

THE NAVY

THE MAGAZINE OF THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA



REBUILDING THE COMMONWEALTH NAVIES - PART I

**THE BATTLE FOR AUSTRALIA
— A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE**

THE CRESWELL ORATION 2019

**OPERATION MO AND
THE BATTLE OF THE
CORAL SEA**

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Front cover:

Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2019 - Army ARH Tiger Helicopter from HMAS CANBERRA (L02) as HMAS NEWCASTLE (FFG 06) maintains station nearby. Image ABIS Kieren Dempsey.

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USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CV-75) Atlantic Ocean, Dec 2018.

I WOULDN'T START FROM HERE

The first article in *The NAVY* Jul-Sep issue is by the redoubtable British author and historian David Hobbs and examines in Part 1 how 'we' might rebuild the Commonwealth Navies. This is an important theme that resonates with R.C. Blake's paper in the Apr-Jun issue dealing with the need to redesign western fleets, based upon the prohibitive costs of current designs, at the necessary scale (numbers and size), and the zombie-like mismatch between crews and frigates/destroyers. The second paper is this year's Creswell Oration by Commodore Timothy Brown RAN, Director General Submarines for Navy Strategic Command. It considers the development of Australia's Submarine Force through the eyes of Admiral Sir William Rooke Creswell. The NLA is indebted to Commodore Brown for his excellent paper, and stepping in at short notice for Rear Admiral Greg Sammut RAN, Head of the Future Submarine Program. Admiral Sammut was completing the *Attack-class* Strategic Partnering Agreement (SPA) at the time of the Oration! The third paper is by Rear Admiral Andrew Robertson AO RAN and addresses *The Battle for Australia* from a maritime perspective. Andrew has previously been described in *The NAVY* as one of Australia's, and the RAN's, 'national treasures'. For those wishing to hear more from the Admiral, they may visit (previous Deputy PM) John Anderson's website for a podcast interview (29 Jan 2019), see <https://johnanderson.net.au/podcasts/conversations-featuring-rear-admiral-ret-andrew-robertson-ao/>. The final paper is by Murray Dear (Essay Competition, 3rd place, professional section) and connects with Andrew Robertson's paper by examining *The Battle of the Coral Sea*. Murray concludes that 'if the Coral Sea and Midway battles are viewed as a continuum, then the Battle of the Coral Sea was the first act of a much larger victory'.

In other words, this was the actual Battle of Australia, and then supporting the British Pacific Fleet (upon which David Hobbs has written). So connecting back to Creswell on submarines, who after WWI stated, *inter alia*:

...some expenditure, even out of proportion to our means, should go toward placing us in a position to have effective submarine defence.

The old Irish (some have claimed Scottish) proverb, as told to two tourists asking for directions to Dublin, says 'I wouldn't be starting from here, if I were you'. It seems somehow apt for all Defence Forces belonging to Julian Lindley-French's *Global West*. Blake in *The Emergence of Zombie Fleets* (*The NAVY*, Vol. 81, No. 2, Apr-Jun) gets at this by suggesting that there is a fundamental mismatch between frigate and destroyer designs in terms of military, economic, and political 'affordability', that does not necessarily exist for submarine designs. His argument goes further to suggest that 'if one cannot afford militarily, economically, and politically to lose these capabilities – then they will not be used'. And vice versa. This aligns with what Sheridan, Molam, Babbage and others have been saying for many years now, see editorial 'Trust But Verify' (*The NAVY*, Apr-Jun issue) – as indeed has Andrew Robertson and the Navy League of Australia. See page 5, *Statement of Policy*, and also Andrew Robertson's interview with John Anderson.

The election results are now out and the LNP (arguably with a more settled/stable Senate than existed before) will form the next government. Noting six prime ministers in as many years, the political-system possibly remains unstable. Perhaps because of this, it seems likely that the current Prime Minister will last longer than his predecessors. Even a full term? The challenge remains steering the great flagship of state; representing and



ARA SAN JUAN (S 42) lost in November 2017.

care-taking its institutions for as long as Government and their parties are trusted to do so. For many western governments this may mean redefining an emerging centre ground and providing leadership for all, not only a preferred political-media class.

Labor put forward some good policies regarding the Defence of Australia, the maritime industry, and the shipbuilding program. They had also, in Penny Wong and Richard Marles, two formidable Ministers-in-waiting – who, potentially, would have been able to provide the bases for leading change and transforming Australian Defence and Foreign Affairs over the next few vital years. That is not to be – ‘Australia is not starting from there’.

The LNP handling of the Defence portfolio since 2013 has been perhaps a little ‘curate’s eggish’. Good in parts. An MP who might have provided a hard-hitting, knowledgeable lead to the Defence portfolio was Tony Abbott, who lost his seat in the 2019 General Election. Heavy-hitting Ministers (who could have led Defence over this period) were in short supply, until probably the promotion of Christopher Pyne as Minister of Defence in August 2018. Pyne resigned his portfolio and seat at the May 2019 General Election. Encouragingly, his nominated successors appear to have the continuity and ability to take command of the complex Defence portfolio, and the breadth, depth and vision to deliver.

Under current planning, the first of the *Attack-class* submarines will be operational in about 2035. It is unclear to *the NAVY* (and many operations), what steel will last another 16 years to make a Life of Type Extension (LOTE) of the *Collins-class* safe and cost effective. The tragic loss of the 34-year old ARA SAN JUAN (S 42) in November 2017, is a salutary reminder to us all. We will remember them – our fellow submariners and sailors. Not only may Australia be expending its vital resources on ‘old rope’, but the extended submarines might be neither value for money, or operationally valuable in the numbers required. It will possibly be the worst of all worlds – more seriously, placing young sailors (average age of a crew is between 22-25, i.e. not born when the first submarines were laid down) in an existential artefact, beyond its useful operational life. This is an ethical question; a moral dilemma and a paradox wrapped up in one.

In many regards, the Global West has run out of time – we really would not want to be starting from here. But we are. The suggestion to retire the USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CV-75) early (see *Flash Traffic*), to form a potential experimental

‘fleet’ may be showing the way. As David Hobbs and Blake (in *Zombie Fleets*) also suggest, the US Navy may be half the size it needs to be for the tasks it is facing. The illiberal powers know this – be they in South East Asia, the Middle East, or Latin America. The existing U.S. Fleet is ageing and the designs are beyond their sell-by dates.

Blake also suggests a RAN Fleet of 100 ships. A question becomes ‘how to get there?’ – which may not be to continue building the same designs, again. A sign of madness according (apparently) to Einstein. If submarine designs are right – and there is evidence to suggest that they are – then ‘how does Australia replace the six *Collins-class* submarines before 2035?’ An answer (suggested in the previous editorial) may be to build two submarines in France in the 2020s – potentially using these designs to bootstrap

a further two Australian-built submarines delivered in the late 2020s, and a further two by the mid-2030s. To reduce risk, the French/Naval Group apparently wants to do this too.

Greg Sheridan (*The Australian*) maintains Australia should have 18 submarines – effectively forming four continuous-Deterrent patrols, with two in build/design at any one time. Opening up the opportunity for 9 nuclear powered submarines (the minimum fleet-size for SSNs) downstream, post 2035. Blake also suggests alternative Versatile Modular Designs for surface ships – which an experimental programme might realise.

Crewing remains a critical issue, and maintaining RAN’s tradition of ‘thinking to fight and win’ – which, according to Admiral ‘ABC’ Cunningham RN, takes centuries to forge. To support twelve submarines, RAN is looking to almost quadruple the current force to about 2500 submariners over the next 15 years. Considering the surface fleet, similar increases may be required – taking the size of Navy from about 16,000 (on a good day, with a fair wind, following sea, and Reserves) to potentially 25,000 in the same timeframe. Can Australia do this – what are the crews that will fit, and what will they look like? Who will lead this vital change – and how? *The NAVY* firmly believes Australia can do it. ■



Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Browne Cunningham 1st Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope KT GCB OM DSO & Two Bars.

STATEMENT OF POLICY

CURRENT AS AT 1 JULY 2019

For the maintenance of the Maritime wellbeing of the nation.

The Navy League is intent upon keeping before the Australian people the fact that we are a maritime nation and that a strong Navy and capable maritime industry are elements of our national wellbeing and vital to the freedom of Australia. The League seeks to promote Defence self-reliance by actively supporting defence manufacturing, and the shipping and transport industries.

The strategic background to Australia's security is changing and in many respects has become much less certain following increasing tensions, particularly in East Asia involving major powers, and in Europe and the Middle East. The League believes that Australia should rapidly increase the capability to defend itself, paying particular attention to maritime defence. Through geographical necessity Australia's prosperity, strength, and safety depend to a great extent upon the security of the surrounding seas and island areas, and on unrestricted seaborne trade.

The Navy League:

- Believes Australia can be defended against attack by other than a major maritime power and that the prime requirement of our defence is an evident ability to control the sea and air space around us and to contribute to defending essential lines of sea and air communication with our allies.
- Supports a continuing strong alliance with the US.
- Supports close relationships with all nations in our general area particularly New Zealand, PNG and the South Pacific island States.
- Advocates the acquisition of the most capable modern armaments, surveillance systems and sensors to ensure technological advantage over forces in our general area.
- Advocates a strong deterrent element in the ADF enabling powerful retaliation at significant distances from our shores.
- Believes the ADF must be capable of protecting commercial shipping both within Australian waters and beyond, in conjunction with allies.
- Endorses the development of the capability for the patrol and surveillance of all of Australia's ocean areas, its island territories and the Southern Ocean.
- Advocates Government initiatives for rebuilding an Australian commercial fleet capable of supporting the ADF and the carriage of essential cargoes to and from Australia in times of conflict.
- Welcomes the 2016 Defence White Paper and the Government intention to increase maritime preparedness and gradually increase defence expenditure to 2% of GDP.
- Urges the strength and capabilities of the Army (including particularly the Army Reserve) and Air Force be enhanced, and the weaponry, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyberspace and electronic capabilities of the ADF be increased, including an expansion in its UAV capability.
- escort requirements of our 5 new major warships and the many other essential maritime tasks.
- Recommends bringing forward the start date of the replacement frigate program to both strengthen the RAN and mitigate the local industry capability gap on completion of the current guided missile destroyer program.
- Recommends the timely replacement and increase in numbers of the current mine-countermeasure force.
- Strongly supports the early acquisition of large, long range and endurance, fast submarines and notes the deterrent value, reliability and huge operational advantages of nuclear powered submarines and their value in training anti-submarine forces.
- The League is concerned at the very long time before the projected 12 new conventional submarines can enter operational service, noting very serious tensions in the NW Pacific involving major maritime powers.
- Recommends very early action to provide a submarine base on the Eastern seaboard.
- Notes the potential combat effectiveness and flexibility of the STOVL version of the Joint Strike Fighter (F35 Lightning II) and supports further examination of its application within the ADF.
- Supports the development of Australia's defence industry, including strong research and design organisations capable of the construction and maintenance of all warships, submarines and support vessels in the Navy's order of battle, and welcomes the Government decision to provide a stable and continuous shipbuilding program.
- Supports the efforts by Navy to rebuild the engineering capability to ensure effective Fleet maintenance and sustainability.
- Advocates the retention in maintained reserve of operationally capable ships that are required to be paid off for resource or other economic reasons.
- Supports a strong Naval Reserve and Australian Navy Cadets organisation.
- Advocates a strong focus on conditions of service as an effective means of combating recruitment and retention difficulties.

As to the RAN, the League, while noting vital national peacetime tasks conducted by Navy, including border protection, flag showing/diplomacy, disaster relief, maritime rescue, hydrography and aid to the civil power:

- Supports the concept of a Navy capable of effective action in war off both the east and west coasts simultaneously and advocates a gradual build-up of the fleet and its afloat support elements to ensure that, in conjunction with the RAAF, this can be sustained against any force which could be deployed in our general area.
- Considers that the level of both the offensive and defensive capabilities of the RAN should be strengthened, in particular with a further increase in the number of new proposed replacement frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels, noting the

The League:

- Calls for a bipartisan political approach to national defence with a commitment to a steady long-term build-up in Australia's defence capability including the required industrial infrastructure.
- While recognising budgetary constraints believes that, given leadership by successive governments, Australia can defend itself in the longer term, within acceptable financial, economic and manpower parameters.

Welcome to the winter edition of *The NAVY – The Magazine of the Navy League of Australia*.

Since we last went to print a new government has been formed and there have been several changes in the Ministry. Primarily of interest to the Navy League is the appointment of a Defence Minister with a strong military background. As you can see from reading our Statement of Policy, which is set out at the front of this edition, the Navy League promotes a bipartisan political approach to national defence, with a commitment to a steady long-term build up in our defence capability, including the required industrial infrastructure. We neither discourage spirited debate, nor shy away from asking the hard questions, though we do encourage this bipartisan defence approach to the members of the 46th Parliament. We also invite you to let your own Federal MP, whether new or returning, of our work and, in particular, our Statement of Policy.

The Prime Minister's first overseas visit, to the Solomon Islands, following the election makes clear to our neighbours in the Pacific of the importance of the region to our government. This follows from the visit of RAN ships, submarine, soldiers and RAAF aircraft, led by HMAS CANBERRA, to Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2019 amphibious operations exercises from March. Vice Admiral Noonan, Chief of Navy, noted at the time that the operations were much more than 'a series of goodwill visits' noting that the IPE 19 is 'about deepening relationships and partnerships in the region, improving our capacity to contribute to the region and building [the RAN's] mariner skills and amphibious capability... [sending] a very strong message throughout the region that Australia's a very capable and committed partner, friend and ally'. The Navy League supports the ongoing development of close relationships with all nations in our general area, the importance of these exercises at a military level and of the political visits as key to regional diplomacy.

PLAN PELORUS 2022

Navy recently released its updated Chief of Navy (CN) statement of intent: *a thinking Navy, a fighting Navy, an Australian Navy*. Not surprisingly, the statement also has a clear focus on the region, as well as on mission focus, defence national enterprise and Navy people creating capability. In a period of uncertainty CN sets out the priorities for Navy to mark against over the next

four years in preparing for a myriad of operational possibilities. It asks that Navy people, as should we all, 'question the status quo, innovate and take action'.

Plan Pelorus 2022 sets the following outcomes for Navy leaders: the provision of maritime forces and systems; assurance of safety, seaworthiness and airworthiness; effective leadership and management and the enablers and oversight to achieve Navy outcomes.

The Navy League advocates for more from Navy, though we are not limited by the fiscal limitations within which Navy must operate. We will continue, though, to advocate for Defence self-reliance, rapid increases in capability especially in maritime defence, the development of an Australian commercial fleet, and increases in defence expenditure to 2% of GDP. In the meantime, I encourage you to review Plan Pelorus 2022 for yourself.

NAVY LEAGUE ANNUAL EFFICIENCY TROPHY AWARDED TO TS MARYBOROUGH

On the last weekend in March I had the pleasure of presenting the Navy League Annual Efficiency Trophy to TS Maryborough, the top unit in Australia. Assessment is conducted across a range of criteria including ceremonial, boat work, marine activities, teamwork, readiness and all elements of the Australian Navy Cadet program.


The Navy Cadets on parade were very well turned out, their skills and readiness were on show for all to see. Most encouraging as well, was the large turnout from members of the Maryborough community and its leaders.

TS Maryborough has now been awarded this top gong for the second year running. It is testament to the leadership of the unit and to the Navy Cadets themselves.

BZ (very well done) TS Maryborough.

RELEVANCE, LONGEVITY AND THE MAINTENANCE OF MARITIME WELLBEING

As a League we are intent on keeping before the Australian people the fact that we are a maritime nation and that a strong Navy and capable maritime industry are elements of our national



Proposed Memorial to HMAS PERTH (1) - Foundation Project Manager Commander Jim O'Neill ANC Rtd Hon Sec, NLA WA Division.



TS Maryborough Marching Past on Award of Navy League Annual Efficiency Trophy.

wellbeing and vital to our freedom. State Divisions have been active in many areas including commemorations, advocacy and public representation of the Navy League.

The Victoria / Tasmania Division have recently enjoyed their well-attended and popular Creswell Oration and tours. The Queensland Division enjoyed visiting HMAS Brisbane and the key annual dinner commemorating the Battle of the Coral Sea. In South Australia and Western Australia, the League has been prominent advocating for the Australian Navy Cadets, continuing work on the HMAS PERTH (I) Memorial Foundation and all Divisions in attendance at ANZAC Day Services. In addition to its strong series of regular activities, the NSW Division has established its Operation *Servatione Vigilare* (you can read more in the letters section).

While Divisions of the League have been busy with these activities, the question of our longevity and the manner in which we continue to serve the nation and fulfil our objectives is one before us all. You will see in our correspondence section the letter noting the absence of Navy League publications from the CN Professional Resource List 2019 and questioning our options. The issue of how we ensure we are able to remain 'On Watch' as a quarterly journal and log of national record, while facing these competing challenges are matters which have not just dawned on us. At our Federal Council and AGM last year we continued an ongoing discussion on this subject, one that has no easy answer. My expectation is that this is a subject we will probably discuss every year up to 2038 and no doubt will continue to have well beyond then!

It is incumbent on us all to look for ways to ensure we are able to meet our goals and continue to do so – as set out in our *Statement of Policy* - and I encourage you all to let us have your feedback and your ideas on how we can manage into the future at editorthenavy@hotmail.com. ■

Happy reading.



CN PROFESSIONAL RESOURCE LIST 2019

Dear Editor,

I draw your attention to the CN Professional Resource List 2019. Whereas ANI gets one mention and the Sea Power Centre is mentioned twice, in a 13-page document (replete with a broad range of referenced reading, including by Chief of Navy and Warrant Officer of Navy) *The NAVY* and the Navy League of Australia, or any of their recent articles, papers, or books are not mentioned once.

Access, viability, and complacency has been a problem for several Navy Associations with attached magazines as I am sure you are aware (i.e. *White Ensign*, which died and then was re-born as part of *Australian Warship*). The *Naval Historical Society* struggles along due to the good work of those of its members based at Garden Island – but its future is always uncertain. The NHSA also has a good website and sends out its magazine and monthly article electronically.

The ANI seems to have taken on much of the role that NLA used to 'fight for' and has a good website, annual journal, annual dinner, and support of Navy. That said, NLA has always asked the much 'harder' questions than ANI due to it being influenced from outside and within Navy. ANI has struggled in the past and nearly 'sank' in the late 1990's due to lack of interest but has several recently retired senior Sirs who make sure it stays afloat and its now on an even keel but it took a lot of hard work. The [colour] ANI magazine *Headmark* died as it was too costly to print and mail out. A website which has weekly updates has taken its place.

Is it time for NLA to consider other options to stay afloat? Or use the ANI model – i.e. website (but open to all) rather than a magazine to get the information out there and maybe a once a year 'annual', or some combination of them both?

Regards

Name and address withheld

By Editor

Dear Correspondent,

Thank you for your letter – this is largely where *The NAVY*/NLA are right now. It is a very real and pressing issue.

The strength of the ANI is its institutional (Navy/Sea Power Centre) access-funding bias. The weakness of the ANI model is its institutional access-funding bias! Disruptive competition is also fierce. And Navy withdrew funding for one full issue of *The NAVY* per year, a number of years ago. Nonetheless, free copies continue to go to all ships and bases, worldwide.

In response, the NSW Division of the NLA has set up *Servatione Vigilare* (Keeping Watch) 2038 (SV38), whose stated aim is:

To Keep the Navy League of Australia 'on Watch' well into the 21st Century and celebrate the 100th Anniversary of The NAVY quarterly journal as a print and digital maritime log of national record in 2038.

Thank you again for your helpful letter – we are looking for support and advice as to how to best engage to realise Operation SV38 and will hope to remain engaged.

Yours Sincerely

Aeneas

USE OF PSEUDONYMS/NOM DE PLUMES

Dear Editor,

Noting recent issues, I wish to enquire about the policy *The NAVY* has regarding the use of pseudonyms, which might appear to run contrary to the spirit of openness required by academic enquiry, and indeed academy.

Regards

Name and address withheld

By Editor

Dear Correspondent,

Thank you for raising this question, which would appear to be in reference to the paper by R.C. Blake that appeared in the previous issue?

Writers have contributed under pseudonym to *The NAVY* since its inception in 1938. Pseudonyms are not unusual in publications of this type, which connect between profession, government, defence and industry. For example, The UK *Naval Review* is a membership-only publication that goes out to a wide audience, chiefly to officers of the Royal Navy and other Commonwealth navies (including Republic of India Navy, and RAN). Junior officers are allowed to write under pseudonym in order to be heard; more senior one's in order to be protected; and both to be safeguarded.

There are clearly ethical issues concerned in terms of what is said, and also moral ones in allowing people a voice to express higher/alternative values that may not align with current thinking/rules/codes of conduct/practice.

Clearly the principle of 'first doing no harm' applies and rules governing plagiarism, false claims, and security apply, as they would for any other publication. The editorial board must assure themselves of the veracity of the author, their publication and reasons behind choosing a pseudonym before granting approval. Generally, but not always, it is made clear in the article that the author is writing under a pseudonym/nom de plume. Readers wishing to be put in contact with the author can do so through the Editorial Board. It is left up to the author as to whether or not they enter into correspondence.

A number of authors writing in *The NAVY* have used pseudonyms going back over many years/even decades; including in other publications. This is on record.

Noting that you do not appear to be a member of the NLA, may we encourage you to join? For which you will also receive four copies of *The NAVY*, annually. Thank you again for your enquiry.

Editorial Board

MIGHTY MO TO BE ON U.S. POSTAGE STAMP

Dear Editor,

The U.S. Postal Service recently announced it's going to issue a stamp for the famous World War II battleship USS MISSOURI (BB 63). The battleship was affectionately nicknamed "Mighty Mo," and had one of the most historic roles during World War II. On Sept. 2, 1945, military officials from the Allied powers and imperial Japan convened on her deck and signed the documents confirming Japan's surrender and ending the war.

I'm sure your readers would find this interesting since millions of people around the world were impacted by the war. See link <https://about.usps.com/newsroom/national-releases/2019/0510-battleship-uss-missouri-honored-with-stamp.htm>

David P. Coleman

Public Relations Representative

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Headquarters, Washington DC



REBUILDING THE COMMONWEALTH NAVIES – PART I

By David Hobbs

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, no single navy, even that of the United States, can act alone to guarantee the freedom of the seas, the great highways which carry over 90% of the world's trade. Surely the fleets of the Commonwealth nations, with their shared heritage, have the ability to act in greater harmony as a force for the common good.



British Pacific Fleet in Port Jackson Oct 1945 following the end of WW2.



HMCS MAGNIFICENT (CVL 21).

PROGRESS FROM A COMMON HERITAGE

In 1944 the RN began to build up a new British Pacific Fleet, BPF, from scratch. It was intended to fight against Japan alongside the US Navy which, by then had mastered the techniques needed to conduct strike operations in the open ocean over prolonged periods supported by a logistic fleet train. Even at the height of its mobilised wartime power, however, the RN could not create this new fleet alone and relied heavily on the Commonwealth navies to provide ships, logistic support, bases and manpower; the latter seamlessly integrated with officers and men from the UK. Looking back, the level of co-operation achieved within the BPF, it is arguable that the Commonwealth Pacific Fleet would have been a more apt name. The RAN, RCN and RNZN all provided warships which were fully integrated with those of the RN and roughly half the Fleet Air Arm aircrew in the carrier air groups came from Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand. The majority had been trained by the Empire Air Training Scheme and had either joined the RNVR directly or the equivalent reserves of the Commonwealth Navies which had formed their own air branches to provide men for service with the RN. In addition to warships, the Australian Government funded and provided air stations, barracks, stores depots and dockyard facilities, the Canadian Government provided logistic support and some of the auxiliary shipping to carry it.

The BPF's operations in this new kind of warfare utilised the

power of embarked aircraft to project sea power into the heart of the Japanese Empire. It was the most powerful British fleet to be deployed in the pre-nuclear era and arguably the way in which the post-war RN developed largely followed on from the experiences of the BPF. The major Commonwealth navies learnt the same lessons, adopted similar tactical doctrines and both the RAN and RCN created their own Fleet Air Arm, based on the RN model, in the years immediately following the end of the Second World War. Progress towards this point had been perfectly logical with all warships in the Commonwealth navies flying the same white ensign as the RN. Although they were national assets funded by their own governments it was agreed that in wartime control of all the fleets within the British Empire would be exercised by the Admiralty, whilst taking into account the wishes of their individual naval boards. At first, the fleets of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India and Pakistan all had RN flag officers as their Chief of Navy until their own officers had gained suitable experience and seniority. Until the 1960s they also operated warships of British design which were either built in the UK or locally to specifications similar to those of the RN. In the immediate post-war period the RN had a surplus of material and was often generous in providing warships and aircraft to the Commonwealth fleets. As an example, the light fleet carrier MAGNIFICENT was lent to the RCN for a decade from 1946 and the cruisers BLACK PRINCE, BELLONA and ROYALIST lent to the RNZN. The two light fleet carriers that became HMA Ships SYDNEY and MELBOURNE were sold to the Australian Government for the estimated price of one plus the cost of the two ships' initial outfit of stores. Destroyers and frigates and even cruisers were provided for all the Commonwealth navies at minimal cost and unstinted training was provided for Commonwealth personnel to man the new ships, sometimes delaying the training of RN personnel in the turbulent years of demobilisation after 1945.

LESSONS LEARNED

The unexpected outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the immediate decision of the United Nations to defend South Korea brought Commonwealth warships together in the Pacific once more under the administrative control of the Admiralty but the operational control, in this instance, of the USN. Operations, largely off the west coast of the peninsula, showed that the lessons of the recent world war had been well absorbed and that the Commonwealth fleets could, when necessary, act as a cohesive force together. The achievements of the aircraft carrier SYDNEY and her air group were particularly successful. By the mid 1950s, however, factors began to emerge that tended to draw the Commonwealth fleets apart. The Australian government, for example, had concerns that the RAN was taking too much note of what the Admiralty wanted and paying too little heed to national priorities. In 1944 Admiral Sir Guy Royle, the RN officer serving as First Naval Member of the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, was reprimanded by Prime Minister Curtin for discussing the transfer of an aircraft carrier and two cruisers from the RN to the RAN in direct conversations with the Admiralty. Although the scheme had involved no actual cost to the Australian taxpayer, Curtin was suspicious that the RAN was being used as a sort of 'foreign legion' to solve a British shortage of manpower and insisted that all future communication with the Admiralty on such matters should be agreed before being sent formally through government channels. To an extent this problem was eased when Rear Admiral Sir John Collins became the first Australian to be appointed as First Naval Member 1948 but as the Australian government sought to implement its own foreign and defence policies it was only natural that it wanted the RAN to follow its own direction. Similar feelings can be detected in Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the newly independent states of India and Pakistan although close ties of outlook and training still helped to keep a spirit of co-operation alive within the Commonwealth fleets. Increasingly, the UK focused on the newly-formed NATO alliance as the threat of a Russian assault on Western Europe escalated after the Berlin airlift crisis; Canada had also joined NATO and shared in its doctrine and training but other Commonwealth countries could not.

A less obvious but still important factor was the stance taken against colonialism by the United States and the new United Nations organisation. The Commonwealth governments were reluctant to become involved in the hostilities that preceded the grant of independence in some of Britain's African colonies although Australian forces did join the fight against communist insurgents in



HMS OCEAN V (R68) launched the first helicopter amphibious assault during the British-France-Israel Suez Canal Invasion in 1956 - a tactical success and strategic failure.

the long-running Malayan Emergency during the 1950s. The decision by the British and French governments to use force against Egypt during the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 can be seen as a 'watershed' operation which was not supported by the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and many other Commonwealth countries or the United States. The Government of Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, insisted that the RN vacate its naval base at Trincomalee as a direct consequence of the action. The Confrontation between Indonesia and the newly-independent Commonwealth state of Malaysia from 1963 to 1966 did see the latter supported by armed forces from the UK, Australia and New Zealand, however, as it was a clear case of external aggression that was justly opposed. Differing opinions over the war in Vietnam also proved divisive. The United States government regarded it as an attempt to halt aggression but successive British prime ministers refused to become involved and when Australia and New Zealand did commit forces they were drawn away from the British outlook on policy and more into line with the Americans. Given the UK's weakening position as a global power this change was probably inevitable but not enough was done by successive British governments to maintain close links with the Commonwealth in defence matters.

RE-CAPITALISING

The RN had its own problems re-capitalising its fleet in the 1950s and budgetary restrictions limited the type and number of warships that could be built. Concentration on a possible war with Russia led to a focus on North Atlantic operations with emphasis on anti-submarine and mine-countermeasure vessels which were not necessarily attractive to the export market although *Leander-class* frigates were procured by India, New Zealand, Australia and other navies besides forming the technological basis of Canadian destroyer escort design. Two other factors prevented the RN from creating the fleet the Admiralty needed to meet its global commitments. First the British Government had calculated that the Soviet Union would not have a large enough nuclear arsenal to launch an offensive against the west until the late 1950s and so a generation of ships and aircraft that could have come into service in the early 1950s was passed over in order to procure what was intended to be better equipment by the year of 'maximum danger' in 1959. As serious, the government decided that its war fighting strategy would concentrate on nuclear bombardment by manned aircraft and missiles in an exchange that might only last a few hours. The role of the RN was considered by successive defence reviews to be of secondary importance, therefore,



Vice-Admiral Sir John Augustine Collins, KBE, CB (then as Commodore) with Captain Dechaîneaux and Commander Gatacre on the secondary conning position of HMAS AUSTRALIA.



INS TARAGIRI (F41) The last of the Leander-class derived Nilgiri-class ships to be decommissioned 27 June 2013.

and this led to further reductions in funding although the Duncan Sandys Defence Review of 1957 did recognise the need for task forces of aircraft carriers and amphibious 'commando carriers' intended for rapid deployment to limit small conflicts or 'brushfire wars' before they could grow into 'major conflagrations'. Significantly, however, politicians considered this to be a short-term requirement during the period of de-colonisation and longer-term provision was not agreed or funded.

RE-LEARNING

Far from producing the best weapons, the missiles and naval aircraft in the period of maximum danger in 1959 including the Sea Slug anti-aircraft missile system and the Scimitar and Sea Vixen fighters proved to be little more than 1940s designs that had undergone prolonged development. The USN had not skipped a generation in the early 1950s and by 1959 had developed even better missiles and aircraft to replace them with which RN equipment compared unfavourably. Sea Slug missiles could only be fitted in ships built around its cumbersome horizontal magazine and the big new fighters could not be operated from the Australian, Canadian and Indian light fleet carriers with the result that none of these systems were attractive to Commonwealth fleets. This, in turn, led to a fall-off in sales to what had been an important market for British naval equipment that coincided with a loss of confidence across the RN after the cancellation of the CVA-01 carrier replacement programme in 1966. Successive defence reviews disbanded the Far East Fleet, withdrew forward deployed ships from the Gulf and dramatically reduced the size of the remaining fleet.

In 1981 the new light carrier INVINCIBLE was sold to the RAN and the RN was to be reduced to a small force of frigates and nuclear submarines allocated to NATO in the North Atlantic. The Falklands conflict a year later showed the stupidity of this policy and the RN retained a small but balanced fleet centred around three light carriers. The sale of INVINCIBLE to Australia was cancelled but the older HERMES which had played a key role in the South Atlantic War was sold to India and only taken out of service in 2016 having become the oldest operational carrier in the world.

Lack of funding has forced the RN to retain warships in service for long periods instead of selling them at their mid-life and this adversely affected the ability to export ships that still offered reasonable operational capability. The sale of *Amazon-class* frigates to Pakistan was arguably the last within the Commonwealth. Another lesson learned was the failure of the Canadian attempt to produce a single defence force to replace the RCN, RCAF and Army. The derision levelled at ship's companies with their army-style ranks and bottle-green uniforms was universal and revealed just how strong

the feelings of heritage and history are among sailors. This is a strength that should be capitalised upon and not discarded lightly by politicians. These negatives help to explain how the Commonwealth navies drifted apart operationally but one positive lesson stands out. Political cut-backs have decimated the RN but the bonds of shared Commonwealth history and heritage have never diminished.

WHAT SHOULD THE COMMONWEALTH NAVIES DO DIFFERENTLY?

No single navy, even that of the United States, is big enough to discharge all the tasks allocated to it and increasing sophistication has increased the individual cost of warships, reducing the number of hulls available still further. Would it not be sensible, therefore, for the Commonwealth navies to work more closely together? A twenty-first century alliance would capitalise on the strength of our shared heritage within a 'family' that can be trusted like no other. The British Empire was once united by the oceans of the world, today the independent nations that formed the Commonwealth could make those same oceans safer by acting in closer partnership against the threat posed by regimes and non-state groups that flout the rule of international law. Such a partnership would also enhance the stature of the Commonwealth; a voluntary organisation with 53 member states, no one of which has power over the others. Sixteen of these have Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II as head of state and taken together they amount to over a quarter of the 193 member states in the United Nations general assembly. Commonwealth nations share similar laws, culture and have navies which have all evolved from the RN. What better basis could there be for a naval partnership than the aims of the Commonwealth which seeks to advance the economic strength, social development and recognition of human rights in all its member states? It also promotes world peace, democracy and both the protection and promotion of values such as tolerance and understanding. The education of young people is seen as pivotal in helping to achieve progress in teaching respect between different cultures. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission is a subsidiary part of the Commonwealth structure that we all know and admire.

Working together in an age of increasingly complex networked, digital command, control and communications systems is complex but frequent practice can ensure that task forces can be created at short notice when needed. A Commonwealth task force would demonstrate greater influence than its constituent elements acting alone and would make a powerful statement about shared belief in the rule of law. Small task forces could be created for short periods with ships participating in Five Power Defence Agreement, Joint Warrior and RIMPAC exercises and by taking every opportunity to cross-deck aircraft and amphibious units; plan frequent replenishment at sea exercises using standardised logistic supplies and creating synthetic training exercises using digital links between ships in their bases. A formal agreement on the use of base facilities, the expansion of exchange appointments and a combined study of how best to achieve future aggressor inputs into realistic sea training could provide interesting solutions to shared problems that individual navies would find it difficult to fund adequately. Other options worth considering are the development of a 'commando mentality' intended to seek new ways of deploying lethal force from the sea into areas beyond the reach of current weapons. This might include the creation of a Commonwealth Construction Battalion (CB or 'SeaBee') that could be mobilised to create airfields for amphibious forces or temporary forward bases in areas where they do not, at present, exist. Solutions would apply to humanitarian relief situations as much as armed conflict.

MOVING ON

Many of the Commonwealth navies already work closely with the USN but do so through individual working agreements. A Commonwealth partnership has the potential to enjoy a more powerful voice in naval affairs since it would be larger than the individual national fleets. This is important because each navy is not simply a small version of the USN intent on copying its methods; they have their own ideas and these might be better expressed from a partnership of like-minded medium-sized navies like those of the UK and Australia acting together. The RN has recently signed a joint training agreement for carrier operations with the Indian Navy and it will be interesting to see over the next decade to what extent India would be willing to move towards a Commonwealth partnership now that it appears to be losing confidence in its aging generation of Russian equipment.

In putting forward the potential advantages that could be gained from closer Commonwealth naval co-operation in the near-term future, I am not suggesting a return to some sort of 'imperial force' dominated by the UK or even the level of integration within the BPF. I believe that we should respect the past and be inspired by it but we must move on and evolve as the twenty-first century progresses. Commonwealth task forces would gain strength from having flag officers or commodores from a variety of navies supported by broad, cross-sectional staffs. Programmes of exercises and visits, once agreed and planned, would be to the benefit of all, not least the smaller Commonwealth countries and their navies that could be drawn into the exercise and training programmes. The ability to work in harmony at the enhanced level proposed would probably require the backing of a small standing naval organisation rather like the National Military Representatives, NMR, organisation within NATO, chaired in rotation by senior naval officers from each of the partner navies. It would act as the focus for planning and for the formulation of Rules of Engagement to be agreed by all national governments that would cover the likely involvement of a task force in a variety of contemporary situations from the suppression of piracy to the brink of conflict. Far from being a bureaucratic burden, this body would act as a conduit to increase trust and knowledge between the partnership navies, giving a degree of permanence to their co-operation.

In my next article I will examine the specific details including the roles that both embarked and shore-based aircraft could play in a Commonwealth task force. ■



HMAS CANBERRA (L02) sails off Cocos-Keeling Islands during Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2019.

By the early 2020s, could such developments lead to the expansion of existing exercises to include the assembly and operation of Commonwealth task forces in different oceans to improve their own capabilities and help smaller navies to develop? Imagine the impact of a task force in 2022 comprising HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH, HMAS CANBERRA with their embarked aircraft and amphibious units together with submarines, destroyers, frigates and auxiliaries from the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, India and perhaps others. A major exercise in the Indian Ocean followed by visits to Commonwealth states around the coast of Africa would make headlines and send a clear statement that this friendly partnership was intended to uphold the rule of international law. Thousands of sailors would carry away the experience of working together and, although the different navies would bring together different weapons systems and aircraft, when the new Hunter class frigates come into service with the RN, RAN and RCN there will likely be logistic benefits. The common procurement of P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft will also be a benefit and, no doubt, the restoration of competition for the Fincastle Trophy between Commonwealth MPA squadrons will boost trust and inter-operability. If the UK does go ahead with the projected procurement of the 'Wedgetail' airborne surveillance and control system, as appears increasingly likely, this too will be a significant boost to maritime force capability.



HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH (R08) with F-35B Embarking.

THE CRESWELL ORATION 2019

By Commodore Timothy Brown RAN

The Constitution of Australia Act received Royal Assent on 9th July 1900 and came into effect on the 1st January 1901. At this moment the separate colonies became states of the Commonwealth of Australia. Thirteen years later, our Nation was at war. On the 4th August 1914, Great Britain declared war on Germany. On the 5th August 1914, the German Steamer SS Pfalz tried to leave Port Melbourne. She was fired on by Fort Nepean, just south of Melbourne. These shots, incidentally, were the first fired in the war.



CDRE Tim Brown RAN giving the Creswell Oration March 2019.

INTRODUCTION

The *Pfalz* was requisitioned by the Royal Australian Navy, and refitted as a troopship -- HMT BOORARA. She carried Australian soldiers to the Mediterranean, and Turkish prisoners from the Dardanelles campaign. In 1919, she brought Australian soldiers home.

In thirteen years we had come together as a Nation and the Royal Australian Navy was at sea in defence of the Empire. But we tend not to hear too much about the Navy.

Tradition holds Navy as the “silent service”.

So we tend to overlook the Navy. And we subsequently tend to misunderstand naval power. Very few people grasp the way naval planning is enmeshed with politics at the level of grand strategy.

Let me fill out those remarks.

- In thirteen years, the Royal Australian Navy grew from the mish-mash of colonial navies transferred to Commonwealth control on Federation.

These—and I will say so-called—navies were token forces confined to harbour protection.

The significance of that remark is in the confinement of the colonial navies to harbour defence. People did not look beyond the beach to the ocean. The sense was not that we were a maritime nation, dependent upon the sea. Look at the early Australian impressionist painters and you will see the Australian self-concept in the bush.

- But when the Australian Fleet steamed into Sydney in 1913, it was a Fleet suited to very much more than harbour defence.

What happened?

How did a nation that was young, and very far from populous, and very far from economically rich manage to acquire such a fleet in such a short time?

We know that officially, the Royal Australian Navy was constituted on 10 July 1911 when King George V granted the Commonwealth Naval Forces the designation “Royal Australian Navy.”

Thus, Commonwealth Naval Order number 77 of October 5th 1911 reads:

His Majesty, the King, has been graciously pleased to approve of the Permanent Naval Force of the Commonwealth being designated the Royal Australian Navy, and of the ships of that Navy being designated as His Majesty’s Australian Ships.

But this is surface gloss.

The provenance of the Navy reflects a farsighted strategic vision: Creswell’s vision.


- The *Commonwealth Defence Act* (1904) enabled the appointment by Prime Minister Reid of Captain W. R. Creswell as Commonwealth Director of Naval Forces.

It was as Director of Naval Forces that Creswell came to sit on the Board of Naval Administration. From this position Creswell dragged the Colonial navies together into a single institution with a centralised administration.

This institution – called the Commonwealth Naval Forces -- was organised in 1907, a mere seven years before the Great War. But though the institution was drawn together, the ships were weak and the naval defence of Australia continued to be reliant on the Royal Navy.

And the Royal Navy ships were not much to write home about.

In 1908 when the Great White Fleet visited Australia; an officer in the US Flagship, *Connecticut*, noted that with the exception of



HMT BOORARA.

HMS POWERFUL, the Australian station looked like an unimportant society posting, suited to cocktails, but nothing serious.

Creswell was a realist and a visionary. In September 1905 he said:

the Naval Service is practically on the verge of collapse appearing to represent to the public a defence which could not be rendered if called upon.

Rather than complacency, Creswell urged action. Very far from content with the status quo, Creswell saw the need for a great leap forward; he grasped the truth that peace is assured only by military strength.

Creswell looked ahead.

Similarly, we must now also, look ahead. We must not be content with the status quo. We must not deceive ourselves that ships, which are new now, will be the solution to our needs for ever.

CRESWELL'S STRATEGIC VIEW

Australia is blessed by her strategic geography, but there has never been a time when we might have claimed to be unassailable.

Creswell looked from our shores to a world defined – as the world continues to be defined by Thucydides:

The strong will do what they can, and the weak will bear what they must.

Creswell died at the age of 80, on April 20, 1933. In the intervening eight decades, politics has not changed. Politics continues to be Clausewitzian, all about power and dominated by war's spectre.

I reference the British diplomat Sir Ernest Satow, who claimed: international politics depends upon "intelligence and tact."

But in fact, that is a superficial reading of the way things are. Recall the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes who said:

"Covenants without Swords are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."

Politics is dominated by power, by the threat of war, and the need to avert war or to win it. Thodore Roosevelt put this memorably: "speak softly and carry a big stick." The Latin is well known: *si vis pacem, para bellum*. If you want peace, prepare for war.

WHOSOEVER COMMANDS THE SEA

It was Sir Walter Raleigh who said:

Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.

Recalling Raleigh, my point concerns the imperative of sea control:

1. We must maintain the security and good order at sea.
2. We must make incursion perilous for our adversaries.

The sense that an incursion must be perilous for our adversary gestures to Mahan who said famously:

It is the possession of overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great common [being the ocean], closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores.

In the modern era, how do we do this?

In the modern era, sea control in the sense that this phrase might once have been used is not feasible for any one Nation. Strategy, as Admiral Stansfield Turner observed, must be paid for, and the costs of overbearing, dominating power at sea are beyond the reasonable scope of any one Nation. Second, the sorts of ships which might exercise this sort of sea power are exposed to the menace of the submarine.

So, my answer is in two parts.

First, in the modern era we project power at sea in alliances.

Second, we grasp and we exploit the ominous potentiality of the submarine.

I will now address these two points.

POWER IN THE ALLIANCE

When Creswell conceived of the Royal Australian Navy, the fleet he envisaged was in fact a very powerful unit, designed to operate in concert with the Royal Navy.

His ideas continue to be relevant.

Today, the Royal Australian Navy is a warfighting system in its own right, but it also takes station as the constituent part of alliance and coalition structures, which aim to serve the cause of justice and good order at sea.

We are not a subsidiary power. We are a power in our own right. But we do not fight alone. We contribute to the distributed lethality of coalitions.

SUBMARINES

I return now to the submarine: the most daunting and perhaps the most misunderstood part of the equation. Submarines change the strategic calculus in formidable and far-reaching ways.



HMS POWERFUL in Port Jackson circa 1905.



Vice Admiral Sir William Rooke Creswell, KCMG, KBE director of the Commonwealth Naval Forces, circa 1904.



A MH-60R Seahawk Helicopter raises its dipping sonar while HMAS FARNCOMB transits through Cockburn Sound, Western Australia (Image LSIS Richard Cordell).

In the maritime environment, the presence – the POSSIBLE presence – of submarines changes the way a surface fleet operates.

An example is from the Falklands War.

In his essay, *The Navy and the Nation*, Vice Admiral Barrett referenced Admiral Sandy Woodward. Admiral Woodward argued, surprisingly, that Royal Navy submarines did NOT deter the Argentinian invasion. Rather, the submarine menace drove the Argentinian commanders to precipitate action. This was because – for political reasons – the Argentinians had committed to the invasion around the September of 1982. They had calculated that the British had neither the force, nor the will, to prevent an invasion, nor to fight and to eject an invading force.

But; when the Argentinians noticed a Royal Navy submarine load torpedoes and leave Gibraltar in the March, they worried that their plans had been tumbled. And they knew that the Royal Navy could sustain an SSN in the South Atlantic, and that such an SSN would make an invasion of the Falklands unworkable.

As a consequence, the Argentinians invaded within days.

Deterrence failed. The British could not deter – they DID NOT deter – the Argentinians.

But the strategic influence of the submarine is established. Leaving Gibraltar, the mere possibility that a submarine might be on station upset the strategic calculus in dramatic fashion. The Argentinian command decided that the only chance of success was to launch operations BEFORE the submarine could play a part.

And of course, the strategic influence of the submarine is demonstrated in the sinking of *Belgrano*. By this action, Royal Navy submarines DID deter Argentine surface actions. In consequence, the Argentinians relied on a failed strategy of passive defence of the islands, and projection of air power into a contested maritime domain, against a powerful and resolute British task force.

AUSTRALIAN SUBMARINES

In the Australian context, since we do not possess nuclear weapons, we rely upon our alliance with the United States. It is this alliance which puts the ultimate damper on incursion by any great power adversary.

In our own right, Australian deterrence obtains from the submarine: which—by conventional means—imposes unacceptable risk on incursion.

Our submarines are very powerful.

If any aggressor were to attempt to cross the sea to so as to do harm to our Nation, rest assured that aggressor should expect to fail. Our submarines are suited to the archipelagic Indo-Pacific region, and prepared to sink ships and submarines.

We do not keep our submarines tied up alongside. We keep our submarines at sea. Ready. There are four boats at sea now. They represent a threat to any adversary, and thus they offer to Australian diplomacy real-world power which is cardinal to real world influence. This is the deterrence concept which was detailed in the 2016



Attack-class Submarine Artists Impression.

Defence White Paper, where Government specified Australia's submarine capability as the Nation's big stick.

Each Collins submarine carries a large number of the Joint US/AUST Mk46 Mod 7 CBASS torpedoes. We can carry around about twenty weapons. Perhaps it doesn't sound like many; however, these sophisticated weapons are highly reliable...highly accurate...and highly effective.

In all realities, if fired, you can expect that that one weapon will find its target, and it will sink it—even the most capable of capital ships.

Since our submarines are stealthy, and since they operate over significant ranges and endure on station for considerable periods of time; we might reasonably say Australian submarines offer substantial menace and significant deterrent to any adversary.

Australia must have submarines.

Justice, the rule of law and good order at sea depend upon submarines. But they are often misunderstood and underestimated.

The same was true in Creswell's time.

Creswell was a modernist. He was ahead of his time in warning of the maritime threat to the Australian economy, and ahead of his time in urging a sea-blind Nation to build a navy. But Creswell was focused on surface forces. Probably he was right.

Submarines—properly called submersibles—were largely experimental: they were weak in stability, seakeeping, range, and capability. With a range of only 3000 nautical miles the first Australian submarines, AE1 and AE2, had done nothing to alter preconceptions. Acquired with the Fleet Unit as assets suitable for local defence, the submarines had been alternately towed by a surface warship for much of the 12,000 nm delivery voyage to Australia. After their arrival in May 1914 both submarines had gone straight into refit. Repairs and maintenance were not completed until after the outbreak of war, and by April 1915 both had been lost, the first to accident and the second to enemy action.

Consequently, in 1915 the wider RAN understood neither the rapid advances made in submarine tactics and technology, nor the difficulties involved in dealing with submarines.

But after the War, things were different.

In fact, after the War, in a newspaper clipping held by the Sea Power Centre, Creswell says:

I do not suppose there lives any human being who could doubt the power and influence of a submarine, seeing how very nearly

it decided the war against us.... It is true to say that our style is cramped, absolutely by the financial position. But at least some expenditure, even out of proportion to our means, should go toward placing us in a position to have effective submarine defence.

PLUS ÇA CHANGE, PLUS C'EST LA MÊME CHOSE

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

Though it is a great challenge, our Nation must build submarines.

Our leadership in science and industry, our hopes for peace, for security, for justice, for human rights, for good order and the rule of law, our obligation to ourselves and to others require that make this effort, that we build ships and submarines, that we take chances and that we triumph over the adversity we will inevitably face.

To take risks, to serve justice: such an endeavour is in the finest traditions of the Royal Australian Navy.

(and by the way, that British submarine that loaded weapons in Gibraltar; it sailed and turned north...)

By Ed: *The Exercise Spring Train* Task Group that also docked in Gibraltar in late March 1982 turned south and kept going south; including amongst its group HM Ships SHEFFIELD and COVENTRY. A few Australians were there and, as dual-citizens, deployed with the task force. ■

Commodore Tim Brown is currently serving as the Director General Submarines. After completing a Bachelor's Degree in Mechanical Engineering at the Queensland University of Technology, Tim pursued an operational career in the submarine force as a dual streamed engineer and warfare officer. He's commanded the submarine HMAS SHEEAN in 2001-02 and the ANZAC frigate HMAS ARUNTA on operations in the Persian Gulf in 2007-08. In 2008, Tim was the inaugural Director of Australia's Future Submarine Program before being appointed as the Director and Chief of Staff Force Structure Review; Director Force Structure in Strategic Policy Group; Director General Navy Communications and Coordination; then as Chief of Staff to Chief of Navy. Tim's specialty has mostly centered on strategic and operational submarine and undersea warfare policy for Australia, working closely with the US over many years. He holds a Masters of Arts (Strategic Studies) and is a graduate of the Australian Institute of Company Directors.



FIT FOR PURPOSE?

A significant and timely debate appears to have been opened in the U.S.N.I. *Proceedings* regarding the future of warfare and, in particular, ship designs and applications, see: Robert C. Rubel,

'Use Carriers Differently in a High-End Fight', U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 144, no. 9 (September 2018); based upon; 'The Future of Aircraft Carriers', *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2011, as updated in;

'Retiring the Truman Early Is a Necessary Strategic Decision', *Proceedings* March 2019 Vol. 145/3/1,393.

In many respects Rubel echoes the challenges outlined in Robert Blake's paper on 'The Emergence of Zombie Fleets (And BMW Builds Minis in Oxford)', *The NAVY* Vol. 81, No. 2, Apr-Jun, pp. 13-18.

A recent book by Sean McFate (2019) *Goliath Why the West Doesn't Win Wars And What We Need to Do About It*, Penguin Books, London reinforces many of these points. McFate apparently was doing well in the 1990s when, as a young lieutenant in the 82d airborne, he met his then Colonel, David Petraeus PhD, to be told that he should "leave the military, do a PhD, and then consider his options". His options (having completed his PhD) included joining a private security company (PSC) and becoming, in effect, a mercenary. He is currently Professor of Strategy at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington.

Securitisation

Petraeus was perhaps seeing a particular future. By 2007, private security contractors/companies constituted the second-largest Army in Iraq (after the US Army), with about 100,000 contractors, of which 48,000 worked as private soldiers. By 2011, PSCs were the largest Army in Iraq. Many private security PSC soldiers worked directly for Other Government Departments OGDs, such as the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and so did not fall under unified/sub-unified command auspices or could be included within unity of effort planning.

The points being made by McFate were that:

1. Future wars will not begin with declarations and end with treaties.
 - a. They will hibernate, smoulder and occasionally explode.
2. Many conflicts will be waged against non-state actors.
3. Subversion becomes critical as a form of deterrence and offence through defence.

McFate notes the civil war occurring on the U.S. border with Mexico and the 'scant



USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN 76) Docks in South Korea.

heed of the carnage, (literally thousands of deaths a year), where weak governments battle ceaselessly against drug barons, amid mountains of corpses'.

McFate is also (perhaps biased by his Army-infantry roots) scornful of big-ticket items such as aircraft carriers, armour, and strike-fighters. He contends that:

1. Mercenaries are the future for western militaries crippled by poor recruitment, legal constraints, media scrutiny and the soaring cost of soldiers.
2. Private force is cost-effective: companies such as Blackwater and the Wagner Group are armed multinationals, which recruit around the world.
3. Patriotism is unimportant, and sometimes a liability.

The point McFate is getting at is that the stripping out of militaries – the privatisation of critical combat engineering and logistics elements in addition to fighting functions from the 1980s on – now means that most Western Armies cannot fight without the PSCs. In Afghanistan it had reached the point where one European NATO Army was placing PSCs as an outer ring to protect its own fighting force from Taliban insurgents!

Mission Creep

Nevertheless, PSCs do not necessarily have oversight or clear/effective rules of engagement (RoE) or rules for the use of force. PSCs can become an undeclared expansion of the scope of the operation leading to mission creep. Many PS Contractors are paid more than three-times national active-duty soldiers, and up to ten-times local-forces. They are also politically or ethically expedient; PSC fatalities and injuries tend to go uncounted in the official toll.

For many of these reasons, including the wish by OGDs to control their own forces (Armies); not to negotiate through their own Army; or be constrained by RoE; nor held accountable for injuries/fatalities, PSCs became 'preferred' force elements in Afghanistan/Iraq. Exacerbated by the fact that privatisation of the military had removed the capacity from Western militaries to provide close protection to OGDs.

The same has been the case at sea. Although much unheralded a significant number of counter-piracy operations from 2009 onwards were contracted to PSCs. Often unseen, PSCs have mounted covert operations ashore and struck at logistics, bases, and support elements of the pirates. They have also been employed on board MN ships – including Cruise Liners – to provide the type of defence that western navies were either unable to provide directly, and/or could not do so (through the lack of ships and resources), and/or lacked the political will and direction to do so.

Alternative Models?

The exploitative model described by McFate exists only for so long as the economic models that make it viable, continue to operate. However, the model changed significantly following the 2007/8 Global Financial Crisis. More recently privatised elements of security – for example the prison and probationary service in the UK – has been brought back under state control.

The model works for so long as:

1. There are no other options – in other words the standing military no longer has the capacity to support missions beyond its force designs;
2. The 'fight' continues 'to be fought in the complicated shadows' (against non-state actors), in which, according to



The Court Martial of General 'Billy' Mitchell US Army.

McFate, 'Militaries can no longer kill their way out of problems'.

3. Patriotism remains unimportant and can be costed out through privatisations.

Change any one of the above conditions, and the result no longer remains the same.

Max Hastings (writing in *The Times*, 26 May 2019) comments on McFate's book and concludes, *inter alia*:

- Our enemies, including Muslim insurgents, understand that war is fundamentally a political activity.
 - The West can prevail only if we understand its new nature and respond with the means this demands, rather than with the weapons systems [ends] of the past.
- Britain spends a grotesque proportion of its shrunken defence budget on nuclear weapons, carriers and F-35s, to indulge yesterday's admirals and air marshals.
 - Whenever I see photographs of Britain's two giant aircraft-carriers, I tremble for our national sanity as well as security.
 - The F-35 fighter jet as a trillion-pound cash bonfire.
 - The super-rich currently wield more power than most countries. The yachts of some oligarchs carry enough weaponry to fight a battle.
- Military operations are hampered by chronically poor intelligence, a critical contributor to US defeat in Vietnam and now Afghanistan. We are not good at understanding our enemies.

Hastings notes that 'I instinctively prefer to entrust our security to the Light Infantry or Guardsmen, soldiers of the Queen. But that

is probably because I am a 20th-century person; ...the Light Infantry and Guardsmen conspicuously failed in Helmand Province'.

Truth to Power?

Hastings' quotes General Billy Mitchell (a pioneer of U.S. air power) who was court-martialled and demoted for insubordination, having insisted that "battleships were history". Hastings' fears that '[we] are squandering hundreds of billions on weapons to fight wars that will never happen'.

Rubel echoes many of these concerns, at least in terms of cost, numbers, and changing existing designs – but potentially comes up against the very same military industrial[-political] complex warned of by General/then President Eisenhower in his 1959 'goodnight speech':

- PSCs, like global multi-media companies and many NGOs, are politically, industrially, and financially connected to the top of shop (unlike the average Colonel, Captain, or Admiral). Likewise, the Defence Primes – who all have a preferred widget to sell and do not want to confuse capacity for capability, for cost, for scale.

McFate's solution is in effect to say "this is the open door – so why push against it? In any case, the alternative – the Billy Mitchell option – is simply too costly and individually prohibitive; making it both untenable and career limiting. Why bother?" Again, the model works only for so long as patriotism can be cowed into submission and bought off through privatisation; the associated use of mercenaries; and/or both. Or, in Tacitus' terms:

when the hate of the PSCs/Primes/accountancy consultancy companies

continues to be outweighed by the fear of them.

It's Capacity, Stupid

Rubel concludes:

- Despite a force reduction from almost 600 ships to today's fleet of less than 300, the lack of serious competition on the high seas allowed the US Navy to focus almost exclusively on presence; its default "strategy" being to fulfil the requests for forces by the regional combatant commanders as best it could.
- The resurgence of Russia and the rise of China with its increasingly powerful navy, along with budgetary constrictions brought about by sequestration, have forced the Navy into a situation requiring difficult choices.

The latest choice identified by Rubel was in the 2020 budget to forego the midlife refuelling of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN-75). He argues that it is today necessary to:

take more risk with day-to-day presence so investments can be made to develop the ability to defeat the Chinese Navy if war breaks out.

Rubel also grimly concludes that 'such a decision probably should have been made 5–10 years ago, but it is now absolutely necessary'. He identifies that the edge is eroding in both quantity and technological capability. China has deployed thousands of land-based and sea-based missiles aimed at neutralizing the carrier battle groups that constitute the core of the Navy's striking power.

Rubel's overriding concern is between the 'mismatch between strategic risk and gain'. Regardless of whether carriers are viable or not, he argues that this mismatch is a strategic vulnerability for the United States, and could hamstring a President's decision-making. In this respect Ruben closely matches Blake's contention that, in the future when losses are almost certain, the affordability question becomes key. In other words, if the President cannot afford to politically, economically (industrially), and militarily 'lose' a particular capability – for example an aircraft carrier – then he is not going to be able to use it. This was essentially the INVINCIBLE/HERMES question during the Falklands War.

Experimental Fleets?

Rubel is suspicious about the claims for 'distributed maritime operations (DMO)', which generally have been used as a cost-cutting exercise to answer the question 'more-for-less' rather than creating new designs and building afresh. He writes:



President Xi Jinping inspects an honour guard prior to the PLAN 70 Fleet Review.

The problem with a DMO concept that relies on advanced weaponry and systems is that nobody knows exactly how it would work.

Rubel goes on to argue that 'if Congress insists on refuelling the HARRY S. TRUMAN and adds money to the Navy's budget for it, there would be little objection. But if it forces the Navy to do it within the current budget, there should be strenuous objection from anyone who understands the gravity of the emerging threat from China and Russia'.

The analogy Rubel seeks to identify is with the 1920s when the US Navy faced 'the emergence of the airplane portending the eclipse of the battleship as the main capital ship'. The advantage of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty was that the Navy stopped constructing two large ships as battle cruisers and instead completed them as aircraft carriers to allow experimentation and development of sea-based aviation.

Rubel argues that the US Navy needs to achieve Forward Presence and Combat Readiness. This he suggests is no longer viable from the 300 Fleet US Navy; its current designs and concepts of operations. He notes that 'the Royal Navy is in the process of building two sizeable aircraft carriers, and, along with France's nuclear-powered carrier, might also fill certain gaps in presence, understanding they would not be under U.S. control'. He also notes that the decision to defer the HARRY S. TRUMAN'S refuelling coupled with the two-carrier buy of the *Gerald R. Ford*-class reflects a focus on high-end warfighting. Blake argues that all these designs need to be replaced with alternative, affordable dual-use ships that can be built and deployed at the necessary scale (numbers/size) to get over the start line. In other words, this is no longer a zero-sum option, with which Rubel concurs:

When the necessary form of combat readiness consisted of power projection from forward presence, and when the

fleet was of sufficient size, the Navy had no need to make zero-sum strategic choices between presence and combat capability.

Rubel concludes that 'combat readiness is taking on a new and not well understood nature. At this point combat readiness must be the priority, and the Navy's decision to pursue it at the expense of some forward presence is the right one – and long overdue'.

TASK FORCE 70

The forward-deployed aircraft-carrier USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN 76), along with supporting Commander Task Force 70 units began underway operations in the Indo-Pacific in May.

The RONALD REAGAN and CTF 70 operate in the Indo-Pacific conducting FONOPS. For over 70 years, U.S. Pacific Fleet forces have been present and ready to respond in the Western Pacific to any contingency on behalf of friends, partners and allies.

USS RONALD REAGAN recently completed an extensive maintenance period which repaired and upgraded ship's systems increasing the ship's warfighting capabilities. As the only forward-deployed aircraft carrier, the ongoing presence of the USS RONALD REAGAN maintains the continued long-term U.S. investment in the Indo-Pacific. USS RONALD REAGAN forward-deployed to the Indo-Pacific (from San Diego) in October 2015 and replaced the aircraft carrier USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73).

PACIFIC VANGUARD

Maritime forces from Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States arrived in Guam in May to conduct

cooperative maritime training in the inaugural Exercise Pacific Vanguard. Bringing together more than 3,000 Sailors from four Indo-Pacific nations to sharpen skills and strengthen practical cooperation at sea. The exercise takes place on Guam and around the Marianas Island Range Complex. According to Vice Adm. Phil Sawyer, commander of U.S. 7th Fleet:

"Pacific Vanguard joins the forces from four, like-minded maritime nations that provide security throughout the Indo-Pacific based on shared values and common interests," said "This exercise advances the integration of our forces, and enables an effective collaborative response to a range of events that might occur in the region."

Representing Australia were HMAS MELBOURNE (FFG 05) and HMAS PARRAMATTA (FFH 154). Rear Adm. Jonathan Mead, RAN Fleet Commander commented:

Australia is committed to the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific and is proud to be part of this important initiative with our regional partners. By working together as a multilateral task group, we deepen interoperability and enable success when our navies cooperate in future exercises and operations

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force sent destroyers JS ARIAKE (DD 109) and JS ASAHI (DD 119). The Republic of Korea Navy sent destroyer ROKS WANG GEON (DDH 978). Representing the U.S. 7th Fleet were its flagship, USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC 19), USS ANTIETAM (CG 54), USS CURTIS WILBUR (DDG 54), USNS *Rappahannock* (T-AO 204) and USNS *Richard E. Byrd* (T-AKE 4).

PLAN 70

The Fleet Review to commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the People's Liberation Army Navy was held in the eastern Chinese city of Qingdao on 23 April. On a misty day, the grey ships of the Fleet Review steamed past a destroyer carrying China's commander-in-chief, President Xi Jinping. At one point, the



ROKS CHOE YEONG (DDH-981).

aircraft carrier the LIAONING was shrouded in thick fog.

Ships attending were from allies such as Russia, in addition to those competing against/with China's triple-strategies of OBOR; the string of pearls; and the Dragon's Spear, such as India, Japan, Australia and Vietnam. Many Fleet Review navies have territorial disputes with China, including Japan and Vietnam. By contrast, America sent no ships.

Under current planning it is believed that PLAN will have 100 more warships (not including the hidden fleets such as the PLA Coast Guard) than the US by 2030, and a Fleet of some 450 ships.

President and military chief Xi Jinping assured the Fleet that China's intentions are peaceful:

The Chinese military is committed to creating a security environment featuring equality, mutual trust, fairness and justice, joint participation and shared benefits."

HMAS MELBOURNE (FFG 05) took part in the Review in addition to 11 other countries.

A Chinese military spokesperson claimed that China is now launching more ships than the US. Chinese media claimed last year that the speed of military development surpassed that of all other countries. International Institute of Strategic Studies analysis suggests China's total fleet, including smaller craft and older ships, at 300 vessels. The RAN currently has about 51 vessels.

China is currently involved in territorial disputes with Japan, and with the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam in the South China Sea. Generally, China's Coast Guard and a fleet of government-subsidised fishing boats – China's maritime militia – are prosecuting these claims. There is some evidence to suggest rivalries between regional commanders and Peking raising concerns as to who is in control. The Philippines recently complained about the presence of almost 300 Chinese fishing surrounding a Philippines-occupied reef.

Current PLAN shipbuilding rates are two to three times those of the U.S. – up to 25 ships a year. This is known to be putting pressure on crewing and training and there is a degree of reverse-hollowing due to the surfeit of ships and the lack of crews, and facilities to support these ships at the required operational standards. In many regards, it is the opposite of the problems facing western fleets being hollowed-out through ageing platforms.

U.S.-based analyst Andrew Erickson commented 'Whether China can stay on this trajectory, given looming maintenance costs and downside risks remains to be seen.

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL SHIPBUILDING PLAN

Preproduction work on the RAN *Hunter-class* frigates continues to meet its demanding schedule, allowing the designer and shipbuilder BAE Systems Australia to develop its response to the Naval Shipbuilding Plan.

BAE Systems will provide Australia with nine next-generation anti-submarine warfare (ASW) *Hunter-class* frigates based on BAE Systems' Type 26 Global Combat Ship. Three significant agreements have been signed with the Commonwealth for the *Hunter-class* build, the acquisition of ASC Shipbuilding (ASCS) from Canberra under a peppercorn rent, and a sovereign capability offer deed (SCOD) on collaborating in the establishment of a long-term sovereign shipbuilding and support capability in Australia.

RNZN HYDROGRAPHIC DSV

The RNZN future hydrographic and diving support vessel arrived in New Zealand in May following a 46-day delivery-journey from Denmark.

The 84.7 m-long vessel, which will be known as HMNZS MANAWANUI (II) once commissioned. She is expected to be officially commissioned in early June during a ceremony at the Devonport Naval Base, is set to be home-ported at Gisborne on New Zealand's North Island.

The ship, which had previously been in service as a commercial offshore support vessel known as *Edda Fonn*, was acquired by New Zealand in 2018 to fulfil operational gaps in the RNZN's diving support and maritime survey capabilities following the retirement of the services' hydrographic ship HMNZS RESOLUTION in 2012 and of dive tender HMNZS MANAWANUI in 2018.

HMNZS MANAWANUI will be formally commissioned in early June by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern. Chief of Navy Rear Admiral David Proctor RNZN was delighted Ms Ardern had accepted the invitation of his predecessor, Rear Admiral John Martin RNZN, to sponsor the ship. Ms Ardern said she looked forward to carrying out her official duties at the commissioning of the ship at the Devonport Naval Base and for the chance to meet the ship's company.

"For me this is not just a naming ceremony and wetting the bow of the ship, as is tradition," she said. "My responsibility as the sponsor of the ship will cover the 15 years MANAWANUI will dedicate in the service to New Zealand,



Launch of BRP JOSE RIZAL (FF-150) at the Hyundai Heavy Industries.

and I take that role very seriously.

"Manawanui means 'big heart' and 'steadfast' in Maori and I know this ship will live up to both meanings as she deploys on diving, search and rescue, and survey operations and exercises to aid in advancing New Zealand's interests from the sea."

The vessel's home port is Gisborne, and has an overall beam of 18 m, a hull draught of 6.3 m, and is equipped with a 100-tonne salvage crane. Powered by four diesel-electric engines driving two azimuth propulsion systems, the 5,700-tonne vessel can reach a top speed of 13 kt.

The vessel, which is also fitted with a diving chamber and a helicopter flight deck, can accommodate a core crew of 39, with 27 more bunks for mission-specific personnel.

NEW PHILIPPINE COMBAT SHIPS

The Frigate BRP JOSE RIZAL (FF-150), was launched at the shipyard of Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) in South Korea's south eastern city of Ulsan at the end of May. It is the first combat vessel to be designed and purposely acquired for the Philippine Navy (PN), whose fleet is mostly composed of second-hand ships acquired from allies. Captain Jonathan Zata PN stated:

She (BRP JOSE RIZAL) is the first combat ship to be designed and acquired for the PN along with her sister-ship, the BRP ANTONIO LUNA (FF-151) whose steel cutting is also scheduled for the end of May.

The two ships are due to be commissioned into PN service by 2020 and 2021, and will be employed securing the country's maritime chokepoints or primary sea routes used for trade, logistics, and naval operations from the above-mentioned threats.

The two ships are due to be fitted with two AgustaWestland AW-159 anti-submarine helicopters. The two AW-159s are expected to be commissioned into PN service by May 2027. The AW-159 (previously called the Future Lynx and Lynx Wildcat) is an improved version of the Westland Super Lynx military helicopter.



It is capable of speeds of 291 km/h, range of 777 km, and can also be armed with rockets, machine guns, missiles, torpedoes and depth charges.

SURPRISE VISIT?

Coincident with the commemoration of the 1989 Tiananmen 'response' and also the D-Day anniversary celebrations, China sent a powerful reminder and task force to Australia in the shape of the frigate PLAN XUCHANG (F536), the Landing Platform Dock ship PLAN KUNLUN SHAN (L998) and the Auxiliary Replenishment ship LUOMA HU (AR964). The Chinese nationalists (with the communists) played a significant role in the defeat of Japan in WW2, before being defeated by the Chinese communists under Chairman Mao in 1949. Coincident or not, the Task Force is a gentle if not persuasive reminder of China's presence and place in past, present, and future global events.

GREENWICH STATION

QE Sacking

The captain of HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH (R08) has been "reassigned to a new role", according to the Royal Navy. The decision is understood to be in response to his alleged misuse of a Royal Navy car. In a statement, a Royal Navy Spokesperson said:

We can confirm Captain Nick Cooke-Priest has been reassigned to a new role. We can only say that management action is ongoing and it would therefore be inappropriate to comment further.

The treatment of Captain Cooke-Priest at the hands of Royal Navy superiors is considered by some in the UK to be nothing less than a monumental public relations disaster:

At a time when our Senior Service is struggling to cope with a number of major challenges, from chronic undermanning to severe budgetary constraints, one would have thought that the top brass would have far more pressing issues to occupy their time than subjecting one of their most distinguished officers to public humiliation.

Other senior military officers are questioning the Navy's handling of this sorry affair, not least General Sir Nick Carter, the UK Chief of Defence Staff who, apparently "only heard about the Navy's decision to sanction the commander of Britain's pre-eminent warship after the event".

The affair needs also to be set against how the Royal Navy is ensuring that it has sufficient ships available to fulfil its numerous overseas commitments, while struggling to meet current commitments.

Yet failing to provide any realistic strategies for resolving these problems. As pointed out in The UK *Daily Telegraph* (Con Coughlin, 21 May):

- The UK Government's solution, as outlined in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, is to develop and build a more cost-effective class of vessel – the Type 31 – that will not have the hi-tech specifications of the Navy's fleet of Type 26 frigates (Global Combatant Ship – RAN *Hunter-class*).
- The appeal of this new design, from the government's perspective, is that it would allow the RN to increase the numbers of ships at its disposal while boosting export opportunities.
- Yet four years after the idea was first proposed, the Navy has still been unable to agree on a design for the new ship, prompting suspicions in Whitehall that it has no real interest in developing a cheaper alternative.

Coughlin concludes that 'so long as Navy chiefs remain incapable of developing a new generation of warships to meet future challenges, the perception will remain that it is more fixated with minor issues than the defence of the realm'.

This returns to the opening Flash Traffic item 'Fit for Purpose' suggesting the need to develop an experimental Fleet and new versatile modular designs capable of getting over the start line.

Ministerial Sacking

Prior to the sacking of Captain Nick Cooke-Priest – in the RN the tradition although a Commodore in substantive rank, as Captain of a Carrier the Commodore reverts to the rank of Captain, until completion of the command – the UK Minister for Defence, Gavin Williamson was sacked by the outgoing UK PM, Theresa May, over the leak from the National Security Council of Huawei's involvement in the UK's 5G network. Williamson has denied the charges strenuously and claimed that he is the victim of a "kangaroo court" after being sacked.

Williamson, previously a May loyalist, nevertheless fell foul of the Brexit train smash. And May, feeling it necessary to reassert authority over squabbling ministers, whom Williamson's successor as chief whip, Julian Smith, recently described as the "worst example of ill-discipline in cabinet in British political history", chose to remove him. With also the potential threat of

a police enquiry.

The new UK Defence Minister, Penny Mordant, is a Naval Reservist but it appears unlikely that she will necessarily remain following the election (by the UK Conservative Party) of a new PM. And she is unlikely – as was Williamson – to be able to take command of the Defence brief and provide the leadership necessary to change RN force design and build of its ships.

New First Sea Lord – Old Address

In an unusual handover, the outgoing First Sea Lord (1SL) – Chief of the British Royal Navy – gave the RUSI address on behalf of the incoming 1SL, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin RN.

In his address to RUSI, Admiral Sir Philip Jones outlined a number of key points, including:

1. the changing threat environment;
2. the continual erosion we are seeing of the rules that govern the international system through what has become known as 'grey zone' activity
3. the diversification of potential adversaries as a growing list of non-state actors who are engaged in serious organised crime and terrorism.
4. the intensification of threats as weapons proliferation and technological advance put ever more capable weaponry into the hands of evermore diverse potential adversaries and cyber opens up entirely new domains in which we in the maritime must be ready to fight and win.

In the Southern Red Sea, we are now seeing increasingly complex physical manifestations of maritime power by the Houthi rebels, the way they target Saudi led coalition forces at sea.

Looking at events in the Kerch Strait last November, as Russian Naval, Coast Guard and intelligence agencies came together to ultimately both detain three Ukrainian Naval Vessels, and, by use of a cleverly positioned commercial tanker under the



Chinese Warships Alongside in Woolloomooloo – Garden Island, Sydney.



HMNZS MANAWANUI.

newly completed Kerch bridge, establish a temporary blockade and deny access through the Ukrainians' sole entry point to the Sea of Azov and the strategically important access to their Eastern Ukrainian ports.

And when it comes to state on state competition in the maritime domain the issue of territorial sea disputes is particularly compelling. The University of Dundee's Maritime Boundaries Research Institute did a piece of work in 2015 which identified that 57% of the world's maritime boundaries remain unresolved.

Arguably the most regularly cited example of this is in the South China Sea where, contrary to rulings in July 2016 by the independent arbitration tribunal established under UNCLOS, specifically in relation to the Chinese '9 dash line' and the status of both the Spratly islands and Scarborough Shoal, China has maintained its territorial claims over that area, and the indigenous resources in that region of course go with that.

A global outlook and a commitment to the rules-based approach is essential in the UK. Those two things are two of the five core values that underpin a new strategy we have in the UK Maritime 2050.

The single factor that centuries ago secured Britain's place at the top of the international system came from the maritime and, I would suggest it is still the single most important factor that keeps us there today.

Notably amongst these expansions of course, China's 'One Belt, One Road' strategy seeks to upgrade several facilities on the 'Maritime Silk Road' connecting China and Europe.

For sea power to be effective, it needs to be able to address the full gamut of diversifying and intensifying threats in the current and future maritime domain, a domain that demands we are able to deliver effect on, above and below the waves, in space and cyberspace, and also have the capacity to do it from the sea to the land.

Our people challenge, it's long running, it's well known to many of you and is not unique

to the Royal Navy by any means. In part of course it's the result of demographics affecting the external employment market, but it is somewhat exacerbated, perhaps inevitably, by the highly technical nature of our service and the need for people with those skills, combined with the unique nature of life at sea which is increasingly divergent from the expectations of modern generations who have grown up with instant access to the internet, connection with family and friends, social media; we take time to explain to our potential recruits how that will work for them.

The very things that makes the Royal Navy unique within defence – our ability to deliver influence and political choice through persistent stand off presence, or 'engagement without embroilment' as it's so often referred to, will continue to see the outputs of our services asked for at sky high levels, both within Defence across Whitehall. We've already begun this transformation; the Modernising Defence Programme powerfully enables us to do so. We absolutely recognise the need to mobilise to confront the threats we see now; to modernise to address future threats; and to transform the way we do business to stay cutting edge and cost efficient.

We're absolutely clear where we want that transformation journey to take us.

And we don't just want to play a 'bit part' in those alliances and coalitions; both within the NATO framework and wider coalitions, we are always proud to take a leading role – and that is invariably expected of us.

As a service we have set out our headmark high, but as the old adage goes, no one has the monopoly on good ideas – that's why we have conferences like today so that you can help us on that journey. So now is the time to test that headmark and find out where we can improve upon it further for the next generation.

50 Years of UK Deterrence

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg praised the United Kingdom for maintaining a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent for 50 years in a letter to Prime Minister Theresa May:

"In NATO, we appreciate this enormous commitment to our shared security by generations of Royal Navy submariners and their families, by scores of dedicated support personnel in the United Kingdom's Armed Forces and Civil Service, and by partners in industry", the Secretary General underlined.

One Royal Navy submarine carrying nuclear missiles has been on undersea patrol at all times since April 1969. Operation Relentless, is the longest sustained military operation ever undertaken by the UK. In 1969, the UK began continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent patrols with four *Resolution-class* boats. The mission is now provided by four *Vanguard-class* submarines based at Clyde Naval Base at Faslane in Scotland.

UK-NATO Baltic Task Group

The Royal Navy flagship HMS ALBION deployed to the Baltic Sea to lead a multinational task group in support of European security. Thousands of UK armed forces personnel will take part in the first UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) maritime deployment.

ALBION carries the joint staff who will command the deployment – codenamed Baltic Protector – drawn from the Plymouth-based headquarters of 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and the staff of the Commander of the Amphibious Task Group. It marks the first deployment of the military force which comprises of nine nations including the UK, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

Captain Peter Laughton, the Commanding Officer of HMS ALBION, said:


"I am really proud of the work my team has completed to prepare HMS ALBION for this unique and exciting deployment.

This deployment represents the largest UK-led operational deployment of a military force in Europe for decades and demonstrates our ability to react quickly and decisively to any crisis in the world."

Sea Viper

The Royal Navy successfully completed a first test of its GWS 45 Sea Viper anti-air guided missile system against an MQM-178 Firejet target. At the conclusion of NATO Exercise 'Formidable Shield 2019', the firing involved an Aster 30 missile launched from the Type 45 destroyer HMS DEFENDER that was used to intercept a Firejet drone launched from the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Hebrides Range site on South Uist.

Sea Viper is the name of the UK variant of the tri-nation Principal Anti-Air Missile System developed by MBDA. The Sea Viper system combines the Aster 15 and Aster 30 surface-to-air missiles with BAE Systems Sampson multifunction radar and an MBDA UK-developed command-and-control system. ■



SS Athenia.

MARITIME IDENTITY-POLITICS

A Scottish Maritime Museum has started a controversy after apparently bowing to 'gender' pressure after it found many references in its collection scratched out and it is changing all references to ships to 'it'.

Ships should no longer be called "she", the industry's newspaper, Lloyd's List has also decreed. The 268-year-old publication which claims to be the world's oldest daily newspaper, is to abandon centuries of seafaring tradition by calling all vessels "it". "They are maritime real estate. The world moves on. I can see why 'she' would suit a magnificent cruise liner but to a rusting old hulk it could be rather offensive." However, senior RN figures including the First Sea Lord disagree, with a spokesman saying it would continue to refer to ships as female. It traditionally chooses masculine or geographical names, such as Iron Duke or Lancaster, for its vessels - although Andromeda, Penelope and Minerva all served in the Falklands War.

"Lloyd's List can do what it wants. The Royal Navy will continue to call its ships 'she' as we always have done. It's historic and traditional", he said.

"Ships have a soul. If I remember my history, they are female because originally the ship was the only woman allowed at sea and was treated with deference and respect - and because they are expensive."

Or as one MN officer explained:

Some years ago, I was subpoenaed to appear at the Tauranga Magistrate's Court as an Amicus Curia (friend of the court) in a case involving a group of business houses who were trying to

recover their fees from the owners of the ship which had gone bankrupt and of which I had been Master. At one stage the Learned Judge laid great stress on saying that "ships were inanimate objects and should be referred to in the gender Neutral manner, namely as an 'it'. He then turned to me and said "Isn't that so captain?" In response I said, "Well sir - some of the ships in which I have served were real bitches and so in my book, that definitely makes them female." Proceedings were enlivened somewhat by the unseemly titters that erupted from the surrounding benches.

Thus, the current MN generation remains recalcitrant, to them ships will always be, she or her, regardless of how Lloyds or that Scottish museum choose to refer to them.

WARTIME LOSS OF LIFE AT SEA

The massive loss of life in the sinking of individual capital ships during the Second World War, HMS HOOD 1415 persons, BISMARCK over 2,000 and the Japanese YAMATO & MUSASHI 2,500 and 2,400 respectively, should cause us to also reflect on some of the losses of non - naval ships during the same period.

SS Athenia first ship sunk after Declaration of War

Maine scientist and wreck hunter, David Mearns, is 98% certain that he has found the wreck of the Anchor- Donaldson Line passenger ship *Athenia* 78 nm west of Galway, Ireland. The ship was torpedoed and sunk by the German submarine, U-30, at 1915, 3 September, 1939, the evening

that War was declared. The passenger list comprised British, Canadian, US and European citizens, and of the 1423 souls on board, 117 lost their lives, including 28 US citizens. Fearing the intervention of the US, the Germans denied any involvement in the sinking which was not acknowledged until after the War.

Troopship *Leopoldville*

The loss of the *Leopoldville* appears to have been one of the longest kept secrets of WWII, largely brought to light by the History Channel in 1996.

Following the Battle of the Bulge, the US Third Army suffered from a lack of replacements and as a result *Leopoldville* a Belgian liner commandeered by the US and used as a troopship. On 24th December, 1944, *Leopoldville* left Southampton for Cherbourg with 2,223 replacement troops of 262nd and 264th Regiments of the US 66th Division escorted by 2 RN destroyers, one RN frigate and a French frigate. At 1754 five miles from Cherbourg she was struck by 2 torpedoes from the U-480 which killed about 300 men in compartments in No. 4 hold and caused the vessel to slowly sink by the stern.

Despite being only five miles from Cherbourg the ensuing rescue arrangements would have been laughable but for their tragic consequences. First the abandon ship instructions were given in Flemish and not understood by many of the troops. Whilst some crew and troops got away in lifeboats and the destroyer HMS BRILLIANT took off around 500 troops, hundreds remained on board expecting rescue as they were so close to shore. First the RN ships tried unsuccessfully to contact Cherbourg by

light, then by radio communication but frequency differences and code made this impossible. BRILLIANT then radioed RN Portsmouth who eventually had to phone Cherbourg but few staff were available as many were attending Christmas parties. Whilst there were many ships in port, their engines were cold and none in readiness for sea. *Leopoldville* sank at 2054 hours but by the time rescue ships did arrive, their task was limited to recovering the bodies as most had died of drowning or hyperthermia. Altogether a total of 802 allied servicemen perished. Survivors were sworn to secrecy under threat of losing their civilian benefits and the incident remained officially classified until 1996.

HMTS LANCASTRIA

The loss of the LANCASTRIA remains Britain's worst maritime disaster; greater than the combined losses of the Titanic and Lusitania. HMTS LANCASTRIA was a former Cunard liner built in 1922. Two weeks after Dunkirk, LANCASTRIA along with ORONSAY and other ships were off St. Nazaire in order to evacuate the many British civilians and troops and refugees still stranded in France. The RN's instructions to the Captain of LANCASTRIA were to embark as many as possible regardless of her lawful passenger capacity.

At 1350, 17 June, 1940 German aircraft attacked the vessels anchored off St. Nazaire and ORONSAY suffered serious damage. The Captain of the destroyer HMS HAVELOCK recommended that LANCASTRIA sail immediately, however the Captain was reluctant to sail without a destroyer escort. At 1548, a second wave of German bombers arrived and LANCASTRIA was hit by 3 bombs causing her to list, a final bomb down the funnel destroyed the Engine Room and caused the release of 1200 tons of fuel oil which was ignited by strafing aircraft. LANCASTRIA sank within 20 minutes.

Final estimates vary as to the number of embarked passengers but is believed to have been between 6,000 – 9,000. Only 2,477 persons were rescued and the loss of life is believed to have been 3,000 to 5,800.

German passenger ship *Wilhelm Gustloff*

The sinking of the German naval passenger ship *Wilhelm Gustloff* in the Baltic on 30th January, 1945 remains the greatest maritime disaster in terms of loss of life. The ship left Gdynia at 1230 hours bound for Kiel, with a total complement, recently calculated to have been 10,582 passengers and crew. The passengers comprised Nazi officials and families, military personnel, nurses and wounded soldiers fleeing the advancing Russian army. The ship had formerly



Passenger Ship *Wilhelm Gustloff* leaving Hamburg.



HMTS LANCASTRIA in her Company colours.



Troopship *Leopoldville*.

been used as a hospital ship, however as she carried anti-aircraft guns, she no longer met the Convention requirements. The ship had an escort of a torpedo boat and fearing mines, the Captain of the *Gustloff* decided to take a deep sea route rather than an inshore route. Anticipating meeting a convoy of German minesweepers, the ship displayed her sidelights, which only assisted the Russian submarine S-13 to put

three torpedoes into her port side. *z* sank in 40 minutes casting her passengers and crew into the icy Baltic with a sea temperature of 4o C and an air temperature of minus-18oC. Only about 900 souls were rescued, resulting in a death toll of over 9,500. ■


THE BATTLE FOR AUSTRALIA – A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

By Andrew Robertson

At the height of the Cold War, Admiral of the Fleet Sergie Gorshkov, the Father of the then mighty Soviet Fleet, was reported to have made an interesting observation:

Australia is the centre of the world's oceans.

As the Battle for Australia Day approaches, it would seem appropriate to ponder on this remark and to look at the realities of some of the strategic aspects of both WW1, and WW2 – the only conflicts affecting directly the survival of our country as a free, independent democracy.



Ships on Fire following the attack on Darwin 19 Feb 1942.

INTRODUCTION

Last year (2018) there was considerable prominence given to the Battle for Australia. This seemed largely to concentrate on the New Guinea Campaign, air attacks on Darwin and other towns, and the submarine attack on Sydney.

But was this accurate or objective analysis of the reality and the major factors involved in the defence of this nation against the background of the overall world situation? Some would argue that there is a different perspective to be considered.


FORGETTING MORE THAN LEARNING?

It is often forgotten that in both world wars success depended fundamentally on allied control of the main ocean lines of communication, for otherwise it would not have been possible for Britain to survive or the might of the British Empire and the United States and other allies to have been marshalled and deployed for the great land campaigns.


Our enemy strategy was to try to sever these sea lines of communication by a massive naval and air offensive using submarines, surface raiders (both disguised heavily-armed merchant ships and warships), mines, and, in WW2, aircraft. Losses at sea in both world wars were huge, but the combination of naval and air action, the holding of vital bases, and the great effort put into ship-building, and aircraft and innovative equipment production, enabled the allies to win at sea and the armies and air forces to be deployed for the war-winning land campaigns.

In our area attacks on shipping caused much concern and major effort was put into anti-submarine and raider operations by the RAN and, in WW2, the RAAF. The tragic loss of HMAS SYDNEY in 1941 with all 645 men (more than our losses of all servicemen in the Korean (340 killed)

and Vietnam Wars (540 killed), or on the terrible Kokoda Track (more than 600 killed)) often overshadows the great importance



The recovery of Japanese Submarine M-27 from Port Jackson showing the effect of demolition charges fired by the Guard Ship Chuman.



HMAS SYDNEY (II) port side too displaying camouflage (Port Jackson) circa 1941.

to the maritime war of the SYDNEY's destruction of the German raider *Kormoran*. For the *Kormoran* had already sunk 11 merchant ships and carried 400 mines for laying numerous minefields around our coasts.

The attack on Darwin by naval aircraft from 4 Japanese aircraft carriers – the same carriers, under the same Admiral, which had attacked Pearl Harbour – was mainly directed at shipping and maritime facilities such as fuel tanks and airfields. Similarly, the Japanese attack on Sydney Harbour was an attack on ships, as was the subsequent submarine campaign off the NSW coast. Around our coasts and approaches no less than 30 merchant ships were sunk with the loss of 645 allied seamen.

MORAL IS AS THREE IS TO ONE

Psychology in war is of the greatest importance. For instance, the ghastly defeats of Gallipoli and Dunkirk were turned into national symbols for unity and the will to win, whereas other very successful actions received little public recognition or historical emphasis, and are thus largely unknown.

The magnificent performance of our soldiers on the Kokoda Track under appalling conditions is seared into the nation's memory. It was of great psychological importance and uplifted spirits, but its strategic importance in the defence of Australia, compared with other important events, is questionable. Had the Japanese taken Port Moresby it would have been a considerable setback for the allies, especially the loss of the most important air bases, and a blow to morale. However, it would not have been possible to hump the fuel, bombs, ammunition, and supplies needed through the mountains and mud of the Kokoda Track.

It is arguable that the first defeat of the Japanese at the eastern tip of New Guinea at Milne Bay and the superb performance of our army and air force in holding that bay was of much greater strategic value. For had the Japanese won that battle they would have been able to control one of the major entrances into the Coral Sea. As it was, Milne Bay was developed into a major base for the subsequent seizures of islands and the campaign up the New Guinea coast and eventually to the Philippines.

All this was only possible through allied control of the Coral Sea, for without the safe passage of shipping none of these campaigns would have been possible and the east coast of Australia would have been open to attack by the Japanese Fleet.

THE KEYS TO THE BAYS & PENINSULAR

And what were the keys to controlling the Coral Sea?

In his official report to the Secretary of the U.S. Navy on the war in

the Pacific, Fleet Admiral Ernest King, the Command in Chief U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, stated:

From the outset of war, it had been evident that the protection of our lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand represented a "must". With the advance of the Japanese in that direction, it was therefore necessary to plan and execute operations that would stop them.

Early in April 1942, the Japanese had overrun the island of Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and been attacked by American carrier aircraft. This was followed by the Battle of the Coral Sea, the historic first occasion of a battle between aircraft-carriers (mobile airfields) in



Coral Sea probably 7 May 1942 Torpedo bombers attack HMAS AUSTRALIA (Image AWM).

history, when the opposing fleets never sighted one another. The powerful American carriers operated against the main Japanese carrier force while a combined task force of American and Australian cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Grace of the Royal Navy (also an Australian) was despatched south of New Guinea, to block a Japanese invasion fleet heading for Port Moresby.

The American's lost the world's largest carrier – USS LEXINGTON – a destroyer, and a tanker. The carrier USS YORKTOWN was damaged. The Japanese lost the small carrier SHOHO while the carrier SHIKAKU was badly damaged. The Australian/American task force including the cruisers HMAS AUSTRALIA and HOBART was attacked by Japanese aircraft (and then by U.S. Aircraft operating from Queensland!), but no ships were hit and the route to Port Moresby remained barred.

While suffering heavier losses, it was a strategic victory for the allies, for the Japanese were forced to withdraw and never again attempted to enter the Coral Sea in force. This not only enabled the defence of New Guinea but removed the possibility of a Japanese assault on our east coast.

FURTHER ADVANCE

In July the Japanese began advancing in New Guinea and also landed troops and labourers at Guadalcanal Island in the Solomon's, where they began the construction of an airfield. As the operation of land-based planes from that island would have immediately imperilled U.S. control of the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) and New Caledonia, and thus communications to Australia, the American's had to eject them.

The American's threw huge naval resources into the area. Great losses were suffered by both sides in a year-long struggle which included



Vice Admiral Sir John Gregory Crace KBE, CB RN (Born in Australia).

ten major naval engagements, and some of the greatest battles of the war. During WW2 the US Navy lost 4 of its largest aircraft carriers – three of these were lost in the Solomon area. Nearly 6000 sailors and 2000 marines were killed – more men than Australia lost in the whole of the New Guinea campaign. We owe a huge debt to the USN for our security in WW2.

The Japanese lost a similar number of major warships as the Americans (about 30), including two aircraft carriers and two battleships and their famous Admiral Yamamoto.

Australia losses there were the heavy cruiser HMAS CANBERRA and heavy damage to the cruiser HMAS HOBART, which was torpedoed.

The victory of the USN, with some help from our Navy and Air Force, in the Coral Sea and the Solomon's ensured the safety of Australia and its development as a major base. Together with the Battle of Midway and the most successful U.S. and Royal Navy submarine campaigns, it so weakened the Japanese fleet that allies could move steadily to the offensive and eventually drive to the very shores of Japan.

It is to be hoped that this perspective will receive some attention as the nation remembers The Battle of Australia.

FUTURE DESIGNS?

As to the future, geography to a large extent controls the possibilities for military strategy, and doesn't change. Both world wars would seem to hold major lessons in this regard. Since 1788, as an island – albeit a large one – we have depended on the control of the ocean's by Britain's Royal Navy, under whose shield we were able to explore, develop, and unite as one nation. Since 1942, we have depended largely on the might of the United States and particularly its most powerful navy.


But the world is changing. Within a few decades the U.S. may no longer be the only super-power. Wars will still take place and there is now a major increase of military power in Asia, particularly maritime. While clearly in recent years emphasis has been on our contributions overseas in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other hot spots, many would caution that we should now further build up our maritime capability, in all its elements, as part of our national insurance.

In the meantime, perhaps still of relevance and interest to a modern island nation, over 95% of whose people live within missile range of the sea, is the famous Greek historian Thucydides' report of the speech of the officials of the island of Corcyra (Corfu) to the Athenians in 433 BC:

And then it is quite a different matter for you if you reject alliance with a naval power than if you do the same with a land power. Your aim should no doubt be, if it were possible, to prevent anyone else having a navy at all: the next best thing is to have on your side the strongest navy that there is.

Today many would argue that for islands, though technology has altered weapons, tactics and capabilities, little needs changing in this philosophy – except to add “and Air Force”.

Stick with the Yanks, and pay our way – but this cannot now be done on a mere 2% of GDP! ■



HMAS AUSTRALIA (II) Wearing her Disruptive Camouflage Scheme circa 1943.



OPERATION MO AND THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA – A RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW

By Murray Dear

Following the discovery of the wreck of the aircraft carrier USS LEXINGTON by Microsoft co-founder and undersea explorer Paul Allen aboard the research vessel PETREL, a review of the Battle of the Coral Sea is now timely. This extensive and complex battle fought to the east of North Queensland during May 1942 has over time acquired the status of a great allied naval victory. This claim is certainly debatable. At the time the Coral Sea was the largest naval battle fought in the Pacific since Tsushima in 1905 but within a month it had been overshadowed by the United States Navy's stunning victory at the Battle of Midway.



Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo IJN who committed suicide during the Battle of Saipan 6 July 1944.

INTRODUCTION

The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first modern fleet action to be fought by aircraft carriers rather than battleships. When Vice Admiral Nagumo's kido butai (Carrier Striking Force) attacked Pearl Harbor, the Imperial Japanese Navy had six fleet carriers and three light carriers in commission with a further light carrier nearing completion. To counter this force, the US Navy had seven fleet carriers plus one escort carrier in commission. With the two smallest US carriers, RANGER and WASP, allocated to the Atlantic Fleet, only the five large carriers of the SARATOGA and YORKTOWN classes were available to Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC). This disparity widened further when on 10 January 1942 the SARATOGA was torpedoed off Hawaii by the Japanese submarine I-6, putting the carrier out of action for five months.



USS WASP (Cv-7) In early 1942 Casco Bay, Maine.

SOUTHWARD MARCH

By April 1942 the Japanese were planning the extension of their defensive perimeter. In the south this included the capture of Port Moresby, Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, plus New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa. This would then cut the lines of communication from the United States, isolating Australia and New Zealand. These plans were rapidly progressed when on 18 April, American B-25 bombers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle attacked Tokyo. These medium bombers had been flown off the carrier HORNET which was operating with its sister ship ENTERPRISE under the command of Vice Admiral William Halsey as Task Force 16 (TF16).

The capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi plus the occupation of Nauru and Ocean Islands, designated Operation MO, was planned for early May. Operation MI, the invasion of Midway and Operation AL, the capture of the western Aleutian Islands of Adak, Attu and Kiska, were scheduled to take place simultaneously a month later. A strong response from the US Navy was anticipated and almost the entire Japanese fleet was committed, with three carriers assigned to Operation MO, six carriers to Operation MI and two carriers to Operation AL.

OPERATION MO

The Japanese had three strategic objectives and the Battle of the Coral Sea was to be fought in three distinct phases. The first objective was to seize Tulagi, the administrative centre of the Solomon Islands, and to establish a seaplane base. Aircraft from this base would then



Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz USN.

monitor allied naval movements in the Coral Sea and protect the southern flank of the Port Moresby invasion force. The second but primary objective was to capture Port Moresby which would then provide a base to mount attacks on northern Australia. The third objective was to occupy Nauru and Ocean Islands which, with their phosphate deposits, had some strategic value.

This complex operation necessitated the use of a number of naval groups to achieve the three objectives. In overall command was Vice Admiral Inouye at Rabaul and his force was comprised as follows:

- **Tulagi Invasion Group:** Rear Admiral Shima in the minelayer OKINOSHIMA with two transports, one seaplane transport, two destroyers, two submarine chasers and five minesweepers. This group was tasked with seizing Nauru and Ocean Islands following the Tulagi invasion.
- **Port Moresby Invasion Group:** Rear Admiral Abe with eleven transports, carrying some 6,000 troops with an escort of a minelayer and four minesweepers. Accompanying this group was an Attack Force commanded by Rear Admiral Kajioka with the light cruiser YUBARI and six destroyers.
- **Support Group:** Rear Admiral Marushige with two light cruisers, a seaplane transport, a minelayer and three gunboats. After providing support for the Tulagi invasion, this group was to establish a seaplane base in the Louisiade Archipelago.
- **Covering Group:** Rear Admiral Goto with the light carrier SHOHO, four heavy cruisers plus a destroyer and an oiler. This group was to provide cover for both the Tulagi and Port Moresby invasion forces.
- **Carrier Striking Force:** Rear Admiral Hara in the fleet carrier ZUIKAKU together with sister carrier SHOKAKU. In overall command was Vice Admiral Takagi in the heavy cruiser MYOKO together with heavy cruiser HAGURO, five destroyers and an oiler. This group was to provide long range cover by intercepting and destroying Allied warships.
- **Submarine Force:** Captain Ishizaki with four large I type submarines stationed southwest of Guadalcanal and two medium RO type boats off Port Moresby.
- **Land Based Aircraft:** Rear Admiral Yamada commanding 25th Air Flotilla operating out of Japanese held airfields together with aircraft to be operated out of the new seaplane bases at Tulagi and the Louisiade Archipelago.

THE ALLIED RESPONSE

Japanese signal traffic was being intercepted and decoded at the joint USN/RAN intelligence unit known as Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL). With the information provided by FRUMEL, the Allies were able to concentrate three task forces in the Coral Sea under the command of Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher USN as follows:

- **Task Force 17:** Rear Admiral Fletcher with carrier YORKTOWN, three heavy cruisers and six destroyers.
- **Task Force 11:** Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch USN with carrier LEXINGTON, two heavy cruisers and seven destroyers.
- **Task Force 44:** Rear Admiral John Crace RN with heavy cruisers AUSTRALIA (RAN) and CHICAGO, light cruiser HOBART (RAN) and a destroyer.

When eventually concentrated as Task Force 17 on 4 May, Fletcher's command consisted of carriers YORKTOWN and LEXINGTON, seven heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, fourteen destroyers and two oilers plus the seaplane tender TANGIER based at Noumea with twelve patrol aircraft.

In support of TF17 but under the overall command of General Douglas MacArthur were:

- **Eastern Australian Submarine Group:** Captain Christie USN recently arrived at Brisbane from Panama with tender GRIFFIN and seven elderly S Class submarines. Of these one was in the Gulf of Papua and three were patrolling in the area of St. George's Channel between New Britain and New Ireland.
- **Allied Air Forces:** Lieutenant General Brett USAAF with allied aircraft based in Australia and New Guinea.

Following the "Doolittle Raid" on Tokyo, TF16 under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey returned to Pearl Harbor in late April. Halsey's two carriers were quickly refuelled and replenished then sailed on 30 April to reinforce Fletcher in the Coral Sea. However, they could not arrive there at the earliest until mid-May.

Under the direct command of Nimitz, was Task Group 12.2 (TG12.2) comprising the RNZN light cruisers ACHILLES and LEANDER plus three US destroyers. On 4 May, TG12.2 escorted five transports into Vila harbour in the New Hebrides group where it then remained to cover the landing of American troops from the transports.

The Coral Sea battleground was complicated in that it straddled two separate operational commands. The Coral Sea lay in the South West Pacific Area under the control of MacArthur while Fletcher's TF17 reported directly to Nimitz. This demarcation was to have significant implications in relation to intelligence from land based air patrols and the extent of US submarine operations.



Fleet Admiral (Sir) William Frederick Halsey Jr KBE USN with Admiral John S. McCain Sr USN.



Light Aircraft Carrier IJN SHOHO under attack and sinking 7 May 1942 at the Battle of the Coral Sea.

FIRST PHASE – TULAGI SKIRMISH

Covered by Goto and Marushige, Shima's invasion group seized Tulagi with little resistance on 3 May. Upon learning of the Japanese landing, Fletcher sped to the north-east with his YORKTOWN group and was in a position to launch a carrier strike early on the morning of 4 May. By then, Shima had sailed his transports after unloading and both Goto and Marushige had withdrawn to the north to cover the Rabaul invasion group. The overconfident Japanese were caught without support and in three strikes launched by the YORKTOWN, the destroyer KIKUTSUKI, three auxiliary minesweepers and four landing barges were sunk. The OKINOSHIMA and two smaller vessels were also damaged. More importantly, all the Japanese seaplanes were destroyed eliminating the Japanese reconnaissance capability which was to have operated out of Tulagi. The American pilots believed that they had inflicted greater damage than actually achieved but the Japanese had certainly received a setback. After the third strike Fletcher withdrew to the south to rendezvous with Fitch and Crace. Shima retired to the north on 5 May, covered by Goto who had reversed course on learning of the American air attack. The landing force remained at Tulagi, leaving a Japanese foothold in the Central Solomons.

SECOND PHASE – CRACE'S CHASE AND THE CARRIER BATTLE

After refueling his ships on 5 May Fletcher detached his oilers, each with a destroyer escort, to the south. He then headed north-west for the Louisiade Archipelago to intercept the Japanese invasion force en-route to Port Moresby. Meanwhile, Takagi's Carrier Striking Force had sailed southward to the east of the Solomon Islands and entered the Coral Sea south of San Cristobal Island and behind TF17. Aerial reconnaissance by both the American and Japanese carrier groups on 6 May was unsuccessful due to heavy cloud cover.

Early on the morning of 7 May Fletcher detached Crace (now designated TG17.3) with cruisers AUSTRALIA, CHICAGO and HOBART plus destroyers PERKINS, WALKER and FARRAGUT to cover the Jomard Passage where the Port Moresby invasion force was expected to enter the Coral Sea. This was a risky decision by Fletcher, an admiral not particularly noted for his boldness. Crace was under no illusion regarding the forces he was facing but was fortunate in that the invasion, support and covering groups were not concentrated. Crace had not proceeded far on what has become known as "Crace's Chase" when his force was detected by a Japanese patrol aircraft. TG17.3 was mistakenly reported as comprising two

battleships, a heavy cruiser and four destroyers and Inouye decided to attack Crace using land based aircraft from Rabaul. Unwilling to risk his transports, Inouye at 0900 ordered the Invasion Group to turn about until Crace's force had been destroyed.

Meanwhile Takagi had been conducting air patrols to the south of Fletcher and one of his scouts reported a carrier and a cruiser south-west of Rennell Island. Assuming that this was part of the American carrier force he prepared to launch an all-out air attack. The Japanese had in fact located the detached oiler NEOSHO and its escorting destroyer SIMS. It was to take over two hours for the Japanese to overcome the fierce defence put up by the American ships. SIMS was eventually sunk with only 14 survivors and NEOSHO was badly damaged but still afloat. Believing that the order to abandon ship had been given, 68 men took to the life rafts but the rest of the crew, along with the destroyer's survivors, remained on board the crippled oiler.

At 0815 Fletcher received a sighting report of two carriers and four cruisers 235 miles to the north-west. This report was inaccurate as this force was Marushige's Support Group. Fletcher immediately ordered a heavy air strike and was dismayed to learn of the reporting error when the scout plane landed. He decided to proceed with the air strike and was to be rewarded for his gamble. An American pilot chanced to sight Goto's group to starboard and this was immediately attacked. The American planes concentrated on the carrier SHOHO which was quickly overwhelmed, sinking at 1135 with the loss of most of the carrier's complement. This was a significant victory for Fletcher as not only had he had eliminated a potential threat to his carriers but more importantly he had destroyed the air cover for the Port Moresby Invasion Group.

Shortly after 1500, when Crace was south of the Jomard Passage, his force was attacked by a dozen twin engined Mitsubishi Nell torpedo bombers. With good seamanship and some luck this attack was beaten off with the loss of five aircraft. No sooner had this attack finished when another group of Nell bombers attacked from astern with bombs. Although AUSTRALIA was narrowly missed, TG17.3 remained unscathed. A third attack by another three aircraft which occurred shortly afterwards was later determined to be a case of friendly fire by USAAF B-17 heavy bombers operating from Townsville. The Japanese pilots who returned to Rabaul reported that they had sunk one battleship and had heavily damaged another battleship plus a cruiser. This report was taken at face value and a second attack was not ordered. Without any news from Fletcher, Crace turned south until dark and then westward to counter any Japanese advance on Port Moresby.

Having wasted time attacking NEOSHO and SIMS, Takagi decided to



USS LEXINGTON (CV-2) nicknamed Lady Lex off Hawaii circa 1933.



HMAS HOBART (D63) Ship's Company Tokyo Bay 1945 - 'They Made It'.

launch a late afternoon strike against Fletcher even though he was unsure of TF17's location. This force of 27 aircraft narrowly missed the American carriers due to adverse weather conditions and on reaching the limit of their range they jettisoned their bombs before returning. The return flight passed close to TF17 and several Japanese aircraft were shot down, some while mistakenly trying to land on the YORKTOWN. Only six aircraft made it back to the Japanese carriers.

By the end of the day, both Fletcher and Takagi had identified the position of their adversary. On the morning of 8 May, both sides located their opponents almost simultaneously. SHOKAKU was hit by a number of bombs and was unable to operate her aircraft. ZUIKAKU was hidden by a rain squall and escaped punishment. Meanwhile, both LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN were attacked by Takagi's experienced aircrew. LEXINGTON was hit by two torpedoes and at least two bombs while YORKTOWN was damaged by one bomb but was still able to operate her aircraft. Shortly after midday LEXINGTON was rocked by a large internal explosion caused by the detonation of petrol fumes from ruptured fuel tanks. This started new fires which gradually spread and at 1707 the order was given to abandon ship. LEXINGTON was eventually sunk by torpedoes fired by the destroyer PHELPS. Fletcher then retired to the south with the damaged but operational YORKTOWN to await the arrival of Halsey.

SHOKAKU had been badly damaged and was detached to return to Truk and then back to Japan for repairs. Japanese aircraft losses had been very heavy and Takagi was in no position to renew the attack. He sought approval from Inouye to retire from the battle zone which was given and at the same time the Port Moresby invasion was finally cancelled. Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto was furious that Fletcher had been allowed to withdraw and ordered Takagi, joined by Goto, back into the Coral Sea. Fletcher was long gone and believing that both American carriers had been sunk, Takagi finally left the Coral Sea on 11 May.

On the same day, TG12.2 destroyer HENLEY located the barely floating NEOSHO. After rescuing 123 survivors, NEOSHO was scuttled and the HENLEY sailed for Brisbane.

CONCLUDING OPERATIONS

While the carrier battle raged to the south, Shima had been regrouping his force for the occupation of Nauru and Ocean Islands. This included reinforcements from the now disbanded Port Moresby Invasion Force. On 11 May, the American submarine S-42 located Shima's flagship south-east of New Ireland and torpedoed the OKINOSHIMA which subsequently capsized and sank. The following

day, submarine S-44 sank the salvage ship SHOEI MARU, sent to aid OKINOSHIMA, in the same vicinity.

Halsey's TF16 was now located by Japanese air reconnaissance and the decision was made to cancel the third objective of Operation MO. Shima and his battered force was ordered to return directly to Truk. This effectively ended the battle but Nimitz hoped to sink Japanese cripples, in particular the SHOKAKU, returning from the Coral Sea. Submarines were placed along the expected retirement route and one of these was the TAUTOG which was en route to Fremantle from Pearl Harbor. TAUTOG was ordered to proceed to the south of Truk and on 17 May it intercepted and sank the submarine I-28 which had participated in Operation MO.

The final act of the battle also took place on 17 May when TG 12.2 destroyer HELM found four survivors on a life raft. These were the only survivors from the 68 men that abandoned the NEOSHO on 7 May.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Both the Japanese and the Americans believed they had won a major victory. There is a view that the Japanese had tactical success but the Allies won the strategic battle. Ship and aircraft losses were roughly comparable with both sides losing a carrier. While the LEXINGTON was a more valuable ship than the SHOHU, other Japanese losses tended to balance the ledger. There can be no doubt that the RAN and USN elements of TG17.3 emerged from the battle with credit, although Crace's contribution was overlooked for many years.


At a strategic level, very little had actually changed and while Takagi had sea control at the conclusion of the battle, this was relinquished when he retired from the Coral Sea. The Port Moresby invasion force had been repulsed but not destroyed. The Japanese were to make second assault on Port Moresby in July by way of a land attack over the Owen Stanley Range. This attacking force was to be defeated at Kokoda.

Japanese plans to seize New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa were quietly abandoned after the loss of four fleet carriers during the Battle of Midway. The Japanese foothold at Tulagi was soon extended to the nearby island of Guadalcanal and the uncontested occupation of Nauru and Ocean Islands was eventually completed in August.

On its own, the Battle of the Coral Sea was inconclusive. However, if the Coral Sea and Midway battles are viewed as a continuum, then the Battle of the Coral Sea was the first act of a much larger victory. ■

Redefining the Modern Military The Intersection of Profession and Ethics

Edited by Nathan K. Finney and Tyrell O. Mayfield;
Foreword by Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, USA (Ret.),
18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Naval Institute Press (15 Oct, 2018)
ISBN: 10:1682473635;
ISBN 13:9781682473634
Hardcover: \$45.00




Nathan K. Finney is an officer in the U.S. Army studying history at Duke University. Tyrell O. Mayfield is an Air Force officer currently commanding the USAF 72d Security Forces Squadron. This is an encouraging book; reflecting an evaluation of war, arguably at a time of

conflict and growing operational demands on the U.S. and its allies. This book represents a period of reflection in the U.S. military; rightly winning plaudits, from the military great and the good (including General Dempsey) from U.S. and UK – which may be both a strength and a weakness. Ethics deals with morals and the principles of morality pertaining to right and wrong conduct and with actions being in accordance with the norms, rules or standards for right conduct or practice, such as the standards of a profession. The point being that the codification of a profession is about ethics, and ethics define the profession. This circularity works well in times of stability but not in times of uncertainty when sailors and soldiers need to think 'outside the box' and no amount of rules of engagement can determine right action and behaviour. Moreover, given their codification, ethics can also become doctrine and dogma – preventing thinking. Napoleon commented that 'moral is to the physical as three is to one'. The pressing intersection is not between professions and ethics per se (which may be one and the same) but between ethics/professions and morality dealing with higher values for proper conduct. Whereas codes of conduct/doctrine can be imposed, moral and values may not. This has to come from within. The U.S. military leads the way in examining decision making and taking through scenarios to get at these types of situations. But herein may lie another issue. Whereas the U.S. military and its allies might come together on values and morals, they have different ways of codifying these into professional ethics. It is this intersection that we may learn more from – and much harder, perhaps, to articulate. A great book and one that no doubt will become a primer for future staff officers.

China's Maritime Gray Zone Operations

Edited by Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson
Naval Institute Press (15 Mar, 2019)
ISBN: 10:1591146933;
ISBN 13:9781591146933
Hardcover: \$55.00



Andrew S. Erickson is professor of strategy at the Naval Warfare College, China Military Studies Institute, and Ryan D. Martinson an assistant professor at the same institute. Drawing on Philip Kapusta's (2015) definition of the Gray Zone the editors define it to be 'competitive interactions that fall between the traditional dualities of peace and war'. This is both helpful and unhelpful since, arguably, it is where life and so competition has always existed. It may therefore be more colourful and dynamic than the binary between the defined poles of peace (white) and war (black?) suggest. The emphasis in the book is on the South China Sea, and how the U.S. may check China's maritime designs in the region. The book identifies, details and maps the current conflict without offering solutions. It creates an important understanding, from a U.S. perspective – although not necessarily a regional, or Australian one. In *Quo Vadis Australia?* (*The NAVY*, Vol 80, No. 2, Apr-Jun 2018) Reay Atkinson & Bogais suggest that the U.S. and region are countering three connected strategies: the 'One Belt and One Road (OBOR) Strategy'; 'The String of Pearl Strategy', incorporating China's First (essentially the Nine-Dashed Line) and [extended] Second Island Chains (the Second Dashed Lines); and 'The Dragon's Spear Strategy' incorporating the Chinese Motte, Keep, Bailey, Mote (reclaimed islands), and Moat comprising the South China and East China Seas. Each strategy is connected politically, economically and in terms of security provision. Each also has symmetry and asymmetry; enabling and denying access – providing for offence through defence. The world has, hitherto, seen nothing like it. This is an essential book for understanding the U.S. mindset, and potentially finding a way of understanding the new Middle Kingdom. There is an argument that the Global West has already lost and that the U.S. is no longer dominant enough to prevail.


An essential read for those seeking to understand and achieve the type of asymmetric offshore counter balancing that regional powers with the U.S. are likely to require if they are live long and prosper alongside the Dragon's den.

All the Factors of Victory

Admiral Joseph Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Airpower

Thomas Wildenberg
Naval Institute Press (15 Jan, 2019)
ISBN: 10:168247299X;
ISBN 13:9781682472996
Softcover: \$45.00

Thomas Wildenberg is an independent historian/scholar who has written widely about the U.S. Navy during the interwar period. Admiral Reeves, for all his pioneering success in developing aircraft carriers as a primary offensive weapon of war (from a more junior auxiliary command, operating in support of the battle line), does




not always come over sympathetically. While, on the one hand, demanding full loyalty, he would take his revenge cold on any junior who mis-stepped, and personally ruined more than one career. On the other hand, detesting formalised, regulatory planning, and favouring simplicity, 'doing and elan' in the execution of tactical procedures, he did not always welcome initiatives from his pilots and air wings, or take criticism from seniors. He did not appear to own the risk and share the success of his teams – in fact, at times, quite the reverse. Reeves could also be particularly finicky when it came to delineating his authority and responsibility from those of his seniors, or other boards (when acting as Chair). This may have been because he was largely a peacetime officer fighting hypercompetitive interservice, internecine battles to advance new technologies, alongside his own career? It may also be that he was both too old and too young to have played an active role in both World Wars, and this impacted his thinking. Regardless, he made an important contribution in preparing the US Navy through the Fleet Problem experimental programme, to advance carrier warfare and make a contribution. A good read that adds to our understanding of the interwar period.

Erich Raeder

Admiral of the Third Reich

Keith Bird
Naval Institute Press (15 Sep, 2018)
ISBN: 10:168247349X; ISBN 13: 9781682473498
Softcover: \$37.50




Even after 75 years it remains difficult to see Nazi admirals and generals as other than convicted war criminals. This remains the case with Raeder. Keith W. Bird has published extensively in German naval and military history and is Chancellor of the Kentucky Community and Technical College System, and does not mount a defence of Raeder. Instead he presents the facts as researched and allows the reader to conclude. It is hard not to start with Nuremberg, and work backwards. After conviction and imprisonment Raeder and Dönitz became reconciled to support their shared legacies, and preserve the traditions within the official history of the newly formed Bundesmarine. Yet during the war and before Nuremberg, both had been at odds. Indeed, Raeder's defence rested on the disallowed to quogue appeal mounted by Dönitz's German (naval) lawyer, Otto Kranzbühler – you did wrong (unrestricted submarine warfare), and so did we.

The main charge by Dönitz was that Raeder had concentrated too much on a 'balanced fleet' that had left his submarine fleet under-resourced until too late. In this the Allies were fortunate that Dönitz was not the Grand Admiral. In the hinge year of 1942, to win the Battle of the Atlantic the Nazis needed 400 submarines, to sustain 130 at sea. Whereas, by the beginning of 1942 they had only 250 submarines, and did not reach 400 submarines until 1943 – by which time the tide had turned. Dönitz, the greater of the two admirals (reviewer's opinion), recognised that 'balance was antithetical to the asymmetric war Germany had to fight, to win'. This is a critical observation for current 'planners'. 'Balance' left Nazi Germany 25-33% short of the submarines required in mid-1942 to win the Battle of the Atlantic. Enoch Powell (on Joseph Chamberlain) observed: 'all political lives, unless they are cut off in midstream... end in failure'. Raeder was cut off by abject failure and, like Dönitz, suffered the loss of a son. Along with many convicted Nazis, Raeder ultimately denied his role in the genocide inflicted by the regime. Yet for all that, he took a moral position in support of his beloved navy, those with whom he served, and the tradition of service at sea. His epitaph reads 'a bitter death cannot separate the love'. This is an important read perhaps getting at that intersection between ethics, politics and profession?

Admiral Gorshkov The Man Who Challenged the U.S. Navy

Norman Polmar, Thomas A. Brooks,
and George E. Fedoroff;
Foreword by John Lehman, U.S. Secretary
of the Navy (1981–1987)
Naval Institute Press (15 Mar, 2019)
ISBN: 10:1682473309; ISBN 13:9781682473306
Hardcover: \$60.00




Many of those who served in the last years of the now long-forgotten Cold War, remember the almost mystical awe in which Gorshkov's name was whispered by western navies. He had achieved the impossible, turning a terrestrial power into a maritime, asymmetric blue water

force that could – and even today – challenge the US Navy. The Russian Navy is still largely that bequeathed by Gorshkov. Perhaps fittingly, the frigate ADMIRAL SERGEY GEORGIYEVICH GORSHKOV (F 417) commissioned in July 2018, entered the South China Sea this April enroute to Qingdao to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army Navy, and subsequently participate in regional [counter] FONOPS (with PLAN). The Authors are all what would have been considered Kremlin or *Sovietologists*, as analysts (Norman Polmar), Naval Intelligence (Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks), or Office of Naval Intelligence (George E. Fedoroff). They tell a detailed and fascinating story of survival, not only in Stalin's Russia, but through to Gorbachev – when the Navy continued to attract 25% of

the Defence budget, at a time of cut-backs and bitter hyper-competition between the service chiefs, following defeat in Afghanistan. The echoes sound surprisingly familiar...The book does not claim the quote 'that Australia is at the centre of all the world's oceans' for Gorshkov – although it would perhaps seem fitting? It does however recognise that Gorshkov (the second founder of the Russian Navy, after Peter the Great) gave the Soviet Union both hands – a formidable Red Army and a fighting Red Navy. He also supported the development of the Russian Marine [Corps], from his own asymmetric experience fighting from land to (the Black) Sea and riverine warfare during WW2. So much has been forgotten about Russia since the 1980s, and is having to be relearned. Russia's biggest threat has never been the U.S. (or the UK) but always from other land powers. Today, its biggest threat is from China and yet the ineptness of Western politicians since the fall of the Cold War has driven Russia further and further into the camp of the illiberals. An essential read for all those considering how the Global West might yet bring Russia in from the Cold.

Admiral John S. McCain and the Triumph of Naval Air Power

William F. Trimble
Naval Institute Press (15 Apr, 2019)
ISBN: 10:1682473708; ISBN 13:9781682473702
Hardcover: \$55.00



Two great Naval Officers of World War 2 died in harness. Their early deaths robbing them of the historical recognition both deserved. One was Captain Frederic John Walker, CB, DSO & Three Bars RN for his development of anti-submarine warfare; the other Admiral John S.

McCain USN. What both of them have in common, is that they died of over work and exhaustion at war, Walker aged 48 and McCain 61. Australia has many reasons to value the McCain family. Admiral McCain's son John S. McCain Jr. was a submarine commander in World War II and later served as CINCPAC, Commander in Chief Pacific Command, during the Vietnam War. And his grandson John S. McCain III was a U.S. Navy pilot, later a U.S. Senator, shot down over Vietnam. All three generations had a love and respect for Australia, alongside whom all had fought. It will be recalled that on the assumption of Trump to the Presidency, it was Senator John McCain who fought Australia's corner and ensured the US (at least) would properly remember the 75th Anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea, in 2017. *We will remember them.* Perhaps Australia might do more, and name one of our future *Hunter-class* frigates after the McCain family? The reviewer digresses. If Reeves (see previous review) developed the peacetime architecture for carrier-based operation, it was McCain with Admiral Halsey who put the pieces together and scaled the whole into a formidable

fighting force at the Battles of Leyte Gulf, and Okinawa; later leading raids on the Japanese mainland. He was awarded the Navy Cross for his role – essentially in disobeying Halsey – and going to the rescue of USS CANBERA (CA 70), named in honour of HMAS CANBERRA I (D33) lost in 1942, and USS HOUSTON (CL 81), named after USS HOUSTON II (CA 30), lost with HMAS PERTH I (D29) in 1942. McCain bore command and was an exemplar, also in the way he worked with allies and embraced jointness – years ahead of his time. This is an important book, about an Admiral and family Australia may wish to consider as one of their own. Professor Trimble tells the story well, thank you.

A study of the first Shanghai incident from military victory to overture to diplomatic failure

Koichiro Kageyama
Yusho Corporation Press, Jan 2019
ISBN: 9784764603509
Hardcover: \$135.00



In this book, Professor (Dr) Koichiro Kageyama expands upon his paper in *The NAVY* (Issue 81, no. 1, Jan-Mar 2019) entitled *The main factors affecting the IJN's historical courses of action with a focus on the significance of the First Shanghai*

Incident, to ask: what kind of influence did the First Shanghai Incident have on the modern history of Japan? Other than for historians, details of the first Shanghai incident of 1932 (Showa 7) are hardly known in Japan or the rest of the world – largely hidden behind the Manchurian incident. The First Shanghai Incident was part of the subterfuge leading to the Manchukuo nation. It was core to the strategy of the (Japanese) Kanto army staff resulting in diplomatic failure and, despite the military victory of the Japanese army, accelerating the withdrawal from the League of Nations; isolating Japan and having a profound effect on Japanese modern history. This is the first book to summarise the research into the military and diplomatic impact of the First Shanghai Incident and its essence, from a Japanese perspective.





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Prize-winners announced in the January-March 2020 Issue of *THE NAVY*.



HATCH: First Arafura-class Offshore Patrol Vessel Keel Laid by Chief of Navy May 2019 (image Navy).



MATCH: NUSHIP SYDNEY (DDG 42) following MH-60R Romeo helicopter upgrade due to be commissioned December 2019 as the third and last of the *Hobart-class*.



DESPATCH: HMAS NEWCASTLE (FFG 06) decommissioned 6 June 2019, Fleet Base East, Garden Island, Sydney (image Navy).