

THE NAVY

THE MAGAZINE OF THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA

THE RAN'S FUTURE SUBMARINE: THE STATE OF THE DEBATE



THE CREATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JAPANESE NAVY - PART 1

OLD FOOL MOVES MOUNTAINS, ISLANDS AND SHIPS

THE CHINA SEAS: 'FIRE & FURY', 'SHAKY WORLD' OR 'A NEW HOPE'?

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Front cover: HMAS ADELAIDE (L01) with HMAS DARWIN (FFG04) and a P8 Poseidon - RAN and RAAF Cooperation Indo-Pacific 2017. Image by LSIS Peter Thompson.

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THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA ANNUAL MARITIME AFFAIRS ESSAY COMPETITION



TOPICS

- 21st Century Naval Warfare
- Australian Naval History
- Australian Industrial Maritime Strategy

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Professional category, which covers Journalists, Defence Officials, Academics, Naval Personnel and previous contributors to *THE NAVY*; and **Non-Professional category**.

Essays should be 2,500-3,000 words in length and will be judged on accuracy, content and structure.

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Submissions should include the writer's name, address, telephone and email contacts, and the nominated entry category.

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
Prize-winners announced in the January-March 2019 Issue of *THE NAVY*.

ARE YOU THERE MORIARTY?

In this first issue of 2018, Paper 1 mounts a spirited response by Mr Jon Stanford of Insight Economics to the [current] Minister for Defence Industry's recent attack on the report: 'Australia's Future Submarine Getting This Key Capability Right' [1]. Paper 2 is by Andrew Ng, first place in the Essay Competition (professional section) and considers the South China Sea; making the case that it is time for Australia to lead. Paper 3, by Lieutenant Commander (Dr) Hiroyuki Kanazawa JMSDF is Part I in a series dealing with Japanese Naval History; covering the period 1855 (and much before) to 1923. Paper 4 is by Kevin Beard, the winner of the Essay Competition (non-professional section), who continues the historical theme by considering Chinese strategy and history regarding the SCS from China's perspective.

'Are you there Moriarty' older readers may recall was a Mess Game – when such things were allowed – that involved two blindfolded players, lying on their fronts head-to-head shaking hands with one hand, and in the other a rolled up newspaper. The starting player asks "Are you there Moriarty?", at which point the other player replies "Yes" and attempts to get away from being thumped by the opening player. And so the game continues until a player is hit, or gives up, and a new challenger is found. Moriarty is also Sherlock Holmes' archenemy, of whom Sir Arthur Conan Doyle wrote, inter alia:

'...a man of good birth...to all appearances, a most brilliant career before him. But the man had hereditary tendencies of the most diabolical kind. He is the Napoleon of crime...a brain which might have made or marred the destiny of nations – that's the man! Is this a man to traduce? Foulmouthed doctor and slandered professor – such would be your respective roles! That's genius...' [2, 3]



Ranges and Bearings from FBW, FBE, and Darwin.

As aficionados of the game will know, a little spice is added by giving one player a rolled up newspaper with a wooden spoon inserted and, or, removing the blindfold from one of the players. In the sublime ridiculousness of such occasions, the aspirant-



Marines from the Malaysian Army operating from one of HMAS ADELAIDE's (L01) LLCs during Endeavour 2017 LSIS Peter Thompson.

contender takes the butt and the hits of the game; whose enjoyment is largely in the occasion and the spectacle – alas far too non-PC for today. The point in Moriarty as game and player is that they contain the dark arts of deception and strategy that we expect of our leaders – a critical thinking capacity to look beyond. To be Machiavelli and Moriarty in application and ability – so we can play the great game emerging before us; connecting the Arctic and Southern, with the Indian, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. How competent are the Professional Political Elites that constitute today's western leadership to lead – particularly to lead our people into action? The continual mantra from the Foreign, Defence and Security glitterati is a reaffirmation of their infallible belief in the so called 'Rules-Based Global Order' – mentioned 55 times in the *2016 Defence White Paper*, as opposed to about ten times in the 2013 issue of the same. An annual compound kakistocratic [4] inflation rate of 62% – maybe fools never differ?

Love him or hate him, ex-PMUK Tony Blair in his 2001 Labour Party Conference speech, less than a month after the 911 terrorist attacks, got at this when he stated 'the Kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us re-order this world around us'. Seventeen grim years later, still in Afghanistan and Iraq, and almost ten years into the deepest global recession since the Great Depression (1929-1939), when productivity continues to stagnate and the 2016 DWP and even the *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper's* answer is to chant an almost religious incantation in the mystical belief of a normative, rules-based deity that expired nearly two decades ago. At least when the fabled beauty contestant says they believe in 'world peace' – they continue to look good. Yet anyone with eyes

and an appreciation of the South China Sea, a topic that *The NAVY Magazine* began to examine in depth almost twenty-years ago, would recognise that the Western concept of the rules-based global order (RBGO) is not compatible with China's. Nor, if we



Sailors from the Brazilian Navy Frigate F CONSTITUIÇÃO (F42) recover debris from Air France Flight 447.

take the UK, U.S., German and French Revolutions of the last two years (not simply Brexit and Trump), are these countries entirely aligned with a RBGO as delivered by the EU, the Euro, WTO, and the United Nations. An order threatening more of the same: a rules-based TPP 11 (just when the U.S. has got out) and (ditto) the pursuit of climate vanity, at the expense of energy security.

Re-ordering is occurring as Blair identified would happen – but it is taking decades (not months), and the leaders who took us into the juncture are not those who will lead us out, nor necessarily the countries and regimes they represent. As Dibb and Brabin-Smith [5] recognise:

Australia's strategic outlook is deteriorating and, for the first time since World War II, we face an increased prospect of threat from a major power...Strategic risk is a grey area in which governments need to make critical assessments of capability, motive and intent...in the years ahead, the level of capability able to be brought to bear against Australia will increase, so judgements relating to contingencies and the associated warning time will need to rely less on evidence of capability and more on assessments of motive and intent. Such areas for judgement are inherently ambiguous and uncertain.

When professionalism becomes a reductionist approach of recruiting to norms and 'training (as opposed to educating) by numbers' in order to certify 'diversity and competency' (often for rule-based reasons) rather than promote specialisation and expertise, specialists are no longer available to 'test the rule' [6]:

A possible example may be the crash of Air France Flight 447 off Brazil in June 2009. Up and until the crash, pilots had essentially been taught to 'fly by numbers, within the box'. Pilots were fine provided 'the numbers they were being shown remained within the automated norms (the box)'. However, if an important speed indicator Pitot tube became blocked; less experienced pilots had limited airworthiness skills for identifying incorrect / ambiguous guidance from the numbers

(being displayed), and correcting by overruling and flying manually. The flight recorders recovered two years later revealed that the aircraft's descent into the sea was not due to mechanical failure or the aircraft being overwhelmed by the weather, but because the flight crew had raised the aircraft's nose, reducing its speed until it entered an aerodynamic stall. Subsequently Air France improved education and training, concentrating on how to fly a plane manually when there is a stall.

The West has been flying-by-numbers since the 1990s, which was fine so long as the norms and rules still fitted within the box. They have not done so for at least a decade. This is seen not simply in the failure of the political classes; their professional advisors, suborned academics and policy wonk tankers (ASPI and Insight Economics excepted) to think and articulate an alternative future, but also in the tragic recent spate of accidents confronting the U.S. Navy. There 'but for' go us, and has gone the British Royal Navy. When we go to war, we want the big stick and the knowledge sovereignty that means we hit the right targets. In peace, we need the rat-like cunning of Moriarty to 'mar the destiny of our enemies' – are you there?

In War, Holmes; In Peace, Moriarty! ■

Erratum: in the previous issue of *The NAVY Magazine* Vol. 79. No. 4, Oct-Dec 2017, p. 4, Presidents' Page: a journalist from The Times of London contacted the NLA and expressed an interest in the two papers on the Royal Navy by Jonathan Foreman. At her request the League President provided an opinion piece. *The NAVY Magazine* has now been informed that this was an enquiry by the journalist only and that any suggestion of a linkage between The Times and the Foreman papers is incorrect. Any such suggestion is therefore retracted.

Notes

1. Insight Economics. (2017) Australia's Future Submarine Getting This Key Capability Right. In: Jon Stanford (ed) Public Policy Report to Submarines for Australia. Canberra: Insight Economics Pty. Ltd.
2. Doyle AC. (1894) The Adventure of the Final Problem. McClure's Magazine. Astor Place, New York: J.J. Little and Co. Vol. 2: p. 104.
3. Doyle AC. (1894) The Valley of Fear. The Strand Magazine, London Sep-May.
4. A system of government which is run by a normative professional class of partisan, overly qualified, least competent, unscrupulous, rent-seekers with interest in power for power's sake.
5. Dibb P. & R., Brabin-Smith. (2017) Australia's management of strategic risk in the new era. In: ASPI (ed) Strategic Insights. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
6. The original Latin was the 'exception that tests the rule' (Exceptio probat regulam); rather 'than proves the rule', which means that the rule or norm should be put to its proof rather than simply confirmed by it.

What a great privilege it is to be introducing you to another fine edition of *The NAVY Magazine* of the Navy League as the League's new President.

Please enjoy the articles in this edition, while doing so contemplate the impacts of the Defence and maritime industry decisions we take as a nation today and engage with us (and those who represent us in the Parliament) once you have done so.

STATEMENT OF POLICY

I also encourage you to revisit the *Statement of Policy* of the League which is printed in the back of this edition and to remind yourself of our *raison d'être*. To a maritime nation such as ours, a strong navy and a capable maritime industry are indispensable. This is of even greater importance in what seem to be increasingly less certain times, with our own Navy stretched to meet its commitments, shifts in the balance of power in our own Asia-Pacific region and an increasing likelihood that our strategic partners will continue to expect more of us from our Defence capabilities.

Much of our work touches on and was supported in large part by The *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper* [1] and the announcement, also in November, awarding Lürssen (with ASC and Civmec) the \$4B contract to build twelve Patrol Boats. Two to be built in Adelaide before construction of the remainder moves to Henderson in Western Australia. This is a complicated arrangement that carries risk. Given the potential of these corvette-sized ships and the RAN's dearth of escorts, at least 'another eight – and we can't wait', may be needed. If ever, the Navy League's role is needed now.

The Statement of Policy is our guiding document, its aims have varied over time to suit the circumstances of the day, and it is revised from time to time to ensure its relevance remains. Those of you familiar with the history of the Navy League will note that early aims of the League are not too different to that which we strive to maintain today. Malcolm Longstaff's history of the Navy League of Australia *Keeping Watch*, is a fine place to revisit for the origins of the League and it is still available from the NSW Division (and details can be found on our website www.navyleague.org.au).

ANNUAL CONFERENCE

The 2017 Navy League of Australia Conference was held in October in Canberra. It was another outstanding success at which each State Division and our New Zealand counterparts were represented.

Graham Harris had previously announced his intention to complete his watch as Federal President and I was honoured to take station as President. Graham's contribution to the League has been immense, including over 23 years as Federal President and his has been a fine example to us all. I take this opportunity to thank Graham for his leadership and unflappable commitment to the Navy League and, through it, the nation.

Each Division made presentations to the Annual Conference on issues of import to their area and to the League as a whole from their unique perspective. It is always encouraging to hear what a vast array of activities different Divisions of the League are involved in and reinforces the stature of the League at all levels of the community across the country.



Life Membership of the Navy League of Australia is awarded from time to time to those members whose contribution has been outstanding and longstanding. Harvey has been a member for over 37 years, a member of the Queensland Division committee from 1992 and president since 2008. As President he set the division on a more active and prominent course to further League policy. He is a fine leader. He was a sea cadet in TS Gayundah and later joined the RANR Port Brisbane Division. He has a great interest in a wide range of naval and maritime matters particularly the history. He has given a number of addresses and written articles on a range of maritime subjects. Those of recent interest are the bicentenary of Trafalgar and naval involvement in WW1. Well done Harvey.

NAVY LEAGUE PERPETUAL TROPHY

The Conference also reviewed nominations for the Navy League Perpetual Trophy – Community Award. The award is presented annually to the ship or establishment that has made the best contribution to the community. Nominations are reviewed by the Fleet Commander before a shortlist is considered by the Federal Council.



A Lürssen designed Patrol Boat to be built in Adelaide and WA.

This year nominations were received from HMAS STIRLING, HMAS PARRAMATTA, HMAS SUCCESS and HMAS WATERHEN for Community Award. Each was very deserving of recognition in its own right. The Federal Council this year has agreed that the most deserving recipient of the Community Award is HMAS STIRLING for its outstanding contributions to the community.

During the year HMAS STIRLING hosted over 363 community activities, raised over \$58,000 directly and more than \$163,000 indirectly through its involvement in various fundraising activities. The ships company of HMAS STIRLING engaged youth and indigenous groups through sport and outdoor activities; trained local community fire brigades; provided maintenance for the Leeuwin Ocean Sailing Foundation, donated more to the Blood Drive than any other WA unit and mentored community groups in resilience and leadership. Well done HMAS STIRLING.

NAVY LEAGUE ANNUAL MARITIME AFFAIRS ESSAY COMPETITION

The Annual Maritime affairs essay competition again attracted a strong field of contributors. These papers will be presented in this and future editions of *The Navy* and demonstrate the depth of interest and capability evident in our readers and contributors in the field of history and international relations. Congratulations to all contributors and especially to the prize-winners. The competition will be held again in the year ahead, and I encourage all readers to get started on your entries.

NON-PROFESSIONAL CATEGORY

	\$500	Kevin Beard Old Fool Moves Mountains Islands & Ships
	\$200	Jamie MacIntyre Mk 6: The Royal Navy's first true dual-purpose naval artillery
	\$150	Brendan Alderman The Submarine Service

PROFESSIONAL CATEGORY

	\$1000	Dr Andrew Ng The China Seas, 'Fire & fury', 'shaky world' or 'a new hope'?
	\$500	Geoff Crowhurst Kido Butai: The First Six Months
	\$250	Captain George Galdorisi (U.S. Navy - retired) A Navy for a Dangerous Neighborhood

MEMBERSHIP

We are always keen to attract new members to the Navy League, and encourage you to share *The NAVY Magazine* with your friends and colleagues. You may also encourage them to join the League, or give an annual membership as a gift. Further details about joining the League are in the insert in this edition and can be found on our website.

INSIDE THIS EDITION

This edition is another example of the fine work of the Editor and the editorial board.

The article in defence of the report *Australia's Future Submarine: Getting This Key Capability Right* is neither a political attack, nor a report from "individuals with no experience in designing, building or operating submarines". Rather, it is a well-considered and researched contribution in the spirit of the League's call for a bipartisan political approach to National Defence with a key focus to avoid the real risk of a serious capability gap. I commend it to you and encourage you to take up the issue with your Federal MP.

Our ongoing commitment to providing fine historical articles is also supported with the first in a fascinating and well documented four-part series (2018-2019) on the history of the Japanese Naval Service.

Enjoy this edition and please let us have any feedback at editorthenavy@hotmail.com or by post to the addresses inside the front cover.

1. See <https://www.fpwwhitepaper.gov.au/> for a pdf version of the FPWP.

CRESWELL

THE 18TH ANNUAL



ORATION

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COST: \$50

DATE: FRIDAY 2ND MARCH 2018

TIME: 1200 for 1230

DRESS: Uniform S7, Lounge suit / Day dress – Decorations & Medals optional.

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ANI & RAN SIGN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

Dear Editor,

I understand that the Navy has entered into a strategic partnership with the Australian Naval Institute to exploit the experience of its retired membership.

It is understandable and natural that there should be a relationship between former members of the Service and current members. However, I would not have thought that it required a formal agreement and have concerns regarding the legality and ethics of a national / Commonwealth possession like The Navy entering into such an agreement. Perhaps of greater concern is the stress that the Agreement places upon links to "industry" and I fear that this might be seen as a back-door access for lobbying and influence.

Regards

E. J. Wilson – Member

By Editor

See also this issue, Book Review of *The Future of Sea Power* (2017), which raises the questions of biases by publications that 'are essentially under the control of government'.

IN DEFENCE OF THE 8TH DIVISION

In an exchange of emails, Mr Greg Patching wrote in defence of The 8th Division; noting reference to the Fall of Singapore in *The NAVY Magazine*, Vol. 79, No. 4, Oct-Dec 2017, Editorial. Mr Patching wrote, inter alia:

Dear Editor,

Thank you for your prompt reply to my letter. I would appreciate mention of the over-all casualty rates of 8th Division and of their role in the only limited success [at the Battles of Gemas, Bakin, Jemaluang and Muar] achieved by the combined Allied forces. The 8th Division representing 15% of Allied troops suffered 75% of casualties and was down to two-thirds of its nominal strength by the time of the fall. [On the Malayan mainland, 462 Australians were killed, or died of wounds and on Singapore Island 883 Australians. Total casualties 1789 killed; 1306 wounded]. The editor of (I think) History Today contacted me to inform me that the author of the book on the Fall of Singapore, after taking note of casualty figures re the 8th Division revised his published opinion and came to the conclusion that 'even the Japanese could not have held the Australian positions on Singapore'.

I must agree with you over our nation's enthusiasm to all too often, follow other powers into conflict without any real consideration as to our nations need for an independent status in the world.

Please continue publishing your excellent magazine, it remains chosen reading;

Thanking you

Greg Patching

By Editor

Dear Greg,

Thank you for the way in which we were able to find common

ground. A question for another day, perhaps, is 'what happened in Australia during WWII?' see Australia's Secret War: *How Unions Sabotaged Our Troops in World War II* by Hal Gibson; and *Hero or Deserter? Gordon Bennett and the Tragic Defeat of 8th Division*.

The point of the Editorial was to consider Australian Sovereign Identity, exactly so that we can call it our own and influence our region appropriately.

ERRATUM

Dear Editor,

Reference *The NAVY Magazine*, Vol. 79, No. 4, page 28, picture showing the launch of a Type 12 claimed to be HMAS SWAN III at Williamstown Dockyard, 16 December 1967. In the background it clearly shows a chimney stack from the power house and also the floating crane Titan. Looking at the picture the frigate is on No1 Slipway. I served my apprenticeship at the Island many years ago & worked on many naval vessels. I started at Codock when the Empress of Australia was on the slip then followed HMAS STALWART and HMAS TORRENS.

Regards

Trevor Stobart

Dear Editor,

The photo of 'the launching of HMAS SWAN' at <http://www.navy.gov.au/hmas-swan-iii> as also used in *The NAVY Magazine* is actually the launching of HMAS PARRAMATTA (III) at Cockatoo Island on 31 January 1959. I'm in the picture somewhere I think!

Kind Regards

John Jeremy

By Editor

With thanks and apologies to Mr John Jeremy AM and Mr Trevor Stobart – the image was selected by the Editor.

EXPORT EXCELLENCE IGNORED

Dear Editor,

The management of LifeRaft Systems Australia (LSA) are to be congratulated on the latest sale of lifesaving equipment to the Royal Navy. The order adds to the already delivered units provided to the two British aircraft carriers.

Like the British Navy the United States, French, Netherlands and New Zealand Navies and the Japanese Self Defence Force are also equipped with state of the art lifesaving equipment designed and built in Tasmania.

Despite the most strenuous efforts over many years, the company has been unable to interest the Australian Navy in this Tasmanian made product, the Australian Navy preferring to buy foreign.

Perhaps some Federal politician [The Defence Industry Minister who agreed life-raft contracts in London, Nov 17] may like to explain why Tasmania continues to be shunned by Federal procurement officers.

Robert Clifford, AO

Chairman, Incat Tasmania Pty Ltd

THE RAN'S FUTURE SUBMARINE: THE STATE OF THE DEBATE

By Jon Stanford

Dissent appropriately expressed is the sincerest form of loyalty
(General James N. Mattis, US Secretary of Defense)

The recent report by Insight Economics, *Australia's Future Submarine: Getting this Key Capability Right* [1], was sponsored by Sydney businessman Gary Johnston. It was launched at the National Press Club in September by Professor Hugh White, perhaps Australia's foremost defence strategist, and Dr Michael Keating AC, a former head of the Australian Public Service. None of these individuals has any commercial interest in submarines and nor do the authors of the report. The project was undertaken in the public interest, with the aim of highlighting both the excessive costs of the FSM and the very high risks around the project. The intention of this exercise is solely to influence future government policy without seeking to overturn any government decision made to date.

BACKGROUND

The discussion in this article focuses on how the government has reacted to the main propositions put forward in the Insight Economics report. These may be summarised as follows:

- The novel competitive evaluation process (CEP) employed to assess the three contenders for the FSM project was deeply flawed. Because the government was ostensibly selecting a design partner rather than a particular platform, it allowed Defence to work around all the checks and balances that had been put in place following a number of reviews into defence procurement.
- The budget for the acquisition of twelve SSKs is excessive, with each submarine costing approximately the equivalent of four large, advanced *Soryu* class boats.
- There are very significant risks around the design concept, including some substantial technical challenges.
- These risks suggest that the Navy will almost certainly face a major gap in submarine capability in the 2030s, at a time when it is becoming increasingly clear that Australia could face a dangerous strategic situation in which a strong Submarine Force would be of critical importance to national security.
- Apparently the government's proposed solution to avoiding a capability gap is to extend the life of *Collins*. This is an extremely risky approach and excessively costly for an additional life of ten years.
- In order to address these risks and without changing the FSM process with the Shortfin Barracuda, the government should order six new submarines, based on military off-the-shelf (MOTS) designs, as soon as possible.
- In light of the more threatening strategic situation, the government should bring forward the review of Australia's submarine capability requirements, as flagged in the 2016 White Paper, and consider three options (or a combination)



Minister for Defence Industry The Hon Christopher Pyne MP.

going forward – proceed to build the Shortfin Barracuda, order more of the MOTS boats proposed above or accelerate the process required to acquire SSNs.

We begin by considering the general, overall reaction to the report when it was first released. We then move on to the report's overriding concern with the probability of a capability gap and the possibility that the Shortfin Barracuda design will be unsatisfactory or not provide value for money. Finally we explain the proposal for a MOTS acquisition as an interim measure and the proposed review of longer-term submarine capability requirements.

GENERAL REACTION TO THE REPORT

On the day the report was launched, the Minister for Defence, Marise Payne, and the Minister for Defence Industry, Christopher Pyne, held a media conference where they stated that the report was a "hatchet job" and a "beat up" rather than an authoritative contribution to the capability discussion. The report had been produced by "individuals who have no experience in designing, building or operating submarines". Mr Pyne went on to say that "much of this report is inaccurate and not informed by the facts. The writers of this report



HMAS COLLINS (SSG 73) arrives in Sydney Harbour in September 2010.

have not been involved in the process of the tender or the projects since the tender was completed.”

Mr Pyne followed up this initial reaction four days later with an article published in *The Australian*. He acknowledged that “when a government embarks on a program worth up to \$50 billion, it is not only reasonable but very important to have debate on the merits of the project, the value for money and the time line for delivery”. But “this debate should always be informed by the facts and not be swayed by an illogical bias against a particular outcome. The so called ‘analysis’ of our Future Submarine Program released this week is nothing more than a hatchet job on an important national endeavour, instigated by armchair critics living in Sydney with no understanding of the tender process involved.” He also said that the report contained “some spectacular errors and oversights” and it was a pity that the authors of the report and its sponsor had made no effort to discuss these issues with him.

These comments deserve some response.

First, the claim that we made no attempt to discuss these issues with the government is incorrect. We discussed our concerns with one government Minister and we also sought a meeting with Mr Pyne. A year ago I sent the Minister a short paper outlining our concerns and offered to travel to Adelaide to discuss them with him. He immediately returned a

one-line email: “This is not government policy”. I guess we took that as a “no”.

Secondly, we reject the criticism that only submarine experts have the right to comment on the FSM acquisition. In preparing the report we consulted a large number of submarine experts – as well as specialists in strategic policy, engineering and naval shipbuilding – while a retired Royal Navy admiral with extensive ASW expertise was a close adviser throughout the process. Ultimately, in the light of previous experience with Defence acquisitions, the ‘leave it to the experts’ approach has something of a hollow ring to it. Presumably it was helicopter experts who advised on the acquisition of the Super Seasprites and naval systems experts who recommended to Ministers the life extension for the FFG-7 frigates.

Finally, Minister Pyne stated twice that we had no understanding of “the tender process” involved in the FSM acquisition. This is puzzling; there has been no tender process involved in the FSM acquisition and this is one of our main concerns. Indeed, we considered the CEP to be a severely flawed approach with no allowance for a funded, competitive project definition study between two or three contenders leading to a fixed price tender process. By the time of Mr Pyne’s speech to the Pacific Sea Power Conference on 4 October the Minister had corrected his error. Any reference to a tender process had now disappeared and instead we had “no understanding of the Competitive Evaluation Process”. But our report contained a very lengthy analysis of the CEP and we are yet to receive any indication of what we failed to understand. By now the Minister was coming off his long run, however, and our report was, in his opinion, “thoroughly discredited”.

THE CAPABILITY GAP

On the present schedule, the first FSM is due to enter service in 2033 and the final delivery will be made around 2050. This extended schedule is a direct consequence of the Navy wanting to design its own submarine, which was only feasible with the French concept. Both the German and Japanese contenders had more advanced designs and would have had the first submarine in service sometime in the late 2020s, with the result that a capability gap could have been narrowly avoided.

As matters presently stand, with the *Collins* class now approaching obsolescence and a maximum of two of these submarines on station at any one time, Australia will have an inadequate submarine capability if the strategic threat level increases in the 2020s. With the six *Collins* class submarines reaching the end of their designed



Professor Hugh White and Dr Michael Keating at the launch of the Australia's Future Submarine - Getting this Key Capability Right National Press Club Canberra 30 Sep 2017.

lives between 2026 and 2033 and the first FSM due to enter service in 2033-34, the Navy faces a serious gap in submarine capability in the 2030s, when the strategic situation may well be significantly more threatening than it is today.

Even if everything goes exactly to plan and the Navy undertakes a successful life of type extension (LOTE) on *Collins* and the FSM is delivered on schedule, the maximum number of submarines on station at any time in the late 2030s would be two. One of these would likely be an extended but obsolescent *Collins* class boat nearing its 40th birthday. The other submarine would be a very large, powerful submarine but one that may well have an unacceptably high indiscretion ratio. With China probably operating over 100 submarines by that time, most of them highly advanced with either nuclear propulsion or AIP, and the strategic threat likely to be considerably higher than it is now, this is a palpably inadequate submarine capability.

The scenario may well be worse than this, however, if we allow for probable delays to the delivery of the FSM. According to Naval Group, the Shortfin Barracuda is an all-new submarine design, which on past experience almost inevitably will be delivered several years

capability in the transition from the *Collins*-class submarines to the future submarines... The most pressing error is the claim that there will be a capability gap in our submarine fleet between the end of the *Collins*-class and the delivery of the future submarines. It's remarkable the report's authors failed to realise this issue was addressed more than one-and-a-half years ago when the government announced through the defence white paper in March 2016 that it would invest in an upgrade of the *Collins*-class submarines. Called the *Collins*-class life of type extension, it will ensure they are a potent fighting force well into the 2030s. At that time we will have our new Future Submarine fleet delivered by Naval Group Australia, ready to dominate the waters around our island nation.

Unfortunately, both of the substantive statements in this extract are incorrect. There was no mention of a *Collins* class LOTE in the 2016 White Paper, only a decision to install new sonars and associated systems that are required to keep the submarines going until the end of their scheduled lives. We understand that the government is considering a *Collins* class LOTE, but no announcement has yet been made. The second incorrect statement is that the FSM fleet will be delivered in the 2030s, whereas even on the most optimistic assumption only three new submarines would be available by the late 2030s.

On the basis of this article, we can only conclude that Minister Pyne has not been briefed on the very high risk of a capability gap. He clearly has a high level of confidence that such a gap can be avoided by undertaking a *Collins* class LOTE and that the FSM will be delivered on schedule. Both of these matters are subject to an extremely high level of risk.

For an additional ten years life, the *Collins* LOTE would cost a great deal of money – \$15 billion (equivalent to the acquisition cost of at least 15 MOTS boats) was the number reported to us when the Cabinet papers on the LOTE were first being developed. When you add the fact that the LOTE would be subject to a very high degree of risk that it may not provide a submarine that could responsibly be deployed in a high threat environment in the 2030s and beyond,

the investment case is weak indeed. It's nearly ten years since the Submarine Institute of Australia, in a submission to the 2009 White Paper, argued strongly why a *Collins* LOTE should not be entertained and explained the associated risk of a capability gap:

Similar to the Oberon experience at this time of life, it will not be cost-effective to sustain or replace ageing/obsolescent systems, nor is it an option to extend *Collins*, since:

- The capability gap between the 1987 specification and contemporary needs is increasing;
- The *Collins* class currently lacks any design margins (space, ship stability, power, cooling etc.) to sustain significant capability enhancements to meet the increasingly demanding environment and new requirements;
- It is possible to achieve additional capacity by cutting the submarine and installing an additional length or 'plug', for example to provide air independent propulsion. Such measures would still not achieve the full range of capabilities necessary to achieve the outcomes set out in the first part of this paper.



Launching of the Soryu-class JS SHORYU (SS 510) November 6 2017 in Kobe.

late. There are very substantial technical risks in developing any *ab initio* submarine – current examples of new submarine classes experiencing significant problems and delays include the Spanish S-80, Russia's Lada class and, of particular relevance to the FSM, the French Barracuda nuclear submarine. In addition, all of Naval Group's export submarine projects, for example, for India and Brazil, have experienced delays of several years. Delivery of the first of the nuclear-powered Barracudas, the SUFFREN, has been postponed several times and has now been pushed out to 2020.

Given these realities, it is entirely possible that Australia will have no operational submarines that could be sent into areas of high-level threat for most of the 2030s. It would then take a very long time to muster the trained crews required to restore that capability.

The government's response to these issues leaned towards rhetoric rather than substance. In *The Australian* on 29 September 2017, Mr Pyne, stated that:

Furthermore, the report contains some spectacular errors and oversights, most importantly when it comes to our submarine



Admiral Sunil Lanba, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, IN visiting the Naval Group yard at Cherbourg France November 2017 with the build-delayed FS SUFFREN on his left.

- The ageing platform and its fundamental systems will become a demanding and expensive vehicle to continue to operate.
- There is an increasing risk of major failures that would be costly and or time consuming to rectify; major defects will occur without warning, with compounding effects on availability, long term planning, bad press and recruitment and retention.
- The application of new and up to date safety requirements will be difficult in an asset designed in the 1980s.
- A life extension program is therefore likely to be a poor return on investment.
- The attraction of this option to the bureaucrat, as a means of delaying a difficult decision should be resisted: it is a distraction and will result in a serious capability gap. [2]

Perhaps a former *Collins* class commanding officer, James Harrap, should have the last word:

Whilst it may be possible (though very costly) to keep COLLINS (SSG 73) operational for another decade or more, most advances can't be retrofitted and the boat will most likely be so technically obsolete by 2022 that the credibility of the capability it offers will be seriously eroded.

THE MOTS SOLUTION

Our proposed solution to the risk of a capability gap is that rather than approving a LOTE of the *Collins* class, the government should establish a competitive process for acquiring six MOTS submarines, modified only to the extent of providing additional range. It should be emphasised that these submarines would not replace the Shortfin Barracuda, where the detailed design would continue according to the contract with Naval Group. They would only take the place of the *Collins* class LOTE.

With all the MOTS submarines to be delivered by 2033, the Navy would avoid a capability gap. Because they would have a reduced endurance compared with *Collins* or the FSM, we also propose acquiring a submarine tender ship. This could operate as a forward base, perhaps being located at Christmas Island or Cocos-Keeling. Without the need for lengthy transits and with fly-in, fly-out crews, the tender ship would also provide a significant and much needed force multiplier, with the availability of Australian submarines in their AOs increased perhaps by around 50 per cent.

The MOTS boats would also offer a valuable insurance policy in the event the Shortfin Barracuda was late or the government did not proceed with it, perhaps because of cost or capability. We also

propose that the review of Australia's future submarine requirements foreshadowed in the 2016 White Paper could be brought forward to the early 2020s. It could consider whether the Navy should build the Shortfin Barracuda, acquire more MOTS boats or, while operating the MOTS submarines, begin the lengthy process of establishing the infrastructure required to operate nuclear submarines.

Mr Pyne was also highly critical of the MOTS proposal:

The secondary argument of the so-called report is that somehow we could buy some ready-made "military off-the-shelf" submarines that would fulfil the needs of our navy into the future. This is an erroneous and dangerous argument that flies in the face of official advice given to

the government by experts in this field. There are no military off-the-shelf submarine options that meet our needs. The idea that somehow we could rejig an existing model into our requirements defies logic and would, in fact, take just as long; we would end up with an inferior option and leave our submariners without the best capability in our region.


We acknowledge the criticism that a modified MOTS submarine can require a very extensive re-design. Although we understand that the latest digital techniques would readily allow the modification of an existing design to incorporate greater fuel bunkering, we have removed this requirement from our MOTS proposal because with AIP and/or lithium-ion batteries together with the tender ship, additional range may well not be a necessary requirement.

Apart from this, however, the Minister repeats here the long-standing opposition to MOTS submarines because of the Navy's supposedly unique requirements. But these requirements are derived, in very large part, from the lengthy transits to and from base required of Australian submarines. These can account for over 50 per cent of the time spent on a 60-day operation. So the first point to make in response to the Minister is that our tender ship proposal, together with fly-in, fly-out crews, allows for much shorter operations while at the same time providing a force multiplier. Shorter patrols would also provide a more attractive working environment for submarine crews and fly-in, fly out would enable them to live in any part of Australia. This could provide a much-needed boost for recruitment.

The second point in response is that it seems the Minister has failed to understand that the MOTS boats we propose are to replace not the FSM, but rather the *Collins* LOTE. There is a much greater likelihood that advanced MOTS boats, with AIP or modern batteries, would provide a superior submarine capability 'up threat' in the 2030s than a refurbished *Collins* boat, which would also be subject to much greater risks. The MOTS boats would also last for thirty years rather than ten, and cost substantially less.

There have also been criticisms of the tender ship proposal on the basis of its vulnerability in a conflict and that the enemy would know where RAN submarines were based. We agree that, like all surface ships, the tender would be vulnerable to attack, but it could be withdrawn to northern Australia in any conflict where it would still be much closer to the submarines' AOs than HMAS STIRLING. It could also be equipped with point air defence missiles and Nulka. To be sure, there is also a danger that enemy submarines could loiter around the tender ship and attack our submarines, but the same is true of HMAS STIRLING itself.

Pump jet propulsion – the warfighter advantage.



Speculation is growing that successful trials of electrically driven pump jets by China will be applied to SSGs - here Shortfin Barracuda with pump jet image DCNS.

CONCLUSION

The Insight Economics report is focussed on the excessive cost of the FSM, the unacceptable delivery schedule and the very high risks that surround the project. Yet the government response to the report ignores all of these issues. The Minister for Defence Industry in particular, while scathing about our “so-called report”, appears not to understand either the extended delivery schedule for the FSM or the very high risks involved both in the Shortfin Barracuda and a *Collins* LOTE.

The major risk is of a capability gap in the 2030s. This constituted a clear danger at the time the government announced its decision on the FSM in April 2016 and since then Australia’s strategic circumstances have deteriorated further. As Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith point out in their recent report [3], threats to Australia are increasing and we can no longer rely on having the cushion of a lengthy ‘warning time’ as a prelude to any attack. Additional submarine capability is required urgently. Before committing to a life extension for *Collins*, the government should undertake a review of Australia’s future capability requirements for its submarine force as a matter of urgency.

Finally, some Ministers’ response to a serious, non-political report by making an ad hominem attack surprisingly lacking in substance suggests both a trivialisation of very important issues and a lack of respect for the individuals involved. The reputations of Hugh White and Michael Keating require no elaboration here. Gary Johnston has long been concerned with Australia’s unfortunate record in defence procurement and, in support of the public interest, he generously funded Insight Economics’ independent report. It is churlish to dismiss him as an “armchair critic” and it does the Minister no credit.

It seems the contemporary political climate in Australia no longer allows for a civil discourse on complex policy issues. Nor does it encourage the gravitas among some of our leaders that would allow them to recognise the statesmanship reflected in General Mattis’s comment cited at the beginning of this article. The US Secretary of Defense is noted for his military aphorisms, some of which have a wider relevance. For example, he routinely used to advise the Marines under his command to “engage your brain before you engage your weapon”. ■

About the Author: Jon Stanford is a Director of Insight Economics and was the principal author of the report “Australia’s Future Submarine: Getting this Key Capability Right”, available at www.insighteconomics.com.au

Response: If Ministers Pyne or Payne would like to respond, *The NAVY Magazine* would be delighted to accept a paper from either, or both. Similarly, this invitation extends to The Hons Richard Marles MP, and Dr Mike Kelly AM, MP and to the Hons Tony Abbott MP and Anthony Albanese MP, who have for long had an active interest in the Royal Australian Navy and Defence.

Table 1 - from Insight Economics Report, p.67, and US China Economic and Security Review Commission (2014), Staff Report, p.12

China’s Submarine Fleet, 1990-2020

Type	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
SSG	88	43	60	51	54	57-62	59-64
SSN	4	5	5	6	6	6-8	6-9
SSBN	1	1	1	2	3	3-5	4-5
Total	93	49	66	59	63	66-75	69-78

...Of which Percentage Modern

Type	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
SSG	0%	0%	7%	40%	50%	70%	75%
SSN	0%	0%	0%	33%	33%	70%	100%

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THE CHINA SEAS: 'FIRE & FURY', 'SHAKY WORLD' OR 'A NEW HOPE'?

By Andrew Ng

What are leaders but dealers in hope? (Napoleon)

The regions of the East and South China Seas remain tinder hot spots ready to ignite at any given moment. Recent events have brought these conflicts into stark focus, not only the disputed South China Sea but most worryingly on the Korean peninsula. With the world watching on intently and the major players working frantically to circumvent an international catastrophe, events continue to evolve at a rapid pace. No doubt by the time this essay comes to press, the global landscape would have changed considerably, either becoming more shaky or more secure. However, the historical contexts and underlying motivations of these unresolved conflict areas will remain a spotlight for the 21st century (the Asian century) and will be the focus of this essay.

INTRODUCTION

When North Korea launched its first ballistic missile of the year in April, the world was put on notice. Before it could launch its second, Presidents Trump and Xi had already met to discuss this and other security & trade issues. Unsurprisingly this meeting of the world's biggest economies took centre stage, since the relationship between these two nations has the potential to either inflame or resolve global conflict. This includes not only managing rogue states but also their own bilateral tensions which will shape the security or shakiness of the future international climate.

The rise of China has often been described as a classic case of the Thucydides Trap (rising nation meets risen nation) [1,2]. In fact this had been predicted centuries before by Napoleon, the leader of arguably the greatest continental empire when he said "Let her sleep, for when the dragon awakes she will shake the world." Others have viewed it as a land power wanting to secure its trade routes, inevitably coming into contact with the reigning superpower (itself essentially a sea power). This theory by Mackinder [3] argues that an industrialized 'heartland' would supersede sea power as a means of geopolitical leverage, an historical process that Paul Kennedy has taken further as explanation for Britain's decline over the course of the 20th century [4]. However, in the 21st century this argument looks premature with the majority of the world's goods still carried by sea and all major nations understanding the primacy of sea power including the US through which it projects its global reach. True sea power was described by Alfred Thayer Mahan as "the product of international trade and commerce, overseas bases, and merchant and naval shipping" [5]. Yet others have described the current 'shaky world' as a result of the

global panorama changing inevitably from the current unipolar to a multi-polar world, with Eastern meeting Western ideologies. These flash points of the East and South China Seas will be viewed from different 'poles' of view including Asia, the US response, Australia's options and finally what China's actions are likely to be.

NORTH KOREA: "FIRE AND FURY"

The hostility between Pyongyang and Washington remains a product of Cold War politics and was intensified in August this year following North Korea's apparent imminent nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities [6]. However, President Trump's unprecedented "fire

and fury" threat, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's singling out of China and Russia as "economic enablers" of North Korea and the recent combined military exercises with South Korea & Australia in August have in fact been a propaganda gift for President Kim particularly among the older generation who well remember the US aggression during the Korean War. In particular it will harden the resolve of the third generation Kim to progress his weapons capabilities similar to what Israel did decades ago in the face of Arab threats to eliminate the Jewish state.

President Xi on the other hand has emphasized diplomacy,

calling for restraint and a scaling down of rhetoric. China also agreed with the UN's additional economic sanctions whilst being acutely aware of the ramifications of the June sanctioning by the US of a regional Chinese bank, a shipping company and two Chinese citizens over dealings with North Korea, which is viewed as a precursor to greater economic and financial pressure on the Middle Kingdom to reign in its errant neighbour. Therefore, Beijing walks a diplomatic tightrope by providing its neighbour with a lifeline, since a buffer



East China Sea The main conflicts involve the Korean peninsula, Japan and Taiwan.
Source: China Defence Ministry



Madman or smart cookie? Both leaders are pursuing security for their nation.

state is preferable to a refugee crisis and a beefed-up US military presence on its border. President Xi also recently called for faster military modernization, telling troops that “a strong army is needed now more than ever”. [7]

Is it possible that this time the Madman policy could work, unlike President Nixon during the Cold War? For example, the prestige and security value of nuclear weapons is clearly seen when looking at the fate of Muammar el-Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein when their nuclear weapons programs were given up. Has this “smart cookie” guesstimated (correctly?) that it can survive sanctions long enough to build its arsenal to a point where the world has to accept it as a nuclear state, in which case the world will have to move from solving the Pyongyang nuclear problem, to managing it.

JAPAN

Although Japan has been an (imposed) pacifist nation since World War 2, the imminent weapons capability of Pyongyang combined with the rise of China and wavering US commitment (e.g. defence budget cuts and the “Japan walks all over us economically” speech) [8] have convinced Tokyo to re-evaluate Article 9 of its constitution (which renounces war), drastically increase its defence budget and perhaps consider nuclear weapons.

Sino-Japanese relations have historically been strained partly due to Japan’s refusal to acknowledge its wartime past to the satisfaction of China. Relations further worsened in 2012 after Japan wanted to nationalise the disputed Senkakus/Diaoyu Islands, a region with great economic and strategic value (rich fishing grounds, probable oil/gas reserves and anti-access area denial potential). Tokyo has bolstered its troop presence close to the disputed islands and China similarly is building a large military base on the Nanji Islands. Although the Americans recently reaffirmed their security treaty with Japan, the economic interdependence of the three largest nations makes any dispute extremely detrimental, meaning that America might instead pursue diplomatic rather than military solutions.

Nevertheless, Beijing cannot be certain and currently cannot match US firepower. Thus the situation at present remains a 3 way stalemate.


TAIWAN (REPUBLIC OF CHINA)

Deng Xiaoping proclaimed that China could wait 100 years to reunify with Taiwan, while Jiang Zemin said it would not wait forever, but lacked the capacity to back this up. Already, the Middle Kingdom holds immense leverage in Taiwan through economic and political ties and has set a timetable of 2021 or by the latest 2049 (100 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China).

However, if not done peacefully, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the US government “make available to Taiwan such defense articles/services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” (Section 3). Interestingly, the only meaningful US obligation is to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions” which is similar wording to other treaties (e.g. Korea, Philippines and Australia). Thus, intervention is not definite and remains contingent on questions of diplomacy, military facts and political will at the time. The SCS is fast becoming the world’s most important waterway. As the main corridor between the Indian and Pacific Oceans it carries 1/3 of global maritime trade (>\$5 trillion annually; \$1.2 trillion going to/from the US). It contains large oil/gas reserves and fishing grounds with six governments having overlapping claims.

To assert authority, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam have reclaimed land around reefs (150 acres) with China after a late start reclaiming 3,000 acres. This could lead to anti-access area denial, and severely hamper US influence who altruistically only seek peaceful resolution of disputes and freedom of navigation (FON). China meanwhile has repeatedly stated that it has no intention to hamper FON and likewise is committed to peace and security. More broadly, the US welcomes a strong and prosperous China, while China in turn, ‘appreciates’ the US presence in Asia-Pacific and its unique and vital role in maintaining stability and security [9].

However, beneath this rhetoric China believes their “nine-dash line” is firmly grounded in history ‘trumping’ international law and making this clear in 1996 (upon ratifying UNCLOS) and again in 2006. On the other hand, the US (a UNCLOS non-signatory) believes the opposite. Other friction areas involve misperceptions with both sides believing their own actions are benign whilst the other’s are not. Beijing says it is performing humanitarian assistance and scientific research whereas Washington says they are aggressive and intimidating. The US says it is focused exclusively on FON and peace while China sees



South China Sea Claims - after Wall Street Journal July 2016.



Trump refuses daily briefings because he claims he's a smart person.

it as an attempt to surround & 'contain' China, bolster US 'hegemony' in Asia and to favour US allies.

Other areas of insecurity involve the Philippines and Vietnam who China views as 'trouble-makers', whilst the US believes they have been bullied. The recent ruling on July 12, 2016 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) which awarded the case of the Chinese navy's seizure of the Scarborough Shoal back to the Philippines also has diametrically opposing views. China believes it to be "null and void" due to the PCA having no proper jurisdiction, while the US says it is legitimate emphasizing that the decision is legally binding (despite itself having an imperfect record of complying with similar decisions).

Thus the SCS contains many unresolved past and present conflicts which could explode at any time, including China's placement in 2014 of an oil rig accompanied by a sizable armada in disputed waters off Vietnam, Vietnam's renewed concession to an Indian oil company in block 128 in July 2017, India's recent monitoring of the Malacca Straits in June 2017, island militarization, recent fatal FON incidents including the guided missile destroyer USS John S McCain, dangerous Chinese manoeuvres in the air and sea causing near collisions and ongoing misperceptions.

EAST CHINA SEA

Decades of on-off negotiations have done little to eradicate North Korea's nuclear desires leaving three remaining options: acceptance, military intervention, or more creative diplomacy. Acceptance would rely on deterrence to lower the risk of an attack and missile defences to reduce damage should one occur, which are never perfect, and would mean living with the perpetual risk of catastrophe. Japan and South Korea would want to go nuclear.

Military intervention, either preventive or pre-emptive would be a leap into the unknown and Seoul plus others would pay a heavy price. The third option is further diplomacy, perhaps in 2 stages. First a freeze on further nuclear development in exchange for lifting some sanctions and an agreement formally ending the Korean War, followed by longer-term efforts to reduce/eliminate the programs in exchange for an end to sanctions and the normalisation of ties.

SOUTH CHINA SEA


With regard to the SCS, and more generally Asia, the US appears to be re-evaluating its trading priorities (e.g. TPP). Will it instead focus on Europe, North or even South America? Does it see its loss of primacy in Asia as inevitable and does it believe Beijing will be a "responsible stakeholder" [10]. For example, the US Navy recently invited China to participate in the 2018 RIMPAC exercise. Perhaps a Chinese dominated SCS would prove benign enough for the US to live with, so long as the balance of power was not tilted excessively in China's favour.

Or perhaps the US will escalate its SCS military presence and deepen its alliances. It could issue a clear warning to Beijing to cease island building and fortification, failing which Washington could then fortify the region's bases e.g. by placing more ships and planes in Philippine ports and airfields, thus denying China access to important waterways, nearby coastlines, and maritime chokepoints.

However, barriers to the above include the region's fear of Chinese retaliation with economic penalties if they partner with the US, especially with Trump's withdrawal from the TPP, a signal that China will dominate the economic order of the region.

AUSTRALIA'S RESPONSE: A TIME TO LEAD

Australia like all other countries should be motivated by security. To ensure a secure future we need as a minimum energy security, trade security and defence security. We need to invest in infrastructure, education and smart immigration policies rather than failed pink bats schemes and overpriced school sheds. While other countries have been securing their homeland and trade routes, we have been



Northern & Central Australia and Hawaii within striking distance of current North Korean ICBMS and potentially all CONUS and Australia (and Europe) in the near-future.

busy arguing about backpacker taxes and politician eligibility. As a G20 nation we need to step up and address the hard questions. If we can't even keep the lights on then all energy options including nuclear need to be discussed sensibly. If we don't have a missile defence shield and are within range of a rogue nuclear state then we have to become self-sufficient. Gone are the days when we could depend on "Mummy" (Britain) or "Daddy" (US) when Mummy forsook us. We cannot simply follow blindly if the US goes to war. As mentioned above, even the ANZUS treaty does not stipulate that in as many words. Australia could potentially be the first target given that



Trump and Xi dine together at Mar-a-Lago while Syria strike underway 'A new hope'.

South Korea, Japan and even Guam have missile defence systems.

Australia has increasingly close cultural, diplomatic, economic and security ties to both China and the US, both of whom have recently released security strategies that centre on the Indo-Asia-Pacific region [11] and which reveal that the most contentious issues between the two great powers are maritime in nature. The failed attempt to produce a code of conduct for managing disputes at the recent East Asia Summit means that ASEAN is irrevocably split and as a middle power nation with a blue water navy (recently stuck in dry dock!) within Asia we may be called upon to arbitrate and pacify disputes. Even though Bob Hawke recently said that there were "no outstanding leaders", now is the time for us to mature, step up and to lead. [12]

CHINA'S RESPONSE

The Chinese enjoy business and trade and require peace and security for this to flourish as witnessed by the recent proliferation of massive infrastructure schemes. All roads and waterways will soon lead to the Rome of the East (Beijing) called the "new Silk Roads" or "One Belt, One Road". These include new transcontinental rail lines with high-speed passenger service and immense freight capacity, plus integration of south-east Asia into the Chinese rail network through Chinese-built railways in Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos. It also includes a maritime trade network of ports and depots that span the Indian Ocean (including Gwadar port in Pakistan), culminating in east Africa, where the first overseas military base has been stationed (Djibouti). Of note Australia declined to be involved. To secure its trade routes, China is developing sea power in the true sense of the Mahan definition.

China has also astutely built from scratch a major new multilateral bank, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which will be run under its leadership, competing with such western-led institution as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to fund projects that will inevitably play to China's industrial strengths. Historically

China has always seen itself as the Middle Kingdom with smaller neighbouring states falling naturally into its orbit with trade, tributes, friendly relations and mutual aid. Then came the 'century of humiliation' followed by its weakest point (after World War 2) when a raft of international treaties and organisations were established about which it had little say. Only now is it catching up.

Some may view this "great dream of revitalisation" as aggression but rather the intended message is that Asia will now be administered by Asians, as opposed to European imperialism or an American-imposed Asian order. In addition, although the proclamation of an air defence identification zone between China and Japan including the contested Senkakus/Diaoyu Islands in President Xi's first year and the historical dominance over the Koreans, Burmese and most famously Vietnam may be as non-pacifist, the maturing leadership on the world stage is highly notable. For example the efforts to solve global problems together (Paris climate accord and Iran nuclear deal), its willingness to fill the void with the TPP and Paris climate accord, its increase in humanitarian aid and being the highest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions all bode well for future world security.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the situations discussed above remain complex with conflicts revolving around a realignment of world order, from Eastern ideology meeting Western and leftover remnants from the Cold War. Careful and well thought through diplomacy is needed now more than ever and hopefully great adversity will bring out great leadership. Essentially, each country is aiming to secure its future. Pyongyang believes this is through the nuclear option, whereas the US is aiming for a smooth-ish transition to a new world order with Beijing on board to address global challenges. For China it means keeping the populace growing ever richer through securing its trade which in turn involves sea power for true security. And for Australia, we need leaders who "can keep the lights on" through energy security which will then pave the way for trade security.

Most commentators believe the Mar-a-Lago summit to be only the 'start of a conversation' [13] with President Xi commenting that "there were a thousand reasons to get China-US relations right". However, the congenial & cooperative atmosphere, rapid pace of discussions (not seen since President Roosevelt's rapid response to the Great Depression) and broad ranging topics of trade and security also give us cause for hopeful optimism especially in regards to the East and South China Seas.

One can only hope that "fire and fury" does not become a reality particularly between nuclear capable nations. One can also only hope that the current "shaky world" becomes more secure with each better understanding the others' motivations and perspectives, and that such leaders learn to become 'great' while in the job. After all as Napoleon said:

What are leaders but dealers in hope? ■

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BAE SYSTEMS PRESENTS TO NLA.

Graham Harris, Past President

BAE took the opportunity of the Navy League Conference in Canberra to make a presentation on the Type 26 Frigate.

The presentation was given by Air Marshal Doug Riding AO, DFC RAAF (Retd.), Senior Military Advisor, BAE Systems and Red McClintock, Business Development Manager, BAE Systems (LCDR RN (Retd.)). The presentation was greatly enhanced by the use of the BAE Visualisation Suite. The Visualisation Suite permitted every detail of the Type 26 to be examined, inside and out. The presentation was scheduled for an hour and was still going after nearly two hours. League members had lots of questions. Questions ranged over many matters including, weaponry, propulsion, helicopter capacity and hull characteristics. There was much discussion regarding the large mission bay.

It is safe to report that the Navy League audience, which contained within it a considerable range of knowledge and experience, was very appreciative by the time and detail provided by both presenters and impressed with the BAE presentation and with the potential of the Type 26 Frigate.

REDEPLOY NAVY TO REGION

Rear Admiral James Goldrick RAN (Retd.) has called for the nation's Middle East naval operations to be redeployed to Southeast Asia and the western Pacific to counter the expansion of China's military footprint, the North Korean nuclear threat and the spill-over of Islamic State terrorists to Indonesia and The Philippines:

'...maintaining one frigate on station effectively ties up nearly one-third of Australia's surface combatant force... the time has come to shift our main maritime effort to our area of direct strategic interest

in the western Pacific, where we face increasing uncertainty and fundamental changes in the balance of power.'

ADMIRAL HARRY HARRIS CANBERRA BOUND

As suggested by *The NAVY Magazine* in June 2017, Admiral Harry Harris is firming as Donald Trump's favourite candidate as the next US Ambassador to Australia. Former US Ambassador to Australia, John Berry left in September last year.

CHECKS AND BALANCES ON SUBMARINES?

Questions were raised about the \$50 Billion future submarine programme following 'Insight Economics careful and comprehensive report', according to Henry Ergas, *The Australian*, 6 Oct. Ergas goes on to say: 'little wonder then that the Insight Economics report attracts such attention: Australians rightly fear that Captain Kafka, cunningly disguised as Pyne, is up to his old tricks. And with little scrutiny and even less disclosure, the first they'll know about it is when they're handed the bill'. See also this issue, Paper 1, by Jon Stanford.

SUBMARINE LOST

The Argentina Navy announced the loss of the ARA SAN JUAN (S-42) and 44 sailors following a non-nuclear explosion detected in its near vicinity. *The NAVY Magazine* expresses its deepest sympathy for the families and all those sailors presumed now lost at sea.

The SAN JUAN was built in Germany in the early 1980s and went through a major Life of Type Extension (LOTE) in 2014, when the boat was cut in two. A concern for any LOTE of the *Collins*-class is that such extensions can carry significant risk to the integrity of the hull. Meaning that a MOTS alternative

— as suggested by Mr Jon Stanford, Paper 1 — may carry considerably less risk than extending the *Collins*-class.

FUTURE FLEET OILERS

Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, announced the names of the Royal Australian Navy's future Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment support ships. The new fleet replenishment ships will be named SUPPLY and STALWART. HMAS SUPPLY (II) will be built in two years, with full operational capability scheduled for 2022. As suggested in previous papers in *The NAVY Magazine*, and The Statement of Policy, p. 32, the RAN needs at least 5 AORs to support RAN operations at scale across 'our area of direct strategic interest in the western Pacific'.

READINESS LAPSES

The USN has told Congress, the Government Accountability Office and the public that it let standards lapse in its forward-stationed forces in the face of a gruelling operational tempo in last several years that led to the conditions that made the incidents on Fitzgerald and McCain possible. Document reviews and interviews conducted by USNI indicated the surface navy has struggled with readiness, manning and training shortfalls for more than a decade.

Those shortfalls were paired with a can-do, don't-say-no culture that tolerates surface ships deploying in less-than-optimal readiness and a relentless demand for forces from combatant commanders that has increased since China and Russia have asserted their presence in the maritime domains.

USN AMPHIBIOUS READINESS

1st December, Washington, Republican Joe Wilson, Chairman of the House Armed



BAE Type 26 Global Combat Ship Design for RAN.



Services Subcommittee on Readiness, noted the following on opening the subcommittee:

- I ask the witnesses do their best to describe where shortfalls exist [to Navy and Marine Corps regarding the status of Amphibious Training and Readiness] and what can be done to improve the less than optimal state we are in, specifically how better and more consistent funding could help.
- Other sessions [on aviation, surface combatants, DoD infrastructure] points to the same grim conclusion...our services are indeed in a readiness crisis.
- To be effective, the Navy Marine Corps team must train together regularly, certainly more than they do today.
- President Ronald Reagan frequently used the phrase, 'Peace Through Strength.' I agree with President Reagan and believe we need a higher level of defense funding to achieve that goal.

GREENWHICH STATION

The British Royal Navy (RN) at short notice is scrambling to find a replacement for HMS DIAMOND (D34) on a high-profile 9-month operational deployment in the Middle East after it suffered a major propeller shaft failure en-route to its task. The £1 Billion (AS\$ 1.75 Billion) air defence destroyer was en-route to the Gulf as part of a nine month-long deployment when the issues with its propeller shaft became evident. Naval and other spokespersons thought it 'nice' that the sailors would now be home for Christmas!

MORE CUTS

Two LPDs – HMS ALBION and HMS BULWARK – in addition to 1000 Royal Marines are suggested to be cut from the RN's Order of Battle in order to 'save the carriers'. Ironically (noting Jonathan Foreman's opinion in his two papers) the disgraced former UK Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon had dubbed 2017 'the Year of the Royal Navy'. More smoke and mirrors then. Rear Admiral Alex Burton RN who raised specific concerns about further cuts to an already sub-critical British Navy was slapped down, and apparently 're-allocated' for speaking truth to power. A MOD spokesperson stated 'In the face of ever-changing threats, we are contributing to the cross-government review of national security capabilities...' Meanwhile the French Government offered to provide ships for the Royal Marines if they did not have their own. So that's OK then.

EMBARRASSED AGAIN

The RN were forced to chase off Spanish vessels cutting across the USNS CARSON

CITY (T-EPF-7) when visiting Gibraltar. Guardia Civil launches attempted to cross in front of the ship but were stopped by the actions of HMS SABRE and a rigid-hulled inflatable boat, which manoeuvred in close, according to eyewitnesses. Luke Coffey, Director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies said:

The UK needs to prepare for the worse. This could include maintaining a robust air bridge if the land border is closed. Also, in the event of a border closure by Spain, the UK must be prepared to respond with appropriate, firm, and proportionate measures against Madrid.

GHOST SUBMARINES

The Kilo-class submarine RS KRASNODAR (B-265), a Russian attack submarine commissioned in 2015 left the coast of Libya in May and fired its magazine of cruise missiles into Syria. In subsequent days, the diesel-electric submarine was pursued by the aircraft carrier USS GEORGE H.W. BUSH (CVN 77), its five accompanying warships, MH-60R Seahawk helicopters and P-8 Poseidon anti-sub jets flying out of Italy. NATO officials stated 'the alliance must consider new investments in submarines and sub-hunting technology'. The findings of a study from the Center for a New American Security, considered that 'the U.S. and its allies weren't prepared for an undersea conflict with Russia' [or China]. Nuclear-armed SSBNs are the cornerstone of the French, U.S. and U.K. Strategic Deterrent. Amid rising tensions between U.S. and Russian and Chinese military forces (operating similar submarines), 'finding a submarine that is operating on batteries underwater is very difficult'. How long the KRASNODAR's batteries can operate between recharging is a secret neither Russian officials who know, nor the U.S. Navy, which may have a good idea, will discuss. A squadron of MH-60R Seahawk helicopters operating from lifted off from the deck of the USS GEORGE H.W. BUSH

and its accompanying escorts in the eastern Mediterranean were part of the search. CMDR. Edward Fossati USN, Commander Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 70, said: 'Russian subs have gotten quieter but the cat-and-mouse game remained about even with advances in tracking; we are much better at it than we were 20 years ago'.

This may be true, however many of the ASW skills developed in the 1980s in the RAN, RCN, RN and the USN have been lost. In this theatre of 'cat and mouse', the skilled operator makes the difference in thinking through the options and making detections. An ASW generation has been lost and now needs to be urgently back-filled – no matter how good the kit.

Australia must also look to its own backyard. RAN LPHs deploying from FBE into our region will need increasingly to expect a 'tail', wherever and whenever they deploy – and to be crewed, equipped and escorted accordingly.

VLADIMIR THE GREAT

Russia's newest nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) was launched in November. RS KNYAZ VLADIMIR (PRINCE VLADIMIR) has an improved suite of electronics and lower sound levels that help make the submarine largely undetectable. The Borei II-class submarines developed by the Rubin Design Bureau, and Chief Designer Sergey Kovalev, are Russia's newest nuclear SSBNs. The 170m long and 13.5m wide submarine is different from predecessors; in having an improved suite of electronics, a deeper dive capability (400 metres), improved living quarters, and lower sound levels that help make the submarine much quieter.. The biggest difference in the Knyaz Vladimir is its ability to launch four additional RSM-56 Bulava ballistic missiles, each capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads. Russia is embarked on a significant redesign and build of its Navy following years of neglect. ■



RS KNYAZ VLADIMIR SSBN to be commissioned into the Russian Navy in 2018.



WHAT HAPPENED TO P&O?

In 1970, the Peninsular & Oriental Steamship Group of shipping companies was the largest British shipping group, comprising passenger liners, cruise ships, ferries, container ships, cargo ships, bulk carrier, tankers, gas carriers, plus stevedoring, container terminals and worldwide network of agency companies.

The Company was founded in 1822 by Brodie Wilcox, a London shipbroker and Arthur Anderson who using a series of chartered sailing vessels started a service from London to Spain and Portugal. In 1837 they were joined by Captain Richard Bourne from whom they had chartered the small as Steamship "William Fawcett" and this led to the founding of the Peninsular Steamship Company which gained the mail contract to the Iberian Peninsular.

Though younger, Anderson was the most imaginative and had the greatest foresight and was appointed Managing Director and Chairman of the Company.

In 1840 the Company secured the mail contract to India and changed its name to Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company. In the same year the Company was granted a Royal Charter of incorporation a rare honour.

Prior to the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869, the mail service involved a sea passage from London to Alexandria, an overland transfer to Suez and a further sea passage from Suez to Bombay. Seeing the obvious advantages of expanding beyond the Indian Sub-Continent the Company set out eastwards to Singapore and Hong Kong and Australia.

P&O's expansion was opposed by the British East India Company, a Chartered Company since 1600, which ruled India and operated their own ships. The powerful East India Company was a private company which maintained its own army and exercised administrative and military control over the puppet Indian states. However, the rivalry was resolved when the British Government dismissed the East India Company and took over direct governance of India in 1858, following the Indian Mutiny.

The opening of the Canal, in 1869, extended P&O's influence with mail services to the Far East via Singapore to Hong Kong and direct services to Australia via Ceylon and continued for more than the next 100 years.

P&O provided troopships for Britain since the Crimea and all her subsequent wars, the Company and its subsidiary companies in

both world wars were massive, the history of P&O has been part of the fabric of Empire.

From the beginning of the 20th century the Company expanded massively through mergers and acquisitions, most retaining their own names, trades and identities. Companies such as British India S.N.Co., New Zealand Shipping Co. and its subsidiary Federal S.S.Co., Australian United S.S. Co., Union Company of New Zealand Co., Strick Line and dozens more. Additionally the Company had a worldwide network of owned agency, stevedoring, cold stores companies, dock yards, insurance, shipbroking, a complete coverage of the shipping ferry, and air services.

This had all been carried out under the stewardship a limited number of people, Arthur Anderson (1822-1868) ; Sir Thomas Sutherland (1868-1914) ; Lord Inchcape I

Throughout the early 1970's hundreds of ships were sold off or dispatched to the breakers; elderly passenger liners were being replaced by new cruise liners, general cargo ships by container ships and heavy investments were made in port terminals, areas which P&O believed to be pre-eminent for its future.

The rot started in 1972, when Ford Geddes, decided to take the Company in a different direction, teaming up with the construction company, Bovis,. His proposal would have seen Bovis, a much smaller company effectively take over P&O. A shareholder revolt followed and Lord Inchcape III, whose family had always had a financial interest in the Company was drafted into the Chairmanship in a caretaker role.

In 1983, Inchcape stepped down to look after his own group, Inchcape & Co. Ltd and

was succeeded by Jeffery Maurice Sterling (formerly Weinberg) a developer and financier – then it really started to unravel.

In the space of 10 years, P&O had sold off its cruise ship division to Carnival, its container fleet followed sold to Maersk, and its worldwide terminals and Company offices and historic memorabilia to Dubai Ports. 184 years of shipping history gone.


Sterling blamed the fund managers but shows little regret and has moved on. On the subject of moving, in 1995 he was exposed in the press for having been caught travelling first-class on a train without a ticket and using his old boy network to escape penalty.

Jeffery Maurice Sterling, a man of the City, a favourite and confidant

of Mrs Thatcher, who created him a Baron, Lord Sterling of Plaistow. She also made him an honorary Rear Admiral in the RN !

Regarding the Company's demise, the UK Telegraph newspaper succinctly commented:

It was quite an empire. In its 1990s heyday, P&O had 11 divisions across 100 countries. There were cruise and cargo ships, ferries, ports, property, the Bovis construction arm and Olympia's exhibition centre. It was too much for most fund managers. They forced a radical break-up, including one of the City's most drawn-out takeover bids – the 18-month slugfest for P&O Princess, the cruise operator snaffled by Carnival Corporation. By the time of the final disposal, the £3.9bn sale of the ports arm to Dubai's DP World, Sterling had disembarked. ■



Published by History Press Limited (2015): Stroud, England, ISBN: 0752489011.

(1914 – 32) ; Lord Craigmyle, Inchcapes' son-in – law , (1932 – 1938) ; Sir William Currie (1938 – 1960) ; Sir Donald Anderson (1960 – 1971) ; Ford Geddes (1971 - 1973) ; Lord Inchcape III)1983 (1973-1983) ; Lord Sterling (1983 – 2005)

In the late 1960's the combined fleet of the Groups companies numbered hundreds of ships, mainly cargo ships, but the Company had seen the future of shipping was in container shipping. It entered the container trade having formed a consortium, called Overseas Containers, with a number of other major British companies and commenced to run down all its own competing services.


In a move intended to rationalize the reduction of its fleet it formed the Group into a series of operating Divisions – the Passenger, General Cargo, Bulk Shipping, European & Air Transport and Energy Divisions.

THE CREATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JAPANESE NAVY 1855-1923: JAPANESE NAVAL HISTORY, PART 1

By Hiroyuki Kanazawa

This paper describes Japanese naval history, and focuses mainly on its development from 1855 to 1923. Given that Japan is an island nation, the sea has played an important role in the lives of its residents from ancient times. However, the so called 'Western Impact' in the 19th century fundamentally changed the relationship between the Japanese, the sea and its Navy.

Please note that family names precede first names in this article, as per the Japanese name style.



Night attack of a Mongol ship by Japanese Samurai-Commandoes.

PREHISTORY

The first recorded Japanese naval battle was the Battle of Baekchongang [1] in 663 A.D. The Japanese fleet confronted the Tang (dynasty of China) and Silla (a dynasty of Korea) combined fleet and suffered a crushing defeat. Following defeat at Baekchongang, Japan did not return to the Korean Peninsula for another 930 years.

During the 9th and 10th centuries, some maritime *Kaizoku* (pirate) and *Kego-shu* (escort) clan-groupings developed a small, highly manoeuvrable ship used for cargo carrying, for hiring out as a mercenary force, and for piracy. Their activities impacted the campaigns between the *daimyo* (feudal lords), and as a result the *daimyo* tried to forge alliances with the maritime clans.

In the 13th and 14th centuries, the Mongol Empire ruled most of the Asian region; stretching from the Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean. In 1274 and again in 1281, the Mongol Empire invaded Japan. Without any large warships, Japanese forces had to fight the Mongols on the shore after they landed – with samurais (acting as modern day commandoes) raiding Mongol shipping at night from small boats. Eventually, the Mongol Fleet was largely destroyed by a typhoon on the 15 August 1281 and the Mongol force withdrew from Japan. The Japanese called the typhoon '*Kamikaze*' (or divine winds). The English (now Royal) Navy celebrates a similar 'divine wind' to account for their victory against the 'invincible' Spanish Armada in August 1588 (three hundred years later):

Then the Almighty blew with His wind and drove them up toward Scotland and away from England.


Following a 930-year hiatus, Japan again invaded the Korean Peninsula in 1592-1593 and again in 1597-1598. The Japanese force crossed the Sea of Japan by *Atake-bune* (armed junks), using also commandeered fishing boats. Although they were victorious on land, the Japanese Fleet was defeated by the Korean Fleet, under the command of Admiral *Yi Sung-Sin* (1545-1598). Finally the Japanese forces withdrew on the death of their leader and main sponsor, Lord *Toyotomi Hideyoshi*. (1537-1598).

In 1603, *Tokugawa Ieyasu* (1543-1616) became Shogun. After defeating his enemy the Toyotomi clan, in 1615. The Tokugawa shogunate (Edo bakufu [2]) ruled until 1867 – establishing a long period of peace. Under the Tokugawa regime, the *Kaizoku* became *Funate* (ship's crews), and the *Funate* transformed themselves from a blue water navy into a coast guard; so losing their maritime combat capabilities.


ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVY

From the end of the 18th century, ships from various countries visited Japan; some requesting supplies such as fuel and water, while others sought to establish trade relations. The period known as the 'Western Impact' caused a serious debate about Japanese national defence, or *Kaibo-ron*.

In 1853, the Commander of the U.S. East India Squadron, Commodore Matthew C. Perry USN (1794-1858) came to Japan with his squadron



An Atake-bune (a 50 metre long armed junk).



An Oshi-Okuri-bune (a 12 metre long boat).

(known in Japan as The Black Ships 黒船) to secure a treaty demanding the protection of American seamen and the opening up of trade with Japan. The Funate's ships, mainly small patrol boats, *Oshi-Okuri-bune*, were no match for Perry's force and, eventually, the Bakufu government had to cede to his request. A combination of the Western Impact and the visit of Commodore Perry led to a determination by the Bakufu government to build a modern Japanese Navy that might safeguard Japan's future maritime and national interests and sovereignty.

The Bakufu (Government) relied on the Netherlands for their naval education and training, the only western country which had trade relations with the Bakufu during the Policy of Seclusion (1615-1854). In 1855, modern naval education started in Nagasaki, the only place where the Dutch were permitted to live in Japan. Willem III (1817-1890), then King of the Netherlands, despatched a group of instructors led by Gerhard Christiaan Coenraad Pels Rijcken [3] (1810-1889), and gifted Japan a steamship, the KANKO-MARU (a 400 tonne, 6 gun, warship), which became Japan's first steam-driven warship. The Nagasaki Naval Academy produced the first generation of Japanese naval officers, including *Katsu Kaishu*. After four years of naval education and training in Nagasaki, the Bakufu established a new naval academy, taught now by the alumni of Nagasaki. It remained until the end of the Bakufu in 1867.

In 1860, the Bakufu despatched the steam warship KANRIN-MARU (625 tonne, 12 gun, warship), commanded by *Katsu Kaishu* with Admiral *Kimura Yoshitake* (1830-1901) wearing his flag on board, to the United States. Its purpose was to escort the Japanese envoys sent for mutual ratification of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. The 10,775 nautical miles voyage took 83 days – 38 days and 4,629nm on the outward bound and 45 days, 6,146nm on the return voyage. It marked the first time a Japanese Naval vessel had been deployed to a foreign country; therefore gaining valuable experience for the 96 man-crew embarked on the training cruise. It was too early and the crews were too immature to conduct all the serials by themselves, so eleven crew from the U.S. Navy assisted; including Lieutenant John Mercer Brooke USN (1826-1906), who instructed and manoeuvred the KANRIN-MARU during a major storm.

Katsu Kaishu was one of the first generation of modern Japanese Naval Officers. Born to a retainer of the Shogun, he served as a naval officer of the bakufu. After the Meiji Restoration, he became the first Minister of the Navy, and was elevated to the title of Count (hakushaku).

After the KANRIN-MARU'S tour to the U.S., the Bakufu Navy became active in various operational missions; including port defense, troop transportation, surveying, search and rescue, and disaster relief. With the increasing demand for naval support, the shortage

of ships and qualified personnel became a serious issue. To solve the shortage of ships, the Bakufu Navy purchased many used gun-equipped merchant ships as a substitute for warships. *Katsu Kaishu* who was promoted to flag officer in 1862 had a naval policy – employing dual-use naval or civilian applications like the Royal Navy in the early 18th Century. These ships proved good enough for peace time operations undertaken by the Bakufu Navy.

The most serious problem was the shortage of trained officers and sailors.

The conventional school-age education system for young samurais proved to be inadequate for developing naval officers, which required modern scientific and technological knowledge. The Bakufu Navy tried to adopt a human resource management system based on skills and performance, regardless of social class, but the Bakufu leadership was opposed to such a movement. Although, the Bakufu Navy's initial education and training systems did not succeed as hoped, the Navy nevertheless laid the future foundations for the Imperial Japanese Navy. Ultimately despite setbacks, the Bakufu, with its feudal domains (*Han*), ruled by the *Daimyo*, of Satsuma-han [4], Choshu-han [5], and Saga-han [6], succeeded in establishing the first modern Japanese Navy [7].


In the late 1860s, a bitter civil war broke out, known today as the Second Baku-Cho and Boshin Wars. This eventually led to the collapse of the Bakufu and the establishment of a new government, during the Meiji Restoration of 1867. During this conflict, the Bakufu Navy and associated [national] allied navies fought several battles, with young *Togo Heihachiro* joining the Satsuma-han Navy as a Gunnery Officer.

Born as the son of a Samurai in Satsuma-han, after the Boshin War



Stormy Voyage of KANRIN-MARU, painted by Suzufuji Yujiro (1826-1868), a deck-officer serving in The KANRIN-MARU at the time.

Togo Heihachiro joined the newly created Imperial Navy in 1871. From 1871 to 1878, he apprenticed with the British Royal Navy and studied mathematics at Cambridge University [8] and later engineering at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich. During the Battle of Tsushima (1905), he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet that totally defeated the Russian Fleet. After the Russo-Japanese War, he became the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and was elevated to the title of Marquis (Koushaku).



Naval battles fought during the 1866-1869 Japanese civil war.

FIRST SINO-JAPANESE WAR

After the 1866-1869 Civil War, Japan resumed its development of a modern navy. The newly established Imperial Navy consisted of quickly organised squadrons from the former Bakufu and Daimyo forces. To introduce British naval training practices, the Meiji government invited naval instructors from the UK Royal Navy, and established a new Naval Academy in Tokyo. At the same time, the Meiji government purchased warships from a number of foreign countries. Japanese warships were initially designated His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Ship (HIJMS), and were later unofficially designated as the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).

The Meiji government leadership thought that Japan lacked the necessary natural resources for modernization and industrialization, which they subsequently planned to acquire through overseas expansion. This policy placed Japan in direct conflict with the Qing (dynasty of China) over the Korean Peninsula. Preparing for war with China, the Japanese government implemented several new military builds; including building the sister ships, MATSUSHIMA, ITSUKUSHIMA and HASHIDATE (4,278 tonne).

In response, in 1866 the Qing also started to build its own modern navy; creating a regional arms race. The Qing Imperial Court was generally conservative and reluctant to change, although there were some enlightened officials in the government who initiated and took the naval armament policy forward. In particular, Li Hung Chang, Governor General and Superintendent of trade for the northern ports (1823-1901), built the *Pei-Yan-Shui-Shi* (the North Sea Squadron)

to directly curtail Japan's ambitions. In the 1880s, Li purchased the sister battleships, TING YUEN and CHEN YUEN (7,144 tonnes) from Germany. By 1885, the Qing Navy had been dramatically expanded and strengthened; by then surpassing that of Japan's.

In May 1894, Japan and China (under the Qing dynasty) despatched soldiers to put down a rebellion in Korea, the *Donghak Peasant Rebellion*. Although it was successfully suppressed, both Japan and The Qing refused to withdraw their forces. On 25 July, the Japanese First Flying Squadron, consisting of three cruisers led by Rear Admiral *Tsuboi Kozo* (1843-1898), attacked the Qing convoy taking troops and supplies to Korea and their escorts, TSI YUEN (2,355t) and KWAN CHIA (1,290t). Qing's transport ships were sunk, and KWAN CHIA damaged so badly it had to be scuttled; only the TSI YUEN managed to escape. It was the opening engagement in what became known as the First Sino-Japanese War, later named the Battle of Pungdo.

Admiral *Ting Ju-chan*, the commander of the *Pei-Yan-Shui-Shi*, had Qing's (China's) two battleships, ten cruisers, and two torpedo boats, while Vice Admiral Ito Sukeyuki (the commander of the Combined Japanese Fleet), only had ten cruisers, one converted cruiser and a torpedo boat. On 17 September 1894, the Combined Fleet and the *Pei-Yan-Shui-Shi* fought at the mouth of the Yalu River, during the Battle of Yellow Sea. Ting


Ju-chan lost 5 ships, with the *Pei-Yan-Shui-Shi* fleeing to Port Arthur (Lu-Shun) shortly after the battle. The Japanese force lost no ships, although four of them suffered serious damage. The majority of the Japanese ships were newer than Qing's, superior in speed and armed with quick firing guns, with well-trained crews affording them greater manoeuvrability. Ting Ju-chan was injured in action during the battle, which significantly impacted his decision making and taking abilities. H.P. Willmott later commented:

The battle was not an action between two fleets or two formations: it was an action between a Japanese Fleet or formation and a collection of Chinese warships. [9]

In March 1895, Japanese forces took both Port Arthur and Wei-



Battleship IJN MIKASA.



Naval battles in the First Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895 (taken from Ryuji Hirano (2015) *The Politics and Strategy in the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars*, Tokyo: Chikura Publishing, p.104.)

hai-wei, both fortified harbors. Subsequently the Pei-Yan-Shui-Shi surrendered to Japan, and Ting Ju-chan killed himself rather than surrender in shame. On 7 April, the *Treaty of Shimonoseki* was signed between the warring parties, and the First Sino-Japanese War formally ended.

Admiral Ito Sukeyuki IJN: Born the son of a Samurai in Satsumahan. Ito Sukeyuki studied at the Kobe Naval Academy, established by Katsu Kaishu, and participated in the Boshin War as a Naval Officer. After the First Sino-Japanese War, he became Chief of the Navy General Staff, and was elevated to the title of Count (hakushaku).

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

In the *Treaty of Shimonoseki*, Japan gained the Island of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Liaodong Peninsula in southern Manchuria, with the Qing additionally having to pay \$150 million in reparation and recognizing Korea as an independent kingdom [10].

Irritated by the Treaty, especially the Japanese acquisition of the Liaotung Peninsula, under *The Triple Intervention*, Russia demanded (in concert with France and Germany) that Japan return the Peninsula to China. Up against the demands from the three powers, Japan acquiesced to their demands. As soon as the peninsula was returned to China, Russia immediately leased Dairen and Port Arthur in Liaodong.

As a result, Japanese leaders felt the necessity to strengthen their military power and find an ally to confront Russia. In 1902, Japan signed a treaty of alliance with Great Britain, the *Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty*. Simultaneously, Japan strengthened her navy - between 1897 and 1902 Japan constructed six battleships: FUJI (12,533t), YASHIMA (12,320t), SHIKISHIMA (14,850t), HATSUSE (15,000t), ASAHI (15,200t), and MIKASA (15,140t).

On 6 February 1904, after the failure of negotiations, Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia. On 8 February, the Japanese First, Second and Third Destroyer Flotillas, consisting of ten ships, made a surprise attack on Port Arthur. Japanese torpedoes hit two Russian battleships and one cruiser, causing them to beach in order to avoid sinking. Simultaneously, the Japanese Fourth Squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral *Uryu Sotokichi*, comprising five cruisers and eight torpedo boats, attacked Port Incheon, during what became known as the Battle of Incheon. Additional Russian cruisers and gunboats were also scuttled.

IJN MIKASA, the flagship of the Japanese Combined Fleet at the time of Russo-Japanese War, was built in Great Britain at Vickers, in Barrow-in-Furness (now in Cumbria). After the end of the war, MIKASA sunk after an explosion in its main magazines.

Admiral *Togo Heihachiro* IJN, the Commander of the Combined Fleet, planned a head-on battle against the Russian Pacific Fleet stationed in Port Arthur. Although winning at the Battle of Yellow Sea on 10 August and the Battle of the Japanese Sea on 14 August, Togo failed to wipe-out the Russian Fleet until the Lushun Fortress, which defended the entrance

to Port Arthur, fell to the Japanese Army on 1 January 1905.

After the fall of Port Arthur and the annihilation of the Russian Pacific Fleet, Russian Tsar Nicholas II (1868-1918) despatched the Second and Third Pacific Fleet (from the Baltic Fleet) to destroy the Japanese Combined Fleet. Vice Admiral *Zinovij Petrovich Rozhdestvenskij*, the commander of the Second Pacific Fleet took a long and arduous voyage to the Sea of Japan via the North Sea (when the *Russian Baltic Fleet* mistook a *British trawler fleet* from Kingston-upon-Hull in the Dogger Bank area of the North Sea for an Imperial Japanese Navy force (assumed to be operating from the UK, which was supporting Japan and hostile to Russia at the time) and fired on them) and the Cape of Good Hope.

On 27 May 1905, *Togo* and *Rozhdestvenskij* fought a decisive battle at the Battle of Tsushima. The Russian fleet was virtually destroyed, with 21 ships sunk, six captured, and six detained in neutral



The explosion of the Russian gunboat KOPEEC.

countries, while the Japanese fleet lost three torpedo boats. The Battle of Tsushima was a historical victory for the Japanese fleet, a virtually unprecedented event in the history of naval warfare which has drawn parallels with Nelson's 'crossing of the T' at Trafalgar, even since. Both the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese war, also seared into Japanese Maritime Doctrine, the principle of the overwhelming, first knock-out strike. On 9 September 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed, and the Russo-Japanese War came to an end.

Vice Admiral Zinovij Petrovich Rozhdestvenskij was born the son of a Saint Petersburg surgeon. He graduated from the naval gunnery academy with honours and held the rank of Chief of the Naval General Staff, serving as the aide-de-camp to Nicholas II. At the Battle of Tsushima, he was severely injured and was subsequently captured. He died in 1909, largely as a result of his wounds.

WWI AND THE FOUR-POWER TREATY

Although experiencing financial difficulties after the Russo-Japanese War, the Imperial Japanese Navy maintained its expansion. Despite the reduction of the shipbuilding programme, the pre-dreadnought battleship *Satsuma*-class, the dreadnought battleship *Kawachi*-class, the super dreadnought battleship *Kongo*-class, and the battle cruiser *Kurama*-class were all constructed between 1905 and 1915.

On 28 July 1914, World War I broke out in Europe. Due to the *Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty*, Japan joined the Allied Powers and declared war to Germany on 23 August. The Imperial Japanese Navy then captured the South Sea Islands, which were then German colonies. Due to mounting damage inflicted by German submarines (U-boats), Great Britain requested Japan to despatch a destroyer fleet to the Mediterranean and a cruiser fleet to the Cape of Good Hope. Although Japanese foreign minister Baron *Kato Takaaki* (1860-1926) initially declined this request, Japan eventually dispatched three Special Duty Fleets to the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and to Australia, where they were based in Sydney. The Second


Special Duty Fleet, despatched to the Mediterranean and consisting of one cruiser and 12 destroyers under the Command of Rear Admiral *Sato Kozo IJN*, was recognised to have performed superlatively. The fleet successfully escorted 700,000 allied soldiers from Alexandria to Marseille, as well as rescuing over 7,000 soldiers and sailors from allied ships sunk by *U-boat* attacks, at a cost of 78 crew members and serious damaged to one destroyer. Throughout World War I, Japan succeeded in maintaining its naval strength, and by the end of the War in 1918, the Imperial Japanese Navy had become the third largest navy in the world, after the British and the U.S.

The Washington Naval Conference held from 12 November 1921 to 6 February 1922, concluded with the signature of the Washington Naval Treaty. In this treaty, the numbers of battleships Japan could possess was limited to 60% of the numbers which Great Britain and the U.S. could maintain. This was seen as humiliating to Japan, as had been its positioning amongst the Allied Powers and the disposition of German colonies during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The chief Japanese delegate, Admiral Baron *Kato Tomozaburo IJN* (1861-1923), had to use significant political capital and stress the virtue of international cooperation in order to suppress a high-profile faction inside the Navy that vehemently opposed the treaty. The *Four-Power-Treaty* concluded between Japan, Great Britain, the U.S., and France, stipulated – at U.S. insistence – not only the procedure for dealing with maritime issues in the Pacific Ocean, but also the termination of the *Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty*.

On 1 September 1923, a large earthquake hit the entire Kanto area (the eastern part of Japan). The epicentre was north of Sagami Bay (Kanagawa Prefecture); with a magnitude of 7.9. As a result, the death toll rose to 91,344 and the number of missing persons totaled 13,275. Today the earthquake is called the *Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923*. As soon as the earthquake occurred, the Imperial Japanese Navy ordered all its ships and organizations to respond immediately for the purpose of providing humanitarian aid and disaster relief. The mighty fleet was the first to transport food and other relief supplies to devastated regions. A total of 150 ships and around 30,000



Togo Heihachiro (1848-1934)



Ito Sukeyuki (1843-1914)



Katsu Kaishu
(1823-1899)

personnel took part in the disaster relief operation; including the Imperial Japanese Navy and foreign warships from the U.S., Great Britain, France, Italy, and China – who all despatched their ships to provide relief to Japan [11]. The U.S. Navy, in particular, despatched 17 ships, led by Admiral Edwin Alexander Anderson, Jr. (1860-1933), Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet. They were active in transportation, medical treatment, and providing lighterage to damaged area [12].

Poignantly, this was the last occurrence of international cooperation with the Imperial Japanese Navy and these countries. On 17 August 1923, 2 weeks before *the Great Kanto Earthquake*, the *Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty* ended. It was the beginning of a tragedy for both Japan and the Imperial Japanese Navy and all the WWI Allied Navies, who only seventeen years later would find themselves at war with each other. ■

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Note: due to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and sensitivities regarding military structures and identities of such standing within a national and international setting, the series title Japanese Naval History was necessarily chosen. Hence also, Japanese naval officers are members of the JMSDF, as opposed, say, to officers in the U.S. Navy who are entitled to use USN as a post-nominal.

REFERENCES / NOTES

1. The Battle of Baekchongang occurred of the mouth of the river thought to be modern day Guem-gan (a river in the southeast of Korea). From the 6th century to the 7th century, the Korean Peninsula comprised the three kingdoms of Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla. In 660, Tang and Silla allied forces annihilated Baekje. At the bequest for reinforcements by the remnants of Baekje, Japan sent a force to Korea.
2. Originally, a 'Shogun' was one of the generals of the Emperor (Mikado or Tenno), and Bakufu meant his headquarters. After the 12th century, Shoguns transformed their position to be the leaders of Samurai and were delegated authorized political power by The Emperor for the next 670 years.
3. Later, Minister for Navy of The Netherlands and the Netherland Royal Navy (RNLN).
4. Current Kagoshima prefecture.
5. Current Yamaguchi prefecture.
6. Current Saga prefecture.
7. The feudal system in early modern Japan called *Baku-Han-Taisei* (Bakufu and Han System) permitted Daimyo to exclusive feudal rule. Daimyo were obligated to maintain military power to provide the Shogun with military forces, support operations and maintain order in their Hans.
8. Possibly under Professor J.J. Thomson, later Cavendish Professor of Physics and Master of Trinity College, and Professor Sir Joseph Larmor, of St John's College and for many years Lucasian Professor of Mathematics. It is unclear to which College *Togo Heihachiro* was attached, it may have been either Trinity or St John's – work for another day. Mathematics at Cambridge was established by Sir Isaac Newton (Lucasian Chair of mathematics from 1669 to 1702) in the 17th Century and has remained globally renowned to this day. Not just anyone 'goes up' to Cambridge, let alone to read Mathematics. *Togo Heihachiro* would also have had to survive and pass the ferocious order of merit examination. Today, *Togo Heihachiro* would be recognised as a warrior-academic, alongside the likes of General (Dr) HR McMasters, the U.S. National Security Adviser.
9. H. P. Willmott, *The Last Century of Sea Power—Volume 1: From Port Arthur to Chanak, 1894-1922* (Bloomington, In.: Indiana University Press, 2009), p. 22.
10. Korea (Yi dynasty 1392-1910) was conquered by Qing and became a vassal state in 1636.
11. Samuel Robinson, the Canadian Captain of the *Empress of Australia*, alongside at the time in Yokohama, took hundreds of refugees aboard, organized a fire brigade that kept the ship from being incinerated by advancing flames, then steered the crippled vessel to safety in the outer harbor.
12. Masashi Kuratani, "Disaster Relief Operations by the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy in the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake: Focusing on the activities of the on-site commanders of the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy." *JMSDF Staff College Review* Vol. 1 No. 2 English Version (Selected) (May 2012).



Katsu Kaishu
Commanding Officer
of the KANRIN-MARU



Ting Ju-chan (1836-1896)



Zinovij Petrovich Rozhdestvenskij (1848-1909)



OLD FOOL MOVES MOUNTAINS, ISLANDS AND SHIPS

By Kevin Beard

In April 2017 China's Navy launched SHANDONG [1], its first locally built aircraft carrier, and the following June a homebuilt carrier fleet escort Type 055 destroyer. [2] The PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy) have indicated that we should expect as many as six carriers, two with nuclear propulsion. [3]. In future the PLAN may operate a carrier fleet in each of the East China Sea, the South China Sea and two in the Indian Ocean. Should Australians be concerned at this power projection toward our western shores? How should we interpret China's naval strategy? Viewing the issues through western media and our own internal politics blindfolds us. To seek insight then answers, we must understand Chinese strategy and history from China's perspective.

THE ART OF WAR 兵法 BING FA

To fight a hundred battles and win each and every one of them is not the wisest thing to do. To break the enemy's resistance without fighting is. Sun Zi [4]

Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating [5] and former Foreign Minister Bob Carr [6] (now Director, Australia-China Relations Institute) have called for Australia to diverge from the USA on China policy to avoid war. Keating considers the United States is in decline and China must be allowed to displace the USA as the "primary economic state in the world". [7] These views are inauspicious as they misinterpret American politics and power, neglects China's aggressive stance, and omits each nation's vastly different perceptions of regional and global leadership.

In an alternate approach, George Galdorisi's essay, "Dealing with Two Superpowers: Australia must understand what China and the United States want" [8] (The Navy, Jun-Sep 2017), the Defence Whitepapers of China and the USA are technically contrasted. I contend that only by becoming familiar with how Chinese folk culture and history influences their outlook can we gain insight into what China's really wants.

The oft misquoted Sun Zi was an ancient military author from the Warring States period (475-221BC) when China was divided into rival kingdoms. Translations of his book, "The Art of War", have been popular in Western bookshops. Less known is his descendant Sun Bin, "The 36 Stratagems", and Chinese fables. I will draw some abridged stories from amongst these to illustrate the greatest strategic problem Australia will forever face.

OLD FOOL MOVES MOUNTAINS 愚公移山 YU GONG YI SHAN

An elderly man called Old Fool lived just north of the mountains. Each time he wanted to go any place, he had to take a very




SHANDONG (CV17) launched in April 2017. Times of India.


circuitous route around them. One day, he summoned all the members of his family together and said to them: "These two mountains are blocking our way. We must all get to work and move them away so as to open up a direct route to Yuzhou." The whole family started to move the mountains. All through the year they worked very hard, digging the soil, chipping away at the rocks, and transporting rocks and soil to the Bohai Sea.

By the shore of the Yellow River there also lived a very clever old man whom people called Old Sage. He thought it quite ridiculous. "How can you be so foolish! You are old and close to death." Old Fool replied: "Yes I am old and cannot stay alive much longer. But after I die, there are my sons, and my sons will have sons, and those grandsons will have sons of their own. Generation after generation; there is no end to it. On the other hand since these mountains will never grow another grain of sand nor another piece of rock, why can't we flatten them?" Old Sage, who always thought he was so smart, could think of nothing to say. [9]

Over their long history the Chinese have built dams, great canals, irrigation, cities, palaces and, of course, the Great Wall. Their naval construction program and island building in the South China Sea is clearly grounded in "Old Fool's" ancient ideas. Our first consideration then is the Chinese conception of time in multiple generations even hundreds of years. By comparison Western politicians rarely think



Mischief Reef left - reef only in 2012.



...and right - Chinese airfield and facilities in 2016.CSIS-AMTI.

beyond the next election.

THE GUEST ACTS AS HOST 反客为主 FAN KE WEI ZHU

One of Yuan's aides suggested a plot to force Magistrate Han to invite Yuan's troops to help defend Jizhou. After entering Jizhou, Yuan gradually organised his men to take over all important positions and eventually deprived Han of all his powers as magistrate. [10]

Zhong Guo (or Middle Kingdom as the Chinese call their country) has been building islands in the South China Sea on what were atolls, rocks and reefs at Woody Island in the Paracel Islands and more recently at Mischief Reef and other sites amongst the Spratly Islands. Aggression aimed at the Japanese Coast Guard vessels around the Japanese Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and similar hostile acts toward Indonesian and Philippine fishermen within their own Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) has alarmed all China's coastal neighbours. Despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration's July 2016 ruling to the contrary, China has claimed ownership of open seas and neighbouring countries' EEZs. [11]

In the context of Donald Trump's election campaign, Xi Jinping's speech in January 2017 to the World Economic Forum in Davos, [12] was to the effect that communist China was the new champion of free trade and investment. This statement deliberately occupies the global standpoint that the USA had once championed against the communist block.

LURING A TIGER OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS (调虎离山 DIÀO HU LI SHAN)

Sun Ce decided that the only way to defeat Liu Xun and capture the town was to lure him to leave his seemingly impregnable stronghold. Sun Ce wrote a letter to him. In the letter he effusively extolled the warlord and gave him an expensive present. Sun begged him to expel the troops from Upper Liao further north.

Warlord Liu was flattered by Sun Ce's letter and gift. He had long harboured an ambition to take over its rich lands. So, he personally led his troops to take the capital of the Upper Liao. When Sun Ce had heard the warlord had left the town of Lujiang, he launched a surprise offensive and easily capture the strategic town. [13]

Historically Mao Zedong established the Chinese strategic plan then called the "100 Year Marathon" or, more recently, the "China Dream". By 2049 The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) would replace the

USA as the world's dominant superpower. [14] Deng Xiaoping, had a modest policy of: "Hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership" [15] during which time China's economy transformed from communist poverty to rich market capitalism.

Xi Jinping had abandoned this approach by 2009 believing the USA to have been weakened by its Middle Eastern military over-reach, reduction in military budgets and Wall Street's financial catastrophes. This perspective has been rendered credible by American financial crises in 1987, early 1990s, USA/Asia in 1997, 2000, and USA/global in 2008. The USA's international policy weakness during the Obama Administration, visible in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Russia extended the outward visage of a declining USA.

Events suggest to the Chinese that they possess the impetus, "shi" [16] as Sun Zi calls it, to overcome the USA. [17] China's 9 dashed line campaign in the South China Sea along with its "pit-bull on a leash" relationship with North Korea during their nuclear missile crisis, may each be elements of this strategy. Conversely, this is a dangerous misreading of the USA's robust market economy, volatile democratic politics and unrestrained free speech in which context Trump's presidency must be understood. China's perception is illusory as the US military is not going to be surpassed, nor will its powerhouse free market economy, any time soon.

HIDING A DAGGER BEHIND A SMILE 笑里藏刀 XIAO LI CANG DAO

[Qin General, Gongsun Yang,] discovered that the Wei general guarding the town was an old acquaintance, so he decided to send him a very friendly letter, in which Gongsun Yang said how he cherished their friendship and expressed his 'sincere' wish to make peace with Wei. At the same time he ordered his troops to retreat.

The Wei general was very pleased to receive the letter and when he learned that the Qin troops were withdrawing, he decided to accept Gongsun's invitation for a meeting. When he arrived with 300 soldiers at the meeting place outside the town he saw that Gongsun Yang was already there, unarmed. He began to truly trust Gongsun Yang and did not suspect a trap. Barely had he sat down at the dinner table, he was seized by Qin troops lurking behind the



Wall Street and the Global Financial Crisis 2008. Australian Financial Review.

walls. Gongsun Yang then took the town effortlessly. [18]


The purchase of the former Soviet Admiral Kuznetsov Class aircraft carrier VARYAG, [19] ostensibly as a floating casino, but re-commissioned as LIAONING (CV-16) is a prime example of Chinese deception tactics. [20] We must therefore cautiously examine the motives behind their acquisition of Australian assets such as electricity networks and Darwin's port facilities, the latter of which President Obama rightly criticised.

How then should we interpret the extract below from the PLA Defense Policy?

China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and will never seek hegemony or expansion. China's armed forces will remain a staunch force in maintaining world peace. [21]

The Chinese military have expanded their Navy, copied American aircraft designs and obtained military secrets through cyber theft. [22] Under President Trump, the United States announced a military build-up and sent the THAAD [23] missile defence system to South Korea. With the latter Xinhua, the official PRC news agency, warned that the missile deployment "will bring an arms race in the region". [24] Contrarily, China has successfully tested a satellite killer missile in space and their ship killer missile has already been deployed. [25]

These policies must be interpreted as deception, and the gap between their rhetoric and China's actual behaviour be carefully observed. The carrier graphic shows China's already published future naval intentions, which challenge the credulity of the quoted Policy.



LIAONING (CV16) SHANDONG (CV17) and the 2 conventional and 2 nuclear (CVN) future Chinese Aircraft Carriers. [http www.naval.com.br](http://www.naval.com.br).

THE NARCISSIST WEST – TREATIES AND ISLANDS

Nemesis, the [Greek] goddess of retribution and revenge, decided to punish Narcissus for his behaviour. She led him to a pool; there, the man saw his reflection in the water and fell in love with it. Although he did not realise in the beginning that it was just a reflection, when he understood it, he fell in despair that his love could not materialise and committed suicide. [26]

Europe's history has much that contrasts their conceits. Europeans spent their past in fervent self destruction during the 30 Years War, the Napoleonic Wars, the First World War and the Second World

War to name just the four most devastating. These wars combined killed some 71 million Europeans. [27] Post war, Europeans met at Westphalia in 1648, the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, Versailles in 1919, and in Rome in 1957 to prevent repetition of their self destructive hostilities. To their credit, the negotiators of these treaties worked to create systematic international rules which have limited the frequency of these catastrophes, though obviously not eliminating them. The current prosperous orderly world is based on these rules. Without a rules based world order: might is right and disorder is the rule!

While their armaments are more ominous, China's airfields and harbours on South China Sea islands such as Mischief Reef were not the first. The Philippines have had a runway on Thitu Island since the mid-1970s. On Spratly Island, South Vietnam built a runway before 1975 which was rebuilt by the present Vietnamese government in 2004 [28]. Though aggression is unjustifiable the Chinese will, nonetheless, feel vindicated by their own genuine history and as such are unlikely to be dissuaded from holding an aggrieved view of international treaties, courts and rules.

Western politicians' and journalists' exuberance in their own moral vanity only inflames international resentments. Australia's live animal export ban on Indonesia unnecessarily divided the two countries whilst President Obama's sanctimonious criticism of President Duterte in the Philippines drove the latter to Beijing and Moscow in retaliation. ASEAN's [29] deference to non-interference increasingly looks like a less arrogant but more respectful and sensible way to build regional relationships.

Still, it is sobering to think what the 40 million Chinese killed by the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen Square, says about the

CPC. [30] The disappearance of Hong Kong bookstore owners [31] and the arrest of Crown Casino workers [32] in 2016 suggests no fundamental change. Western leaders' expectations that China will rise peacefully based on economics, western institutions and their values, are merely wilful self-deception.

RIDE THE TIGER 骑虎难下 QI HU NAN XIA

Not long after Sima Yan took over, one of the leaders in his army, General Su, staged a coup and seized control of the capital. Two governors in the area learned of the rebellion and joined forces to overthrow General Su and reinstate Sima Yan.



China - the cake of Kings and Emperors. From left Britain, Germany, Russia, France and Japan. China standing.

After a series of disheartening defeats, one of the governors told the other that he thought it would be best to withdraw from the war. The other governor said, however, that they could not stop fighting at this point because the war they were fighting was like riding a tiger; if they got off now the tiger would just turn around and attack them. The governors strengthened their resolve and together vanquished General Su. [33]

Yes, we should be concerned. As RAN founder Vice-Admiral Creswell said in 1902: "the sea, so far from being a safe frontier is rather a highway for her enemies; but with a navy, it surpasses all other frontiers in strength". [34] The Chinese construction of so many aircraft carriers clearly obligates us to invest in a strong navy, maritime army and capable air force to police the seaways to protect



Vietnam's Spratly Island showing its longstanding airfield and recent reclamation. CSIS-AMTI.

our trade, island territories, energy, and mineral resources.

Traditional Chinese strategy accentuates deception and its history, the rise of a single dominant state. For the entirety of modern Australian history the British Empire and subsequently the USA have dominated global politics to our security and benefit. Britain and the USA have fostered global trade, freedom and prosperity. Australians lack awareness as we have never directly experienced the horrid alternative of hostile domination that the French, Greeks, Koreans and others historically endured. Uniquely, the USA invested in the redevelopment of former adversaries such as Japan and Germany and later won a cold war avoiding, thus far, a third global conflagration.

Alternately, a hegemonic China will ignore human rights, suppress dissent by force, pursue international interests by aggression, and treat its neighbours as tributary states. The West's desire for a democratic China is no solution as it would only arouse the same popular nationalism. Behind the smiles and peaceful rhetoric are new ports, naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, naval construction, missile technology and the South China Sea island military bases.

Moreover, if you are not as horrified by the prospects of Keating and Carr's passivity as by American action, then you do not yet understand the problem. Both approaches are equally fraught! There is no benign, simple, easy or quick solution of which Western politicians aspire. On the upside, with Australia's privileged maritime security, the RAN with a century of professional service, access to US technology, reserves of energy and minerals, and with the prospects of a future population of 35 to 50 million, Australia will not be inconsequential.

BOTH ARE DEFEATED AND ALL IS LOST 两败俱伤 LIANG BAI JÜ SHANG

King Xuan of Qi was about to attack the state of Wei. Chunyu Kun [spoke:] "Han Zilu was the finest hound in the world and Dongguo Qun was the most cunning rabbit on earth. Once, Han Zilu tried to catch the rabbit. The rabbit ran until it was exhausted, and the dog chased until it was utterly worn out. In the end, they both died at the foot of the mountain, and a farmer walked by and carried both dog and rabbit away."



The launch ceremony of China's first locally designed and built 10000 tonne Type 055 destroyer at Shanghai's Jiangnan Shipyard. Larger than Australia's newest 7,000 tonne Air Warfare Destroyers. Shanghai Daily Xinhua.

"Now if Qi and Wei were to fight a prolonged war, their soldiers would be exhausted and the people's miseries increased. Moreover, right behind us are the big and powerful states of Qin and Chu. If we were to attack Wei, it seems to me, the other two would enjoy a windfall just like the farmer!" King Xuan became uneasy, and decided not to attack Wei. [35]

POSTSCRIPT: By 221BC the Qin Emperor, Shi Huang Di, had conquered his neighbouring kingdoms including Qi, Wei and Chu and so achieved imperial hegemony. His empire became known as "Qínhuá" (magnificent Chin) and this is the origin of the name we know as China. If Australians wish to avoid the ignominious fate of these ancient kingdoms, we must take ourselves and our place in our region seriously; understand China's actions in terms of their culture, history and timescales; whilst preserving our own sovereignty, freedoms and alliances; otherwise, like "Old Sage", we will be the real fools! ■




Worth remembering, IJNS HOSHO, commissioned 1922 as the world's first purpose built aircraft carrier from keel up. The forerunner of the World War 2 Japanese fleet that bombed Pearl Harbour.

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America's First General Staff

A Short History of the Rise and Fall of the General Board of the U.S. Navy, 1900-1950

Commander (Dr) John T. Kuehn USN (Ret.)


Naval Institute Press (October 15, 2017)

Hardcover ISBN: 10: 1682471913

Hardcover: \$45.95 eBook: \$18.40

There was a period of significant invention in both the U.S. and in Australia, at the beginning of the 19th Century when new institutes and indeed Navies were being formed. John Kuehn gets at this, and much more besides in his excellent analysis of America's first General Staff, the General Board of the Navy – which inspired the formation of the Army General Staff, the Army War College and the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This [critical systems and design] thinking Board in many respects replicated the British Admiralty of 1694; representing the Bank of England, the City of London and professional Naval Officers. Something Admiral Jackie Fisher endeavoured to recreate in the late 1800s but was allowed to wither after WWI. The General Board existed for only 50 years. The question today should, perhaps be – how do we recreate such institutions? Its end in 1950 came following the 'Revolt of the Admirals' and resistance to an emerging strategy – based on nuclear weapons – that relied entirely on air power; expressed in the conflict between strategic bombers and super carriers. Despite a robust defence of the Board by the US Army – 'the Navy General Board has always appeared to me

to be the epitome of the pure general staff theory' – Secretary Matthews closed it as, 'having outlived its usefulness.' Given the emerging Cold War, Korea and Vietnam it could be argued that its real usefulness was in peacetime; rather than war. Moreover, following the end of the Cold War through to today is exactly when such a General Board / proper Admiralty – not the disaster seen in the RN today – gets going. The General Board started out as an experiment, to test the bounds between possibility and existence. It achieved this in creating an adaptive organisational mind-set that was prepared for WWI and ready for WWII. It was not meant to be perfect – and when the perfect model arrived (post WW2) and dissent and experimentation could no longer be allowed for – like Naval Intelligence in the RN / RAN – it was disbanded. John Kuehn has written a great book and one that deserves to be studied and built upon today, when we desperately need again such Boards and Admiralty in the Allied navies. A great read, thank you.



The Future of Sea Power

Proceedings of the RAN Sea Power Conference 2015

Edited by Andrew Forbes

Sea Power Centre – Australia, Canberra (2017)

Softcover from Sea Power Centre,

ISBN: 978-0-9925004-8-1


eBook available at:

http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/sites/default/files/publication-documents/SPC2015_Proceedings.pdf

Published almost two years after the Sea Power Conference, there is a sense both of prescience but also of *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*. The great strength of these types of books is that they reflect what the great and the good have to say. It is also their biggest weakness, for the experiential is not, alone, empirical. Nor, therefore, is it necessarily research – with risks of becoming a talking-head narrative. Given increasing numbers of in-house Government (and Defence) Glossy Publications, a very real concern has to be that the independent voice and opportunity to publish – as offered, for example, by the USNI and, to an extent, the NLA – is being drowned out. So what? In terms not only of bias, there are reasons to do with critical analysis that have significant ethical bearing. In other words, how the questions are set, the Proceedings run, and the book produced all contain biases. And unlike in other media outlets, all the biases are essentially under the control of government – no matter how independent the editor may be. In this regard, Andrew Forbes has and continues to do excellent work at *The Sea Power Centre*. There is a risk, that independent analysis, away from Canberra is being avoided – not necessarily deliberately, but certainly in terms of the costs of competing against government's deep pockets. It is a form of censorship by stealth, of which *The Australian* and other leading newspapers are distinctly aware regarding the ABC / multi-media competitors.

In terms of referencing, the academic authors responding (Professors Michael Evans (ANU), Milan Vego (US Naval War College), and Drs James

Boutilier (RCN / PACOM) and Peter Chalk (RAND)) all add value, probably the most so Michael Evans who gets specifically at the need for 'inspired political leadership!' The contributions by other naval contributors – all at Flag rank – are interesting, but do not necessarily take the debate forward significantly. Of the four Chiefs, the paper by Chief of Army Lieutenant General Angus Campbell engages most; including building on work by Peter Dean on Amphibious Warfare (see Gleiman K, and P.J. Dean. (2015) *Strategy, the ADF and Amphibious Warfare: Past, Present and Future*. *The NAVY Magazine* Vol. 77, No. 4), and Michael Evans. Campbell's paper stands the test of time – but lack of real Army staffing of the Amphibious Readiness Element (ARE) remains a pressing problem. Vice Admiral Tim Barrett's opening restates Government Maritime policy, with a single reference – see also Tim Barrett T. (2017) *The Navy and The Nation* (reviewed in *The NAVY Magazine*, 2017, Vol. 79, No. 4). The most disappointing contribution by a 'Chief' was by Dr Alex Zelinsky (the Chief Defence Scientist), which reads more like a un-researched OpEd, with little to support the polemic. Given the representative opportunity to speak on DSTG and research science to Defence, this was both telling and a significant leadership missed opportunity. Finally, Rear Admiral James Goldrick AO CSC RAN (Retd.) who has done so much to steer the naval debate and take forward thinking, should perhaps be given more prominence in future proceedings (plus referencing please James!)? Worth a read.



Winning in the Gray Zone

Using Electromagnetic Warfare to Regain Escalation Dominance

Bryan Clark, Mark Gunzinger, Jesse Sloman

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Washington (2017)

Softcover from CSBA

eBook available at: [http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6305_\(EMS2_Report\)Final2-web.pdf](http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6305_(EMS2_Report)Final2-web.pdf)

Bryan Clark served in the USN as a Chief Engineer and Operations Officer in submarines; Jesse Sloman served as an Intelligence Officer in the USMC from 2009 to 2013, and Mark Gunzinger is a retired USAF Colonel and Command Pilot – all told, the three authors bring significant military experience. A critique is the book is overly prescriptive and assertive 'the advent of Informationized Warfare, New Generation Warfare, and gray zone operations create new challenges...' without always substantiating through reference and case. They contend that 'the gray zone is an area where acts of aggression, are designed to stay below the level of violence that would trigger a response, or mean it is too late to do so'. Persistent island building in the SCS may be an example of Gray Zone aggression? In detail, in processes, in maps, capabilities, and operational responses necessary to counter such 'Gray Zone aggression' the book cannot be faulted. There are, however, two issues that fall out. The first

is that capability is being used to drive strategy, very much a reactive response to a Gray Zone infringement (– there is also a sense of a marketing strategy behind the capability?) Secondly, the book in its title infers *Escalation Dominance*. The Gray Zone was considered in the U.S. NSS (2002) *Use of Force Responses*, as being that area between prevention & an 'adapted imminent threat'; and pre-emption, short of an actual enemy attack. As recognised by Fish et al [1], 'for threats in the gray zone, the coercive power of retaliatory force to deter use of WMD is deficient'. The UK MoD [2] similarly addressed this deficiency and the need to manage the escalator, up and down – not just escalation! Given Cyber as a Weapons of Mass Effect, this may be an area that the authors need to examine in their next publication? This is more to do with 'Command, Control, Decision Making & Taking, and Intent' – than capability *per se*: setting strategy – what we want to achieve – ahead of capability. Worth a read.

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STATEMENT OF POLICY

For the maintenance of the Maritime wellbeing of the nation.

CURRENT AS AT 1 JANUARY 2018

The Navy League is intent upon keeping before the Australian people the fact that we are a maritime nation and that a strong Navy and capable maritime industry are elements of our national wellbeing and vital to the freedom of Australia. The League seeks to promote Defence self-reliance by actively supporting defence manufacturing, and the shipping and transport industries.

The strategic background to Australia's security is changing and in many respects has become much less certain following increasing tensions, particularly in East Asia involving major powers, and in Europe and the Middle East. The League believes that Australia should rapidly increase the capability to defend itself, paying particular attention to maritime defence. Through geographical necessity Australia's prosperity, strength, and safety depend to a great extent upon the security of the surrounding seas and island areas, and on unrestricted seaborne trade.

The Navy League:

- Believes Australia can be defended against attack by other than a major maritime power and that the prime requirement of our defence is an evident ability to control the sea and air space around us and to contribute to defending essential lines of sea and air communication with our allies.
 - Supports a continuing strong alliance with the US.
 - Supports close relationships with all nations in our general area particularly New Zealand, PNG and the South Pacific island States.
 - Advocates the acquisition of the most capable modern armaments, surveillance systems and sensors to ensure technological advantage over forces in our general area.
 - Advocates a strong deterrent element in the ADF enabling powerful retaliation at significant distances from our shores.
 - Believes the ADF must be capable of protecting commercial shipping both within Australian waters and beyond, in conjunction with allies.
 - Endorses the development of the capability for the patrol and surveillance of all of Australia's ocean areas, its island territories and the Southern Ocean.
 - Advocates Government initiatives for rebuilding an Australian commercial fleet capable of supporting the ADF and the carriage of essential cargoes to and from Australia in times of conflict.
 - Welcomes the 2016 Defence White Paper and the Government intention to increase maritime preparedness and gradually increase defence expenditure to 2% of GDP.
 - Urges the strength and capabilities of the Army (including particularly the Army Reserve) and Air Force be enhanced, and the weaponry, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyberspace and electronic capabilities of the ADF be increased, including an expansion in its UAV capability.
- As to the RAN, the League,** while noting vital national peacetime tasks conducted by Navy, including border protection, flag showing/diplomacy, disaster relief, maritime rescue, hydrography and aid to the civil power:
- Supports the concept of a Navy capable of effective action in war off both the east and west coasts simultaneously and advocates a gradual build-up of the fleet and its afloat support elements to ensure that, in conjunction with the RAAF, this can be sustained against any force which could be deployed in our general area.
 - Considers that the level of both the offensive and defensive capabilities of the RAN should be strengthened, in particular with a further increase in the number of new proposed replacement frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels, noting the escort requirements of our 5 new major warships and the many other essential maritime tasks.
 - Recommends bringing forward the start date of the replacement frigate program to both strengthen the RAN and mitigate the local industry capability gap on completion of the current guided missile destroyer program.
 - Recommends the timely replacement and increase in numbers of the current mine-countermeasure force.
 - Strongly supports the early acquisition of large, long range and endurance, fast submarines and notes the deterrent value, reliability and huge operational advantages of nuclear powered submarines and their value in training anti-submarine forces.
 - The League is concerned at the very long time before the projected 12 new conventional submarines can enter operational service, noting very serious tensions in the NW Pacific involving major maritime powers.
 - Recommends very early action to provide a submarine base on the Eastern seaboard.
 - Notes the potential combat effectiveness and flexibility of the STOVL version of the Joint Strike Fighter (F35 Lightning II) and supports further examination of its application within the ADF.
 - Supports the development of Australia's defence industry, including strong research and design organisations capable of the construction and maintenance of all warships, submarines and support vessels in the Navy's order of battle, and welcomes the Government decision to provide a stable and continuous shipbuilding program.
 - Supports the efforts by Navy to rebuild the engineering capability to ensure effective Fleet maintenance and sustainability.
 - Advocates the retention in maintained reserve of operationally capable ships that are required to be paid off for resource or other economic reasons.
 - Supports a strong Naval Reserve and Australian Navy Cadets organisation.
 - Advocates a strong focus on conditions of service as an effective means of combating recruitment and retention difficulties.
- The League:**
- Calls for a bipartisan political approach to national defence with a commitment to a steady long-term build-up in Australia's defence capability including the required industrial infrastructure.
 - While recognising budgetary constraints believes that, given leadership by successive governments, Australia can defend itself in the longer term, within acceptable financial, economic and manpower parameters.

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Read more at www.wartsila.com/navy

HATCH: NUSHIP BRISBANE (D41) Embarking on Contractor Sea Trials
November 2017. Image: Department of Defence.

