

THE

# NAVY

THE MAGAZINE OF THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA



**ADDING TO THE “KIT”  
OF AUSTRALIA’S BLUE  
WATER NAVY**

**THE ‘VOODOO ECONOMICS’  
OF THE RAN**

**MUTUALLY ASSURED DRONE  
SWARM WARFARE**

**SEMPER FORTIS PRO  
PATRIA, NON SOLUM SIBI**



\$5.95 INC.GST

ISSN 1322-6231



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AUSTRALIA’S LEADING NAVAL MAGAZINE SINCE 1938



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**Front cover:** HMAS ADELAIDE (L01) exits Sydney Harbour for Exercises  
HMAS ANZAC (FFG150) astern (Image SGT Christopher Dickson)

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## All letters and contributions to:

The Office of The Editor

*THE NAVY*

Navy League of Australia

GPO Box 1719

Sydney, NSW 2001

E-mail to: editorthenavy@hotmail.com

All Subscriptions, Membership and Advertising enquiries to:

The Hon Secretary

Navy League of Australia, NSW Division

GPO Box 1719, Sydney NSW 2001

**Deadline for next edition 5 February 2023**





## A NET ASSESSMENT

The first issue of *The NAVY* in 2023 has at its core the intertwined subjects of Defence, politics, economics, security, drones, and loss. The picture painted is one of change, disruption, and uncertainty. Where a net assessment may not come down favourably on the Global West. Russia's war shows little sign of ending; China's transgressions in the South China Sea and against Taiwan continue, and Covid sputters on. The consequences of Covid adding significantly to inflation, exacerbated by global and local energy policies, green tape, and the dash for renewables. Not simply Russia's war against Ukraine.

In *The Voodoo Economics of Australian Defence*, Dr Baird gets at some of this when he comments, *inter alia*:

...the current [Professors] Angus Houston/Stephen Smith *Defence Strategic Review*, unfortunately – thanks to their backgrounds, is highly unlikely to achieve that, [a completely new broom to Defence]. Inevitably, given the outcomes of a plethora of past such reviews, that is not really the government's intention for it. Rather than Houston and Smith, the RAN urgently needs a modern Samuel Pepys.

Neil concludes: “stripped of its fancy arcane terminology, economics is really very simple...eliminating the ‘Canberra margin’ alone would offer Australia vastly more bang for its bucks”.

Long standing contributor, Captain George Galdorisi (USN, Ret) – *first prize, NLA essay professional entry* – takes forward the political, defence, security, economic, industry challenge in his paper *Adding to the “Kit” of Australia’s Blue Water Navy*. George considers that “a large part of the impetus for [our] unprecedented naval building program is the fact that Australians live in a dangerous neighbourhood”. Captain Galdorisi places emphasis on uncrewed maritime vessels (UMV) by asking the question: “how do Australia's expeditionary forces bring more *kit* to the fight”? He argues that the RAN should “watch how the US Navy evolves missions for its intended fleet of UMV and see how some of these lessons might lead to having these (relatively low-cost) assets add value to expeditionary forces, led by the *Canberra-class* amphibious ships”. George concludes:

While evolutionary in nature, this disruptive capability delivered using emerging technologies can provide the ADF and RAN with near-term solutions to vexing operational challenges, while demonstrating...that there is a way to add to the kit [and] make these naval formations more lethal and survivable. This will enable Australia to continue to provide for the defence of the nation, as well as the security and prosperity of the greater Indo-Pacific region, while dealing with the growing *pacing* threats in the region.

Jonathan Wilson – *first prize, essay non-professional entry* – builds on Captain Galdorisi's paper, from an Australian perspective. In *Mutually Assured Drone Swarm Warfare*, paper 3, Jonathan argues that “[AUKUS] promises nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). If Australia wants to maintain a networked and sophisticated force, the acquisition of Uncrewed Underwater Vessels (UUV) into the RAN and their pairing with multiple platforms is of equal importance”. He concludes, *inter alia*:

If the *Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI) Strategy 2040* [1] is indicative of the RAN's classified plans for UUVs, then the document needs revision...If a future



PLAN Sailor tracks ROCS LAN YANG (FFG 935) off Taiwan, Aug 2022

RAN task force faces superior enemy UUV swarms, the results may be more underwhelming than expected. The fleet may simply retreat to the safety of territorial waters, as the Argentine Navy did in 1982, while the Australian government sues for peace.

At short notice, Ed asked Dr Simon Reay Atkinson, a long-standing NLA contributing-member, to use his detailed experience leading get well and research programs in academe and in Defence (ADF, RAN and RN) – as Director and Principal Investigator (Associate Professor) – to consider the July 2020 fire aboard USS BONHOMME RICHARD (LHD 6). Simon takes both a traditional and forward-looking approach to the fire in his paper entitled: *Semper Fortis Pro Patria, Non Solum Sibi*. Dr Atkinson, essentially pulls together the previous three papers by arguing (I paraphrase) “that ship designs need to be fit for purpose; fitting crews to ships – rather than simply shipping the crews and fits”. He suggests that the loss of USS BONHOMME RICHARD was due in large part to the political, economic, defence and security context that the 25-year-old ship found herself in, by 2020. Which prevented the effective and timely exercise of Command and Control. He comes up with some useful maxims, that may be worthy of further consideration:

- *If leaders don't lead; followers can't follow.*
- *Managers can't manage, unless leaders lead.*
- *without trust, no leadership*
- *without trust, no courage.*

Dr Atkinson also considers the essential rebuild of western navies. Drawing from USS BONHOMME RICHARD lessons, he suggests current ship designs and shipyards to be politically, militarily, and economically “unfit for purpose”. He argues for new designs which, if the 455 (+) USN Fleet is to be realised, will need to include UMV and UUV. Something argued for in the first three papers.

## FREEZES

A critical weakness with any review is that it artificially freezes an organisation at a moment in time – preventing any further change while it is undertaken. Yet “time and tide wait for no sailor”. Reviews also assume that other organisations and competition stands still. Ignoring the old adage that “the enemy will always have a say”.



China has fully Militarised Fiery Cross (and Mischief) Reef, March 2022 (Image Peoples Daily).



Battle of the Coral Sea (Rear Admiral Andrew Robertson RAN (2015) *We Will Remember The NAVY* Issue 4 Oct-Dec). The Battle Area: Action (1), 4 May 1942; Actions (2) and (3), 7 May and Action (4), 8 May (Main Battle).

Questions have also been raised about the standing and bias of Smith and Houston. Including in paper 1. After many previous such “reviews”, APS and sailors may have already concluded that it will be “yet more for less”. False optimisation, where the less is always at the expense of sailors and APS. Not the accountancy consultancies noted in paper 4. Which also indicates there are 2 consultants for every [Defence] public servant: “raising the question of value for money; supported versus supporting; and insourcing versus outsourcing...” See also [2,3]

There are also worrying lock-ins, such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), which artificially freezes the ADF “program” to deliver a global accounting, software, business regime – based upon its own “perfect” model. ERP, while creating huge costs (already consuming 1000s of Defence personnel), justifies itself against claimed efficiencies. Software models of this type *rarely if ever* deliver on the claims. They also prevent change, exactly by assuming *apriori* perfection. ERP is antithetical to the changes necessary for urgent new designs and realising *Defence Strategic Review* outcomes.

## ASSESSMENT

While there have been welcome geostrategic advances, including AUKUS and the QUAD – none has yet delivered an earlier submarine or frigate. The USN has not settled on future fleet numbers and its current submarine build program has little additional capacity. Suggestions that Japan should join AUKUS (AUKJUS?) make absolute sense. Noting also excellent submarines (ships and aircraft) designs built by Japan – which also has some capacity.

Regionally, the continued value and purpose of ANZUS and New Zealand membership of Five-Eyes remains questionable. No serious observer is suggesting New Zealand should belong to AUKUS, or the QUAD – not simply because of what but who they would, or would not, bring to the party.

Questions regarding Guadalcanal (now in the Solomon Islands (SI)) represent an existential threat. Over 7000 US and Allied (and 19,000 Japanese) service personnel were killed retaking the island during WW2. The *Battle for Australia – the Battle for the Coral Sea* – was fought precisely so as to retain vital Australian sea lines of communication, through the Solomon Islands and prevent attack on

the mainland. It beggars’ belief that the SI PM, Manasseh Sogavare, and his unpopular, democratically deficient Government, is treating his own people and long standing allies (the US, Australia and Japan) in this way. See also Letters. The question of Taiwan remains open, with Xi indicating “resolution” well before 2027.

A net assessment might conclude that Australia and the Global West is possibly less able to deter in January 2023, than it was in January 2018. Which means, given China continues to build its fleets and influence across the globe – that, relatively, the West is politically, economically, and militarily going backwards. Never the best means of Defence or Deterrence. ■



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# STATEMENT OF POLICY

## For the maintenance of the Maritime wellbeing of the nation.

The Navy League is intent upon keeping before the Australian people the fact that we are a maritime nation and that a strong Navy and capable maritime industry are elements of our national wellbeing and vital to the freedom of Australia. The League seeks to promote Defence self-reliance by actively supporting defence manufacturing, research, cyberspace, shipping, transport and other relevant industries.

Through geographical necessity Australia's prosperity, strength, and safety depend to a great extent upon the security of the surrounding seas and island areas, and on unrestricted seaborne trade.

The strategic background to Australia's security is changing and in many respects has become much less certain following increasing tensions, particularly in East Asia involving major powers, and in Europe and the Middle East. The League believes that Australia should rapidly increase the capability to defend itself, paying particular attention to maritime defence.

### The Navy League:

- Believes Australia can be defended against attack by other than a major maritime power and that the prime requirement of our defence is an evident ability to control the sea and air space around us and to contribute to defending essential lines of sea and air communication with our allies.
- Supports a continuing strong alliance with the US.
- Supports close relationships with all nations in our general area particularly New Zealand, PNG and the South Pacific island States.
- Advocates the acquisition of the most capable modern armaments, surveillance systems and sensors to ensure technological advantage over forces in our general area.
- Advocates a strong deterrent element in the ADF enabling powerful retaliation at significant distances from our shores.
- Believes the ADF must be capable of protecting commercial shipping both within Australian waters and beyond, in conjunction with allies.
- Endorses the development of the capability for the patrol and surveillance of all of Australia's ocean areas, its island territories and the Southern Ocean.
- Advocates Government initiatives for rebuilding an Australian commercial fleet capable of supporting the ADF and the carriage of essential cargoes to and from Australia in times of conflict.
- Notes the Government intention to increase maritime preparedness and gradually increase defence expenditure to 2% of GDP, while recommending that this target should be increased to 3%.
- Urges the strength and capabilities of the Army (including particularly the Army Reserve) and Air Force be enhanced, and the weaponry, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyberspace and electronic capabilities of the ADF be increased, including an expansion in its UAV capability.
- Considers that the level of both the offensive and defensive capabilities of the RAN should be strengthened, in particular with a further increase in the number of new proposed replacement frigates and offshore patrol vessels, noting the need to ensure essential fuel and other supplies, and the many other essential maritime tasks.
- Recommends bringing forward the start date of the replacement frigate program to both strengthen the RAN and mitigate the local industry capability gap.
- Recommends the timely replacement and increase in numbers of the current mine-countermeasure force.
- Strongly supports the early acquisition of large, long range and endurance, fast submarines and notes the deterrent value, reliability and huge operational advantages of nuclear powered submarines and their value in training anti-submarine forces.
- The League is concerned at the very long time before the projected 12 new conventional submarines can enter operational service, noting very serious tensions in the NW Pacific involving major maritime powers.
- Recommends very early action to provide a submarine base on the Eastern seaboard.
- Notes the potential combat effectiveness and flexibility of the STOVL version of the Joint Strike Fighter (F35 *Lightning II*) and supports further examination of its application within the ADF.
- Supports the development of Australia's defence industry, including strong research and design organisations capable of the construction and maintenance of all warships, submarines and support vessels in the Navy's order of battle, and welcomes the Government decision to provide a stable and continuous shipbuilding program.
- Advocates the retention in maintained reserve of operationally capable ships that are required to be paid off for resource or other economic reasons.
- Supports a strong and identifiable Naval Reserve and Australian Navy Cadets organisation.
- Advocates urgent Government research and action to remedy the reported serious naval recruiting and retention problem.

**As to the RAN, the League,** while noting vital national peacetime tasks conducted by Navy, including border protection, flag showing/diplomacy, disaster relief, maritime rescue, hydrography and aid to the civil power:

- Supports the maintenance of a Navy capable of effective action in hostilities and advocates a build-up of the fleet and its afloat support elements to ensure that, in conjunction with the RAAF, this can be sustained against any force which could be deployed in our area of strategic interest.

### The League:

- Calls for a bipartisan political approach to national defence with a commitment to a steady long-term build-up in Australia's defence capability including the required industrial infrastructure.
- Believes that, given leadership by successive governments, Australia can defend itself in the longer term, within acceptable financial, economic and manpower parameters.

Welcome to another great edition of *The NAVY – the Magazine of the Navy League of Australia* and another year for the League to continue its important work. Here's hoping the year is off to a great start for you all.



The Immortal Memory: the death of Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson RN, 21 October 1805 (image NMM).



The Immortal Factor - Australian Navy Cadets on board HMAS CANBERRA (L02) Fremantle (image SGT Ben Dempster).

## THE NAVY LEAGUE FEDERAL COUNCIL AND AGM

In October last year we were able to hold our Annual Conference in person for the first time in three years. While we had managed to get together *virtually* over the past couple of years with videoconferencing it was great to be back into the same room with our colleagues from across the nation to enjoy not only the business of the League but also some conviviality and collegiality. I know I had missed the opportunity to catch up in person, and others said the same to me, so it was great to be back together again after such a long time.

Much business was conducted in Canberra over the weekend of 21-23 October. Events included the League's first official toast to His Majesty the King of Australia and toasting the immortal memory of Admiral Nelson. Both of these toasts were done in fine style at a formal dinner to mark the occasion of our Federal Council and Annual General Meeting as well as acknowledging Nelson's great victory at Trafalgar and the seamless transition of the King to the role as our Head of State.

While in Canberra we were joined by Navy League colleagues as well as representatives of the Navy and the Federal Parliament. We received a briefing from Commodore David Greaves RAN, the Director General Australian Navy Cadets, which brought our members up to speed with many issues affecting cadets and the broader Navy which was very well received by those who were in attendance. We also received a brief from Senator Jim Molan AO DSC, who provided a view from the Senate on the emerging strategic issues in the region, and their impacts on our Navy and the broader Australian Defence Force. Both guests made a sterling contribution to the success of our meeting and our members were very grateful to have such high calibre speakers join us once again.

The Federal Council also received reports from each of the State Divisions of the Navy League, as well as from our New Zealand counterpart Bill Dobbie who we were grateful to see after such a long time. The Divisions really are the heart and soul of the League and it was quite impressive to hear how much is being done by the Executive of each Division and our members, all of whom are

volunteers, to advance the interests of the League and in support of our objects. Well done to you all and I encourage you to keep up the great work this year.

Other reports included updates on membership, finances and this, *The NAVY* magazine, as well as the League's website, properties and our *Statement of Policy*. I encourage you all to re-read the Statement of Policy, it should guide all that we do, and be sure to let us have your views on what we should do to ensure it remains relevant to our emerging national and international strategic environment. Your opinions and input are vital to shaping our future and the future security of the nation.

Importantly, we also settled on our meeting dates for 2023, so if you are planning ahead, please set aside the weekend of 20-22 October 2023 in your calendar to be in Canberra for the 2023 Annual Conference. We look forward to seeing many of you there this year.

## THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA ANNUAL MARITIME AFFAIRS ESSAY COMPETITION

During the Federal Council meeting, the recommendations of our Essay Competition committee were received regarding the entries to the 2022 Maritime Affairs Essay Competition. The entries were again of a most commendable standard and winning entrants will be published in *The NAVY* over the coming editions.

Each year prizes are awarded in the professional and non-professional categories with the chance to have the papers published in *The NAVY* as well as prize money awarded to the winning entrants. If you are inclined to contribute an entry I encourage you to get writing now for the 2023 competition. The professional category is open to journalists, Defence officials, academics, Navy personnel and previous contributors to *The NAVY* with the balance of entrants being judged in the non-professional category.

After some considerable deliberation the competition winners were announced at the Federal Council meeting and our congratulations go out to those who have been rewarded with a prize as well as to



all who made the effort to contribute. Well done to you all for a high standard of entries and for your ongoing interest and efforts in keeping before the Australian people that we are a maritime nation and that a strong Navy and capable maritime industry are elements of our national wellbeing and vital to our freedom.

In the professional category, our congratulations go to first prize winner Captain George Galdorosi USN (Retd) for his paper *'Adding to the "Kit" of Australia's Blue Water NAVY'*. More on that below. Second prize in the professional category is awarded to Greg Swinden, for his work *'Back to the Future – The Need to Create an RAFA'*. Congratulations Greg. Congratulations also go out to Kelvin Curnow for his paper *'The Royal Australian Navy Current Status and Future Prospects'* which is a great read which you can look forward to seeing it in a future edition of *The NAVY* magazine. Well done all.

In the non-professional category the paper *'Mutually Assured Drone Swarm Warfare'* by Jonathan Wilson took out first prize and you can read that article in this edition of the magazine. Second prize was awarded to Geoff Hawkins for his paper *'Recruitment'* which I encourage you to keep an eye out for. It is an engaging read. Murray Dear, our friend from across the ditch took out third prize for his article *'Contest for the Southern Ocean'* which I'm sure will also draw much interest from readers of the future editions of *The Navy*.

## IN THIS EDITION

I am confident that you will enjoy the reading we have in store for you in this edition of *The NAVY* magazine. In addition to the prize-winning articles from George Galdorosi, regarding USVs for the RAN from the US experience and Jonathan Wilson which builds on Captain Galdorosi's paper from an Australian perspective, there is much more for you to read. Dr Neil Baird has contributed what might be considered some magic or religion or a little of both in his article *'The Voodoo Economics of Australian Defence'* which is likely to intrigue many of you with Neil's view of the local approach. Complementary to Neil's paper is Dr Simon Reay Atkinson's paper *'Semper Fortis Pro Patria, Non Solum Sibi'*. For those schooled after Latin fell off the curriculum, rest assured that the bulk of the article is written in English, so you may be educated, if not in Latin, in the lessons learnt from the recently released report and findings into the catastrophic fire onboard USS BONHOMME RICHARD.

## BEST REGARDS FOR THE YEAR AHEAD — MAY IT BE YOUR BEST ONE YET!

I hope you have all enjoyed a restful Christmas and New Year break, that 2023 is your best year yet, and encourage you to continue to contribute to this, your Navy Magazine, in 2023. Remember, we welcome your input, whether in article form, a letter to the editor or simply sending us an email. Please also encourage your friends to sign up as members and if you are thinking of a great gift idea, a subscription to *The NAVY* magazine could be just the ticket.

Happy reading and best wishes for a fruitful year ahead. ■

## HMAS PERTH (I) MEMORIAL

The first stage of the HMAS Perth (I) Memorial was completed today with the installation of a half-size replica of a propeller as mounted on the ill-fated HMAS PERTH (I) which was sunk in March 1942.

This phase of the memorial includes a Wall of Remembrance which has the names of all those who were on the HMAS PERTH (I) when she was overcome by a superior Japanese naval force at the *Battle of Sunda Strait*. The USS HOUSTON was also sunk with great loss of life in the same battle.

The propeller was modelled on a Royal Navy Admiralty 1930s design, cast, and machined by Veem Ltd, Canning Vale.

The Memorial is the result of work carried out by the Navy League (WA Div.) and the HMAS PERTH (I) Memorial Foundation Inc.

It is hoped to complete the second stage by mid-2023.

The memorial was designed by Smith's Sculptures who were also responsible for the HMAS SYDNEY memorial in Geraldton.

Mike Bailey, the Chair of the HMAS Perth (I) Memorial Foundation Inc (supported by the NLA WA Div.), stated:

After many years of dedicated work by volunteers from the HMAS PERTH (I) Memorial Foundation and the Navy League (WA Div.), the first stage of the Memorial has now been completed. It is a fitting reminder of the sacrifice made by the officers and crew of that fine Royal Australian Ship in World War 2.



HMAS PERTH (I) Memorial with 1930 Navy Admiralty Patent Propellor and Memorial Wall.





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**Hi Aeneas,**

I noted with interest in the article by Mark Schweikert entitled "*Make Ready In All Respects*" in Volume 84 No 4 of *The NAVY* that the government of the Solomon Islands has inferred to their counterparts here in Australia that they would not allow a foreign naval base to be established in their sovereign territory. I just hope that our politicians are fully aware of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) control over that country's one-party government and every aspect of its society.

Just because the Peoples' Liberation Army – Navy (PLA-N) is prohibited from establishing a naval base in another country means little if other components under its control can.

The Australian Government needs to be cognisant of the fact that the PLA-N also has control over other bodies such as the China Coast Guard, China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, China Marine Surveillance, People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia and General Administration of Customs as well as having significant influence over the nation's vast commercial fishing fleet (+25,000 vessels of over 100 tonnes). Thus, the PLA-N has many de facto methods of achieving its influence as has been seen in the South China Sea ever since the end of the Vietnam War as China commenced its territorial advances across the Pacific.

We have already seen members of the China Armed Police training members of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) in Crowd Control and it's also been reported that personnel from the RSIPF have gone to China for additional training so it should come as no surprise to our politicians when a major fisheries base is established in our neighbourhood.

Let's also hope that the mainstream Australian media is also aware of this not to subtle situation and reports to the population accordingly.

Keep up the good work and kind regards,

Jon D

NSW

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**By Editor,**

**Dear Jon,**

Thank you and also for being a longstanding member of the NLA and contributor.

The concerns expressed by you in your kind letter have been passed on to Mr Mark Schweikert and I know are shared by him and Senator Jim Molan. Jim and Mark both presented on similar themes at the recent NLA AGM, held in Canberra last October. Themes that are also taken up in three of the four papers in this issue, and in the editorial.

Jim, as you may be aware, has not been well these past few months. I am sure you share with us all our best wishes for a full recovery. We need voices such as Senator Molan's at this critical time.

Please continue to raise with your elected representatives and, if I may ask, in papers for *The NAVY*, the Journal of the Navy League of Australia.

Kind regards

Aeneas

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## ROYAL CYPHER

A number of readers from across the political spectrum shared with editor sadness at the death of Her Majesty the Queen and commentary on the future choice of crowns, to be worn on uniforms of His Majesty's Defence Forces.

His Majesty King Charles has chosen the Tudor Crown as his England, Wales and Northern Ireland (as opposed to Scottish, which has the crown of Scotland) Royal Cypher, with the Kings initial C. In the English and Scottish variant, the King's initial "C" is intertwined with the letter "R" for Rex, with "III" denoting Charles III. Since Charles is the third King Charles of England and Scotland. Whereas, Her Late Majesty was Queen Elizabeth the Second of England and Queen Elizabeth the First, of Scotland.

The Queen's Australian Royal Cypher (1962) represented St Edward's Crown, with the Queen's initial "E", not intertwined with the letter R (for Regina) or "II", since Her Majesty was Queen Elizabeth the First of Australia. It seems likely, therefore, that His Majesty's Australian Royal Cypher will be the Tudor Crown over the Letter "C".



Without wishing to be accused of *lèse-majesté*, King Charles's Australian Royal Cypher, may look similar to Her Late Majesty's Australian Cypher (as it appears in Her Australian Royal Standard – along with the flags of the six states, but not ACT or NT).

Republic or Constitutional Monarchy remains a burning issue for the inner city-political elites – not necessarily the rest of Australia. For the time being, the Governor General, as the King's Vice Regal representative, remains the ADF Commander in Chief. As long as that remains the case, the Crowns in the uniforms of the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Royal Australian Regiment (and Army) will all change, over a period of time. Likely to be continued under a future King William.

A question arising and asked under previous correspondence is "the role of Australian Defence Vessels and their right to wear *His Majesty's* Australian White Ensign?" Despite probing, both Defence and Navy have been unforthcoming on this issue. Will HMAS be ADV in a future republic? It appears cumbersome and ugly to those who have served and are serving.





## ARAFURA-CLASS LISTED

In the early days of scoping the *Arafura-class*, the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group took the incredible decision to de-fang and under-arm the class. Ostensibly to ensure that politically, it was not seen as a Corvette but an OPV and it would not therefore challenge the *Hunter-class* and *Hobart-class* procurements.

**The Canberra Margin** The Canberra experts took a perfectly reasonable design and decided to remove from it, its primary weapon system, targeting radar, and strengthened flight deck. Capable of operating large maritime helicopters, in addition to UAV.

The same experts did not leave the original design as “Fitted for; not With (FFNW)”, but took the extraordinary decision to remove and detune, so that the final class could no longer sustain the weapons, sensors, and aircraft it was originally designed to carry. An act of *strategic vandalism* that ultimately puts crews and ships at risk.

Not satisfied with defanging the ship for Australian political-military purposes, the successful design by Lürssen was then shoehorned into the WA-based shipbuilder, Austal. To be included in the program as a sub-contractor. Leading to significant delays as designs were re-drafted and contracts let for what was, by now, a unique Australian class. No longer in the class of similar vessels operated worldwide. With all the additional sustainment and maintenance requirements / costs that go with any small-in-number variant, no longer in class.

Three issues have emerged:

1. Seaworthiness and stability issues due to problems meeting the changed design and marrying civil (Lloyds Register) standards with naval engineering standards and practices;
2. The defanged lightly armed Lürssen OPV is no longer considered sufficient to be up-armed (as per the original design) to meet emerging Indo-Pacific requirements in an increasingly contested environment. Including coming up against Chinese maritime militia forces incorporating its fishing fleet.

A senior Government official apparently told the ABC, that:

It's late, has next-to-no armament, a helicopter platform that is not strong enough for helicopters, it isn't seaworthy and there are safety standard issues.

3. It may not be possible to adequately up-armour the unique *Arafura-class* without adding to existing stability



USS GERALD R FORD (CVN 78) at anchor off Portsmouth UK with Isle of Wight in the background.

concerns. These same instability issues, are likely to further constrain weapon and sensor choices.

Adding to delays, are issues impacting all workforces following COVID border shutdowns, and the upswing in mining (ironically iron and coal) industry competition.

If Australia had simply bought into the existing Lürssen design (on a FFNW basis), instead of applying the Canberra Margin (see Dr Baird, this issue paper 1), it is very likely that Australia would today have a perfectly adequate Corvette sized warship, capably of being up-armoured to meet current and future threats, within stability margins. In addition to being a ship in a common, sustainable, and maintainable worldwide class – including with regional navies. Irrespective of where it was built.

The question now facing the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) is whether to continue with the *Arafura-class*, knowing it may never be adequate to fulfil strategic Defence needs, today and tomorrow. Or to discontinue the class and replace with a design that will allow for commonality with other navies, and growth within stability margins. Or to discontinue the *Arafura-class* and allow Austal and, or, INCAT to design and build an alternative commercial hull variant. Suitable to Australian waters, and that leverages directly off very successful existing Austal and INCAT designs. As advocated by Dr Baird in Paper 1.

## LESSONS NOT LEARNED?

The critical issue regarding the *Arafura-class* and LHD designs is that Canberra needs to “stop thinking with a peacetime mentality”. It is this mentality that allows for the apparent acts of strategic vandalism that are currently crippling Australia's ability to grow and respond to

the “pacing threat”, referred to by Captain Galdorisi in paper 2 (this issue).

The same lessons were not learned from the design of the LHD (HMA Ships CANBERRA (L02) and ADELAIDE (L01)). In sum, the Canberra experts in this case – probably in acquiesce to political imperatives that the ship was not to be an aircraft carrier, and associated RAAF demands for the F-35A, not the F-35B carrier variant – acquired a class that was not capable of operating fixed wing aircraft. Unlike the original design, the *Juan Carlos-class*, already successfully operating F35B with the USMC and USN. In addition to its Harriers.

The act of *strategic vandalism* in this instance, again took a perfectly adequate design and, rather than allowing the class to be “fitted for but not with”, deliberately removed this capability. By changing deck strengthening designs, fuel arrangements, and flight deck lifts. So that the *Canberra-class* cannot operate F-35B without modification. At exactly the time, when the maritime aircraft of choice, operated by the USMC, the USN, Japan, the UK, and many other Allies – including, potentially Singapore, when it acquires ships (possibly of civil design) capable of being operated as aircraft carriers – is the F-35B. Not the F-35A.

Worryingly, as pointed out previously in *The NAVY*, the two DSR Professors (Smith and Houston) were in power during the time at which the decisions for the F-35A and the de-fanged LHD were taken. It will be a measure of them both, if they are able to admit their own mistakes, start thinking “what we would do if we were at war” and restore the capabilities now urgently required.

## SELF DEFENCE

Although not an act of *strategic vandalism*, per se, critical underinvestment in close in weapons systems (CIWS), close range systems (CRS) and SAM has left all classes of RAN warship, less potentially the *Hobart-class*, critically under armed in terms of Self Defence.

A recent CRS Report into *US Navy Shipboard Lasers* [1], stated “two key limitations that Navy surface ships currently have in defending themselves against UAVs and anti-ship missiles are:

1. limited depth of magazine and;
2. unfavourable cost exchange ratios.

Limited depth of magazine refers to the fact that [US] Navy surface ships can use surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and their Close-in Weapon System (CIWS) Gatling guns to shoot down only a certain number of enemy UAVs and anti-ship missiles before running out of SAMs and CIWS ammunition (\*) a situation (sometimes called “going Winchester”) that can require a ship to withdraw from battle, spend time travelling to a safe reloading location (which can be hundreds of miles away), (\*\*) and then spend more time traveling back to the battle area.

Given these additional constraints, the deployment of RAN vessels significantly up-threat becomes problematic. As suggested in previous papers provide to *The NAVY*, including by Senator Jim Molan, Mark Schweikert, and Dr Neil Baird. Amongst others.

A critical aspect of Self Defence is being able to survive, which includes being “able to militarily, politically, economically, and industrially afford to lose assets, in order to use them”. This is not attritional but plays into the designs of ships at scale (size and numbers) that will be necessary to cross the

line of battle. As the Russian Navy is finding to its cost in the Black Sea. Current designs do “not fit”. [2]

## AUSTRALIA NAVAL SHIPBUILDING AND SUSTAINMENT GROUP

Naval shipbuilding and sustainment activities are to be overseen by a new group created within the Department of Defence (DoD). The new agency – the *Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Group* (NSSG) – is led by Tony Dalton, Rear Admiral RAN (Ret) formerly the deputy secretary of naval shipbuilding in the DoD's Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG). It will comprise also CASG maritime divisions.

The formation of the NSSG came shortly after the announcement of a \$322M five-year contract with *Raytheon Australia*, to provide in-service support for the combat systems of the six *Collins-class* submarines.

Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy recently announced a six-year \$155M contract with *BAE Systems Australia* to become the Capability Life Cycle Manager for the three *Hobart-class* air warfare destroyers. Minister Conroy stated:

Under the new approach, *BAE Systems* will steer the destroyers through life, including a significant upgrade to their combat management system in 2024.

## HMAS WOLLONGONG DECOMMISSIONS

The *Armidale-class* Patrol Boat HMAS WOLLONGONG (P92) decommissioned at a ceremony in HMAS CAIRNS in December, after 15 years of service.

The outgoing Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Jonathan Earley, CSC, RAN, attended the ceremony and recognised the service of the Ship's Company.

HMAS WOLLONGONG and the crews

who have served in the vessel have made a significant contribution to our national interest.

These professional and dedicated men and women have protected our nation's borders and offshore maritime interests from illegal activity.

While today's decommissioning is a necessary part of renewing our fleet, it is also an opportunity to honour the contribution made by the crews who have served Australia in HMAS Wollongong.

Navy is transitioning to 12 new *Arafura-class* Offshore Patrol Vessels. These boats have greater range and endurance than our existing boats. This will allow Navy to protect Australian interests over great distances and in more complex maritime environments.

## USS FORD ON FIRST OFFICIAL DEPLOYMENT

USS GERALD R FORD (CVN 78) departed Norfolk, Virginia, on 4 October 2022 for its first official deployment.

USS FORD will not currently be deployed as part of the USN Global Force Management deployment. Rather it will be sent on a Retained Service deployment, according to Vice Admiral Daniel Dwyer, commander of United States 2nd Fleet and Joint Force Command.

The ship's first Global Force Management deployment is currently planned for 2023.

The type of deployment is determined in a large part by Operational Command and technical Control. The deployed force reports to the geographic combatant commander for Global Force Management deployments. For example, INDOPACOM in the Pacific. For service-retained deployments, Admiral Michael Gilday, the chief of naval operations (CNO), maintains operational command.

Vice Admiral Dwyer said, “The deployment of USS GERALD R FORD's carrier strike group (CSG) is the natural progression of our renewed commitment to the Atlantic.” Specifically, also to support and bolster NATO Allies during the Russo-Ukraine war.

US commands and units participating in the GERALD R FORD Carrier Strike Group (GRFCSG) deployment include:

- Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 12,
- Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 8,
- Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 2,
- guided-missile cruiser USS NORMANDY (CG 60),
- guided-missile destroyers USS RAMAGE (DDG 61), USS MCFAUL (DDG 74), and USS THOMAS HUDNER (DDG 116),



SM6 Missile (Image Raytheon).





HMAS WOLLONGONG alongside Fleet Base East NSW prior to Decommissioning (Image LSIS Matthew Lyall).

- USNS replenishment oiler Joshua Humphreys (T-AO-188),
- dry cargo ship USNS Robert E Peary (T-AKE-5), and;
- US Coast Guard high endurance cutter USCGC HAMILTON (WMEC-715).

### FINCANTIERI MARINETTE MARINE COMMENCES FRIGATE CONSTELLATION BUILD

Fincantieri Marinette Marine (FMM) officially began construction on the first US Navy (USN) *Constellation-class* guided missile frigate, CONSTELLATION (FFG 62), in late 31 August at the FMM shipyard, Marinette, Wisconsin, with the first steel cut. The USN awarded FMM the *Constellation* detail design and construction contract in April 2020. Start of construction began after FMM successfully completed the critical design review in May and the production readiness review in July.

Rear Admiral Casey Moton, the programme executive officer, stated FMM had surpassed the 80% detail-design objective the USN wanted before the start of construction.

Delivery of CONSTELLATION is due 2026. FMM is also on contract to build CHESAPEAKE (FFG 64) and CONGRESS (FFG 63). The USN plans to build 20 *Constellation-class* ships.

Marco Galbiati, CEO of Fincantieri Marine Group said:

We invested more than \$450 million (\$300M USD) into our Marinette shipyard to build many frigates for the US Navy;

We stand ready to deliver the two frigates a year the navy requires.

The USN initially planned to build two frigates annually starting in fiscal year (FY) 2023. The FY 2023 proposed budget called for the service to alternate between an annual buy of one per year and two per year. Changes in acquisition planning will depend on funding and industrial base capacity. Noting that agreement as to the size of the US Navy, its growth path, and the ratio of crewed to uncrewed vessels has yet to be approved by Congress. See paper 4, this issue.

### US APPROVES SM-6 SALE TO JAPAN

Seen as an essential element of Tokyo's future efforts to enhance air- and missile-defence capabilities alongside future technologies to detect and track supersonic glide weapons and research on modern railguns, the SM-6 is a cornerstone of Japan's Defence White Paper, *Defense of Japan 2022*

The US Department of State approved a request by Japan to procure Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) air-defence missiles for an estimated \$670 million, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has announced.

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS), which requires approval from Congress, includes 32 SM-6 Block I missiles, in two tranches of 16, MK41 vertical launch system (VLS) canisters, and a range of related equipment and services.

The DSCA said SM-6:

will also provide the US-Japan security alliance with the latest and most advanced capabilities, reducing Japan's reliance on US forces for the defence of Japan and further improving US-Japan military interoperability.

Japan was considered by Raytheon as a potential customer of SM-6, alongside Australia and South Korea. Navies. All looking to upgrade their surface fleets Baseline 9 Aegis combat system, integrated with SM-6.

In September 2018 Tokyo confirmed its plan to equip the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's (JMSDF's) two improved Atago-class destroyers with the SM-6.

The Republic of Korea (RoK) Navy plans to integrate the SM-6 missiles onto its KDX-III destroyers.

Navy plans to equip its three *Hobart-class* guided-missile destroyers and its future *Hunter-class* frigates with the SM-6. And to upgrade the Aegis system on the *Hobart-class* destroyers to Baseline 9 from 2024. Baseline 9 is also identified for the *Hunter-class*.

SM-6 is a multi-purpose, sea-based terminal defence and anti-surface missile over sea and land, with a range estimated at 370 km. Block I is anti-air warfare-capable, with a dual-mode seeker (active and semi-active), a solid-rocket booster, and dual-thrust solid rocket motors.

### NAVAL GROUP FLOATS FDI FRIGATE FOR FRENCH NAVY

French shipbuilder Naval Group today floated the first defense and intervention frigate (FDI), AMIRAL RONARC'H (D660), for the French Navy (Marine Nationale). See back page, this issue.

The November event was a partial launch. The covered construction dock where the first FDI frigate took shape was floated. However, the hull of AMIRAL RONARC'H was not taken out to the outfitting pier on the Scorff river due to weather condition. This step, performed with tugboats, is expected to be performed later.

The ceremony took place in presence of Sébastien Lecornu, French minister of the Armed Forces, and his Greek counterpart, Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos. The ship is expected to be delivered to the French Navy in 2024.

*The Frégate de Défense et d'Intervention* (Defence and Intervention Frigate) or FDI, is also known as *Frégate de Taille Intermédiaire* (Medium-Size Frigate) or FTI. It is a planned class of up to 15 French frigates. As of early 2022, five ships have been ordered for the French Navy, with the lead ship being named AMIRAL RONARC'H, and an additional three, more heavily armed vessels, for the Hellenic Navy, with the lead ship named KIMON.



RFA *Fort Victoria* (A387) Leaves the Firth of Forth to take up Operational Duties with CSG23.

## SEIZURE IN GULF OF GUINEA

On 30 November, under the direction of the Maritime Prefect of the Atlantic and the Prosecutor of the Republic of Brest, the French amphibious helicopter carrier (PHA) *TONNERRE* (L9014) seized more than 4.6 tonnes of cocaine from a tugboat in the Gulf of Guinea.

Supported by a Falcon 50 aircraft detached to Dakar and two embarked helicopters, FS *TONNERRE* visiting team intervened aboard the Brazilian tug to ascertain the nature of its cargo. With the approval of the Brazilian authorities, the French sailors searched the building and discovered numerous bales of cocaine. These were then destroyed on board. This seizure of more than 4.6 tons of cocaine represents a total value estimated at €150 million.

## GREENWICH STATION

The ship responsible for supporting the UK aircraft carrier task groups with fuel and ammunition is returning to full operations after an extensive refit.

RFA *Fort Victoria* deployed for seven months of 2021 deployed with Carrier Strike Group, 21 during its mission to the Indo-Pacific. Keeping warships, aircraft and sailors fuelled and fed across a combined 500,000 nautical miles.

RFA *Fort Victoria* and RFA *Tidespring* – were critical components of the global deployment providing most of the group's needs – fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts, replacement engines and the like.

Much of 2022 has seen *Fort Victoria* at Liverpool's Cammell Laird shipyard for extensive repairs and upgrades, especially

on her engines, to ready her for the front line once again ahead of a jam-packed 2023.

Captain Martin Jones, Commanding Officer of *Fort Victoria*, said:

It's pleasing to get *Fort Victoria* back to sea after a lengthy period in the shipyard and allow her to stretch her legs.

We are very much looking forward to returning to the fold of Carrier Strike and supporting Carrier Strike Group 23.

The UK Royal Navy's (RN) second *Daring* (Type 45)-class destroyer, HMS *DAUNTLESS* (D33), has returned to base-port Portsmouth after completing engine trials as part of a major power generation upgrade and get-well programme.

*DAUNTLESS* is the first in class to complete the upgrade, known as the Power Improvement Project (PIP), which seeks to improve resilience of the destroyers' power and propulsion system. It is one part of *Project Napier*, intended to overcome problems that have affected the performance *Type 45s* since coming into service, 17 years ago. The ship may already be considered at half-life.

The programme is being delivered by prime contractor BAE Systems in collaboration with BMT Defence Services and Cammell Laird under a £160 million (\$270M) firm-price contract awarded by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) in March 2018.

Work began at Cammell Laird's shipyard in Birkenhead in spring 2020 and included removing and replacing the two original 2 MW Wärtsilä diesel generators with three more reliable, more powerful, and cleaner MTU Series 4000 generators (3 MW each). In addition, a storeroom has been converted

into a high-voltage switchboard to process the extra power generated – which amounts to between 4 and 5 MW.

As the first in class to complete the upgrade, programme of work will act as the foundation for upgrade work on the remaining five ships in the class.

Lieutenant Commander Amy Glover, *DAUNTLESS*'s Marine Engineering Officer, said “that indications from the sea trials stipulated that so far, the PIP was delivering exactly what it set out to do”.

The CO, Commander Ben Power RN, considered “the PIP will provide the additional flexibility and power that future-proofs the class for the next 20–30 years, as well as enable the RN to embark and integrate future weapon systems”.

The ship is intended to return to the Fleet in mid-2023.

Note 3. HMS *DARING*, the first of class, was launched in 2006. The last of class, HMS *DUNCAN*, in 2010. Assuming a Design-life of 25 years, *DARING* should be decommissioning in or about 2032, and *DUNCAN* in 2036. The indication of the CO is that the class will be extended by a decade or so, decommissioning between 2043 and 2047. In actuality, the RN needs to be bootstrapping some of its highly innovative designs into early build and service. Replacing the class by the late 2020s; not the mid-2040s. ■



## NOTES

\* US Navy cruisers have 122 missile cells; Navy destroyers have 90 or 96 missile cells. Some of these cells are used for storing and launching Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles or anti-submarine rockets. The remainder are available for storing and launching SAMs. A US Navy cruiser or destroyer might thus be armed with a few dozen or several dozen SAMs for countering missiles and UAVs. Countering missiles and UAVs with SAMs might sometimes require shooting two SAMs at each enemy missile.

Note 1: these are significantly larger magazines than any held in existing RAN (and RN) Frigates and Destroyers.

\*\* The missile cells on a Navy cruiser or destroyers are clustered together in an installation called a Vertical Launch System (VLS). VLS cells cannot be reloaded while the ship is underway; a ship needs to return to a port or a calm anchorage to reload its VLS.

Note 2: calm Pacific anchorages and ports for ammunition ships is a known constraint on the RAN.

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India Navy Conducting Amphibious Operations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

## INDAUS ECONOMIC SECURITY COOPERATION

Writing in *The Interpreter* (6 Dec) Radhey Tambi, noting the Fleet Commander (Rear Admiral Jonathan Earley RAN) comments of “big power muscle movements” during a visit to India, suggested “a coordinated maritime domain awareness program would act as a force multiplier”.

In accordance with Indian Maritime Doctrine (established during both WWI and WW2), the region from the east coast of Africa to the western shores of Australia is the primary area of responsibility of the Indian Navy, whereas the north-eastern part of the Indian Ocean is a priority area for Australia as described in the *2020 Defence Strategic Update*.

India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands lie close to the Strait of Malacca, while Australia's Cocos (Keeling) Islands are also located near strategic waters of Indonesia, with access to Sunda, Lombok, and Wetar Straits. Together, Tambi recognises that these territories cover the entry and exit points of the Indian and Pacific Oceans; the three peninsulas and three bays.

There is increased economic interest in the region, including more recently a significant increase in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. There is also a growing number of Chinese research vessels, submarines, and underwater drones operating in the Indian Ocean has raised concerns. The island territories of India and Australia offer the chance to strengthen maritime surveillance in the region, as well as develop ties with other partners.

Chinese research vessels in addition to collecting information about resources, also collect data related to salinity, depth, and turbidity, along with oxygen and chlorophyll levels. The use of this data is not necessarily limited to civil use is also used for tracking foreign submarines and maintaining egress routes for the operation of Chinese submarines.

### Hotspot

The hotspot is the shallow water of Ninety East Ridge, which divides the Indian Ocean into the East and West Indian Ocean.

India and Australia currently use the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Cocos (Keeling) for surveillance and reconnaissance. The proposal to tfly P-8 aircraft through and from the islands, which lie north and south of each other, would act as a force multiplier. Such a program would improve interoperability of the forces and strengthen the deterrence and defence objectives of both countries, complementing a logistics agreement that allows the islands to be used for refuelling purposes when India's ships are entering the Pacific Ocean and when Australia's ships are entering the Indian Ocean.

### Extended Deterrence

Such patrols would additionally assist in the tackling of piracy, which is on the increase. Burden-sharing would also help in addressing regional challenges, including disaster events resulting from climate change, as well as search and rescue operations. India, Australia and Indonesia already serve as the primary information providers for tsunami warnings in the Indian Ocean region. Extended cooperation will assist in covering the breadth of potential challenges to come and provide a form of regional *Extended Deterrence*. [1]

the systematic, multidimensional, attempt to persuade an adversary, through the prospect of military engagement, defensive support, intervention, or retaliation, not to attack an ally, and to provide reassurance to that ally about the continuing security of the relationship. [2]

### Economic Opportunities

The coordinated relationship between New Delhi and Canberra opens the potential to engage with other nations in the western part of the Indian Ocean, too. Maritime cooperation with India also opens up the opportunity for investment in ship design

and building opportunities as Australia (and the U.S.) seeks to divest its reliance on China.

The QUAD, while being a Defence agreement nonetheless opens up the opportunity for economic cooperation and direct investment in both civil and military enterprises. The challenge posed by China through currency manipulation and tariffs means that the cost of labour per hour is \$2.0 in China compared to \$20 in the West. A ten-fold markup.

The freezing for 10-years of US Technology investment and offshoring to China, in addition to other investment disincentives, has increased the cost of China labour to between \$4.0 and \$5.0, a four-fold mark up. At this cost, investment in India becomes significantly more attractive.

## MARITIME STRATEGIC FLEET TASK FORCE

The Commonwealth established a *Maritime Strategic Fleet Task Force* to strengthen economic sovereignty and support improved National security outcomes. The Strategic Fleet will be made up of vessels which are Australian Flagged and crewed.

The Task Force is led by the usual Canberra luminaries, including the Chair, Mr John Mullen (also Chair of Telstra); Dr Sarah Ryan (NEO Woodside); Ms Angela Gillham (BSc, CEO Maritime Industry Australia Ltd.); Major General Jason Walk (Defence Estates) and Mr Paddy Crumlin (Joint Deputy National Secretary of the MUA). The board is more notable by who is absent – including industry (e.g., as represented by Svitzer, Baird Maritime, etc.), the energy sector, the Navy, Merchant Navy Associations, Port Authorities, the NLA, shipbuilding, Higher Education, TAFE, Research (CSIRO), and the TF instigator, the Hon. Bill Shorton MP.


The first phase will report on high-level strategic objectives for the fleet at the end of 2022.

Given the *de facto* backdrop of nationalisation (according to Santos CEO, Kevin Gallagher) of the Reliables energy market (Coal, Oil, Gas), including production and extraction, through caps and windfall taxes, in addition to 1970s style IR changes, the continuing ban on nuclear power, and Renewables Green Tape (laundering and washing) all contributing significantly to inflation (more so than Russia's war on Ukraine), the likelihood of investment in Australia's maritime industry appears increasingly remote.

Don't hold your breath. ■

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## MASTERING THE ART OF COMMAND

**Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Victory in the Pacific**

By Trent Hone

USNI (September 15, 2022)

ISBN-10: 1682475956

ISBN-13: 9781682475959

Hardcover: \$60.00

Trent Hone studied religion and archaeology at Carleton College in Northfield, MN and works as a consultant helping a variety of organisations improve their processes and techniques. He is an authority on the U.S. Navy of the early twentieth century and a leader in the application of complexity science to organisational design. Hone regularly writes and speaks about leadership, sensemaking, organizational learning, and complexity.


Hone argues in *Mastering the Art of Command* that Nimitz used his leadership skills, command talents, and strategic acumen to create the conditions for victory against Japan. He examines how Nimitz, as both Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC), revised and adapted his organisational structure to

capitalise on lessons and newly emerging information and technologies. The main crux is that, because Nimitz served simultaneously as CINCPAC and CINCPAC, he was able to couple tactical successes to strategic outcomes and more effectively plan and execute victory at Midway, Guadalcanal, the Marshall Islands, the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Whereas the Fulcrum year in the Battle of the Atlantic was 1942, in the Pacific Theatre the fulcrum year was 1943, after which the tide was turned.

Hone maintains that Nimitz was able to move beyond the Operational and from Operational Art (the employment of military forces to attain operational objectives) to strategic art (the employment of all levers of power to attain national (grand) strategic and operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration, and conduct of war). Hone also maintains that, like Nelson, he had the “Nimitz Touch”, displaying deftness and subtlety in his dealings with “Admiral King and occasional conferences with MacArthur”.

Hone argues that “Nimitz’s campaign had *flow*: timing, movement, and opportunity all coming together in a series of integrated flows”: planned operations, logistical sustenance, and the offensive execution of operations that swept the Japanese Fleet from the seas.

A book worth reading and building on. Unfortunately, Western navies learned the lessons of the Atlantic and not the Pacific, which bedevils designs, thinking, and *Strategic Art* to this day.



## THE ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR

**Great Power War in Asia and the Pacific**

Edited by John H. Maurer and Erik Goldstein

USNI (October 15, 2022)

ISBN-10: 1682477703

ISBN-13: 9781682477700

Hardcover: \$60.00

John H. Maurer serves as the *Alfred Thayer Mahan* Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy in the Strategy and Policy Department at the US Naval War College, RI. Erik Goldstein is professor of International Relations and History, Boston University. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.

*The Road to Pearl Harbor* examines the conflict in the Pacific prior to the attacks on Pearl Harbour and offers lessons applicable to contemporary Great Power flash points in the Indo-Pacific. It brings together renowned historians and analysts of national (grand) strategy to map out the fateful decisions that culminated in war.

The positioning of Winston Churchill is examined by a number of the authors, and in Chapter 4, by John H. Maurer. There is an increasingly contested view of Churchill in both India and Australia. Notwithstanding, in the years leading up to Pearl Harbour that this book covers, Churchill at a very early stage raised his alarm at the threat posed from Japan. His “worst nightmare” was Japan attacking the British Empire, while the United States did not join in the fighting on the side of Britain. From an Australian perspective, the fall of Singapore and the withdrawal of the AIF fundamentally changed the relationship with both Britain and Churchill. Maurer writes, “while Churchill could not prevent war in the Pacific, he did know how it would be won”.

The final Chapter (*Future Warfare in the Indo Pacific First Strike and U.S. Forward Bases in Japan*) by Toshi Yoshihara, is a sobering reality check. Yoshihara concludes: “the PLA’s core institutional beliefs and values, as exemplified by the doctrine hit first and hard to seize the initiative, will only grow. It thus behoves Western observers to discern the circumstances under which Chinese leaders would yield to pressures of a first strike”.

A challenging but convincing and well edited summer read.



## SINGAPORE, 1941-1942

**The Japanese version of the Malayan Campaign of World War II**

By Masanobu Tsuji

Singapore: Oxford University Press (1988)

ISBN 0-1958891 X

Softcover: Used \$25.00; New \$258.00

While India and Australia might have conflicting views on Churchill both before and during WW2, the author Masanobu Tsuji maintains the fact that Japan did not have a Churchill, cost Japan the war. Tsuji in his various lives also shared some of Churchill’s attributes for adventure and operating beyond the establishment.

Colonel Tsuji Masanobu (in the Asian convention) was variously a Colonel in the Japanese Imperial Army, a spy, a member of the Diet, a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek and a War Criminal. He served in Taiwan, China, Thailand and Vietnam during and after WW2. His work with the CIA assisting him escape the death penalty. He disappeared mysteriously in 1961 on an official trip to Laos. Although he was declared dead in July 1968, it was thought he might have died in the Laotian Civil War. Other rumours suggest that, given his post war liaison with Vietnam (possibly meeting with Ho Chi Minh), that he became an advisor to the North Vietnamese government.

Described as a tactical genius, a master of improvisation, the CIA thought he was “the type of man who, given the chance, would start World War III without

any misgivings”. And that he “had a lack of expertise in politics and information manipulation”. Like Churchill, he also has a bronze statue. In his case in Kaga, Ishikawa.

The introduction to this version is provided by Lieutenant General Gordon Bennett, against whom charges were laid that he had relinquished his command (in Malaya-Singapore) without permission. A court of enquiry upheld that “Bennett was not justified in handing over his command, or in leaving Singapore” but a Royal Enquiry partially exonerated him. Tsuji failed at Guadalcanal, and the fiasco discredited him. Including charges that he chose to escape the island.

The book itself is a marquee of its time and written in a style – even translated – that is forthright, confronting, if engaging. It tells a story of a different time, when Japan was seeking to rid South East Asia (and India) of its European and American overlords. The planning and details he provides of the Malaya-Singapore campaign; the overwhelming Japanese victory against significantly superior numbers (by bicycle) and the way in which an ignominious surrender was orchestrated, are excoriating.

As a book detailing Japan’s doctrine of hit first and hard to seize the initiative, and how it succeeded and failed it is worthy of study and thoughtful reflection. As Tsuji concludes:

In military operations we conquered splendidly, but in the war we were severely defeated. But, as if by magic, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines all gained independence, one after the other. The reduction of Singapore was indeed the hinge of fate for the peoples of Asia. It remains the case today, along with Taiwan.





# THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA ANNUAL MARITIME AFFAIRS ESSAY COMPETITION



## TOPICS:

- 21st Century Naval Warfare
- Australian Naval History
- Australian Industrial and Merchant Navy Maritime Strategy
- Australian Strategic Alliances: AUKUS, QUAD, Five-Eyes, FPDA, ANZUS.

## CATEGORIES:

A first, second and third prize will be awarded in each of two categories:

**Professional category**, which covers Journalists, Defence Officials, Academics, Naval Personnel and previous contributors to *The NAVY*; and **Non-Professional category**.

Essays should be 2,500-3,000 words in length and will be judged on accuracy, content and structure.

## PRIZES:

	1ST PLACE	2ND PLACE	3RD PLACE
Professional	\$1,000	\$500	\$250
Non-Professional	\$500	\$200	\$150

Essays should be submitted in Microsoft Word format on disk by;

**Post to:** Navy League Essay Competition  
Box 1719 GPO, SYDNEY NSW 2001

OR

**Emailed to:** [editorthenavy@hotmail.com](mailto:editorthenavy@hotmail.com)

Submissions should include the writer's name, address, telephone and email contacts, and the nominated entry category.

*The Navy* reserves the right to reprint all essays in the magazine, together with the right to edit them as considered appropriate for publication.


**SUBMISSION DEADLINE:**

**Saturday 19 August 2023**

Prize-winners announced in the January-March 2024 Issue of *The NAVY*.



**HATCH:** Naval Group Launches French Navy's first Defense and Intervention Frigate (FDI) FS AMIRAL RONARCH (D660).



**MATCH:** ADV *Reliant* wearing His Majesty's Australian White Ensign following flag raising ceremony August 2022. (Image SGT Peter Borys)



**DESPATCH:** USS ST LOUIS (LCS-19) Commissioned in 2020 being considered by Congress for Decommissioning in 2023 along with 39 other US warships.