

THE NAVY

THE MAGAZINE OF THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA

**WE'LL HAVE GO WITH
WHAT WE'VE GOT**

**THE PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION ARMY
NAVY FIERCE DRAGON
OR PAPER TIGER?**

**DEVELOPING
NAVAL AIR
POWER
PROJECTION
CAPABILITY**

**AUSTRALIA AND
THE ORIGINS OF
THE SINGAPORE
STRATEGY**

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Front cover:

HMAS SYDNEY (DDG 42) fires an Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile off Southern California.
 (Image RAN Matt Skirde)

06 WE'LL HAVE GO WITH WHAT WE'VE GOT

By Mark Schweikert

11 AUSTRALIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SINGAPORE STRATEGY

By Dr Honae Cuffe

REGULAR FEATURES

02 From the Crow's Nest

04 The President's Page

15 League Policy Statement

THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA

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TOO EARLY TO SAY

This issue opens with a powerful paper by Mr Mark Schweikert, Federal Vice-President of the Navy League, an Editor of *The NAVY* and former Director of Joint Force Integration. Mark has made a remarkable contribution to Defence and the Navy, in particular, during his career. Mark writes presciently (Paper 1) in an article entitled *We'll Have To Go With What We've Got*. He paints a grim picture – arguing “[our] will to pivot to a war footing now will be key to not only deterring conflict but defeating [our enemies]”. The second paper is by Mr Kelvin Curnow, a long-standing contributor who kindly gave permission for his paper on the PLAN (*Fierce Dragon or Paper Tiger*) to be published as an out-of-essay-competition article. It makes an important contribution. The third paper is by John Rigby and Paul Sawtell on Developing Air Power Projection Capability. They make the case for organic naval air power projection by the FAA – applying F-35B *Lightning IIs* from suitably designed, versatile modular ships (including Incat vessels). They conclude that “there seem few other options for Australia with respect to projecting air power that offers the potential to deter an adversary”. Tying in with the views developed by Mr Mark Schweikert, the final paper is by Dr Honae Cuff, an academic at the Seapower Centre, Canberra. Third prize in the Essay competition, professional section, Honae examines, in detail, *Australia and the Origins of the Singapore Strategy*. Concurring with analysis and papers presented in *The NAVY* going back at least two decades, Dr Cuff concludes:

As two former members of the British Empire and with robust security links to the U.S. today, one would hope that senior Australian and Singaporean political and military leaders recall the lessons of the Singapore Strategy. A nation cannot always rely on the protection of a larger power and diverse and comprehensive bilateral relations – matched with autonomous capabilities – can play a constructive role in regional affairs and defending security interests.

These are powerful papers presented by established and new authors to *The NAVY*, for which Editor is most grateful. Dr Cuff states “one would *hope* that senior Australian and Singaporean political and military leaders recall the lessons...”. The editor is reminded of the old Army adage – “that hope is not a plan”, and President Ike Eisenhower’s (5* General U.S. Army) attributed admonition:

The value is not in the plan, but in the planning.



USS AMERICA (LHA6) Operating Twelve USMC F-35B Lightning II as designed also to Fly from LHDs such as HMAS CANBERRA and ADELAIDE.

In the early 1970s, shortly after the 1968 Paris Riots, Henry Kissinger – in discussion with Zhou Enlai (Communist Party of China statesman and Prime Minister 1949–76) – asked about the success of revolutions in France. Referring to the recent riots, Zhou made the oft quoted remark “too early to say” – frequently interpreted to be about the 1789 French Revolution. The Fifth French Republic referred to, that began in October 1958, survived the riots.

In the long cycle of history [1], 2016/17 may represent a juncture. In the UK, it probably represented its Fourth Reformation (on voting to leave the EU) and the beginning of a Fourth (Networked) Commonwealth. If the British Century began at Waterloo in 1815, it ended in 1916 in the battles of Jutland, the Somme and the Dublin Easter Rising. Similarly, the American Century, commencing in 1917 and its Second Empire (following defeat in Vietnam in 1974), probably both ended in 2016. Not simply on the election of President Donald Trump – which was more a symptom, than the cause. Currently, the world might be seeing the emergence of a short-lived Fourth (Network) Republic, before the U.S. redefines itself more powerfully, fit for the 21st Century.

Historically, the election of President Macron and the ongoing Jacquerie against the state (and the EU), suggests the end of the Fifth Republic (1958-2017) and the formation of a new Sixth Republic. Australia – itself a product of the French, American, and British (Industrial) Revolutions – is also going through change. The Constitutional Crisis of 1975, possibly instigated the Third [Australian] Commonwealth, which – noting the instability of the major parties and the turnover of PMs – probably ended in 2018. Coincident with the purported Fourth [U.S.] Republic, Australia may be seeing the reassertion of its sovereignty within an emerging Second Australian [Networked] Federation. Neither filial; nor monarchical – as it ever was.

China records its Century of Shame 1842-1948, and is resolved both never to allow this to happen again and, increasingly, to enact revenge on the colonisers and occupiers who inflicted the shame. Existentially, the Communist Party of China, is threatened by U.S. Forces in the Korean Peninsula – from where the Japanese mounted their successful invasions of China. And where, between 1950 and 1953 – shortly after it defeated the Nationalists in mainland China – the CPC fought an existential war of survival. Similarly, the CPC is threatened by any advances towards the Yangtze – where the forts were seized as a precursor for ending the Civil War. If the Chinese Second Republic began in 1977 (on the death of Mao in 1976), it ended in 2012, with the founding of the Xi Dynasty – predating the changes currently occurring in the U.S., France, the UK, and Australia. The CPC is exploiting perceived weaknesses brutally exposed by COVID; bringing forward its 2050 designs for the assimilation of Taiwan and the South China Sea, and assertion of a new Chinese Political Economic Global Order (PEGO).

A very real concern is that the Global West has fixed itself to a plan, without understanding the value (and morality) behind the plan. Consequently, removing the thinking capacity and doers behind the plan. Sometimes attributed to Clausewitz [2] but generally accepted to have been posited by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (Chief of the German General Staff, 1871-1888) is the observation: [3]

No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy’s main strength (or “no plan survives contact with the enemy”) ...a battle changes the situation to such a degree, that no human acumen is able to. Consequently: “strategy is a system of expedients”.



USS GERALD R. FORD (CVN-78) Commissioned in 2017, with USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 75) in background.

The “plan” is well known by the enemies of the Global West. As a result, the Global West is fixed – without the thinkers, planners and doers to expedite victory from first contact. Returning to Mr Schweikert’s argument for “pivoting Australia’s war footing in order to deter conflict and defeat our enemies” – this will pose a challenge that would have been beyond pre-COVID Governments to understand or respond too. The curse of COVID has, fortuitously, challenged Governments in Australia and elsewhere. Plans failed. Australia has examples of states where the response has been agile – and others typified by repeated failures. It will be essential that Australia learns from its failures, if it is to face its future, successfully.

Australia has also been criticised for speaking out against the CPC over COVID and other matters when, so the argument goes, “Australia would have been better leaving it to others to do so”. [4] An appeasement “hiding behind Mother’s skirt strategy” – where Mother, it is presumed, represents the U.S., EU, or UK? This is not Australian. The reassertion of an Australian Sovereign Voice during COVID has allowed the U.S. (and latterly the UK) to wake up and begin their reformations. Australia’s tradition of reason is one that will ever “rage against the lights going out” in Hong Kong and elsewhere. Never will Australia “go gentle into the foul night of tyranny”. [5] The CPC should not underestimate the ability of the Global West to change *expediently* – as it will. It is far “too early to say” whether the long-cycle-ideas of Liberal Democracy are over. As Chief of Navy, paraphrased, observes (see Letters),

[The RAN stands ready, aye, ready to stand alongside its Allies as a] “lethal, Thinking, Fighting Australian Navy”. ■



RAN amphibious forces insignia with Fighting Kangaroo based on Lord Mountbatten’s WW2 All Arms Insignia.

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- [4] See for example, Katrina Grace Kelly, “Bunch of bogans in a Monaro try to goad China to war”, *The Australian*, 22 May 2021.
- [5] After Dylan Thomas (1947) “Do not go gentle into that good night”.

Welcome to the winter edition of *The NAVY – the Magazine of the Navy League of Australia*.

In our last edition I wrote about the future submarine project and we included the article from Neil Baird and Robert Blake proposing a 'submarine stocktake'. I hope you enjoyed the article and I note that since then there has been discussion about alternatives to the future Attack Class submarine. It is the view of the Navy League that what is needed now is not consideration of alternatives to the ambitious program that our Navy and Australian Defence industry have committed to, but a renewed and intensified commitment to it—that is—to the *Attack-class* future submarine program. That will require extending the life of the *Collins-class* submarines, but the contemplation of a stop-gap measure; building an alternative in the meantime—which has been floated—is bound to create more complexity than it will alleviate. Defence, industry and the Navy have enough on their plate with the complex tasks ahead of them and now is the time to consolidate, focus on the programme that has been committed to and work expeditiously through it to the end. To do otherwise would be compounding an already very challenging time ahead.

A TIME FOR ALLIANCE BUILDING


At a time when senior strategists are warning of the dangerous regional security balance now is a time for building and reinforcing our alliances. While it was possible to be concerned that not so long-ago Australia appeared to be becoming increasingly isolated in the region, our invitation to participate in the recent G7 summit in Cornwall, UK and our Prime Minister's efforts during and around the summit, has advanced Australia's security interests in our home region.

The maritime sphere is key to these efforts and the UK has recently signalled a renewed interest in the region. The UK carrier strike group being sent into South East Asia is a clear example of this and our Prime Minister's announcement, shortly after the summit, that the RAN will join the group is another positive step. These deployments diplomatically demonstrate that Australia is not alone in dealing with aggression and coercion in the region. The Royal New Zealand Navy had also announced it will join the UK Carrier group, led by HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH, on its passage through the area and there will also be exercises including the Five Power Defence Arrangements countries in the areas around Singapore and Malaysia, as will Australia.

Further advancing our interests in rules-based order, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with Australia's reinvigorated recent participation, strengthens our position in the region. In particular, this has been illustrated by the 2021 joint statement reinforcing a shared vision for a free and open, rules based maritime order in the region which the Navy League applauds.

THE FUTURE OF THE NAVY LEAGUE

An ongoing issue that arises for consideration at our AGM and Federal Council meetings is the future of the Navy League, and the role we can play to meet our Statement of Policy and ensuring we remain relevant and effective. Like all organisations, to do so we must be alive to the changing environment in which we operate, as well as taking account of the needs of our members and the value we can provide to our maritime nation. This issue has also been canvassed in several articles in *The NAVY* magazine over the years which I encourage you to return to.



QUAD Foreign and State Ministers meet with Prime Minister of Japan.



HMS TAMAR (P233) Provides Picket Boat Overwatch for the G7 Summit.



Image of Attack-class Submarine docking at Osborne, SA (NAVAL GROUP).

A group from the Navy League Federal Council is refining the various suggestions we have received to date and will report back to Federal Council at this year's AGM. We'd love to have your ideas and we welcome your input into the discussion about how best to prepare the Navy League for the future. Please be sure to have your say, you can send a short email to our editor, a more formal 'letter to the editor' to be considered for publication, or you might like to pen an article for consideration for publication in a future edition of *The NAVY* magazine.

OUR STATEMENT OF POLICY

As we contemplate the future of the Navy League, we should continue to be directed by our Statement of Policy for the maintenance of the Maritime wellbeing of the nation. The Statement of Policy has changed in some of the detail over the years and is adaptable, though these principles, guided by the fact that we are a maritime nation, remind us all of the importance of a strong Navy and capable maritime industry for Australia. As we work through the possibilities of the Navy League of the future, it is our task to reflect on how well we have achieved these goals and how best we can impact them in the future. As I mention above, your input into this process, as members and readers is imperative, and I encourage you to include consideration of the Statement of Policy in your input on how we best can translate our objectives into action in the future.

IN THIS ISSUE

As always, this edition contains some great reading. The first, from our own Vice President Mark Schweikert, is a must-read written on contemporary maritime issues which will prompt many of you to rethink your approach to Defence planning and ask whether we are investing in the right equipment. We are also lucky to have Kelvin Curnow's contribution on the People's Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN), which continues its expansion seaward. It should factor into our questioning whether our current defence posture has us sufficiently alive to the risk, how quickly it might develop and whether we are able to respond in a timely way. John Rigby and Paul Sawtell present their paper 'Developing Naval Air Power Projection Capability'. As you read their paper, I encourage you to reflect also on what, as a nation, is the appropriate balance of Australian input into defence production and sovereign capability. We also have a paper from Dr Honae Cuffe, which was the third

prize in the professional section of our 2020 Maritime Affairs Essay Competition. Dr Cuffe discusses the Singapore Strategy compellingly, and I am sure the paper will be of interest to you as you enjoy this edition of *The NAVY*.

THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA MARITIME AFFAIRS ESSAY COMPETITION

As you read Dr Cuffe's article, you might also begin to think about your own contribution to upcoming editions of *The Navy*. The competition has a place for all, whether you are a professional maritime strategist or have never before put pen to paper. With prizes in the professional and non-professional categories and the opportunity, like Dr Cuffe and all of last year's winners, you also have the chance to have your work published in a future edition of *The Navy*. I encourage you to submit your essay to be in the running for one of the great prizes. In these times where the regional strategic balance has become more tenuous and the importance of the maritime sphere so obvious, reviewing our past and planning for the future is in all of our interests.

The annual Maritime Affairs Essay Competition is open for entries until 21 August 2021.

I hope you enjoy this volume of *The NAVY – The Magazine of the Navy League of Australia* and, as always, encourage your feedback.

Happy reading. ■



WE'LL HAVE GO WITH WHAT WE'VE GOT

By Mark Schweikert

The United States Marines Corps (UMSC) have a philosophy, 'fight tonight'. It is a reflection of their need, and propensity, to have to fight with little warning and with what they have. Australia is currently in a similar position facing down a threat from China. Time is at a premium, if not already lost, to prepare for a potential regional conflict with a more aggressive militarised China.

INTRODUCTION

In 1986, Paul Dibb wrote a controversial and thought-provoking assessment on Australia's defence strategy. Dubbed the 'Dibb Report', it contained such assertions that Tier 2 frigates (fitted for but not with) while under RAAF air cover in the top end was an effective means of maritime security, and that any major conflict threatening Australia would essentially be seen from seven to ten years out and spending on high end military capabilities could commence at that point.

These assertions/theories enabled the then Hawke Government to adopt a 'fortress Australia' defence strategy in its subsequent 1987 Defence White Paper. Many argued that the Dibb Report was actually an economic model not a defence strategy to endorse the then Labor government's predetermined actions to cut defence spending by investing in lesser military capabilities.

BACKGROUND

Since 1987, contemporary Defence White Papers have moved away from a fortress mentality to a forward engaged, high technology model of overmatch to deter aggression, or meet it in someone else's back yard.

Nevertheless, Dibb's theory of being able to see a potential high-end conflict from almost a decade out, while criticised then, is looking more and more accurate.

China's rapid developments in military technology, build rates, coupled with a 'Wolf Warrior' aggressive foreign policy outlook, is having many commentators state that we are on a trajectory to war.

Former US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo (former congressman, CIA director and secretary of state for two years) recently said of China

their central idea is to undermine democracy everywhere. The Chinese Communist Party deeply believes their Marxist/Leninist ideology is the right ideology for the world, and they attempt to impose that ideology everywhere.

Pompeo's statement adds tension to the recent announcement by China that its military modernisation program (the likes of which not seen since 1930's Nazi Germany) has been brought forward from 2030 to 2027.

Of note too is China's growing addiction to resources from other countries. This puts it in parallel with Japan's reliance on imports pre-Pearl Harbour, which ultimately saw it go to war to secure those



China's first locally built and second aircraft carrier SHANDONG (CV-17). At 70,000 tonnes she is the biggest of the two carriers, for the time being. China's next aircraft carrier, hull number 18, is expected to be approx. 85,000 tonnes and will launch within weeks of publication.



A Chinese maritime militia vessel harassing another fishing boat. These 'little blue men' will be pivotal, to the PLA-N's ability to influence the sea at great distances from the Chinese mainland while presenting a collateral damage nightmare.



The sleek and stealthy game changing *Renhai*-class cruiser NANCHANG (DDG-101). Larger than a USN Ticonderoga class cruiser, the class is fitted with sophisticated air defence systems not previously seen. (USN)

resources after embargoes were applied for its ethnic cleansing activities on the Chinese mainland (a similar situation presents itself today with world concern over Chinese treatment of the Uyghurs ethnic minority).

Appeasers dismiss the China threat and believe the Chinese middle class will rise up in a greed, freedom and prosperity inspired political correction, much like an Arab Spring. However, they fail to understand the Chinese middle class. Owning a car, a flat, having a job in the city, access to medical services etc were things unthought of 50 years ago (i.e. living memory). The political system that has given people this middle-class prosperity is Communism via the Chinese Communist Party. It is said that the Chinese middle class now number 500 million. So why would anyone expect them to cut the throat of the golden goose? Consequently, China, as a society, is quite secure and its government has the support of the people.

So, what does all this mean for Australia? Well, it may indicate that we are too late to react to Dobb's theory as 2027 is fast approaching. It may be a case of having to go to war with what we've got, rather than with the luxury of what we had planned.

CHINA'S MILITARY STRENGTH

In the 1980s-1990s when the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) was being built by the Army, it was said that it resembled exactly what an army thinks a navy should look like. From this, many ignored its rise and labelled it a brown water navy.

Since then, the PLA-N consists of two very large aircraft carriers, powerful cruisers, advanced destroyers, multitudes of frigates, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, nuclear powered attack submarines and diesel electric submarines, and using these at increasingly longer ranges from home (blue water). It is also rapidly growing an amphibious assault capability in the form of large well dock equipped ships (LPDs) and now helicopter assault ships (LHDs) similar to the RAN's Canberra class ships ADEALIDE and CANBERRA.

The PLA-N is yet to be tested in conflict including its ability to leverage and integrate other military and national capabilities. To this end China is developing its Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in an attempt to fully fuse the information into real-time accurate targeting data. Apart from surveillance satellites, long range surface wave radar and over the horizon radar, one tactic/measure being employed is a low-tech solution known as the 'The Little Blue Men'.

The term was coined by Andrew S. Erickson of the Naval War College in reference to Russia's 'Little Green Men' employed by President Putin during the 2014 annexation of Crimea, essentially Russian troops posing as civilians doing clandestine military things in full view. China's little blue men form the growing and ubiquitous Chinese Maritime Militia.

The Militia pose as fishermen on vessels of all shapes and sizes but answer to the military. They engage in low level harassment to coerce without armed conflict. The Militia also form an important and impressive chain of observation/listening posts reporting on opposing naval movements for intelligence and targeting purposes.

To the casual observer they are civilians and not legitimate military targets. Neutralisation thus becomes an activity fraught with collateral damage and public perception danger, made even more difficult when one realises that 50% of the world's fishing fleet is located in the South China Sea

FORTS

China has been occupying and developing many of the reefs and shoals in the Spratly and Paracel islands into man-made outposts/islands, in contravention of a 2016 UN ruling that it was illegal. Originally the Chinese claimed they would not develop or house military capabilities on these newly created man-made islands. Lately this has been proven incorrect.

It was thought the presence of oil and gas was China's intent in securing these outposts. However, their militarisation has many are wondering about more sinister aims, such as providing air cover for lurking ballistic missile submarines and/or cutting off the supply lines to North Asia from Australia and the middle east, given one third of the world's shipping passes through the South China Sea.

Also, any military force wishing to transit the South China Sea or coming to the aid of Taiwan would need to neutralise these island bases first, thus alerting China not only of a military force's presence and strength but also intent.

ANTI-SHIP BALLISTIC MISSILES

One way China is attempting to deny large tracts of ocean is through land-based DF-21 and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles. Some have dubbed their employment akin to the WW I concept of creating a modern day no man's land, given the theoretical 'foot print' from their launch site.

The DF-21 is a two-stage, solid-fuel rocket, single-warhead medium-range ballistic missile. It has a 600kg warhead and travels at speeds up to Mach 10 (although it is thought it may slow considerably in terminal phase due to air resistance). Its range is approx. 1,500kms – 2,700kms and requires third party targeting data to get it within



The Brunei Navy KDB DARULAMAN with the now decommissioned USS RODNEY M. DAVIS. The KDB DARULAMAN is similar to the RAN's *Arafura-class* patrol boats. With an electronics and armament upgrade, the *Arafura-class* could make for very effective destroyer escorts, providing a force multiplier effect to the larger ships of task group by fulfilling the inevitable medium to low end warfighting tasks required. (USN)



An RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornet with two anti-ship Harpoon missiles. A quick purchase of 'more of the same' Super Hornets would provide a force multiplier to the RAAF. (RAAF)

range of its own sensors for the terminal phase. Even then, the short timeframe for engagement leaves the missile vulnerable to jamming, spoofing and high-speed aggressive manoeuvring of the target. Only larger aircraft carriers are considered capable of being acquired by its sensors (which might explain why the West has not developed this capability).

The DF-26 operates similarly but has a range of 5,000kms.

China's little blue men and their ubiquitous fishing boats will be pivotal to the use of the DF-21/26 for maximum range engagements and keeping large surface combatants at bay. Without their input, no man's land will be crowded.

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

China operates two aircraft carriers (Liaoning 67,000 tonnes and Shandong 70,000 tonnes) employing supersonic fixed wing aircraft. Its third and larger aircraft carrier (the Type 003 at 85,000 tonnes +) is expected to be launched within weeks from the time of this article's publication. A fourth has also been laid down (the Type 004 at 110,000 tonnes) which is expected to have nuclear propulsion.

Many in the intelligence community believe that a PLA-N carrier battle group may soon steam through the South West Pacific, or even below the Indonesian archipelago given the extended range deployments and exercises that are being conducted each and every year. If so, it would demonstrate China's confidence in its capabilities and send a message to weaker states that 'the dragon has arrived'. The implications of this for regional third-party basing rights and agreements for the ADF cannot be overestimated.

ENTER THE CRUISER

One of the more interesting game changing developments in the last few years has been the launch and appearance of a new large Chinese stealth cruiser with technically advanced long range air defence capabilities not previously seen. Some reports suggest that the Type 055/*Renhai-class* cruisers are also fitted with anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the DF-21/26.

Larger than a US Ticonderoga class cruiser, the three *Renhai-class* cruisers will eventually number 16 units and are designed to defend carrier battle groups as well as perform out of area/expeditionary missions.

WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT?

The short time frame from when China is expecting to have its military modernisation complete leaves Australia with a reduced ability to react in order to maintain its overmatch defence policy. Lead times for nearly all new equipment, particularly ships and submarines, mean they will not be ready in time.

One way to react and enhance our current military state is through acquisition of legacy/existing in-service equipment and capabilities.

Army recently purchased more CH-47F Chinook helicopters and second-hand U.S Army M-1A2 Abrams tanks with associated combat support vehicles and systems to revitalise its armoured manoeuvre capability, currently based around the M-1A1. This capability upgrade will be done with relatively little cost but more importantly will be completed within five years. Its need for self-propelled Howitzers and long-range surface to surface missiles is now paramount.

For Navy, with long lead times, off the shelf purchases are near impossible with no ships or submarines available that could fill the need.

One measure could be to upgrade the electronics packages and arm our *Arafura-class* offshore patrol vessels (currently in build). Despite being a quantum leap in patrol and constabulary capabilities from the *Armadales*, they were redesigned for RAN use substantially unarmed from their original configuration, reducing cost in the process.

As part of a combined or joint force package, upgraded *Arafuras* could provide a force multiplier effect to larger ships and task groups, possibly even reviving the concept of the 'destroyer escort'.

Modern modular techniques could enhance other aspects of the *Arafuras* utility in areas such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine countermeasures. This could involve a removable ISO container with a variable depth sonar streaming from the stern of the ship.

While the *Arafuras* helicopter pad is unable to take the weight of a SH-60R Seahawk ASW helicopter, it could take a variety of smaller armed utility helicopters to complement and supplement the Seahawk force for all manner of non-ASW tasks. A marinized version of the Airbus H-145M armed light helicopter comes to mind (which is currently being considered by our Special Forces).



The Boeing Australia and RAAF jointly developed Loyal Wingman UCAV during testing. (RAAF)

Given we are building 12 *Arafuras* now, this potentially makes them the best platform to get more naval power to the sea through arming and modular application techniques. The historical similarities and precedence with the successful yet smaller 60 Bathurst class corvettes built in Australia for service in and during World War II cannot be overlooked.

Our *Hobart* and *Anzac* class ships could also be upgraded. All warships are capable of refitting with new capabilities. For example, the Royal Navy's *Type 42 Batch 1 class* destroyers were thought to be space and weight limited. But after the class's poor performance and losses in the Falkland's conflict, space and weight were found to fix weaknesses. They were, in fact, lengthened.

Our *Hobart-class* destroyers could be given more 'bolt-on' anti-ship missile defence systems such as Phalanx and Mk-49 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers to survive swarm attacks. Weight would be an issue but an engineering diet and other measures could allow for these vital combat enhancements.

Life of Type Extensions (LOTES), with upgrades, for existing capabilities could also be a powerfully effective measure, as the government is doing with the *Anzacs* and *Collins-class* submarines.

The RAAF is currently one of the preeminent air forces in the world. Its F-35 JSF project is delivering the world's most advanced fighter aircraft but additional orders in a timely manner would not be possible given the world-wide demand. An alternative is potentially expanding the existing *Super Hornet* and *Growler* fleets. Boeing is still producing the *Super Hornet* but now in a new Block III configuration, as well as the game changing electronic warfare *Growler* Block II. Given the existing in-service nature of these aircraft this might be a very useful short-term addition.

RAAF and Boeing Australia are also in the process of developing a new stealthy unmanned aerial combat vehicle program called the Loyal Wingman. This semi-autonomous stealth aircraft can fly into harm's way and deliver precision payloads.

The concept of the Loyal Wingman started in the US with converted F-16 Falcons being controlled remotely by other strike/fighter aircraft in order to safeguard the controlling aircraft. So far, RAAF and Boeing have achieved success with the flight test program, but if full scale production could start sooner rather than later, then this would provide the force multiplier RAAF needs in the coming years.

Another related area this program could investigate is removing the pilot support systems from older Classic Hornets and converting them to Loyal Wingmen aircraft (much like the U.S F-16s mentioned above). They are being decommissioned anyway and have a very useful range and ordnance load.



An ESSM missile leaves the vertical launcher of an Anzac Frigate. A sovereign missile building capability will enable ammunition to be plentiful and not have to be used sparingly. As the old Chinese saying goes, 'many ants are the death of the serpent'. Just like many missiles. (Defence)

Other generic measures to meet the coming storm could include; delayed withdrawal from service of existing platforms (Classic Hornets and HMAS SIRIUS come to mind); technology refreshes; imaginative upgrades (lithium-Ion batteries for *Collins* for example); Electronic Warfare enhancements; Cyber resilience and exploitation fits; joint force integration measures such as long-range high-volume data links, and significantly greater ammunition stockpiles (new smarter variants too).

URGENCY – MISSILE BUILDING CENTRE

Quantity or critical mass of platforms on the coming battlefield will be needed, which is an area Australia is lacking. However, enhancing ammunition supply could be the panacea to lower numbers.

A lesson of the 2014 Russian-Ukraine war was the use of massed artillery to overcome technology and numerical advantages. To illustrate, Russian supplied tanks were fitted with explosive reactive armour (ERA) that rendered contemporary anti-tank weapons ineffective. However, use of massed artillery in the indirect role for extended periods against tank formations tended to strip away the ERA through blast and shrapnel effect on fittings, thus exposing the armour to small Ukrainian anti-tank teams.

Something conceptually along those lines for the ADF could be provided through the Government's recent decision for a sovereign ammunition and missile building facility. Historically, ammunition usage rates for all recent conflicts has been 2-3 times higher than the wildest peacetime predictions.

RUSSIA FIRST, CHINA SECOND?

Another consideration for our ability to deter and/or win conflict in the region is the Russia-China 'friendship' and how far that might extend into military co-operation?

Russia and China are increasingly operating together militarily, including in large-scale military exercises and joint operations in places like the South China Sea. Russia is also still supplying advanced military equipment to China.

Both countries share the same geopolitical view of a decadent, decaying West led by the U.S. They also understand the U.S military cannot handle two major regional wars concurrently. So, if the U.S



Australian, French, Indian, Japanese and US ships operating together in the Bay of Bengal. Strengthening alliance interoperability through joint exercises and integration measures is an effective means of deterrence. (USN)

were to be otherwise engaged with its NATO allies against Russia what does that mean for Taiwan or even Australia in times of need?

Australia's military reliance on the U.S is reminiscent to that which was placed in Britain through the Singapore Strategy, which incidentally was the last time a major war was fought in our region. Like the aftermath of the capture of Singapore, this strategy could benefit with a reassessment to a more self-supporting posture.

ALLIANCES – A KEY DETERRENT

Another means of boosting our military capability is through enhanced alliance cooperation, both with our traditional five eyes partners and our newer endeavours with 'The Quad' and bi-laterally with Britain, France and India.

The recent image on the front cover of the last issue of *The NAVY* (Volume 83, No.2) would have sent shock waves through Beijing. It depicted a USN aircraft carrier operating with an Indian aircraft carrier with escorting Japanese and Australia warships in a great demonstration of regional military cooperation and power known as The QUAD (four nations).

Australia is also stepping up bilateral exercises with India and France through the Malabar and La Perouse series of regular exercises (respectively).

Closer to home, our connection with the French in the Pacific is one that potentially needs greater thought and attention. New Caledonia and French Polynesia could be key anchor points for influencing/controlling the South West Pacific, given the lack of an Australian aircraft carrier or power projection capability. Question is, can our advanced 5th generation air force operate from there and can they be protected (assuming the French allow basing)? RAAF's plans for enhanced ground-based air and missile defence and Army's land based anti-ship missiles to defend island forward operating bases have yet to come to fruition.

CONCLUSION

The PLA-N is currently the largest navy in the world by number of combatants, 350 compared to the U.S. Navy at 293. Although some would argue that real naval power is more than just ship numbers. To paraphrase Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham 'it takes three years to build a ship but 300 years to build a navy'.

So, although numerically superior, the question remains as to the PLAN's professional mastery at sea, having never fought in that environment before. Recent observations indicate the PLA-N tend to operate as a separate and single service force without the force multiplier advantages of joint force integration and information fusion. One way they may overcome this is a willingness to accept casualties, a potential strong point over western militaries.

While Australia and our traditional allies and bi-lateral partners have significantly greater years of 'tradition' (which encompasses training, experience, doctrine, exercises, logistics etc) than China, their ability and will to pivot to a war footing now will be key to not only deterring conflict but defeating it. ■



About the Author: Mark Schweikert is the Federal Vice-President of the Navy League, a former Editor of *The NAVY* and the former Director Joint Force Integration with Defence. He left the Department after 22 years to start his own consultancy business 'Remarkable Effects'.



AUSTRALIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SINGAPORE STRATEGY

Dr Honae Cuffe

June 2021 marks 100 years since the British Government approved plans for the construction of a fortified naval base in Singapore. Australia's relationship with the Singapore Strategy is dwarfed by the devastating shadow cast by the fall of Singapore and two schools of thought – that of betrayal by the British government, or wilful ignorance on Australia's part as the nation accepted Singapore as the impregnable cornerstone in imperial defence despite evidence of Britain's waning power. [1] These narratives have detracted from the origins of the Singapore Strategy and Australia's keen appreciation of the maritime domain and the utility of the Navy in defending the nation's interests. For a nation with a young and, arguably, inexperienced Navy, this was quite a surprising appreciation with a great deal of foresight. This history carries important lessons in self-reliance for us today.

WARTIME LESSONS AND EMPIRE DEFENCE NEEDS

The origins of the Singapore Strategy can be found during the First World War. Japan had entered the First World War in August 1914 with the expectation that it would capture German territories in the East and South China Seas and the escort Allied convoys in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Imperial Japanese Navy quickly extended its operations, capturing the Marshall, Mariana and Caroline Islands, each a part of the German territories in the North Pacific. Australia saw in Japan's rapid territorial advances its desire to broaden its Pacific empire, with the potential for a campaign of aggressive southern expansion with designs on Australia. These concerns were exacerbated by Japan's rapidly growing shipbuilding capability, increasing from 85,000 tonnes annually to 650,000 tonnes between 1914 and 1919. [2] For the remaining years of the war, the RAN and the Prime Minister's Department paid close attention to Japan's naval movements and collated intelligence concerning the nation's intentions in the region. [3]

It was against this backdrop in September 1917 that Australia's Minister for the Navy, Joseph Cook, requested that the British Admiralty reassess the maritime defence needs of Australia and the Asia-Pacific. Cook suggested that a major imperial base was required either in Australia or another British territory close by. Plans were made to send an Admiralty officer to Australia to investigate, although, given the wartime context, this could not happen until after the end of the war. In December 1918, the Australian government was informed that the Admiral of the Fleet, Lord John Jellicoe would visit to review the situation in the region. [4]

It is interesting to note that as the Australian government was seeking a reassessment of the maritime defence needs in the Asia-Pacific region, Australian representatives at the Paris Peace Conference were considering the significance of strategic isolation and naval deterrence. One of the key issues addressed in Paris was the future of Germany's former Pacific territories. Australia saw the chain of islands in the South Pacific as "natural bastions", essential in securing naval approaches to the nation's north. Australia hoped to couple administrative control of these islands with increased naval deterrence.




Japanese troops besieging the German Chinese Colony of Tsingtao 1914.

In a report prepared by John Latham, a wartime Australian naval intelligence officer and assistant secretary to the British Empire delegation in Paris, he argued that


"Australia ... must aim at doing her best to counteract the naval preponderance of the enemy by employing a smaller force along sound strategic lines. She should aim, that is, at holding the sea passages and threatening from a flank the sea routes by which an attack would come. The suggested naval frontier would, roughly speaking, extend through Singapore to the Tonga group."

He went on to characterise this maritime frontier as not only an Australian concern but an Empire one. If this area fell into the hands of an enemy, other nearby British possessions and lines of communication would all be threatened. Latham recommended the establishment of a series of observation points and naval bases in existing British Empire possessions. These establishments would facilitate the collection of intelligence and the carrying out of regular naval patrols to deter enemy forces. Responsibility for the Singapore-Tonga naval frontier would be shared between Australia, Britain and New Zealand. [5]

In the end, Latham's suggestions were not acted on, in part because of a League of Nations' stipulation that the former German Pacific territories could not be fortified or garrisoned. Nevertheless, this report highlights Australia's appreciation of the value of sea control and denial and, to that end, an attempt to convince Britain to commit greater naval resources in the Asia-Pacific region.



Pre-dreadnought HJMS AKI circa 1914.



Minister for the Navy Joseph Cook (1917-1920).

THE JELlicoe REPORT

In May 1919, Acting Prime Minister William Watt cabled Jellicoe, outlining Australia's security concerns and the questions he hoped would be addressed in his report. Watt requested that Jellicoe provide an assessment of the "naval strategical problems affecting Australian waters and the Pacific", the need for new shore establishments and the future composition and administration of the RAN. This included particular attention to the probable routes of attack on Australia, "with special reference to occupation by a foreign power of Islands north of the Equator" and Britain's strategy in the event of war with another Pacific power. [6] While it was never specifically stated, there is little doubt that the Pacific threat Watt had in mind was Japan and the strategic utility of its new territorial acquisitions.

Jellicoe presented his report to the Australian government in August 1919. The report echoed a number of Australia's concerns. Jellicoe believed that it was almost inevitable that the interests of Japan and the British Empire would clash in the coming years. He judged Australia to be "powerless against a strong naval and military power without the assistance of the British fleet". To counter this threat, Jellicoe recommended the establishment of a major naval base at Singapore in the coming five years. A major seagoing Far Eastern Fleet was to be stationed at Singapore, including 8 Dreadnought battleships, 8 battle cruisers, 10 light cruisers, 40 destroyers, 4 aircraft carriers, 12 minesweepers, 36 submarines and a number of other smaller vessels. The cost of constructing and maintaining the base and fleet, estimated at £19.7 million, would be shared between Britain (75%), Australia (20%) and New Zealand (5%). This strategy was expected to protect the lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and allow simultaneous operations in the event of war in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific. [7]

In addition to Australia's contributions to the Far Eastern Fleet, Jellicoe assessed the nation's requirements for harbour defence and trade protection. For this task, he recommended the acquisition of 20 destroyers, 4 boom defence vessels and 82 minesweepers.

AUSTRALIA'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE SINGAPORE STRATEGY

Australian naval decision makers were initially supportive of Jellicoe's proposals. However, Jellicoe's proposals and the recommendations made at Penang failed to appreciate the political and economic constraints shaping British and Australian defence planning. The Singapore Strategy was ultimately inconsistent with Britain's Ten-Year Rule – the belief that the British Empire would not be at war in the coming decade, thereby allowing the contraction of defence expenditure. Moreover, it went beyond what the war-weary and financially strained Britain and Australia could reasonably afford. [8]

In March 1921, with the Singapore Strategy still awaiting British approval, Rear-Admiral Grant, RAN, met with the commanders of the Chinese and East Indies Stations in Penang, British Malaya. The Admiralty requested the C-in-C make recommendations for Far Eastern defence planning on the basis of a war between Japan and the British Empire.

The commanders considered Singapore to be "the key to British Naval Position in the Pacific" and urged that it be established as the centre of imperial communications and naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region. There would be no Far Eastern Fleet permanently based at Singapore. Instead, a unit of the British Main Fleet would be dispatched in the event of war in the Pacific. This unit would comprise of 2 battle cruisers, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 2 aircraft carriers, 16 destroyers, 14 submarines and a contingent of smaller vessels. For the Main Fleet strategy to work, the commanders stressed that it was absolutely essential that "Singapore is made impregnable" and able to withstand enemy attacks in the interim "Defensive Period" before the arrival of the fleet. The RAN would also play a role in local defence and deterrence during this interim period. [9]

In June 1921, after many months of deliberation, the British Cabinet finally approved the Main Fleet strategy and construction of a naval base in Singapore. The nation's financial limitations are clearly evident in these documents. The British Cabinet believed that being seen to have a "practical plan" at Singapore to maintain British sea power was, in fact, "even more important than actually commencing



HIJMS HARUNA at Yokosuka 1916.

the work of developing Singapore at the moment.” Cabinet did not expect to make any new expenditure in Singapore for at least two years and the recommended five year construction timeline was pushed back to eight years – a deadline that it would fail to meet. [10] These early deviations from Jellicoe’s initial recommendations marked the beginning of years of uncertainty and political backflips in the Singapore project.

RECOGNISING THE SHORTFALLS OF SINGAPORE


The shortfall of the Singapore Strategy was not the base itself but a financially hamstrung Empire and, as would be realised in February 1942, Britain’s inability to deploy the Main Fleet or hold the base until the fleet arrived. [11] These problems did not go unnoticed in Australia. At the 1923 Imperial Conference, with work only having just commenced at Singapore, Prime Minister Stanley Melbourne

Bruce flagged his concerns. He remarked that “I am not quite clear as to how the protection of Singapore is to be assured, I am quite clear on this point, that apparently it can be done.” Bruce received bland assurances that Singapore would be finished and the fleet would arrive. Later, Bruce pointedly remarked on RN capabilities and Britain’s commitment to its Pacific interests.

The question of the naval strength of the Empire is of the most vital importance to us. We are a very long way from Great Britain, and we have had evidence from time to time that the people of Britain do not fully realize the position of Australia, and its value to the Empire. It is quite possible that in Britain, hard pressed as she is with the war burden, a short-sighted vision may be taken of the problem of Empire defence, and expenditure may be concentrated upon the immediate defence of Britain to the detriment of the outlying parts of the Empire. [12]

Australia’s fears around the Singapore Strategy were never completely resolved and Singapore remained at the centre of the nation’s regional defence planning. This has paved the way for criticisms that Australia was too slow and lacked the assertiveness to accept Britain’s wanning capabilities. It is important to recall that Britain remained Australia’s sole security partner, leaving little choice beyond accepting the Singapore Assurance, albeit with reservations.

The Australian government was not wilfully ignorant to Britain’s weaknesses, nor did it fail to pursue its own defence initiatives. The nation recognised that the Main Fleet was important in the defence of Australia and it undoubtedly influenced military thinking throughout the interwar years. Australia also acknowledged that Singapore and the arrival of the Main Fleet did not replace sovereign naval capabilities that could be turned to local and Empire defence when needed.



Fortress Singapore - Greatest Naval Base in Far East.



Fall of Singapore and, arguably, the British Empire – surrendered by Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, 15 Feb 1942.

In 1924, Parliament authorised a five year defence program in which the RAN was the major beneficiary, receiving nearly £8 million for new naval constructions. This program partly met Jellicoe's assessments of Australia's local defence and trade protection requirements. When detailing the new program, Prime Minister Bruce remarked that "so long as the capital ships of Great Britain are afloat no country dare send a great expeditionary force against Australia." However, a minor force could "choose his point of attack" along Australia's immense coastline and "it would be impossible to take measures to meet an attack at every possible point." Bruce went on to detail the utility of the RAN in meeting such a threat, to deploy vessels to deter against attacks or respond to threats at sea. "Thus", he concluded, "we might prevent an invader from risking the attempt to come here. That is the great value of a mobile sea force as against a much greater land defence force." [13]

Granted, the new defence program was only a modest contribution to Australia's naval capabilities. Nevertheless, the nation recognised the importance of greater naval self-reliance and was investing in this during a period of significant financial pressure.

CONCLUSION

The Singapore Strategy was certainly not without its weaknesses, and the Australian government and defence planners cannot escape criticism for being too slow and not assertive enough in responding to British defence limitations. These shortcomings aside, the thinking by Australia's policymakers and strategists that underpinned the conceptualisation of the Singapore Strategy demonstrates an attentiveness to future regional threats. Moreover, Australia was acutely aware of its particular strategic considerations as a remote island nation and the unique utility of sea power in responding to these considerations.

In reflecting on the conceptualisation and failures of the Singapore Strategy, there are some useful lessons for us today as we face an increasingly insecure world. Alliances are key in the defence of Australia's interests, but they are not infallible. Investing in strategic alliances, particularly via cooperative naval activities like RIMPAC, is essential in contributing to trust, maritime confidence building and interoperability. However, alliances must be matched with sovereign capabilities. The 2020 *Defence Strategic Update*, announced 1 July 2020, recognises this, noting that "the ADF must increase its self-reliant ability to deploy and deliver combat power and reduce its dependencies on partners for critical capability." [14] Here there is a particular focus on investing in sovereign industrial and intelligence capabilities. Recent investment in sovereign intelligence capabilities and a significant

expansion of maritime capabilities are a welcome sign in the move towards greater self-reliance.

The hope is that should alliances fail, as was the case in 1942, Australia will be ready to defend itself and its most vital interests independently.

In the face of an increased risk of regional conflict, it is pertinent to consider Singapore's strategic importance today. Australia's relationship with Singapore is one of the closest in Southeast Asia, built on a shared Commonwealth history and shared interests in regional trade, stability and security. One of the most important aspects of the Australia-Singapore relationship is the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), signed in 2015. A key initiative of the CSP is the Australia-Singapore Military Training Initiative (ASMTI) and the Treaty on Military Training and Training Area Development, signed March 2020. Under ASMTI and the Treaty, Singapore will invest \$2.25 billion for the construction of new training areas in north Queensland (owned and managed by the Australian Government), where some 14,000 Singapore Armed Forces will train annually over an 18 week period. [15] These initiatives build on 30 years of Australia-Singapore military training cooperation, deepening people-to-people links and interoperability.

As two former members of the British Empire and with robust security links to the US today, one would hope that senior Australian and Singaporean political and military leaders recall the lessons of the Singapore Strategy. A nation cannot always rely on the protection of a larger power and diverse and comprehensive bilateral relations – matched with autonomous capabilities – can play a constructive role in regional affairs and defending security interests. ■

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STATEMENT OF POLICY

For the maintenance of the Maritime wellbeing of the nation.

The Navy League is intent upon keeping before the Australian people the fact that we are a maritime nation and that a strong Navy and capable maritime industry are elements of our national wellbeing and vital to the freedom of Australia. The League seeks to promote Defence self-reliance by actively supporting defence manufacturing, research, cyberspace, shipping, transport and other relevant industries.

Through geographical necessity Australia's prosperity, strength, and safety depend to a great extent upon the security of the surrounding seas and island areas, and on unrestricted seaborne trade.

The strategic background to Australia's security is changing and in many respects has become much less certain following increasing tensions, particularly in East Asia involving major powers, and in Europe and the Middle East. The League believes that Australia should rapidly increase the capability to defend itself, paying particular attention to maritime defence.

The Navy League:

- Believes Australia can be defended against attack by other than a major maritime power and that the prime requirement of our defence is an evident ability to control the sea and air space around us and to contribute to defending essential lines of sea and air communication with our allies.
 - Supports a continuing strong alliance with the US.
 - Supports close relationships with all nations in our general area particularly New Zealand, PNG and the South Pacific island States.
 - Advocates the acquisition of the most capable modern armaments, surveillance systems and sensors to ensure technological advantage over forces in our general area.
 - Advocates a strong deterrent element in the ADF enabling powerful retaliation at significant distances from our shores.
 - Believes the ADF must be capable of protecting commercial shipping both within Australian waters and beyond, in conjunction with allies.
 - Endorses the development of the capability for the patrol and surveillance of all of Australia's ocean areas, its island territories and the Southern Ocean.
 - Advocates Government initiatives for rebuilding an Australian commercial fleet capable of supporting the ADF and the carriage of essential cargoes to and from Australia in times of conflict.
 - Notes the Government intention to increase maritime preparedness and gradually increase defence expenditure to 2% of GDP, while recommending that this target should be increased to 3%.
 - Urges the strength and capabilities of the Army (including particularly the Army Reserve) and Air Force be enhanced, and the weaponry, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyberspace and electronic capabilities of the ADF be increased, including an expansion in its UAV capability.
 - Considers that the level of both the offensive and defensive capabilities of the RAN should be strengthened, in particular with a further increase in the number of new proposed replacement frigates and offshore patrol vessels, noting the need to ensure essential fuel and other supplies, and the many other essential maritime tasks.
 - Recommends bringing forward the start date of the replacement frigate program to both strengthen the RAN and mitigate the local industry capability gap.
 - Recommends the timely replacement and increase in numbers of the current mine-countermeasure force.
 - Strongly supports the early acquisition of large, long range and endurance, fast submarines and notes the deterrent value, reliability and huge operational advantages of nuclear powered submarines and their value in training anti-submarine forces.
 - The League is concerned at the very long time before the projected 12 new conventional submarines can enter operational service, noting very serious tensions in the NW Pacific involving major maritime powers.
 - Recommends very early action to provide a submarine base on the Eastern seaboard.
 - Notes the potential combat effectiveness and flexibility of the STOVL version of the Joint Strike Fighter (F35 *Lightning II*) and supports further examination of its application within the ADF.
 - Supports the development of Australia's defence industry, including strong research and design organisations capable of the construction and maintenance of all warships, submarines and support vessels in the Navy's order of battle, and welcomes the Government decision to provide a stable and continuous shipbuilding program.
 - Advocates the retention in maintained reserve of operationally capable ships that are required to be paid off for resource or other economic reasons.
 - Supports a strong and identifiable Naval Reserve and Australian Navy Cadets organisation.
 - Advocates urgent Government research and action to remedy the reported serious naval recruiting and retention problem.
- The League:**
- Calls for a bipartisan political approach to national defence with a commitment to a steady long-term build-up in Australia's defence capability including the required industrial infrastructure.
 - Believes that, given leadership by successive governments, Australia can defend itself in the longer term, within acceptable financial, economic and manpower parameters.

As to the RAN, the League, while noting vital national peacetime tasks conducted by Navy, including border protection, flag showing/diplomacy, disaster relief, maritime rescue, hydrography and aid to the civil power:

- Supports the maintenance of a Navy capable of effective action in hostilities and advocates a build-up of the fleet and its afloat support elements to ensure that, in conjunction with the RAAF, this can be sustained against any force which could be deployed in our area of strategic interest.



HATCH:

Antasena-class Tank-Boat built by North Sea Boats for the Indonesian Navy with potential for Australian Army Riverine Craft.



HATCH:

HMAS SUPPLY (A195) Commissioning 10 April 2021, Fleet Base East, Garden Island, Sydney (Image LSIS Christopher Szumlanski).



MATCH:

USS CANBERRA (LCS 30) Christening Ceremony 5 Jun 2021, Mobile, Alabama.