, Japanese and South Koreans may not be able to deliver any earlier from their yards as the threat from China is on their doorstep. Concomitantly, it needs to be an Australian build, remembering we haven't built a submarine in 21 years and all the 'builders' and project management people have moved on. So we start from scratch again; negating the need for SSN.

The irony is that "back" in the 2000s we examined four options to replace *Collins*. 'More *Collins*' and 'off the shelf' options were discontinued in favour of a completely new sub or a *Collins* derivative, as our needs are unique. In the end Defence went with a hybrid off the shelf in the form of the Short Fin Barracuda. If we were to go South Korean or Japanese we would probably have to modify it (potentially less so for the South Korean option) as we did to the French boat. So the question will be asked:

Why not just go back to the French boat?

At least we were a few years ahead of the curve of the other Asian boats.

SETTING ASIDE THE CAPABILITY ISSUES THERE IS THE POLITICS

Take this simplistic scenario:

Anthony goes to the milk bar to buy a double choc thick shake from Joe the American milk bar owner. A thick shake costs \$10. The time is 20:22hrs. Joe says "man, my machine is working flat out. I can't make it for that guy down there until 20:40hrs". Anthony says "OK, I'd like it earlier but I guess I'll have to wait."

Along come two of Anthony's school friends. They say "hey, while you wait why not get a chocy milk from the fridge as well". Anthony says "but its \$7 and I only have enough for my thick shake as the flu season was really bad this century".

Then Adam goes into the milk bar. He hates Joe and thick shakes and says to Anthony "if you don't wait and just take the chocy milk I'll let you come to my place and copy my homework. You can then donate the remaining \$3 and be super super popular". Anthony, says "OK, this chocy milk is good enough". And they leave the milk bar at 20:39hrs.

Obviously the above is a take on Australian politics today. When Prime Minister Anthony Albanese wants to get legislation through the Senate that isn't supported by the Liberals, he will have to turn to the Greens Adam Bandt. The Greens have already said that any legislative negotiations on any topic will first involve the cancellation of the SSN project. Consequently, if an interim solution is in the field then it becomes the solution for short term political expediency and bye bye SSNs.

Experience working with the Greens by some NLA members suggests that the above scenario will play out. In the parable, if no 'chocy milk' is available, then the PM will have to wait for his thick shake from Joe. It is in the interests of Australia and our Allies to make sure of that.

PROPOSED NLA POLICY POSITION

The following policy position was proposed:

The League has been an active supporter of a nuclear powered submarine capability since 1985 and thus welcomes the decision to acquire the capability for Australia's security. We are concerned however, at the potential impact on our undersea warfare capability a protracted acquisition may impose.

- The above high-level policy avoids 'solutionising' from the glossy brochure (as that's never worked); noting:

- Australia cannot risk defeat being snatched from the jaws of victory on the SSN capability.
- While the argument is attractive for the interim (New submarines and / or LOTE), NLA has worked too hard for this to accidentally shoot ourselves in the foot at the last minute.

GAP FILLER?

As previously noted, the maritime, thematic, and temporal gap to be filled is much wider deeper and challenging than the GIUK.

UUVs and large numbers is a pre-requisite. Australia could build them here. At least five for every *Collins-class* submarine. Essentially wrapping each *Collins* in a UUV cloak. And providing opportunity for optional crewing downstream. In other words, turning the *Collins* itself into a UUV as part of an upgrade (not LOTE) program. Critically, the *Collins* becomes the UUV controller, eyes on, in situ. The Master switch...

The worst option of all is LOTE. Followed by *Collins-2*. It would be a new submarine. Dr Neil Baird maintains the same.

The challenge facing Australia today is to adequately extend the useful operational life of its current first-class *Collins-class* submarines, without undertaking a highly risky and potentially unsafe LOTE rebuild and endangering the SSN procurement.

Incredibly, at least one fully crewed *Collins-class* submarine deploys each year from the West Coast, to operate off the East Coast, via the Great Southern Ocean and Bight! And returns each year. Travelling largely on the surface, its speed of advance is not much faster than the speed of HMS VICTORY in 1805. This is a patent nonsense.

Of the *six-Collins*, four are operational at any one time; one in long-term and another in shorter-term maintenance.

The argument for Versatile Modular Systems has been to use commercial ships in support and warship roles, modularised to fit.

Significantly reducing hull usage, would act to extend life and therefore greatly reduce the need for LOTE and / or its costs. Emphasis might be placed on an upgrade rather than rebuild.

The proposal is that the RAN acquire three Heavy Lift ships, each capable of carrying two *Collins-class* submarines and associated UUVs. Two of these ships would be dedicated as fast transit mother ships, and the third as an experimental capability.

Additionally, the Heavy Lift Ships would be:

- Crewed as Merchant Ships (Auxiliary or RAN);
- Modularised for:
 - Submarine support systems – allowing the submarine to act as a trainer while in transit;
 - Hotel facilities, for [two] *Collins* and UUV crews and engineering support capabilities;
 - Self-defence Weapons;
 - Weapons (Torpedo) Magazines;
 - C2 facilities to process and augment/support the operation of *Collins* and multiple UUVs.

Significantly, such an approach is conservatively estimated to reduce the usage of existing hulls by as much as 33%, thus extending the life of the *Collins-class* to cover off the SSN-gap. Moreover, this approach would take the pressure off building the East Coast Submarine Base, with the Heavy Ship capability providing the hotel services and engineering capabilities to sustain on board all maintenance other than a full refit.



HMCS CHICOUTIMI (SSK 879) aboard the heavy lift ship Tern in Halifax harbour on April 6, 2009.



Boeing Orca-class UUV.

The full costs saved in outfitting and operating the Fleet in this way, from 2023 to 2040 is estimated to be \$5B in terms of the estimated \$6B costs for full LOTE rebuild.

It would be what we were doing if we were at war, so why not now. . .

COLLINS-UUV HEAVY LIFT WRAPAROUND

The *Collins-UUV* wraparound proposal allowing for optional *Collins*-crewing and heavy mother-ship lift capacity would additionally extend life safely and provide an innovative solution to “the gap”, matched against the criteria set out by the proposed NLA policy position.

Australia would get much more bang for the buck and it would be an innovative solution, aligned to Australian strengths.

UUV have large crewing (and data-centric) footprints of their own - so local (operational) tethering to Heavy Lift mother ships and *Collins* would make sense in all regards.

END GAME

The Albanese Government may want a way off the AUKUS-SSN hook. This carries considerable risk. The proposal set out by the NLA:

1. Allows the longer-term introduction of SSNs matched to long-lead [UK or U.S.] procurement programmes;
2. Enables the growing of nuclear power engineering and back-aft expertise, over a realistic timeframe;
3. De-risks the hugely expensive and potentially unsafe *Collins*-LOTE program;
4. Removes the need for an alternative submarine-class build;
5. Extends the life of the *Collins-class* by as much as 33%

6. Plays significantly to Australia's engineering strengths of innovation and automation through:
 - a. the 21st Century application of *Collins* / Heavy Lift wraparound UUVs;
 - b. augmenting the *Collins-class*;
 - c. capitalised through the introduction of heavy lift mother ships.

As significantly, it would allow the Albanese-government to maintain the longer-term SSN program without diffusing intent. In fact, it would provide an enhanced regional capability apposite for the moment and capable of significantly enhancing RAN power projection, and therefore Australian deterrence capability, pending arrival of Australia's first SSN.

AUKUS

A bipartisan group of U.S. House lawmakers unveiled in June legislation that would help the Royal Australian Navy train its future submarine warfare officers with U.S. sailors.

Dubbed the “The Australia-U.S. Submarine Officer Pipeline Act,” the legislation would allow Australia to send at least two of its submarine warfare officers to train with American sailors each year. The Royal Australian Navy officers would first attend the Navy Nuclear Propulsion School, then take the Submarine Officer Basic Course, and finally deploy aboard a U.S. submarine after finishing the basic course, according to text of the bill.

“The new bipartisan bill will establish a joint training pipeline between the U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Navy, and will enable the start of U.S.-based training of Commanding Officers for Australia's future fleet of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS alliance,” the AUKUS working group said in a news release.

The bill would mandate that the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy begin the training exchange in 2023 and continue it in the years to follow.

The legislation is the product of Congress' AUKUS working group, which lawmakers created in April to help advance the new partnership between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.

The bill comes as the U.S., the U.K., and Australia continue an 18-month evaluation period to determine what's necessary for Australia to develop nuclear-powered submarines.

“The AUKUS alliance is the most important national security partnership that America has entered into in decades. Its centerpiece is creating an Australian nuclear-powered undersea fleet of submarines, which all three allies are actively designing. While that work is ongoing, it makes sense to open the U.S. Navy's nuclear training programs to Australia's naval officers to acquire proficiency in the operation of nuclear submarines,” Rep. Joe Courtney (D-Conn.), a member of the AUKUS working group who is also the chair of the House Armed Services seapower and project forces subcommittee, said in a statement.

RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR

While the denouement will necessarily be ashore, the Russo-Ukraine war will be lost at sea, before it is won ashore.

Putin's land grab is intended ultimately to seize Odessa and the Black Sea coast, below the 47th parallel. Thus, removing Ukraine's ability to exist as an independent state, in anything but name.

Stubborn and exceptional resistance has so far prevented this seizure but it remains uncertain how this war ends, or can end.

While initially coalescing support against Russia and bringing the European democracies together with NATO, the U.S. and the EU, divisions are appearing. With President Macron and Kissinger both advocating for an appeased solution. Largely to the detriment of a sovereign state, in this case Ukraine.

The 1917 Russian Revolution was brought forward by the starvation caused by the blocking of non-icebound Russian ports and ships in the Black Sea through the closure of the Dardanelles by Turkey. One of the key reasons for launching the 1915 Gallipoli campaign was to open up the sea routes to Russia – and so keep her in the war.

The positions are now arguably reversed – with much of the world facing starvation without the ability to bring the grain carriers



USS KEARSAGE (LHD 3) moored in Stockholm, Sweden June 03, 2022 Part of 40 NATO warships undertaking Baltic Operations 22.

into Ukrainian ports, and extract the grain stockpiled from last year's harvest.

The Baltic states, also defined by the maritime, are equally anxious as recognised by both Finland and Sweden seeking to join NATO.

Putin having failed in his gambit and exposed his Chinese Ally for what they are, has potentially only two final recourses to play. Both are likely to involve a maritime incursion on a NATO state or its shipping. Equally, there may be a need at some point to stage a new "Berlin Airlift", with convoys of grain carriers being escorted and channels cleared to Ukrainian ports.

For this reason, and in an unprecedented move, the French, British, and U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Forces all gathered earlier this year in Faslane.

In the meantime, Putin awaits General Winter's return, when energy prices will sky rocket in the northern hemisphere and shortages will be exploited. The EU is unlikely to be able to sustain its position for long, member states will break away at some stage. Some NATO members also. It will be left then to the usual alliance of Canada, Norway, the U.S., the UK, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Australia to hold the line, with Scandinavian, and Baltic Allies.

There is scant support from the rest of the world for the western position on Ukraine. If nothing else, Putin has assisted in further isolating the global west from the non-Liberal and democratic states that make up the majority of countries in the UN. Many now deeply in hoc to China.

TAIWAN

Xi Jinping has made clear his intent to reunify Taiwan with the mainland by 2025, including by force, if not achieved beforehand.

It is increasingly clear from the coordinated support for Russia against Ukraine, that if Putin had succeeded in seizing Ukraine in the first 72 hours – as his advisors had told him was possible – that China would have in all likelihood moved on Taiwan this year. At least as far as the Quemoy and Matsu Islands, lying close to the mainland are concerned.

The delay caused by Ukraine's resistance may unfortunately end up strengthening China's position in 2025, exactly by denuding the West's will and ability to support Taiwan.

ANTARCTICA IN THE FRAME

Russia and China have made it clear that they will contest and if needed, revoke the Antarctic Treaty System, if necessary, before its renewal date of 2048 in order to allow for mining and, potentially, military basing.

Already China has established a belt through Australian Antarctic Territory as part of its Belt & Road Initiative, thereby connecting the Pacific with the Atlantic.

As the ice melts across the Arctic, Russia is similarly seeking to militarise and exploit its position across the North Pole, where it has already launched numerous contested claims. Putting pressure on NATO Allies, including the U.S. Norway, Denmark, and Canada. China continues to seek northern basing facilities, including recently in Greenland.

RETURN OF THE BOATS

Admitting the collapse of its economy, Sri Lanka announced in June it will default on all its international loan commitments, pushing an estimated 500,000 of its 22 million population into extreme poverty.

Although the root cause is a failure of politics and the decision to place a ban on imports of chemical fertilisers to ease the burden on the balance of payments, the result has

implications for all economies reliant on inexpensive Russian energy, and fertilizers.

Not only in developing countries but also in the Western World, do police and security forces recognise the connection between social unrest, crime and the price of fuel and bread. As for the poorer suburbs of Melbourne, is the case in the Middle East and South East Asia.

The economic crisis in Sri Lanka giving rise to an increase in people trafficking emerging from the island is potentially a portent of what is coming to the rest of the world if prices and shortages persist.

While the conflict in the Ukraine continues, these systemic failings will push more and more people into poverty and malnutrition around the world, not just in developing countries.

Russia is the world's largest exporter of superphosphate. Ukraine is the world's number four exporter and number one in the export of urea, which is needed to create nitrogenous fertilisers. China, which accounts for about one-tenth of the world's urea and one-third of another important farm product involved in the production of diammonium phosphate.

General Northern Winter may yet provide the Russian Leader the victory he is demanding in Ukraine. He appears more than happy to seed discontent across the western world and use the misery of millions to achieve his aims. As have Russian (and Chinese) Dictators before him. Except this time on a global scale.

DEVONPORT STATION

Dr Oliver Hartwich, Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative, a Wellington-based think tank, wrote recently (11 May, *The Australian*) on the Foreign Policy lessons New Zealand should learn from Germany. He concluded that the parallels in both countries' international positioning are astonishing.

As a German and New Zealand citizen, he noted that Putin's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February exposed Germany's major foreign policy mistakes as being three separate but related issues.

- First, the Germans realised how dependent they were on Russia, especially in the energy sector.
- Second, it finally dawned on Germany that its military capacity was depleted.
- And third, Berlin found its relations with its major security allies and neighbours strained.

Hartwich recognised that not just for the past few years but for the past three decades,



Germany indulged in the dream of its special relationship with Moscow. Germany then chose to ignore Russia's geopolitical ambitions by pretending that Russian oil, gas and coal exports were just ordinary business transactions. Consequently, Germany allowed its armed forces to deteriorate to the point where it had no ships that sailed, no planes that flew, and no soldiers properly equipped for their missions.

All these policy decisions were traduced by Putin's invasion of Russia. "Germany emerged as a nation that had naively confused its strategic and economic interests, and... isolated itself from its Western allies".

Like Germany, New Zealand put its economic interests with China ahead of any security concerns. And dependencies shaped by its agricultural exports, rather than its energy imports. But it is a similar strategic dependence regardless.

New Zealand has also neglected its defence spending. At 1.5 per cent of GDP, New Zealand spends about as much on its military as Germany. That is too little to defend New Zealand, and also insufficient to pull its weight in the region.

New Zealand was content to free-ride on the Defence provided by its allies, most notably Australia and the US. And just as Germany, New Zealand irritated these allies, for example over its reluctance to engage more deeply through the Five Eyes partnership. And its gratuitous criticism of AUKUS.

Like Germany's pursuit of carbon and nuclear zero by using cheap available Russian gas, New Zealand, banned offshore oil and gas exploration under the umbrella of pursuing a 'net zero' emissions goal.

As a result of ambitious carbon targets, energy security has deteriorated in both countries. The Germans are now desperate to correct past mistakes and establish alternative sources of energy.

In cleaning up the messes of their past policy choices, the Germans now recognise two things

- First, dealing with autocracies comes with major risks.
- Second, liberal democracies must assume responsibility, both militarily and politically, within the Western security framework.

Dr Hartwich concludes that New Zealand still has to learn these lessons. And it would better do so quickly.

Meanwhile, following a self-invited visit to the U.S., rewarded by a visit to the White House, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern downplayed the reshuffle of her Cabinet as "minor". Yet the key minister,



Five British aircraft carriers of the British Pacific Fleet at anchor 1945.

more notable by her absence in the region and her pro-China, anti-ANZUS stance on Foreign Affairs, Nanaia Mahuta, stayed put as Minister for local government and foreign affairs. Reflecting more the increasingly factional, Maori divisions within the New Zealand Labour Party and its Government.

Mahuta, while being critical of Australia, including on the Solomon Islands, has been notably absent from the region at a time when China is aggressively expanding its security belt across Pacific island nations. Former Labour cabinet minister Michael Bassett said:

Mahuta was Foreign Minister "in name only", adding: "Mahuta holds a Rasputin-like grip over Jacinda, who seems permanently in thrall to anything promoting Maori that Nanaia comes up with."

It would be interesting to have been a fly on the wall at Prime Minister Aherm's pre-briefings in the West Wing. It may have made for uncomfortable viewing.

GREENWICH STATION

First Sea Lord, or Chief of the British Royal Navy (RBN?), Sir Ben Key announced at PAC 22 and more recently a significant ramping-up of British Defence and diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific to combat rising change threats and re-establish the UK as a major player in the region. This follows on what is considered to have been a successful Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 21 deployment, see Paper 2.

Noting HMS TAMAR's arrival in Darwin, the Royal Navy First Sea Lord said "Britain's increased influence in the region under Prime Johnson's Indo-Pacific tilt was a return to waters we once knew well".

Sir Ben went on to note the deployment of

Britain's newest and greenest warship (HMS TAMAR) highlighted the UK's "deep interest and renewed presence in the Indo-Pacific".

"The Indo-Pacific tilt, announced in the 2021 integrated review of foreign policy, security, defence and development, is driven by the UK's strong economic ties to the region,"

Writing in *The Australian*, he said.

"We benefit from an extremely strong network of diplomatic missions from Kolkata to Canberra, membership of the Five Power Defence Arrang recently the granting of dialogue partner status from ASEAN, the first time this was granted in 25 years."

The Batch 2 offshore patrol vessels, HMS TAMAR and HMS SPEY propulsion systems reduce nitrogen oxide and carbon monoxide emissions by up to 97 per cent.

On AUKUS, Admiral Key offered that:

"It is also profound, only the second time our American cousins have agreed to share nuclear technology in the seven decades that they have operating submarines."

Two OPVs do not a fleet make, no matter how green, competent and attractive. The UK is ideas and cash-strapped. Lack of ambition and capacity to think is constraining the RNs ability to mobilise and grow. It remains to be seen if the political will exists to support its growth over the longer term. And if the RN leadership, has the competency, will, intent and guts to take the RN back to the high seas. The recent past is not a good indication. The RN will perhaps achieve such an aim if it were to show the resolve and pluck that led to the last great Empire Fleet, the British Pacific Fleet. A Fleet that fought its way back into the Indo-Pacific against the strong opposition of the USN, and the designs of the IJN. ■



QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY HONOURS 2022: RAVI INDER SINGH NIJJER, AM

Ravi Inder Singh Nijjer, was awarded an AM following a 62-year career in shipping that continues to steam ahead to this day.

Joining as a Merchant Navy officer in India in 1960, he has been awarded the AM as an international expert on maritime safety.

"It's been quite an improbable life for a boy who grew up in landlocked Jullundur," Mr Nijjer laughed. "In fact, that's the name of my soon-to-be published book: *An Improbable Life*."

Following education at The Bishop Cotton School (Simla) Nijjer was serving in Hong Kong in 1968 when he met his Australian wife. They moved to Australia in 1970 and he continued to serve on the seas until 1980. He then moved to education and head at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Transport's Department of Marine Transport. In his role there, he rewrote the Masterclass I syllabus. Commenting on today:

"There's not much of an industry left in Australia, though," Nijjer lamented. "When I arrived in 1970 there was a thriving merchant shipping industry with over 100 Australia-registered ships. The number has dwindled to around 12 ships. That's despite being an island continent where 99% of imports and exports are transported by sea, with hundreds of large commercial ships operating in Australian waters. The decline has many people seriously concerned. The new prime minister is promising to create a strategic fleet of up to a dozen ships that can be relied on to deliver essential cargoes and fuel supplies."

MERCHANT NAVY DAY 3 SEPTEMBER 2022

Merchant Navy Day occurs each year on 3 September on the anniversary of the first merchant marine sinking of World War II. The British liner SS *Athenia* was torpedoed and sunk without warning by the German submarine U-30. This happened only 10 hours after Britain's declaration of war in 1939.

During the World Wars and the Vietnam War, merchant ships and their civilian crew have been responsible for transporting service personnel, supplies and equipment. Some vessels were converted to military hospital ships for wartime service.

The Battle of the Atlantic was fought across the war's most dangerous shipping lanes. Over 3000 Allied merchant ships were sunk. Some 30,000 Allied sailors and merchant mariners were lost at sea.

Over 800 Australian merchant mariners died serving the Allied cause during the World Wars, almost 10% of Australia's Merchant Marine. More than Australians killed in the Vietnam and Korean wars.

The Merchant Navy Memorial, on the edge of Lake Burley Griffin in Canberra, commemorates the contribution made by the Australian Merchant Navy during the World Wars. The Shrine in Melbourne also remembers our Merchant Sailors, as do memorials in Newcastle and other major ports.

MARITIME UNION OF AUSTRALIA 150TH ANNIVERSARY

The MUA traces its lineage back to the Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia, whose roots lay in the formation on the Australian waterfront in September 1872 of two unions in Sydney, the Labouring Men's Union of Circular Quay and the West Sydney Labouring Men's Association which merged ten years later to form the Sydney Wharf Labourers' Union. The Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) covers waterside workers, seafarers, port workers, professional divers, and office workers associated with Australian ports. The MUA was formed in 1993 with merger of the Seamen's Union of Australia and the Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia.


On 29 February 2016, at the MUA national conference, delegates voted unanimously in favour of a merger with the CFMEU. The Fair Work Commission approved the merger in March 2018.

MUA WELCOMES LABOR VICTORY

Opening his account with the new Labor Government, Paddy Crumlin (National Secretary) stated:

"Our members have been prosecuted, persecuted, lied about, undermined, sacked, vilified and conspired against by the Liberals and Nationals in line with a pattern of behaviour established by their predecessors in the 1980s and 1990s".

In a letter to members, Mr Crumlin noted the enthusiastic and early commitment by Labor to establish a *National Strategic Fleet of Australian-crewed and Australian-flagged vessels*. This is a crucial step towards securing Australian supply chains and revitalising an industry which has been



SS Athenia sunk at the outbreak of WW2, 3 September 1939

allowed to decline under successive Liberal leaders as big-businesses have shifted more and more of their seaborne trade on to Flag of Convenience ships crewed by vulnerable and exploited international seafarers being paid as little as \$2 per hour.

Paddy Crumlin added:

"Labor's victory and the election of that great supporter of decent and sustainable shipping policies and maritime workers -- Anthony Albanese -- provides a new and definitely our greatest opportunity to protect our rights and jobs and by extension all workers' rights, jobs, health and retirements."

Bill Shorten, whose policy this is, has been appointed as the Minister for NDIS in the Albanese-Government. It might have been appropriate to make Mr Shorten also Minister for the Merchant Navy – providing wider recognition of the role. Noting the fact that, unlike almost all his colleagues, Bill Shorten has actually served. As an Army Reservist. In a bolder move, as advocated by *The NAVY*, if the Government elects to reinstate single Service political secretariats, as required for any coherent mobilisation – Mr Shorten should become the Secretary of Navy, including the Merchant Marine. A bold move validated in these uncertain times.


The drive for the unions to return Australian Industrial Relations to the 1970s is not the answer. It will simply drive capital further off shore. At the same time, it is clear that the accountancy driven consultancy companies and their media-techs have paid scant regard to sovereign capabilities, knowledge and rights. They have done considerable damage to all Western democracies – immorally setting global ethics and profit before values. A new compact is urgently required – as seen in the recent debacle over energy supplies. ■

TWO MYTHS OF THE SINKING OF HMAS ARMIDALE

THE LAST STAND OF TEDDY SHEEAN VC

By Dr Tom Lewis

The forthcoming 80th anniversary of the sinking of HMAS ARMIDALE, a gallant ship of the Royal Australian Navy, and the awarding of the Navy's only Victoria Cross, is an opportune time to dispel two myths associated with this battle. The first is that some of the corvette's survivors were massacred by a Japanese submarine. The other is that the ship's commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Richards, was "shunned by the Navy" in some sort of quiet disapproval of his actions. Both of these stories need putting in their place.



Teddy Sheean VC wearing the cap tally of HMAS DERWENT, where he was training in Hobart. (Sheean family).

INTRODUCTION

The corvette HMAS ARMIDALE was lost in tragic circumstances in 1942. Strafed, bombed, and torpedoed mercilessly by Japanese aircraft, she went down fighting inbetween Darwin and Timor. One of her young seaman, Teddy Sheean, returned to his 20mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft cannon after the order to "Abandon Ship" had been

given, and fired until the vessel sank beneath him. 101 of those on board died, and the survivors endured days at sea before some were rescued.

CLAIM AND DETAIL – FACTS AND MYTHOLOGY

In recent years a claim has been made that a Japanese submarine massacred survivor. This suggestion was first contained in an article published in *The Age* newspaper in 2005. [1] The impact of this claim on the families of the ARMIDALE men, and the subsequent rewriting of the whole story if it was found to be true, is well worth analysis.

The submarine suggested was *I-165*. The article summarized research carried out by one of the ARMIDALE survivors, to be later released in the book *HMAS Armidale Lives On*, by Frank Walker. That book is essentially a re-issue of Walker's first book, *The Ship that had to Die*, on the ARMIDALE, with updates.

The relevant paragraphs from the article are:


New research cited in *HMAS Armidale Lives On*, by Frank B. Walker, to be published next Saturday, shows the big Japanese submarine *I-165* was lurking in the vicinity during the search for the raft in the Timor Sea on December 9 and 10, 1942.

The same submarine played a role in the destruction of the British naval Z Force, including the battleships *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, off Malaya a year earlier, and on January 28, 1943, fired 10 shells at midnight into the tiny West Australian town of Port Gregory, north of Geraldton. It also sank nine merchant ships during the course of the war.

The research has been collated by one of HMAS ARMIDALE's seven surviving crew, former Veterans Affairs chief psychologist V.R. "Ray" Leonard, 81, who was on the raft for three days before being chosen to go aboard a whaler lifeboat. The separation was "a very sad memory" for him. He believes the raft's occupants, poignantly photographed by an RAAF Catalina flying boat, might have been shot by the submarine, either in the water or on board after capture – but says he cannot be certain.

Dr Leonard has turned up details showing the submarine had been ordered from Penang to Surabaya, in east Java, in November 1942, because of an Italian report (which turned out to be false) that Australians and Americans would invade Timor from the south.

It therefore might be thought that the release of Walker's new book, in the same year, would contain a more enlarged account of the submarine theory. But most strangely, it does not. The new section



HMAS ARMIDALE (J240) Image ANMM.

is an addition of a mere 119 words. The original paragraph from the first book is shown in the left hand column below; the revised paragraph from the second on the right:

Nothing of the fate of the men on the raft has ever been established. The most likely scenario is that one of the Japanese cruisers found the raft party, took the rafts and the pieces of wreckage and the men on board and executed them. This would not have been beyond the Japanese, as evidenced by the execution of 21 army nurses earlier that year on Banka Island, and countless other atrocities that were matters of routine for the Japanese. [2] That is the only theory that would account for...

Nothing definite of the fate of the men on the raft has ever been established. One scenario is that one of the Japanese cruisers found the raft party, took the rafts and the pieces of wreckage and the men on board and executed them. Another scenario is that a Japanese submarine captured the raft survivors and killed them. Research by Ray Leonard, one of the whaler survivors, showed that the Japanese submarine I-65 had been sent from the submarine base at Penang to patrol the Arafura Sea, and intercept any Australian force attempting to retake Timor. It would have reached the Arafura Sea on or about the date of the ARMIDALE's sinking, December 1, and could have found the raft. Under international law, which the Japanese totally ignored, it is legitimate to fire on an invasion force, but not on survivors of a sinking. The men on the raft could not possibly have been classified as an invasion force, but it [This] would not have been beyond the Japanese, as evidenced by the execution of 21 army nurses earlier that year on Banka Island, and countless other atrocities that were matters of routine for the Japanese. That is the only theory that would account for...[3]

This 119-word insertion is all that the new book contained of the submarine atrocity suggestion. There are no sources given for the claim: indeed the style of Walker's first and second book is not to use footnotes or endnotes but rather give the source of his research directly in the text. That is fine, but there is nothing recounted at all to show where the information came from, and the book's "bibliography" (on page 9 in the original, and page 11 in the second work) is six works, ranging from Gill's authoritative history of the RAN in WWII to five Australian accounts – two being first-person diary recounts from the war – of various aspects of the naval conflict. None touch on the ARMIDALE action beyond a few brief mentions.

AGE-LESS STORY?

Indeed, *The Age* article gives more information than the book. It says: "the big Japanese submarine I-165 was lurking in the vicinity during the search for the raft in the Timor Sea on December 9 and 10, 1942."

There were indeed a number of instances of submarine commanders ordering the killing of maritime survivors in WWII, including instances involving the Imperial Japanese Navy, the (British) Royal Navy, the Soviet Navy, the German Kriegsmarine, and the United States Navy, despite the fact that all of the major nations had agreed before the war not to take such action.[4]


By virtue of a Treaty which Japan had signed, passengers and crew of ships under submarine attack in WWII should have been safe.[5] As Lord Russell of Liverpool explains [6] in his seminal work *The Knights of Bushido*, the personnel of torpedoed ships were not even to be placed in ships' boats unless those small craft were assured of safety by sea conditions, proximity to land or another vessel.

However, an order issued by the Japanese in 1943 stated: "...Do not stop at the sinking of enemy ships and cargoes. At the same time carry out the complete destruction of the crews of the enemy's ships..." [7] Russell lists nine instances during the war where merchant ships were torpedoed. Then the submarine surfaced, a few prisoners were taken for interrogation, and then the lifeboats and rafts were destroyed, and the remaining survivors murdered.

The ships were the *SS Daisy Moller*, *SS British Chivalry*, *MV Sutley*, *SS Ascot*, *MV Behar*, *SS Nancy Moller*, *SS Tjissalak*, *SS Jean Nicolet*, and the *SS John A Johnson*. They were of British, American and Dutch flags. [8]



Lieutenant Commander David Herbert Richards (AWM).



USS POPE (DD-225) Off Luzon 15 January 1924.

ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES

On 26 January 1943 the US Navy submarine WAHOO, commanded by Dudley Morton, torpedoed and sank three Japanese ships, one of them a troop transport which was also carrying many Indian prisoners. After surfacing the submarine closed the lifeboats. One report says that the submarine was attacked by machine-gun fire. Using the deck gun and machine guns the submarine crew killed hundreds of those in the water. One of the US crew commented to another "...if those troops get rescued, we're going to lose a lot of American boys' lives digging them out of foxholes and shooting them out of palm trees". [9] It seems the US crew did not know there were Indian prisoners on board the ship, and therefore many of them were killed too.

The men of the submarine USS BARB had the same attitude when they used their four-inch gun on what they thought was a derelict Japanese patrol boat, only to see "about eight or nine Japs" come running out onto the deck. But "our four-inch crew, being very bloodthirsty at that time, landed a shot right in their midst, which blew them all apart". [10]

In the European theatre submarine warfare saw similar incidents. The German submarine *U-37* torpedoed the 5,242-ton *Severn Leigh* in 1940. The submarine then surfaced and used her machine guns to kill 18 of the survivors, the submarine commander later saying that he thought he was being attacked by them.

U-852, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Heinz Eck, shot up the survivors from the freighter *Peleus* with machine guns and grenades after the ship had been torpedoed. He and two of his officers were executed after the war, and another two imprisoned, in the only case of capital punishment being awarded for such crimes committed by submariners. Some of this sort of action may well have been the result of the infamous Donitz order, the subject of much debate after the War, in which the German naval leader supposedly ordered against picking up survivors, although there is considerable room for doubt as to whether that was indeed the case. [11]

Such actions in the Atlantic submarine warfare included the Allied side. British naval officer, broadcaster and writer Ludovic Kennedy tells of a British submarine, the crew of which had killed seven survivors of a Greek schooner. The men were trying to escape in a rubber dinghy after their vessel was set for scuttling by the submariners. Kennedy does not name the boat's captain or the vessel, but he did research the incident, and found the submarine's report of proceedings confirmed the action, and even listed another, where a small ship flying "the Nazi flag" had been sunk by a surface gun action, with machine guns used "to destroy the boats and personnel". [12]

ARMIDALE CRIMES?

So indeed, there were atrocities carried out against ship survivors, but this was an occasional practice carried out by several forces. So was this the situation in the ARMIDALE case? We noted in the previous chapter that the raft was sighted on December 7th. The article suggests – there is no source – that "the submarine had been ordered from Penang to Surabaya, in east Java, in November 1942." There is no date specified in November. Then the article says that: "*I-165* was lurking in the vicinity during the search for the raft in the Timor Sea on December 9 and 10, 1942."

This would certainly place the IJN boat in the area. Strangely, though, Walker's book says: "It would have reached the Arafura Sea on or about the date of the ARMIDALE's sinking, December 1." There is no source for this cited either. *I-165's* track is however able to be found. The comprehensive website *Nihon Kaigun* has details on the submarine's movements.[13] This site, categorizing the movements of Imperial Japanese Navy vessels in WWII, far more heavily researched than any book published to date on the vast subject, advises that:

5 December 1942:

I-165 is in the Southwest Area Fleet's SubDiv 30 with *I-162* and *I-166*.

I-165 departs Surabaya, Java on her eighth war patrol to raid commerce in the Arafura Sea.

22 December 1942:

I-165 arrives back at Surabaya.

What is of note here is the *I-165* departed Surabaya to voyage to the Arafura Sea on the 5th. It is not in the area as Walker says on the 1st of the month, but thousands of kilometres away. It is not even there when the corvette's boat is sighted and rescued on the same day – the 5th – by KALGOORLIE, because a WWII submarine is slow and especially cautious in wartime. In an area which had seen considerable battle that year, the *I-165* would have been submerged in the daylight hours as much as she could; would have travelled with extreme caution on the surface at night – boats travelled fast on the surface, but very slowly submerged; and would have dived and remained still and silent whenever she saw – or her lookouts thought they saw – enemy ships or aircraft.

It is important to underline this: submarines carried several lookouts on their conning tower bridge when surfaced, and their duty – aggressively enforced upon them – was to scout their designated section for aircraft and surface ships. For any reported contact a submarine crash-dived, her bridge team hurling themselves down the conning tower even as the emergency ballast tanks blew and the boat started its descent, with complete submergence being achieved in seconds rather than minutes. It was a fear borne of necessity: a destroyer could sink the submarine very quickly, and there was little chance of survival if the vessel was caught too close to the surface. Aircraft were even worse: they could see the submarine underwater in good conditions, and they were so fast and "on top" of the boat so quickly they rapidly became the primary menace for the underwater warriors in WWII.

SPEED OF ADVANCE

What is known in naval terms as the submarine's "speed of advance" is important here. *I-165* was a 75-man vessel known as a KD5.[14] Built in 1932, she was not particularly capable, and was armed with four forward torpedo tubes; two aft tubes, and a 10 centimetre gun. What is of interest is her speed. She was capable of nearly 21 knots on the surface, but only eight submerged. In tropical waters north of Australia, a regular and almost even twelve hours of daylight is the year-round norm. Therefore, in twelve hours at night the boat could travel theoretically over two hundred nautical miles, and in the day

around 100. We might note in parenthesis however that vessels do not usually travel at maximum speed as it consumes too much fuel. A usual cruise speed on the surface would have been 12 knots, and submerged the vessel would have travelled at around five.


Even if, however, *I-165* was proceeding at maximum speed in a straight line she could cover around 300 nautical miles a day, which is 555 kilometres. In two days, she could cover over a thousand kilometres. But this does not put her anywhere near ARMIDALE on the 5th December 1942. It is 2,062 kilometres from Surabaya to Darwin, and of course, submarines do not proceed as aircraft do, in a straight line (or in fact in a Great Circle course). What is now Indonesia is a massive archipelago of 17,508 islands [15] with shallow water all around them, demanding all sorts of course variations.

This was a time when Japanese submarine commanders knew full well what dangers could come speedily over the horizon to kill them: long-range Catalinas, short-range fighters on the lookout for a submarine on the surface, or even just below it, for, to repeat, submarines can be seen to some depth by aircraft overhead.

The combination of the speed of an aircraft; its machineguns, cannons and bombs were to be feared, but if the submarine crashed and lay quiet, eventually its tormentor might have to leave, low on fuel. But it might have called in a warship, and such an enemy was often prepared to wait around for many hours, and depth charge mercilessly anything that returned an echo, to be replaced by other warships when it left to refuel and re-arm. This was just what had happened to the Japanese *I-124* when it was sunk off Darwin in January 1942, and the *I-165's* crew knew full well that their friends still lay entombed in their submarine, sunk outside Darwin almost a year previously. [16]

There were many difficulties requiring careful navigation in confined waters. They included the need to remain covert; the need for cautious recharging of the submarine's batteries by her diesels when surfaced – and sudden diving if a threat was thought nearby, and the extra distance dictated by a non-straight track. We can therefore realistically expect *I-165* to be covering only 100 nautical miles a day, or 185 kilometres. Even achieving 200 kilometres a day, it would still take the boat twenty days to reach the action area. She had no need to hurry and every reason to be slow, silent and cautious.

If *I-165* left Surabaya on the 5th as the records show she would not have reached the area until 25 December at the earliest. This was two weeks after the corvette survivors had been found, and the search for the raft given up on the 13th. [17]



Imperial Japanese Navy Submarine I-165 carrying a Kaiten in 1945.

RECORDING TRUTHS

It should be noted at this point that Japanese records have always been found to be truthful, although in some cases lacking through wartime destruction. The commander of the *I-165* survived the war and his advice on that deployment, together with extracts from the naval records, are contained in a letter, from the Japanese historian Professor Teruaki Kawano to Australian author David Jenkins. [18] The letter cites the *I-165's* commanding officer at the time as being Lieutenant Commander Tatenosuke Tosu. This was part of investigations being carried out in relation to the sinking of HMAS SYDNEY in 1941 in its battle with the German raider *Kormoran*.

Professor Kawano questioned the former commander of submarine *I-165*. Of interest is:

- *I-165's* patrol is confirmed as 5-22 December, departing Surabaya for the Arafura Sea and returning to the same port
- Lieutenant Commander Tosu advised the boat was not re-supplied in that period
- There had been no “memorable encounters” during the deployment
- Lieutenant Commander Tosu's period of command finished on 15 March 1943

But for some, this will not be enough. Perhaps, they may say, the records were simply falsified – who would log such details anyway? Maybe *I-165* left much earlier than she did. However, despite the controversial claim of *The Age* article and the book there is absolutely no evidence of any enemy submarine being involved in the ARMIDALE loss. Nor has any been found in this author's writing of a book on the ARMIDALE; and in researching several others on WWII operations off northern Australia. There is just this bald assertion, made with no backup material: no archive entries, no interviews, and no physical evidence.

CLAIM VERITY

The claim overall is very odd. The IJN's hundreds of submarines were of course scattered all around the Pacific and associated bodies of water at this time. Just because a submarine was in an area does not mean its commander ordered a massacre. Nor does it mean he ordered a rescue. Just because some Japanese personnel behaved badly in WWII does not mean they all did. Nor do the attacks on Japanese helpless personnel by the USS WAHOO's commander mean this was how all US submarine commanders behaved.

Frank Walker has hinted at the possibility before. In both books he suggests:

The most likely scenario is that one of the Japanese cruisers found the raft party, took the rafts and the pieces of wreckage and the men on board and executed them. This would not have been beyond the Japanese, as evidenced by the execution of 21 army nurses earlier that year on Banka Island, and countless other atrocities that were matters of routine for the Japanese. [19]

This is not supported with evidence by Walker, and nor is it supported by evidence from the war. Survivors of enemy warships were in general treated well by the Japanese – although those who ended up in Prisoner of War camps were not given appropriate conditions and often treated abominably. But for cases of being treated well after battle one only has to look at the stories of the sinking of HMAS YARRA and HMAS PERTH – both were sunk nearby. One of the survivors of PERTH later wrote:

The Japanese sailors were curious as to our nationality but treated the Australian and American sailors kindly with eye drops for oil blindness and water and dry biscuits. Our oil covered clothing was taken away and replaced with new white cotton loin cloths... [20]



HMAS PERTH (D29) - Image AWM.

In another incident, naval officer Sam Falle gives an account of his rescue after HMS ENCOUNTER was sunk along with HMS EXETER and USS POPE on 1st March 1942 in the second Battle of the Java Sea:

It must have been about midday, for the sun was vertical and we were just south of the equator. About 200 yards away we thought we saw a Japanese destroyer. Was she a mirage? We all saw her, so perhaps she was real, but our first emotion was not joy or relief, for we expected to be machine-gunned.

There was a great bustle aboard that ship, but the main armament was trained fore and aft and there was no sign of machine-guns. The ship's sailors were lowering rope-ladders all along the side of the ship. They were smiling small brown men in their floppy white sun-hats and too-long khaki shorts.

The ship came closer. We caught hold of the rope-ladders and managed to clamber aboard. We were covered with oil and exhausted. The Japanese sailors surrounded us and regarded us with cheerful curiosity. They took cotton waste and spirit and cleaned the oil off us, firmly but gently. It was – extraordinary to relate – a friendly welcome.

I was given a green shirt, a pair of khaki shorts and a pair of gym shoes. Then we were escorted to a large space amidships and politely invited to sit down in comfortable cane chairs. We were served hot milk, bully beef and biscuits.

After a while the captain of the destroyer came down from the bridge, saluted us and addressed us in English: 'You have fought bravely. Now you are the honoured guests of the Imperial Japanese Navy. I respect the English navy, but your government is very foolish to make war on Japan.'

That fine officer searched for survivors all day, stopping to pick up even single men, until his small ship was overflowing. An awning was spread over the fo'c's'le to protect us from the sun; lavatories were rigged outboard; cigarettes were handed out; and by a biblical type of miracle, our hosts managed to give all 300 of us food and drink.

The only order we were given was not to smoke after dark lest 'English submarine' should see a lighted cigarette. The Japanese did not know, it seems, that there were no English submarines in the Java Sea. Yet they had continually stopped to rescue every survivor they could find.

Thanks to this destroyer and other Japanese ships, ENCOUNTER only lost seven men and EXETER a surprisingly small number also. The survivors from POPE were rescued by the Japanese two days later. [21]

Historian Tom Frame has also commented on the allegations contained in the Walker first edition. Beyond taking issue with he called the "extreme virulence, destructiveness and outright cruelty

of the author's criticisms and jibes at the RAN and several officers in particular," he criticised allegations of Japanese atrocities made without foundation, saying:

The fact of nurses being murdered elsewhere and in different circumstances does not establish any likelihood that it happened in the Timor Sea... It incites further anger about the war when, in this case, these sentiments are not justified by fact. Practically anything could have happened to the men on the raft. This should be the conclusion and the matter left at that. [22]

To summarise, the Japanese Navy was not characterized overall by poor treatment of shipwrecked survivors. Some submarine commanders, and some surface ship personnel, on both sides of WWII were indeed involved in massacres of ship-action survivors. But most commanders were not involved in such actions.

There is no evidence any of the ARMIDALE crew were massacred by a Japanese submarine, nor by a surface ship. Anyone who wants to suggest so needs to have evidence for their case rather simple assertion.

SECOND MYTH

The second myth is a more simple story. An inquiry was held into the ARMIDALE's sinking, normal practise in such situations. It was a straightforward affair. The conclusion was that "all reasonable steps were taken and that the actions of the Commanding Officers were correct," referring to the ships present: ARMIDALE, KURU, CASTLEMAINE and KALGOORLIE. [23]

The tragic aftermath of the warship's sinking was given especial analysis. The most poignant aspect of it was the frustrating discovery of the liferaft, showing several survivors were still alive when it was spotted from the air, but then this was followed by the unrealised subsequent search for it. The liferaft, or recognisable parts of it, has never been found.

In his book [24] published some years later, by Frank Walker, entitled *The Ship that Had to Die*, and as repeated in various accounts, it was suggested that Lieutenant Commander Richards was victimised by the Navy for the loss of his ship. The reasoning behind this is unknown: if Richards was found to be correct in his actions – by the Navy – then why would the Navy seek to suggest otherwise by denying him of further commands?

It was not only in Walker's book that the assertion was made that: "...the Navy refused to give him another command." [25] Probably leading on from that comment, the allegation has been repeated, not always by those agreeing with Walker, but because it was presumed the allegation was correct. For example, the historian Tom Frame, former naval officer, Bishop of the Defence Forces, and ethicist, acknowledged it in *Headmark*, the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, in 1991:

Walker makes three serious allegations about the subsequent handling of the loss of ARMIDALE. First, he asks why no medals were ever awarded to ARMIDALE survivors. Second, why Sheean was only mentioned-in-despatches, and third, why the commanding officer of ARMIDALE, Lieutenant-Commander Richards, did not get another command. His answer to all three questions is that the Navy wanted to cover up the loss.

I cannot answer the questions he raises. For what it is worth, I find what actually happened incomprehensible and very unfortunate. However, to suggest it amounted to a cover-up or that the RAN was actively responsible is unwarranted. [26]

Frame was only reviewing the book, and as such had no duty to check every fact asserted. But the allegation became accepted. As recently as making an:

...oral submission to the Tribunal on 14 December 2011... Dr Leonard, a survivor from the whaler...stated that when KALGOORLIE arrived at the wharf, Pope and other senior naval officers met them with 'formality, distance, coldness and even an implied threat'. Dr Leonard recalled that Pope said that 'none of you must say a word about the sinking of ARMIDALE to anyone'. Dr Leonard said he was left with the impression that Pope thought the survivors had failed in losing their ship, and he felt that this was a factor in Richards not getting another command.[27]

But Lieutenant Commander Richards was indeed given other sea-going commands. His Service Record is readily available for anyone to see in the National Archives, and lists his appointments, including ARMIDALE and beyond. He was next appointed to the corvette *Katoomba* as CO, but this was cancelled – the reason has not yet been found. He served at the shore base *Moreton* as Naval Berthing Officer; and then was posted to Darwin to the base HMAS MELVILLE in the same capacity. Then in 1946 he was appointed in command to another corvette, HMAS BURNIE. He then took over command of two identical ships in succession: *Landing Ship (Tank) 3022* and *LST 3008*.

The LSTs were big ships, over 2,000 tons; of 345 feet (105 m) in length, and designed to carry tanks, artillery, and troops for amphibious landings. They were heavily defended from air attack by four 40mm Bofors in two twin mounts and six 20mm Oerlikons in two twin and two single mounts.[28] Richards probably reflected on this comparison with his lost corvette on occasion, with its much lesser armament of three 20mm Oerlikons and an anti-surface four-inch gun.

VALUED SERVICE

A year and a half after the end of the war, on 31 December 1946, Richards was promoted to full commander. This is significant for two reasons. Post-war the Navy was contracting sharply, down from its peak of nearly 40,000 personnel to well under twenty thousand. There was usually no work available for a Reserve lieutenant commander, in fact there was a lot less available for Permanent Force members. It is a myth to think that "the Navy" either then and now gazes down from a mountain and bestows favours, god-like, on those it likes, while dispensing thunderbolts to those it doesn't. More likely Richards' combination of experience, availability, and abilities placed him into positions.

But there is a significant note in Richards' naval career at this point: he was promoted commander. This is the equivalent from the step up from army major to army lieutenant colonel. Most naval officers do not rise above lieutenant commander. To gain the coveted "step" upwards brings with it the conferral of a new cap, this one with gold braid on its peak, hence the expression "brass hat." Again, Navy does not bestow from a pinnacle such favours, but nevertheless the list of promotions was, and is, closely scrutinized by the very senior officers of the force.

If Richards was out of favour generally with the Navy, as Walker implies, it is unlikely he would have been given this promotion. Indeed, this appointment would have been reviewed several times by the most senior figures in the force, and it could have been removed with a pen-stroke, and Richards never told of such an action. That the promotion was indeed promulgated is the reverse of what Walker was suggesting: the Navy wanted to recognize the officer who had lost ARMIDALE in heroic circumstances, and was acknowledging the loss of the corvette, not covering it up.

Commander Richards worked in Navy Office – that is, its headquarters – until 1952, when he was placed at the age of 50 on the retirement list; normal practice in those days. Little is known of his later life. He died in 1967, fifteen years later, at the age of 65, a recognised brave fighting naval officer who had given of his best. [29] ■

About the Author: Dr Tom Lewis OAM is the author of *Teddy Sheean VC* (Big Sky Publications) the story of the loss of the ARMIDALE and the fight for a Victoria Cross for Teddy Sheean. He served as a naval officer for nearly 20 years, seeing war service in Baghdad as an intelligence analyst. His most recent publication is *Australia Remembers 4: the Bombing of Darwin*, a book for upper primary/lower secondary school students.



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- [2] Walker, Frank. *HMAS Armidale – The Ship That Had To Die*. NSW: Kingfisher Press, 1980. (p. 94-95)
- [3] Walker, Frank. *HMAS Armidale Lives On*. NSW: Kingfisher Press, 2005. (p. 94-95) Walker's second book is virtually the same as the first, even down to the page numbers, until it gets to the end of where the first one stopped at 179 pages. Then for another 44 pages – to p. 223 – the second work contains a chapter on the then-new RAN ARMIDALE patrol boats; and some discussion of the awarding of the Victoria Cross to Teddy Sheean. He does not cite an interview or materials from Leonard.
- [4] See *Submarine Atrocities*. Website. <http://www.occities.org/pentagon/camp/3166/> Accessed July 2014.
- [5] The Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, often known as the London Treaty, was signed in 1930 by United Kingdom, Japan, France, Italy and the United States. Part IV Article 22, states: "a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board." Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Naval_Treaty 14 November 2005.
- [6] Russell, Lord, of Liverpool. *The Knights of Bushido: a short history of Japanese War Crimes*. Bath: Chivers Press, 1989. (p. 172)
- [7] *ibid.* (p.173)
- [8] The submarine which was in the area of the ARMIDALE sinking – I-165 – was probably involved in the action, but under a different and subsequent CO, Lieutenant-Commander Shimizu, with the sinking of the British steamship *Nancy Moller* on 18 March 1944.
- [9] DeRose, James F. *Unrestricted warfare: how a new breed of officers led the submarine force to victory in World War II*. New York: John Wiley, 2000. (p.84)
- [10] DeRose, James F. *Unrestricted warfare: how a new breed of officers led the submarine force to victory in World War II*. New York: John Wiley, 2000. (p. 245)
- [11] Bridgland, Tony. *Waves of Hate*. Leo Cooper: South Yorkshire, 2002. (p.28, pp.85-112)
- [12] Kennedy, Ludovic Henry Coverley. *On my Way to the Club: the autobiography of Ludovic Kennedy*. London: Fontana, 1989. (pp. 340-342) These nine paragraphs have been reproduced before in the same author's *Lethality in Combat*.
- [13] *Nihon Kaigun*. Website. <http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-165.htm> Accessed June 2014.
- [14] *Nihon Kaigun*. Website. http://www.combinedfleet.com/type_kd5.htm Accessed June 2014. The boat's range is given at 10,000nm @ 10 knots. Other dimensions of interest are: Displacement: 1,705 tons / 2,330 tons submerged; dimensions 320.5 ft x 26.75 ft x 15.5 ft; machinery: two diesels: 6,000 hp, electric motors: 1,800 h; maximum depth 70 m (230 feet).
- [15] *CIA Factbook*. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html> Accessed October 2014.
- [16] See the same author's *Darwin's Submarine I-124* (Avonmore).
- [17] The Inquiry was told: "The final search took place on Sunday 13th December and was then reluctantly abandoned." Walker, Frank. *HMAS Armidale – The Ship That Had To Die*. NSW: Kingfisher Press, 1980. (p. 94-95)
- [18] Department of Defence. HMAS SYDNEY II Commission of Inquiry. http://www.defence.gov.au/sydneyii/SUBM/SUBM_007_0084_R.pdf Accessed June 2014. The original letter is from Professor Kawano to David Jenkins, and written on 29 May 1991. It contains answers to many questions raised by Mr Jenkins, who was writing *Battle Surface* at the time. It should be acknowledged here that author Lewis of this work also was researching with Professor Kawano a few years later for a publication – *Darwin's Submarine I-124* – on the 80-man submarine I-124, sunk outside Darwin, and found him to be a scholar of the highest repute and integrity, who worked assiduously to grant full and unfettered access to Japanese records.
- [19] Walker, Frank. *HMAS ARMIDALE – The Ship That Had To Die*. NSW: Kingfisher Press, 1980. (p. 94-95) Repeated on page 95 in the second book. Mr Walker also suggests that Japanese aircraft could have strafed the raft people; or that NEI soldiers (who were Allies) could have killed the Australians, presumably in a competition to survive.
- [20] Winstanley, Lt. Col. Peter. OAM RFD. Website: Prisoners of war of the Japanese. "Survival - At Sea And On Land. A Wartime Resume Of An Australian Sailor." <http://www.pows-of-japan.net/articles/61.htm> Accessed May 2015.
- [21] Extracted from *Falle Sam: My Lucky Life: In War, Revolution, Peace and Diplomacy*. "Rescued from the sea by the Japanese Navy." <http://www2today.com/2nd-march-1942-rescued-from-the-sea-by-the-japanese-navy> Accessed February 2014.
- [22] Frame, Tom. *Headmark*. "The Ship History – Recording or Distorting the Navy's Past?" Journal of the Australian Naval Institute. Volume 17, February 1991, Number 1. (pp. 44-48)
- [23] National Archives of Australia. "Naval Operations - Report by Naval Board on loss of HMAS "ARMIDALE" 4/12/42 - 12/1/43." MP138/1, 603/280/945.
- [24] Walker, Frank. *HMAS Armidale – The Ship that had to Die*. NSW: Kingfisher Press, 1980.
- [25] See *U-Boat Net*. Website. <http://www.uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/3699.html> Accessed June 2014. Walker's book says on page 124 that "...the Navy refused to give him another command."
- [26] Frame, Tom. *Headmark*. "The Ship History – Recording or Distorting the Navy's Past?" Journal of the Australian Naval Institute. Volume 17, February 1991, Number 1. (pp. 44-48)
- [27] Australian Government. Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal. Inquiry into unresolved recognition for past acts of naval and military gallantry and valour. 6 February 2013. <https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Submission-027-Mr-Howard-Halsted-President-Royal-Australian-Navy-Corvettes-Association-NSW-Lnc.pdf>
- [28] Gillett, Ross. *Australian and New Zealand Warships since 1946*. Brookvale, New South Wales: Child & Associates, 1988. (p.35)
- [29] NSW State Records. David Herbert Richards - Date of Death 11/03/1967, Item Number: Series 4-630982 <http://search.records.nsw.gov.au/items/1232911> Accessed September 2014.



COMMANDER AGETA'S INCURSION

By Murray Dear

It has long been assumed that the New Zealand war patrol of I-22 during June 1942 was very much a non-event. It is now possible to state it is highly likely that I-22 crippled MV *Koau* in a torpedo attack and that the submarine penetrated Auckland's anti-submarine defences. This paper explores the incursion during May 1942 of five Japanese submarines of the 8th Squadron ordered to undertake maritime operations off Australia and New Zealand.

INTRODUCTION

During May 1942, five Japanese submarines of the 8th Squadron were ordered to undertake operations off Australia and New Zealand. Captain Sasaki Hankyu was in command of the I-21 (flagship), I-29, I-22, I-24 and I-27. I-21 and I-29 were B1 Type scouting submarines and each carried a Yokosuka E14Y1 Glen floatplane. I-22 and I-24 were C1 Type attack submarines and each carried a Type A midget submarine. I-27 was a B1 Type modified to also carry a midget submarine. It had been intended that the modified B1 Type I-28 would also be part of this group, but this submarine was sunk on 17 May by the US submarine TAUTOG while returning from the Battle of the Coral Sea.

While sailing between Wellington and Newcastle, the Russian steamer *Wellen* was shelled by I-29 on 16 May. An intensive search for the submarine was unsuccessful and the attack was regarded incorrectly as an isolated incident by the officer in charge of Sydney and Newcastle harbour defences, Rear Admiral Muirhead-Gould. A reconnaissance flight was undertaken over Sydney Harbour at dawn on 23 May by I-29's floatplane which reported three large cruisers or battleships, four destroyers and many small naval vessels.

On 24 May, I-21's floatplane flew unobserved over Auckland where the armed merchant cruiser HMNZS MONOWAI was undergoing a refit. On receiving news of I-29's floatplane report, Sasaki immediately sailed westward to join his other four boats off Sydney. His progress was monitored by Radio Direction Finding (D/F) and this information was passed on by the New Zealand Naval Board to the Naval Intelligence Centre in Melbourne. These warnings were disregarded.

THE ATTACK ON SYDNEY HARBOUR

On his arrival off Sydney, Sasaki ordered a further reconnaissance flight by I-21's floatplane over the harbour. An attack was ordered on the "battleships and cruisers" [1] sighted for the night of 31 May-1 June and all three midget submarines were successfully launched. Despite the element of surprise, the attack achieved little. The first midget went off course and got caught in the boom net where it was sighted by James Cargill, a Marine Services Board watchman. His report of a submarine was initially disbelieved but common sense eventually prevailed and it was attacked by the harbour defence craft LOLITA. Realising their position was hopeless, the two-man crew fired the scuttling charge which blew off the forward section of the submarine.



IJN Submarine I-22.

The second midget entered Sydney Harbour through the eastern gate of the boom net and was sighted by an alert seaman on the American heavy cruiser USS CHICAGO. After eluding gunfire from CHICAGO, the midget sailed further up the harbour before returning to make a torpedo attack on the big cruiser. Both torpedoes missed with one exploding against a harbour wall underneath the accommodation ship HMAS KUTTABUL. The requisitioned harbour ferry sank with the loss of 21 lives and the Dutch submarine K9 rafted outboard of KUTTABUL was damaged. The ultimate resting place for this midget was a mystery for many years before the wreck was recently discovered off Sydney Heads.

The third midget was initially sighted and attacked by the patrol vessels LAURIANA and YANDRA. This attack was not successful but some six hours later the submarine was sighted and depth charged again by the launch SEA MIST. More depth charges were dropped by the patrol craft YARROMA and STEADY HOUR and with their midget submarine badly damaged, both crew members committed suicide.

ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPPING

Following the 31 May-1 June midget submarine attack on Sydney Harbour, the five submarines commenced attacks on merchant shipping. Both I-21 and I-24 continued to operate off New South Wales while I-29 was to harass shipping off Brisbane and I-27 was ordered southward to Bass Strait. The subsequent movements of I-22 under the command of Commander Ageta Kiyotake, which was ordered to patrol off New Zealand and Fiji, remain largely unknown.

On 3 June, I-21 shelled the unarmed steamer *Age* which ran for safety. Shortly after this attack, I-24 torpedoed and sank the steamer *Iron Chieftan* with the loss of twelve lives. At dawn on 4 June, I-27 attacked the *Barwon* with gunfire off Gabo Island but the steamer escaped by outrunning the attacking submarine. Later that day I-27 was to sink the *Iron Crown* with the loss of 37 crew members. As a consequence of these attacks, the Australian Naval Board suspended all merchant ship sailings from eastern and southern ports on 4 June.



Portrait of Commander Kiyoi Ageta IJN (AWM).



MV Koau.

On the night of 8 June, Sydney and Newcastle were shelled by I-24 and I-21 respectively. While little damage was caused, a secondary objective to frighten the local population was remarkably successful. Many panic-stricken residents of Sydney's eastern suburbs fled to the Blue Mountains and even further inland. Following the shelling, I-24 and I-21 again turned their attention to attacks on merchant shipping. I-24 shelled the *British Orestes* south of Sydney on 9 June but despite being set on fire, the merchant ship safely made Melbourne the next day. Not so fortunate was the Panamanian merchant ship *Guatemala* which was torpedoed and sunk by I-24 on 12 June. The sinking of the *Guatemala* was the last attack on merchant shipping off the east coast for some six weeks, effectively ending this phase of Japan's submarine offensive against Australia.

EIGHT DAYS IN JUNE

An enquiry to the Centre for Military History, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo elicited the response that no official Imperial Japanese Navy records for I-22's New Zealand war patrol could be located. Naoki Kanno, a senior fellow of Military Archives at the Centre for Military History, advised that the only record held is a diary kept by Sub Lieutenant 1st Class Muneaki Hujisawa, Material Assistant to the Torpedo Officer of I-22, which "describes about New Zealand in June 1942". [2] Unfortunately, the officer's family will not allow the diary to be copied and it can only viewed by the Centre's reading room users. It would appear that what secondary source records that do exist for I-22's New Zealand war patrol have been mainly based on Sub Lieutenant Muneaki Hujisawa's diary, which appears to have been poorly translated. The Tabular Record of Movement (TRM) [3] for the submarine I-22 has some information which at best is inconsistent and in some instances is clearly incorrect. The TRM records on 3 June, "I-22 heads for New Zealand area to reconnoitre Wellington, Auckland and Suva".

A close examination of the War Diary of Navy Office, Wellington, New Zealand (War Diary) for June 1942 discloses information that can be directly related to I-22's war patrol in New Zealand waters. On Saturday 6 June 1942 the War Diary records "D/F places enemy submarine within 200 miles of 34o S 168o E. Believed to be submarine reported off Sydney 2nd June." This places I-22 west of the Three Kings islands (off North Cape) and indicates the submarine sailed due east from Sydney. The time of this D/F report is not stated but it must be between 1847 and 2225 which are the times of the preceding and following entries in the War Diary. It is assumed that this radio message sent by I-22 was an operational report to I-21 and/or the 6th Submarine Fleet Base at Kwajalein but no record has been found of

this or subsequent radio messages.

The submarine then clearly passed down the west coast of the North Island without incident and for the period 8-9 June 1942 the TRM records "I-22 carries out periscope reconnaissance of Wellington". There is no evidence that I-22 attempted to enter Wellington Harbour. The War Diary records and the TRM repeats a sighting of a submarine at 1030 on 9 June by a military post at Mahinepua Bay in the Cavalli Islands. This purported sighting can be ignored as the Cavalli Islands are off the east coast of Northland and it would have been physically impossible for I-22 to be there on that date.

On 10 June the TRM records "At 1418, Cdr Ageta attacks a small steamer off Portland Island, but the torpedo passes under its keel. After sundown, I-20 (sic) reconnoitres Hauraki Gulf and Auckland." Portland Island lies off the southern tip of the Mahia Peninsula in northern Hawkes Bay so quite clearly these two events could not happen on the same day. It is pertinent to note that Japanese warships operated on Tokyo time, three hours behind New Zealand time. The torpedo attack recorded on 10 June therefore occurred at 1718 New Zealand time, i.e., near sunset.

There is no record of a ship being attacked by a submarine off Portland Island on 10 June 1942 in the War Diary. Based on the location of the vessel attacked by I-22, it is possible to make two assumptions regarding the intended victim. It was very probably sailing to or from the port of Napier and it was likely to have been a coastal vessel owned by the Napier based shipping company Richardson & Company Ltd. The Napier Harbour Board Pilot's Log Book records the following ship movements for the period 9-11 June:

- 9 June – No arrivals. MV *Kopara* (679 grt, Richardson & Company) sailed at 10.00 pm
- 10 June – No arrivals. SS *Wainui* (1,633 grt, Union Steam Ship Company) sailed at 10.00 pm
- 11 June – No arrivals. MV *Koau* (144 grt, Richardson & Company) sailed at 2.50 am

It will be noted that all three vessels sailed at night as a defensive anti-submarine measure but realistically none of them could have been off Portland Island at 5.18 pm on 10 June. It now appears that Commander Ageta's attack may have taken place a day later on 11 June and this date is consistent with the later movements of I-22. As noted above, KOAU sailed from Napier for Tokomaru Bay at 2.50 am on 11 June. In normal circumstances Koau would have sailed directly for Portland Island which would have been reached around

midday. These were not normal circumstances and it is more likely Koau kept close inshore as a defensive anti-submarine measure. This would have added a few hours to her passage with the motor vessel rounding Portland Island around sunset for a run up the East coast to Tokomaru Bay during the hours of darkness.

COMMANDER AGETA'S INTENT

Commander Ageta's intended victim is recorded as a steamer, however all Richardson's steamers were converted to motor vessels pre-war. There are two published company histories, both titled "Richardsons of Napier", by maritime historians S.D. Waters (1959) and Gavin McLean (1989). Waters recorded "The *Koau* was on her way to Tokomaru Bay in June 1942 when she lost her port propeller and her engine room filled with water. She was picked up by the *Koutonui* and towed first to Gisborne and thence to Napier." [4] McLean recorded "11 June 1942 (*Koau*) broke tail shaft off Hawkes Bay, towed to Gisborne, then Napier for repairs." [5] This incident places *Koau* in the same area as the attack by I-22 but a day later than that recorded in the TRM. In hindsight it would appear that the torpedo fired by I-22 clipped *Koau*'s port propeller without detonating. Clearly, Waters and McLean assumed they were recording a very rare mechanical accident rather than the outcome of a possible submarine torpedo attack. A primary source, namely the company report on this incident, would help determine date, time and location. Unfortunately, following the liquidation of Richardson & Company in 1969, all the company records were consigned to the local rubbish tip (McLean's book is based on the records of the Union Steam Ship Company which secretly owned Richardson & Company).

It would be reasonable to assume that I-22 departed quickly from the attack site and proceeded northward up the East Coast while surfaced during the hours of darkness. At a moderate speed of say 16 knots surfaced, I-22 could have entered the Hauraki Gulf after sunset on 12 June. Early in the morning after sunrise on 12 June 1942, the first American troops from the US Army 37th Division arrived in New Zealand. "The skies were grey and the water the colour of steel as five transport ships, with a cruiser in front and a destroyer in the rear, sailed into Auckland Harbour unannounced." [6] This convoy comprised the troopships USS PRESIDENT MONROE, URUGUAY, JAMES PARKER, TASKER H. BLISS and SANTA CLARA with the escort comprising the heavy cruiser USS SAN FRANCISCO and the



HMAS KUTTABUL.

destroyer USS FARRAGUT. On 13 June, FARRAGUT and the TASKER H. BLISS sailed from Auckland for Suva.

At 1555 on Saturday 13 June the War Diary records "Loops between Kawau and Tiri Tiri crossed at 0355Z and 0750Z. Nothing visible". These times indicate that the indicator loops were crossed at 1555 and 1950 New Zealand time on 13 June, twelve hours ahead of Zulu time. It is useful at this point to digress and examine the anti-submarine fixed defences in the approaches to Auckland Harbour. Indicator loops were long lengths of cables laid in precise patterns on the seabed which formed part of the underwater defences of a harbour or anchorage. The presence of steel-hulled vessels, both surface craft and submarines, was indicated by the swing of a galvanometer needle at a nearby shore station. By April 1941, the New Zealand War Cabinet had approved indicator loops across the Hauraki Gulf channels but construction did not immediately commence. This was the situation when Japan entered the war in December 1941 and shortly thereafter the Navy Board requested information from Australia on costs and availability of indicator loops. This resulted in the Australian cable-laying vessel *Mernoo* laying six loops in the approaches to Auckland between 27 February and 29 March 1942.

In addition to the indicator loops, the approaches to Auckland were also protected by minefields. Between 16 and 20 March 1942 the minelayer HMAS BUNGAREE laid 422 moored contact mines as follows:

- A zig zag line of 200 mines spaced at 35 to the mile across the main channel between Tiritiri Matangi and Motuhurakai.
- A supplementary line of 200 mines between Tiritiri Matangi and The Noises
- Six mines in the Rakino Channel between Rakino and Motutapu
- Sixteen mines across the channel on the north side of Rakino

It will be noted that no mines were laid in the Whangaparaoa Passage between the Whangaparaoa Peninsula and Tiritiri Matangi Island. It is through this gap in the minefields that I-22 evidently breached Auckland's outer anti-submarine defences on the afternoon of 13 June 1942. It was not until September 1942 that the minelayer HMS ALSEY supported by the base ship HMS ATREUS laid seven loops of controlled mines and two guard loops in the Whangaparaoa Passage.


It is assumed "Loops between Kawau and Tiri Tiri" in the War Diary refers to the No. 4 Indicator Loop laid at the northern entrance of the Whangaparaoa Passage (Approaches to Auckland, A/S Fixed Defences, Map 4 - Secret). In response to my query, indicator loop expert Dr. Richard Walding of Griffith University, Queensland



USS CHICAGO (CA29).



USS FARRAGUT (DD348) 14 September 1936.



US Troop Ship TASKER H BLISS (AP42) in 1942.

advised "It takes a significantly sized object to cause a big deflection in a loop galvanometer. Drifting mines and empty 44-gallon drums may cause a blip but wouldn't give a signal like a submarine or ship." [7]

The maximum submerged speed of I-22 was 8 knots but it is more likely the submarine would be moving at say 3-5 knots to conserve its batteries. Some back of the envelope calculations indicate that I-22 would have gone southward for around 6 to 10 nautical miles before reversing course. This would place it at the northern entrance to the Rangitoto Channel. It certainly didn't enter the Rangitoto Channel as there is no evidence it passed over the "A" Indicator Loop between Takapuna and Rangitoto. Having expended its Type A midget submarine in the attack on Sydney Harbour, I-22 was unable to launch an attack on Auckland Harbour. Berthed in Auckland on the afternoon of 13 June were the cruiser USS SAN FRANCISCO, four US troopships plus the armed merchant cruisers HMS ASCANIA (arrived 9 June) and HMNZS MONOWAI.

At 1925 on 14 June the War Diary records "Submarine reported in 034o55' S 174o50' E by D/F. It is considered probable that submarine is one of the units recently operating off Sydney. Believed to be "I" class and may carry aircraft as well as midget submarine." The assumptions made were mainly correct. This D/F report places I-22 to the east of the Three Kings islands and was presumably an operational report advising that the submarine was leaving New Zealand waters for Fiji. The TRM records I-22 reconnoitred Suva on 17-18 June but inexplicably then states the submarine reconnoitred Auckland for a second time on 19 June. This is clearly not possible. On 25 June I-22 arrived at Kwajalein with I-21, I-24, I-27 and I-29, and by 11 July the submarine was at Yokosuka. Two months later I-22 departed Yokosuka for operations in the Solomons area. On 4 October the last signal was received from I-22 and the submarine was subsequently declared lost with all hands.

CONCLUSIONS

It has long been assumed that the New Zealand war patrol of I-22 during June 1942 was very much a non-event. It is now possible to state it is highly likely that I-22 crippled MV *Koau* in a torpedo attack and that the submarine penetrated Auckland's anti-submarine defences. In essence, the information in the War Diary and other New Zealand records complements the information recorded in the TRM. It would appear that I-22, the US destroyer FARRAGUT and the troop transport TASKER H. BLISS were all in the Hauraki

Gulf on 13 June, but clearly their paths did not cross. The outcome of an encounter between I-22 and these two US ships can only be speculated. The potential for a naval disaster on Auckland's doorstep may have been narrowly averted. ■



NOTES


- [1] Carruthers, *Australia Under Siege* p. 64
- [2] Letter from Naoki Kanno, Senior Fellow of Military Archives, Centre for Military History, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo dated 17 June 2016
- [3] Website <http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-22.htm>
- [4] Waters, *Richardsons of Napier* p. 46
- [5] McLean, *Richardsons of Napier* p. 104
- [6] Arrival – US Forces in New Zealand, NZ History - New Zealand history online
- [7] Email from Richard Walding dated 23 December 2016

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 Correspondence with Naoki Kanno, Senior Fellow of Military Archives, Centre for Military History, The National Institute of Defense Studies, Tokyo
 Correspondence with Dr. Richard Walding, Research Fellow, School of Science, Griffith University
 Document – Approaches to Auckland, A/S Fixed Defences, Map 4, Secret
 Document – Napier Harbour Board Pilot's Log Book 9-11 June 1942
 Document – War Diary of Navy Office Wellington, New Zealand 1-30 June 1942
 Website – IJN Submarine I-22: Tabular Record of Movement
 Website – New Zealand history online



TEDDY SHEEAN VC

A Selfless Act of Valour

Tom Lewis

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
Tom Lewis is to be commended for forensically reviewing all primary and secondary sources and producing an easy-to-read book about the short 18-year life of Teddy Sheean, as well as the even shorter 173-day life of HMAS ARMIDALE.

The author sets the scene by describing what it was like to serve in the Navy, Teddy Sheean’s family, his Navy life in Tasmania, and the changes in technology that were impacting naval warfare and the rise of Japan at the time.

The book describes the tragic finale with the air and sea search not starting until two days after the sinking. While those men who were in the motorboat were picked up on the sixth day, those men who were rowing the salvaged whaler were not picked up for eight harrowing days. Those men left desperately hanging on to the constructed raft were initially sighted but never seen again. The author quite categorically assesses that there is no evidence of a Japanese submarine being involved in the loss of the raft.

The second half of the book address the history of the Victoria Cross with the standard for awarding the medal differing from service to service. It has been a long and somewhat inconsistent history, varied and haphazard, with ultimate approval in the hands of the Monarch. The author deduces that the absence of a recommendation for Teddy Sheean was not due to deliberate incompetence, rather just the stresses of war on the chain of naval command.

This book about Teddy’s war, a story of a sea disaster and tragedy, should be in the library of every school in Australia and readily available in Timor Leste, Indonesia and Holland. This event was the greatest loss of RAN life after the sinking of HMAS SYDNEY and HMAS PARRAMATTA in the Second World War. Now that the wreck lays in waters belonging to Timor Leste, the names of those lost at sea in the final battle and ordeal while awaiting rescue should be placed on the honour board in the Australian Embassy’s Sparrow Force House in Dili alongside the soldiers who gave their lives in this campaign.



DEVELOPING THE NAVAL MIND

By Benjamin F. Armstrong and John Freymann

USNI: November 15, 2021

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Commander Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong, USN, is a former search and rescue helicopter pilot and associate professor of war studies and naval history at the U.S. Naval Academy. John Freymann is a permanent military professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. After spending the first half of his career as a Surface Warfare Officer, he earned his PhD in the history of Christianity from the University of Chicago.

By not accepting born leaders or a ruling class, the US Armed Forces have a tradition of engagement at the cultural edges of knowledge. So important to exercising unity of command, in war. The underlying theme of this book, though, is the lack of thinking currently being exercised by senior officers in the USN (and USMC). Often driven out by performance management KPIs that insist on 20-minute, power point briefs, to be completed throughout the day – with no allowance for the exchange of (true) knowledge (both human and infotechnological) and proper reflection.

While recommending that officers read broadly in pursuit of individual knowledge is an important part of creating a truly educated and professional Fleet and Fleet Marine Force, the authors maintain that it is also important for leaders in the sea services to offer mentorship and create opportunities (a safe to speak and fail ecology) for discourse that encourages group learning. *Developing the Naval Mind* not only serves as a traditional how-to manual and syllabus for leaders to create and lead discussions – but paints a very real scenario of future demise and failure, should Navy’s fail to listen, speak and learn.


The final chapter, ch. 19, *How we lost the Great Pacific War*, by Dale C. Rielage is sobering. You may wish to start the book from here, and read back? It begins with a Memo from COMUSPAC Fleet to CNO, dated 6 Jun 2025, entitled *Lesson Learned from Recent Naval Actions in the Western Pacific*. COMUSPAC Fleet concludes, *inter alia*:

- The tragedy of our defeat is that it hinged on such small factors: our margin of victory in high-end naval combat had grown “razor thin.”
- Shifting resources was simple compared to creating an intellectual shift within the force. We did not rebalance the force until well after we advertised that we had. We worked hard on getting the narrative right, but our allies and potential adversaries could do the math on the correlation of forces; and they concluded that the numbers had stopped adding up in our favour.
- Our ten-year rule was an informal, unspoken assumption throughout the force, and thus harder to challenge. We lost along the way the truth that the imperfect reality trumps the perfect potentiality.
- Fleet staffs, warfighting development centres, and the Naval War College spent hard effort in creating concepts that required varsity level execution. Unfortunately, at the same time we were creating these concepts, we were also haemorrhaging experience out of the Pacific.
- Once combat was joined, it was apparent that we had not found the right balance between efficiency and effectiveness. The years of continuing resolutions, Budget Control Act restrictions, and maintenance deficits left the sustainment phase a shell of a concept.
- We lost the ability to train naval aviators in quantity for the next decade. We repeated the mistake of the Imperial Japanese Navy air arm, which spent most of its highly trained naval aviators in combat in the first half of World War II without considering the need to train replacements.
- The best insights on this fight had been found within the professional research, assessment and planning community which was disbanded some years ago after being nursed along for a decade.
- We needed to align our command and control across warfare domains. After all, the war started in cyber. From the first inklings of conflict, our networks were contested terrain; and we started that fight behind the power curve. The losses sustained by Task Force 70.2 stemmed in part from attacks that leveraged these vulnerabilities. We should have been willing to harden the network in peacetime.
- The crew of the destroyer USS FISHBURNE earned a Navy Unit Commendation going back for the survivors of the USS HOLLOWAY. It was a heroic, if unsuccessful, gesture that ultimately cost us a second DDG. The reality is that keeping FISHBURNE’s missile magazines afloat and, in the fight, would have saved more American lives than any successful rescue.

These tragic lessons need learning and reflecting upon today, which is the intent behind this excellent book.



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